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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 NEIL LOREN BRUNT; ERIC BRUNT, Case No. 3:26-cv-05254-TMC 8 Petitioners, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 REMAND v. 10 GARY LOREN BRUNT, 11 Respondents. 12 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This case began in 2024 as a guardianship action in Thurston County Superior Court. In 16 March 2026, Respondent Gary Brunt removed the case to this Court, alleging that federal 17 question jurisdiction existed because the state court had violated his federal constitutional and 18 statutory rights. See Dkt. 1 at 5–7. Petitioners Neil and Eric Brunt moved to remand. Dkt. 16. 19 Because Gary Brunt’s federal defenses to the guardianship matter do not establish removal 20 jurisdiction, the motion to remand is GRANTED. The Court also GRANTS Petitioners’ request 21 for attorney’s fees because there was no reasonable basis for removal. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioners Neil and Eric Brunt filed a guardianship petition in Thurston County Superior 24 Court in May 2024. Dkt. 17-1. In October 2024, that court entered orders the parties had agreed 1 to following mediation. Dkt. 17-3. In March 2025, Respondent moved to dismiss the case and 2 vacate the agreed orders, arguing that they had violated his constitutional rights. Dkt. 17-4. In 3 June 2025, the superior court rejected Respondent’s constitutional arguments, denied his
4 motions, and imposed sanctions on his attorney. See Dkts. 17-6, 17-8, 17-9. Respondent 5 appealed the 2025 orders and that appeal remains pending. See Dkts. 17-10, 17-12. In January 6 2026, the superior court found Respondent in contempt and set a hearing for March 13, 2026 to 7 determine whether the contempt had been cured. Dkt. 17-11. The morning of that hearing, 8 Respondent removed the case to this Court. Dkt. 1. 9 In his notice of removal, Respondent alleges that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists 10 because (1) the state court violated his First Amendment right not to associate with his adult 11 children, Dkt. 1 at 5; (2) the state court violated his due process and equal protection rights by 12 entering the guardianship orders without a trial, id. at 5–6; and (3) the state court violated his
13 HIPAA rights by entering orders without a trial that required Respondent to give up privacy 14 interests in his healthcare records, id. at 6. Dkt. 1 at 7. The notice of removal does not address 15 timeliness, other than stating that Respondent “recently discovered” the challenged orders. See 16 Dkt. 1 at 2. 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD An action brought in state court is removable to federal district court only if the federal 18 court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The 19 threshold requirement for removal . . . is a finding that the complaint contains a cause of action 20 that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court.” Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 21 653 (9th Cir. 1998). A party may claim that a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction based 22 on either diversity or a federal question. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th 23 24 1 Cir. 2009). For the latter, the question turns on whether the complaint contained a claim that 2 “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 3 Federal question jurisdiction arises only if the complaint “affirmatively allege[s] a federal
4 claim.” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Broth. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 947 (9th 5 Cir. 2014) (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003)). It is a fundamental 6 principle of jurisdiction that the plaintiff is the “master of the claim.” Karambelas v. Hughes 7 Aircraft Co., 992 F.2d 971, 973 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 8 386, 392 (1987)). A “case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense.” 9 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. 10 The removal statute is construed narrowly, and any doubts about removal are resolved in 11 favor of remanding the case to the state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 12 1992). Accordingly, on a motion to remand, the removing defendant faces a strong presumption
13 against removal and bears the burden of establishing that removal was proper. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 14 566; see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (“[B]ecause we presume 15 that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record, the 16 party asserting federal jurisdiction when it is challenged has the burden of establishing it.”) 17 (citation modified). If at any time before final judgment, the court determines that it is without 18 subject matter jurisdiction, the action must be remanded to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 A. This Court does not have federal question jurisdiction. Petitioners argue that this Court lacks removal jurisdiction because the underlying state 21 court guardianship petition did not contain a federal claim. Dkt. 16 at 4–6. Respondent asserts, 22 without citation to any authority, that “the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply because 23 the basis for removal is the fact federal questions have arisen during the pendency of this case.” 24 1 Dkt. 19 at 4. He then reiterates his claims that the decisions of the superior court judge and 2 commissioner violated his constitutional rights. See generally Dkt. 19. 3 Petitioners are correct. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is
