Neinken v. Brill

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Neinken v. Brill

251 A.D. 730, 295 N.Y.S. 469, 1937 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7269

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 14, 1937

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 251 A.D. 730 (Neinken v. Brill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Neinken v. Brill, 251 A.D. 730, 295 N.Y.S. 469, 1937 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7269 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1937).

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Opinion

In an action for the conversion of certain bonds which were admittedly stolen and shortly thereafter negotiated to defendant Brill, judgment, entered on a directed verdict for said defendant, reversed on the law and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. When the plaintiff made proof that the bonds were stolen, the burden was on defendant Brill to prove that he, or the person under whom he claimed, acquired the title in good faith (Neg. Inst. Law, § 98), and that he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. (Neg. Inst. Law, § 91.) Defendant Brill was not a dealer in bonds and did not receive these bonds in the usual course of business. The evidence indicated such circumstances in acquiring the title by him as would create suspicion concerning his good faith and his lack of notice or knowledge of the infirmity in the title of the person from whom he is alleged to have purchased. The inferences and the probabilities, as well as the credibility of the witnesses, are matters for the consideration of a jury in determining the questions of fact. (C. N. Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191; New York Bankers, Inc., v. Duncan, 257 id. 160; Harter v. Peoples Bank of Buffalo, 221 App. Div. 122.) Hagarty, Davis, Johnston, Adel and Close, JJ., concur.

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In an action for the conversion of certain bonds which were admittedly stolen and shortly thereafter negotiated to defendant Brill, judgment, entered on a directed verdict for said defendant, reversed on the law and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. When the plaintiff made proof that the bonds were stolen, the burden was on defendant Brill to prove that he, or the person under whom he claimed, acquired the title in good faith (Neg. Inst. Law, § 98), and that he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. (Neg. Inst. Law, § 91.) Defendant Brill was not a dealer in bonds and did not receive these bonds in the usual course of business. The evidence indicated such circumstances in acquiring the title by him as would create suspicion concerning his good faith and his lack of notice or knowledge of the infirmity in the title of the person from whom he is alleged to have purchased. The inferences and the probabilities, as well as the credibility of the witnesses, are matters for the consideration of a jury in determining the questions of fact. (C. N. Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191; New York Bankers, Inc., v. Duncan, 257 id. 160; Harter v. Peoples Bank of Buffalo, 221 App. Div. 122.) Hagarty, Davis, Johnston, Adel and Close, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

251 A.D. 730, 295 N.Y.S. 469, 1937 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7269, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neinken-v-brill-nyappdiv-1937.

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