Nelson v. Fulton County

585 S.E.2d 710, 262 Ga. App. 382, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2269, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 927
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedJuly 15, 2003
DocketA03A1484
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 585 S.E.2d 710 (Nelson v. Fulton County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nelson v. Fulton County, 585 S.E.2d 710, 262 Ga. App. 382, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2269, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

Mikell, Judge.

Ruth Nelson filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Fulton County and the Fulton County Board of Commissioners (collectively, the “County”), challenging their denial of her application to rezone a parcel of property. The superior court dismissed Nelson’s complaint as untimely. Nelson filed a direct appeal. Because “all appeals in zoning cases require an application,” 1 we dismiss this direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), an appeal of a superior court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision requires an application for discretionary appeal. Trend Dev. Corp. set out a bright-line rule that all appeals to either appellate court in zoning cases must come by application. 2 In Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. &c., 3 the Supreme Court clarified that a party to a decision rendered by an administrative body must follow the appeal procedure dictated by the underlying subject matter. 4 The Supreme Court went on to state in Fulton County v. Congregation of Anshei Chesed 5 that “a party to the decision of an administrative agency may not avoid the requirements of filing an application to appeal in the appellate courts by filing in superior court an action from which a direct appeal is authorized by OCGA § 5-6-34.” 6 Accordingly, Nelson may not circumvent the discretionary appeal requirement in this Court by filing a declaratory *383 action in the superior court. Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), Nelson was required to file an application to appeal the dismissal of her suit against the County.

Decided July 15, 2003. Ruth Nelson, pro se. Overtis H. Brantley, Larry W. Ramsey, Jr., Valerie A. Ross, for appellees.

Appeal dismissed.

Johnson, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur.
1

O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 724 (482 SE2d 295) (1997), citing Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425, 426 (1) (383 SE2d 123) (1989).

2

Trend Dev. Corp., supra at 426 (1).

3

275 Ga. 255 (564 SE2d 715) (2002).

4

Id. at 256-257 (1).

5

275 Ga. 856 (572 SE2d 530) (2002).

6

Id. at 857 (1).

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Bluebook (online)
585 S.E.2d 710, 262 Ga. App. 382, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2269, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 927, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nelson-v-fulton-county-gactapp-2003.