MERCER, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Local 95, filed a complaint to compel defendant to arbitrate an alleged grievance asserted by Joseph G. Stanke, one of defendant’s employees.
After defendant had answered the complaint, each party filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion was denied and judgment was entered upon defendant’s motion dismissing the complaint. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff is the bargaining agent for certain of defendant’s employees, including Stanke. When this dispute arose, employment relations between defendant and the bargaining unit represented by plaintiff were governed by a collective bargaining agreement dated June 1, 1958. Pertinent provisions of that agreement are summarized in the paragraph which follows, with footnote references to the full text thereof.
Section 3 provided for no strikes and no lockouts during the effective term of the agreement.
Subsection e of Section 6, relating to seniority, provided,
inter alia,
that no employee should be promoted or transferred upon a seniority basis unless he is capable of performing the work required for the job by standards set by the employer.
Section 7 governed promotions, demotions and transfers of employees.
Subsection g there
of, which has specific application to this dispute, establishes the procedure for filling job vacancies. That subsection required that notice of any vacancy on jobs covered by the agreement should be posted upon the company bulletin board to permit any employee “who feels he has the necessary qualifications” to apply for the posted job, and contained a provision for a “grievance” by any employee dissatisfied with “the final selection.”
Section 10 established a method for handling grievances, first through negotiations between the employee involved and plaintiff’s agents, on the one hand, with representatives of defendant on the other, and, ultimately, if negotiations failed, through submission of the grievance to arbitration.
The dispute involved here arose within the framework of Section 7g. Defendant posted a notice of a job vacancy in the classification of Relief Cost Clerk, a job covered by the agreement. Stanke was one- of 16 persons who applied for the job. His written application for the job was presented in the time and manner prescribed by Section 7-g-3 of the agreement. Another of the applicants, an employee outside the bargaining unit represented by plaintiff, was awarded the job.
Stanke then filed a signed statement with the company which was in words and figures as follows: “Position 97-1 Relief Cost Clerk-Posting has been filled by an employee outside the unit. Joseph
Stanke believes he has the necessary-qualifications for this job. He has been in the office union for 14 months and has
5Yz
years experience in the finishing room.” Upon receipt of that statement, defendant conferred with Stanke and representatives of the plaintiff with respect to Stanke’s claim of entitlement by reason of seniority to the job vacancy through and including procedures established by
Step Four
of Section 10 of the agreement.
Having exhausted such preliminary procedures without resolving the dispute, plaintiff demanded that Stanke’s claim be submitted to a board of arbitration selected in accordance with the provisions of
Step Five
of Section 10.
Defendant refused that demand, taking the position that Stanke’s claim was not an arbitrable grievance within the meaning of the provisions of the latter section. This suit was then instituted.
In entering judgment dismissing the complaint, the lower court concluded that Stanke’s claim was not an arbitrable grievance subject to the provisions of Section 10 of the agreement. The court reasoned that subsections 6e,
7a and 7b
made the selection of an employee to fill a job vacancy a matter for defendant’s sole judgment and discretion which could not be challenged or questioned under the provisions of the contract.
Disposition of the case is governed by principles pronounced by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1432, and United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409. The congressional policy found in the Labor Management Relations Act favoring the use of arbitration as a means to the achievement of industrial peace requires that arbitration clauses in labor agreements be given the most liberal construction which is compatible with the intent of the parties as therein expressed. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., supra, 363 U.S. at pages 577-578, 80 S.Ct. 1347; cf., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450, 453-457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972. When the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have therein agreed to submit disputes as to the proper interpretation and application of the agreement to arbitration, and one party applies to a court for a judgment to compel the other to honor the arbitration clause, the court may not consider the merits of the dispute. The only function of the court is, to ascertain “whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator.” United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra, 363 U.S. at page 568, 80 S.Ct. at page 1346; to same effect, United Steelworkers v. Warrior
&
Gulf Co., supra, 363 U.S. at page 583, 80 S.Ct. 1347.
