GOLDEN, Justice.
The appellant (Nesius) was arrested on the evening of February 4, 1988, for driving while under the influence (DWUI). At some point after his arrival at the jail that evening, Nesius was asked to take a breath test.1 He refused to take the test and his driver’s license was suspended.2 Nesius [940]*940received a hearing to contest the suspension; 3 the hearing examiner sustained the suspension.4 The district court granted Nesius’s petition of review,5 and on June 26, 1989, it issued an order affirming the suspension.
On appeal, Nesius seeks reversal of the hearing examiner’s suspension of his driver’s license.
Nesius contends that:
I. The jurisdictional sworn statement was not presented according to the statute.
A. The signed statement must contain the information mandated by statute.
B. The suspension order is reversible under the administrative procedure act as having been obtained without observance of procedure required by law.
II. The refusal to take a chemical test is excused by failure to give adequate advisement of the law.
A. The refusal to submit, to be the basis for suspension, must be voluntary and knowing.
B. The appellant’s unadvised refusal was not voluntary.
The state asks whether:
I. The arresting officer’s signed statement and attached arrest report were properly submitted pursuant to law?
II. [Appellant] was properly advised of the Wyoming implied consent law?
We find sufficient evidence to support the hearing examiner’s decision. We affirm, but with a prospective modification of “Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement” to alleviate the possibility of confusion between the advisement about the chemical test and Miranda warnings.
BACKGROUND
Nesius, accompanied by his attorney, testified before the hearing examiner on March 14, 1988, that he was given his Miranda warnings upon his arrival at the jail. Nesius alleges he made his demand to speak with an attorney after being given the Miranda warnings and that the “Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement” form was never read to him. Since Nesius did not subpoena the deputy, he had no opportunity to question him at the hearing.6
The state’s evidence consisted of the officer’s signed statement,7 on which was written, “see attached report.” The attached report was in narrative form and consisted of three pages. Nesius objected to the statement and the report. The hearing examiner overruled the objection and admitted the signed statement and report into evidence, apparently as a “certified record.”8
[941]*941According to the attached report, the officer observed Nesius’s pickup speeding, cross the center line twice, and drive onto the shoulder of the highway four times. It goes on to note that Nesius had balance problems, smelled of alcohol, and had red and watery eyes. Nesius admitted, in the report, that he had drunk two beers. The report also chronicles Nesius’s poor performance in various field sobriety tests. From these observations, the officer believed he had probable cause to arrest Nesi-us for DWUI.
In the report the police officer additionally stated Nesius was advised that9 1) he was under arrest for DWUI; 2) his failure to submit to all required tests requested of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content of his blood would result in the suspension for six months of his Wyoming driver’s license and his privilege to operate a motor vehicle; 3) if a test was taken and the results indicated he was under the influence of alcohol, he may be subject to criminal penalties and his Wyoming driver’s license and his privileges to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for ninety days; and 4) he may be taken to the nearest hospital or clinic and secure any or all required tests at his own expense or he could have the tests administered by a person at a place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense of the officer’s agency. The officer stated that the above warning was given while Nesius was in the jail.
The report also states that Nesius refused to take the breath test. When Nesi-us was asked if he intended to have the test administered at his own expense, he indicated that he wanted to see an attorney before consenting to the test. Nesius was then issued a “Notice of Suspension and Temporary Wyoming Driver’s License.” 10
The hearing officer issued his “Implied Consent Order of Suspension” on March 18, 1988. The hearing officer ruled that the state, through the certified record, had established by a preponderance of the evidence each of the four elements necessary to uphold the suspension.11 The hearing officer found, inter alia, that Nesius “was advised of the requirement to submit to all requested tests and the consequences of taking or refusing to take a test.”
DISCUSSION
Nesius’s first argument focuses on the officer’s use of the attached report, instead of the signed statement, to document the arrest. Nesius argues that the language of W.S. 31-6-102(d) is mandatory; all of the statutory elements must be [942]*942found on the signed statement.12 The reason for this requirement, according to Nesi-us, is that the signed statement is deemed a sworn statement, and subject to the penalties for perjury.13 Nesius claims that because the signed statement contains none of the required elements (all of the necessary elements are, instead, found on the attached “unsworn” report), the state’s certified record violates the statute.
The force of Nesius’s argument is undercut, however, because he acknowledges that the signed statement could incorporate the attached report, notwithstanding the “mandatory” statutory language. He claims the officer failed to explicitly incorporate the report; therefore, we should find the certified record deficient and set aside the suspension. Our implied consent statutes are silent on incorporation of the officer’s investigative report into his signed statement. We believe the proper resolution of this issue focuses not on whether the attached report was properly incorporated, but on whether the attached report was accurate. The means to make that inquiry are already in place.
Through discovery, the officer’s signed statement and any accompanying documentation submitted by the arresting officer14 are accessible before the hearing. The individual with his attorney15 may challenge the suspension both before a hearing examiner and the district court. The power to subpoena the officer to question his preparation of the report is also available. Finally, the signed statement submitted by the peace officer shall be deemed a sworn statement and shall be subject to penalties for perjury. This provision subjects police officers to charges of perjury for attaching false reports to their signed statements.
