Nelson v. Major

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedOctober 12, 2023
Docket8:22-cv-02409
StatusUnknown

This text of Nelson v. Major (Nelson v. Major) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nelson v. Major, (M.D. Fla. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

ROSS LANE NELSON,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 8:22-cv-2409-VMC-AAS ROBERT L. MAJOR and MAJOR SITE DEVELOPMENT, INC.,

Defendants. _______________________________/ ORDER This matter is before the Court on consideration of United States Magistrate Judge Amanda Arnold Sansone’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 23), recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendants (Doc. # 22), seeking entry of default judgment against Defendants Major Site Development, Inc., and Robert L. Major, be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the Report and Recommendation recommends granting default judgment for Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Florida Minimum Wage Act (“FMWA”), and awarding attorney’s fees related to those claims. (Id. at 5-8, 10-11). The Report and Recommendation also recommends denying default judgment for Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the Florida Private Sector Whistleblower’s Act (“FWA”). (Id. at 8-10). On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a partial objection, arguing that he was not required to have submitted written notice to his employer to be entitled to default judgment on his claim under the FWA. (Doc. # 24). Plaintiff did not object to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusions regarding his claims pursuant to the FLSA or the FMWA, nor the conclusions regarding his entitlement to attorney’s fees based on his

FLSA and FMWA claims. No response to the objection has been filed, and the time for the parties to file such objections has elapsed. The Court accepts and adopts the Report and Recommendation regarding entitlement to default judgment under the FLSA and FMWA and corresponding attorney’s fees. However, it also sustains Plaintiff’s objection and grants default judgment under the FWA. Discussion After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and recommendations, a district judge may accept,

reject or modify the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections, there is no requirement that a district judge review factual findings de novo, Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993), and the court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). If a party files a timely and specific objection to a finding of fact by the magistrate judge, the district court must conduct a de novo review with respect to that factual issue. Stokes v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992). The district judge reviews legal conclusions de novo, even in the absence

of an objection. See Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994); Castro Bobadilla v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1431-32 (S.D. Fla. 1993), aff’d, 28 F.3d 116 (11th Cir. 1994). After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and giving de novo review to matters of law, the Court accepts the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to default judgment under the FLSA and FMWA, and to corresponding attorney’s fees.

However, the Court also sustains Plaintiff’s objection to the Report and Recommendation’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment based on his FWA claim. The Report and Recommendation found that while Plaintiff had established a prima facie case under the FWA, he was not entitled to default judgment because he had failed to comply with Florida Statute § 448.103(1)(c). (Doc. # 23 at 9-10). Section 448.103(1)(c) states: An employee may not recover in any action brought pursuant to this subsection if he or she failed to notify the employer about the illegal activity, policy, or practice as required by [section] 448.102(1) or if the retaliatory personnel action was predicated upon a ground other than the employee’s exercise of a right protected by this act. Fla. Stat. § 448.103(1)(c). Section 448.102(1) requires that an employee seeking relief due to retaliation stemming from an employee’s disclosure of their employer’s unlawful activities notify their employer in writing of the “activity, policy, or practice” and “afford[] the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy or practice.” Fla. Stat. § 448.102(1). Because Plaintiff had not alleged in the complaint that he had provided his employer with written notice, the Magistrate Judge recommended the Court deny Plaintiff’s request for default judgment on this claim. (Doc. # 23 at 10). Plaintiff’s objection cites Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2000), to argue that written notice is not required for an employee to prevail on claims under Florida Statute § 448.102(3), such as Plaintiff’s claim. (Doc. # 24 at 2-3). This Court agrees. Golf Channel held that “the requirement that employees give their employers written notice . . . . does not apply to . . . objection claims brought pursuant to subsection 448.102(3) based on the employee’s objection to the unlawful activity of the employer.” Golf Channel, 752 So. 2d at 567-68. Therefore, the written notice requirement does not apply to Plaintiff’s

claim and Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment under the FWA. As such, Plaintiff is directed to file additional documentation and support demonstrating the appropriate remedies to which he is entitled for his FWA claim.1 Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 23) is granted. Specifically, default judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the FLSA, FMWA, and FWA. Plaintiff is also entitled to attorney’s fees as to his FLSA and FMWA claims.

1 This Court notes that, while Plaintiff may also be entitled to attorney’s fees related to his FWA claim, see Fla. Stat. § 448.104 (“A court may award reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and expenses to the prevailing party.”), Plaintiff intends to move for attorney’s fees related to his FWA claim after damages related to this claim have been determined, see (Doc. # 22 at 5 n.2) (stating that Plaintiff “intends to move for attorneys’ fees and costs after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing or jury trial on damages under [the FWA count]”). Therefore, this Court will refrain from addressing this issue at this time. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: (1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 23) is ADOPTED in part. (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 22) is GRANTED. (3) Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment against

Defendants Robert L. Major and Major Site Development, Inc., on Plaintiff’s claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Florida Minimum Wage Act, and Florida Private Sector Whistleblower’s Act.

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Related

Marina Cooper-Houston v. Southern Railway Company
37 F.3d 603 (Eleventh Circuit, 1994)
Castro Bobadilla v. Reno
826 F. Supp. 1428 (S.D. Florida, 1993)
Golf Channel v. Jenkins
752 So. 2d 561 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2000)
Stokes v. Singletary
952 F.2d 1567 (Eleventh Circuit, 1992)
Garvey v. Vaughn
993 F.2d 776 (Eleventh Circuit, 1993)

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Nelson v. Major, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nelson-v-major-flmd-2023.