Under those principles the issue which is decisive of this appeal is the question whether the court below correctly determined that the Stanke dispute was not an arbitrable grievance within the meaning of the provisions of the controlling collective bargaining agreement. Directing our attention to that narrow issue, we conclude that the court erred in entering judgment in favor of the defendant.
While subsections 6e, 7a and 7b of the agreement would seem to vest complete discretion and authority in defendant, as employer, to determine all questions of qualifications of applicants competing for the same job, the import of those subsections is tempered by the provision of subsection 7-g-4 that only employees who process job applications within the time provided by 7-g-3 “will be permitted to present a
grievance
against the final selection.”
(Italics supplied).
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MERCER, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Local 95, filed a complaint to compel defendant to arbitrate an alleged grievance asserted by Joseph G. Stanke, one of defendant’s employees.
After defendant had answered the complaint, each party filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion was denied and judgment was entered upon defendant’s motion dismissing the complaint. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff is the bargaining agent for certain of defendant’s employees, including Stanke. When this dispute arose, employment relations between defendant and the bargaining unit represented by plaintiff were governed by a collective bargaining agreement dated June 1, 1958. Pertinent provisions of that agreement are summarized in the paragraph which follows, with footnote references to the full text thereof.
Section 3 provided for no strikes and no lockouts during the effective term of the agreement.
Subsection e of Section 6, relating to seniority, provided,
inter alia,
that no employee should be promoted or transferred upon a seniority basis unless he is capable of performing the work required for the job by standards set by the employer.
Section 7 governed promotions, demotions and transfers of employees.
Subsection g there
of, which has specific application to this dispute, establishes the procedure for filling job vacancies. That subsection required that notice of any vacancy on jobs covered by the agreement should be posted upon the company bulletin board to permit any employee “who feels he has the necessary qualifications” to apply for the posted job, and contained a provision for a “grievance” by any employee dissatisfied with “the final selection.”
Section 10 established a method for handling grievances, first through negotiations between the employee involved and plaintiff’s agents, on the one hand, with representatives of defendant on the other, and, ultimately, if negotiations failed, through submission of the grievance to arbitration.
The dispute involved here arose within the framework of Section 7g. Defendant posted a notice of a job vacancy in the classification of Relief Cost Clerk, a job covered by the agreement. Stanke was one- of 16 persons who applied for the job. His written application for the job was presented in the time and manner prescribed by Section 7-g-3 of the agreement. Another of the applicants, an employee outside the bargaining unit represented by plaintiff, was awarded the job.
Stanke then filed a signed statement with the company which was in words and figures as follows: “Position 97-1 Relief Cost Clerk-Posting has been filled by an employee outside the unit. Joseph
Stanke believes he has the necessary-qualifications for this job. He has been in the office union for 14 months and has
5Yz
years experience in the finishing room.” Upon receipt of that statement, defendant conferred with Stanke and representatives of the plaintiff with respect to Stanke’s claim of entitlement by reason of seniority to the job vacancy through and including procedures established by
Step Four
of Section 10 of the agreement.
Having exhausted such preliminary procedures without resolving the dispute, plaintiff demanded that Stanke’s claim be submitted to a board of arbitration selected in accordance with the provisions of
Step Five
of Section 10.
Defendant refused that demand, taking the position that Stanke’s claim was not an arbitrable grievance within the meaning of the provisions of the latter section. This suit was then instituted.
In entering judgment dismissing the complaint, the lower court concluded that Stanke’s claim was not an arbitrable grievance subject to the provisions of Section 10 of the agreement. The court reasoned that subsections 6e,
7a and 7b
made the selection of an employee to fill a job vacancy a matter for defendant’s sole judgment and discretion which could not be challenged or questioned under the provisions of the contract.