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GOLDEN, Justice.
The appellant (Nesius) was arrested on the evening of February 4, 1988, for driving while under the influence (DWUI). At some point after his arrival at the jail that evening, Nesius was asked to take a breath test.1 He refused to take the test and his driver’s license was suspended.2 Nesius [940]*940received a hearing to contest the suspension; 3 the hearing examiner sustained the suspension.4 The district court granted Nesius’s petition of review,5 and on June 26, 1989, it issued an order affirming the suspension.
On appeal, Nesius seeks reversal of the hearing examiner’s suspension of his driver’s license.
Nesius contends that:
I. The jurisdictional sworn statement was not presented according to the statute.
A. The signed statement must contain the information mandated by statute.
B. The suspension order is reversible under the administrative procedure act as having been obtained without observance of procedure required by law.
II. The refusal to take a chemical test is excused by failure to give adequate advisement of the law.
A. The refusal to submit, to be the basis for suspension, must be voluntary and knowing.
B. The appellant’s unadvised refusal was not voluntary.
The state asks whether:
I. The arresting officer’s signed statement and attached arrest report were properly submitted pursuant to law?
II. [Appellant] was properly advised of the Wyoming implied consent law?
We find sufficient evidence to support the hearing examiner’s decision. We affirm, but with a prospective modification of “Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement” to alleviate the possibility of confusion between the advisement about the chemical test and Miranda warnings.
BACKGROUND
Nesius, accompanied by his attorney, testified before the hearing examiner on March 14, 1988, that he was given his Miranda warnings upon his arrival at the jail. Nesius alleges he made his demand to speak with an attorney after being given the Miranda warnings and that the “Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement” form was never read to him. Since Nesius did not subpoena the deputy, he had no opportunity to question him at the hearing.6
The state’s evidence consisted of the officer’s signed statement,7 on which was written, “see attached report.” The attached report was in narrative form and consisted of three pages. Nesius objected to the statement and the report. The hearing examiner overruled the objection and admitted the signed statement and report into evidence, apparently as a “certified record.”8
[941]*941According to the attached report, the officer observed Nesius’s pickup speeding, cross the center line twice, and drive onto the shoulder of the highway four times. It goes on to note that Nesius had balance problems, smelled of alcohol, and had red and watery eyes. Nesius admitted, in the report, that he had drunk two beers. The report also chronicles Nesius’s poor performance in various field sobriety tests. From these observations, the officer believed he had probable cause to arrest Nesi-us for DWUI.
In the report the police officer additionally stated Nesius was advised that9 1) he was under arrest for DWUI; 2) his failure to submit to all required tests requested of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content of his blood would result in the suspension for six months of his Wyoming driver’s license and his privilege to operate a motor vehicle; 3) if a test was taken and the results indicated he was under the influence of alcohol, he may be subject to criminal penalties and his Wyoming driver’s license and his privileges to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for ninety days; and 4) he may be taken to the nearest hospital or clinic and secure any or all required tests at his own expense or he could have the tests administered by a person at a place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense of the officer’s agency. The officer stated that the above warning was given while Nesius was in the jail.
The report also states that Nesius refused to take the breath test. When Nesi-us was asked if he intended to have the test administered at his own expense, he indicated that he wanted to see an attorney before consenting to the test. Nesius was then issued a “Notice of Suspension and Temporary Wyoming Driver’s License.” 10
The hearing officer issued his “Implied Consent Order of Suspension” on March 18, 1988. The hearing officer ruled that the state, through the certified record, had established by a preponderance of the evidence each of the four elements necessary to uphold the suspension.11 The hearing officer found, inter alia, that Nesius “was advised of the requirement to submit to all requested tests and the consequences of taking or refusing to take a test.”
DISCUSSION
Nesius’s first argument focuses on the officer’s use of the attached report, instead of the signed statement, to document the arrest. Nesius argues that the language of W.S. 31-6-102(d) is mandatory; all of the statutory elements must be [942]*942found on the signed statement.12 The reason for this requirement, according to Nesi-us, is that the signed statement is deemed a sworn statement, and subject to the penalties for perjury.13 Nesius claims that because the signed statement contains none of the required elements (all of the necessary elements are, instead, found on the attached “unsworn” report), the state’s certified record violates the statute.
The force of Nesius’s argument is undercut, however, because he acknowledges that the signed statement could incorporate the attached report, notwithstanding the “mandatory” statutory language. He claims the officer failed to explicitly incorporate the report; therefore, we should find the certified record deficient and set aside the suspension. Our implied consent statutes are silent on incorporation of the officer’s investigative report into his signed statement. We believe the proper resolution of this issue focuses not on whether the attached report was properly incorporated, but on whether the attached report was accurate. The means to make that inquiry are already in place.
