Nemeth v. Nemeth, 2008-G-2824 (9-12-2008)
This text of 2008 Ohio 4673 (Nemeth v. Nemeth, 2008-G-2824 (9-12-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
{¶ 2} Our review of the trial docket in the underlying divorce case indicates that on the date the trial court's March 6, 2008 judgment denying appellant's motions, appellant's appeal from the divorce decree was pending before this court in Nemeth v. Nemeth, 11th Dist. No. 2007-G-2791,
{¶ 3} As a general proposition, the taking of an appeal from a final order does not deprive a trial court of all jurisdiction over the subject case. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp. v. Urquhart, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2004-04-098 CA2004-10-271,
{¶ 4} With respect to appellant's motion to supplement her objections to the *Page 3 magistrate's decision, we note that if the trial court had granted this motion, it would have potentially resulted in a subsequent determination that would have altered the substance of the decree which had already been appealed to this court. Further, if appellant had been permitted to supplement her objections, such ruling would have been inconsistent with the finality of the divorce decree and our ability to reverse, modify, or affirm it. To this extent, appellant's motion to supplement her objections conflicted with this court's jurisdiction in Nemeth I to fully review the merits of the divorce decree. The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to rule on this motion.
{¶ 5} Likewise, the granting of appellant's motion for new trial would have the ultimate effect of rendering the divorce decree void, and would have been inconsistent with our ability to reverse, modify, or affirm the trial court's divorce decree. We would also note that this court has previously ruled that the filing of an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion for new trial. In Powell v. Turner
(1984),
{¶ 6} Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, it is the sua sponte order of this court that the instant appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., COLLEEN MARY O'TOOLE, J., TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J., concur. *Page 1
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2008 Ohio 4673, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nemeth-v-nemeth-2008-g-2824-9-12-2008-ohioctapp-2008.