Disposition of the case is governed by principles pronounced by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1432, and United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409. The congressional policy found in the Labor Management Relations Act favoring the use of arbitration as a means to the achievement of industrial peace requires that arbitration clauses in labor agreements be given the most liberal construction which is compatible with the intent of the parties as therein expressed. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., supra, 363 U.S. at pages 577-578, 80 S.Ct. 1347; cf., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450, 453-457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972. When the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have therein agreed to submit disputes as to the proper interpretation and application of the agreement to arbitration, and one party applies to a court for a judgment to compel the other to honor the arbitration clause, the court may not consider the merits of the dispute. The only function of the court is, to ascertain “whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator.” United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra, 363 U.S. at page 568, 80 S.Ct. at page 1346; to same effect, United Steelworkers v. Warrior
&
Gulf Co., supra, 363 U.S. at page 583, 80 S.Ct. 1347.
Under those principles the issue which is decisive of this appeal is the question whether the court below correctly determined that the Stanke dispute was not an arbitrable grievance within the meaning of the provisions of the controlling collective bargaining agreement. Directing our attention to that narrow issue, we conclude that the court erred in entering judgment in favor of the defendant.
While subsections 6e, 7a and 7b of the agreement would seem to vest complete discretion and authority in defendant, as employer, to determine all questions of qualifications of applicants competing for the same job, the import of those subsections is tempered by the provision of subsection 7-g-4 that only employees who process job applications within the time provided by 7-g-3 “will be permitted to present a
grievance
against the final selection.”
(Italics supplied).
Defendant suggests that the latter clause, though inconsistent with 6e, 7a and 7b, should now be ignored because it is a minor clause of limitation whereas the provisions of 6e, 7a and 7b are basic reservations of right to defendant. That argument merely points up a patent ambiguity which may be resolved only by interpretation of the agreement as a whole.
We express no opinion as to the proper interpretation of 7-g-4 with subsections 6e, 7a and 7b when considered together. That issue is a question of interpretation of the agreement which is within the scope of the power expressly granted by the agreement to the arbitration board, and therefore, not a function of the courts. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra, 363 U.S. at page 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343.
The provision of subsection 7-g-4 of the contract, though ambiguous when compared with other provisions of the same document, must nevertheless be given effect for present purposes. The provisions of that subsection cannot be construed other than contemplating that a complaint may be processed by any employee who is discontent with the rejection of his transfer application and who feel that he has the qualifications and seniority which would entitle him to placement in the requested job. The agreement employs the term “grievance” generically and without qualification in both subsection 7-g-4 and Section 10. Since the terms are used in both instances without any qualification, we conclude that a “grievance” of the type mentioned in 7-g-4 is an arbitrable “grievance” within the meaning of the provisions of Section 10 of the agreement. In any event, we cannot say “with positive assurance that the arbitration clause” here in issue “is not susceptible of an interpretation” which covers any complaint or grievance asserted pursuant to subsection 7-g-4. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., supra, 363 U.S. at pages 582-583, 80 S.Ct. 1347.
We are cognizant of the factual distinction which does exist, as defendant claims, between the case at bar and the American and Warrior cases, but that distinction does not affect the general applicability of the definitive principles announced in those cases to all labor-arbitration litigation.
We reject defendant’s contention that no contract violation was charged by the statement presented by Stanke. Stanke’s statement, in essence, stated that the job vacancy was filled by an employee outside the bargaining unit, that Stanke believed that he had the necessary qualifications for the job and that Stanke had been in the office union for 14 months. We agree that the statement omits the niceties of precision which would be required in a pleading to state a claim of contract violation, but we think the statement sufficiently advised defendant that Stanke was asserting a claim of equal qualifications with, and seniority over, the employee to whom defendant had given the job. Indeed, it appears that defendant negotiated Stanke’s claim upon that basis with him and with officials of plaintiff union through the first four steps provided by Section 10. It first challenged the statement as a proper statement of a grievance when those steps failed and the ax*bitration demand was received.
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to enter judgment against defendant for the relief prayed in the complaint.