Through discovery, the officer’s signed statement and any accompanying documentation submitted by the arresting officer14 are accessible before the hearing. The individual with his attorney15 may challenge the suspension both before a hearing examiner and the district court. The power to subpoena the officer to question his preparation of the report is also available. Finally, the signed statement submitted by the peace officer shall be deemed a sworn statement and shall be subject to penalties for perjury. This provision subjects police officers to charges of perjury for attaching false reports to their signed statements.
Nesius’s attorney reviewed the attached report. He did not directly challenge the report’s accuracy; instead, he argued of the potential “danger” in police attaching “unsworn” reports to their signed statements. If Nesius truly believed that the officer attached a false or inaccurate report to the signed statement, he should have subpoenaed the officer to testify at the hearing. Justice Urbigkit has correctly noted: “[i]t will be the driver and not the State that will bear the responsibility of challenging the validity of the implied-eon-sent suspension action through subpoenaing the officer to testify when the decision is made to challenge the véracity or validity of the filed form.” Hull, 751 P.2d at 356.
The hearing examiner complied with the statute.16 We believe the necessary tools are available to individuals to challenge suspect reports; therefore,- we decline the invitation to add an unnecessary layer to the law by requiring a determination of whether the report was properly incorporated. The attached report established: the officer had probable cause to believe Nesius was driving on the public streets while under the influence of alcohol; Nesi-us was arrested for DWUI; Nesius was properly informed of his rights vis-a-vis submitting to a chemical test; and Nesius refused to take a test.
Nesius also argues that the Administrative Procedures Act provides independent grounds to reverse the suspension because the signed statement was not filled out according to the statutes. For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the signed statement does comport with the statutes.
Nesius’s second argument states that “the refusal to take a chemical test is excused by failure to give adequate advisement of the law.” Nesius claims that he understood the Miranda warning to mean that he had the right to consult with an attorney before taking the chemical tests. He suggests that if the officer would have informed him that he had no right to an [943]*943attorney before deciding whether to take the tests, his decision might have been different. Nesius argues that “the only way to ensure fairness is to make a rule that the officer must further explain that the right to counsel does not apply to implied consent decisions.”
Wyoming’s implied consent law, W.S. 31-6-102(a)(i), provides, in pertinent part: “The test or tests shall be: (A) Incidental to a lawful arrest; (B) Given as promptly as possible after the arrest.” In other words, the individual is arrested, and may or may not be given the Miranda warning, then read the consent form and asked to submit to a “chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content of his blood.” Id. “Wyoming’[s] Implied Consent Advisement” does not alert the individual that the right to an attorney, expressed in the Miranda warning, only applies in the context of an arrest for DWUI, and not to the question of implied consent.
The Utah Supreme Court noted the importance of the distinction between Miranda and implied consent:
[W]hen a driver suspected of driving under the influence is arrested, he is at that point involved in a criminal proceeding and must be given the Miranda warning * * *. Almost contemporaneous with the giving of the Miranda warning a request to take a test pursuant to the Implied Consent Statute may be made and the driver informed that he has no right to consult an attorney prior to taking the test. These two propositions are not inconsistent with each other; but it is important that each proposition be stated fully, clearly and understandably so that the driver understands that his affirmative duty to take a blood test is not obviated by the Miranda warning.
Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979).
In Arizona, the following implied consent form is read to the individual:
1. Those [Miranda] rights of which you have just been advised, that is the right to remain silent or to speak with an attorney, have an attorney present during questioning, or to have one appointed for you, do not apply to this request.
2. If you remain silent, your silence will be considered a refusal to take the test. Likewise, you are advised that regardless of what an attorney may advise you regarding submission to this test, if you refuse to take the test, your right to drive will still be suspended * * *.
Gaunt v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Transportation, 136 Ariz. 424, 666 P.2d 524, 525 (1983).
Similarly, individuals arrested for DWUI in Colorado are told that “proceedings under the implied consent law are civil in nature, not criminal, [and] as a matter of law you have no right to consult with an attorney before deciding to submit to, or refuse, a chemical test of your blood, breath, or urine.” Drake v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, 674 P.2d 359, 361 n. 5 (Colo.1984).
We believe that Arizona, Colorado, and Utah’s implied consent forms reflect a pragmatic view of the possible confusion between Miranda and implied consent. We do not foresee any burden in ruling, prospectively, that police officers add a brief statement in the “Wyoming Implied Consent Advisement” which includes some combination of the above information.
We continue to adhere to our previous ruling:
[I]f the arrested person is reasonably informed of his rights, duties and obligations under our implied consent law and he is neither tricked nor misled into thinking he has no right to refuse the test to determine the alcohol content in his blood, urine or breath, the test will generally be held admissible.
Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 113 (Wyo.1985).
Our ruling, today, is simply this: In an attempt to prevent future claims of “confusion,” police officers, whether or not they give a Miranda warning to the individual, should include a brief statement that the [944]*944individual has no right to an attorney before deciding whether to take the chemical test.
Affirmed.