4 governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists 5 only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 6 complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. This rule “means that ‘a case may not be removed to 7 federal court on the basis of a federal defense.’” Retail Prop. Tr., 768 F.3d at 947 (quoting 8 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393). Respondent’s grounds for removal are essentially defenses that go 9 to why the guardianship orders should not have been entered. There is no authority to support his 10 argument that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply because the alleged constitutional 11 problems arose during the litigation due to the actions of the state court judges. Because this 12 state-court guardianship case could not originally have been filed in federal court, there is no
13 removal jurisdiction, and the motion to remand must be granted. 14 B. Removal was untimely. 15 Although the jurisdictional issue is dispositive, the removal notice was also untimely. The 16 removal statute requires that the notice of removal “be filed within thirty days after the receipt by 17 the defendant” of the “paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is 18 or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 NEIL LOREN BRUNT; ERIC BRUNT, Case No. 3:26-cv-05254-TMC 8 Petitioners, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 REMAND v. 10 GARY LOREN BRUNT, 11 Respondents. 12 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This case began in 2024 as a guardianship action in Thurston County Superior Court. In 16 March 2026, Respondent Gary Brunt removed the case to this Court, alleging that federal 17 question jurisdiction existed because the state court had violated his federal constitutional and 18 statutory rights. See Dkt. 1 at 5–7. Petitioners Neil and Eric Brunt moved to remand. Dkt. 16. 19 Because Gary Brunt’s federal defenses to the guardianship matter do not establish removal 20 jurisdiction, the motion to remand is GRANTED. The Court also GRANTS Petitioners’ request 21 for attorney’s fees because there was no reasonable basis for removal. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioners Neil and Eric Brunt filed a guardianship petition in Thurston County Superior 24 Court in May 2024. Dkt. 17-1. In October 2024, that court entered orders the parties had agreed 1 to following mediation. Dkt. 17-3. In March 2025, Respondent moved to dismiss the case and 2 vacate the agreed orders, arguing that they had violated his constitutional rights. Dkt. 17-4. In 3 June 2025, the superior court rejected Respondent’s constitutional arguments, denied his
4 motions, and imposed sanctions on his attorney. See Dkts. 17-6, 17-8, 17-9. Respondent 5 appealed the 2025 orders and that appeal remains pending. See Dkts. 17-10, 17-12. In January 6 2026, the superior court found Respondent in contempt and set a hearing for March 13, 2026 to 7 determine whether the contempt had been cured. Dkt. 17-11. The morning of that hearing, 8 Respondent removed the case to this Court. Dkt. 1. 9 In his notice of removal, Respondent alleges that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists 10 because (1) the state court violated his First Amendment right not to associate with his adult 11 children, Dkt. 1 at 5; (2) the state court violated his due process and equal protection rights by 12 entering the guardianship orders without a trial, id. at 5–6; and (3) the state court violated his
13 HIPAA rights by entering orders without a trial that required Respondent to give up privacy 14 interests in his healthcare records, id. at 6. Dkt. 1 at 7. The notice of removal does not address 15 timeliness, other than stating that Respondent “recently discovered” the challenged orders. See 16 Dkt. 1 at 2. 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD An action brought in state court is removable to federal district court only if the federal 18 court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The 19 threshold requirement for removal . . . is a finding that the complaint contains a cause of action 20 that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court.” Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 21 653 (9th Cir. 1998). A party may claim that a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction based 22 on either diversity or a federal question. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th 23 24 1 Cir. 2009). For the latter, the question turns on whether the complaint contained a claim that 2 “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 3 Federal question jurisdiction arises only if the complaint “affirmatively allege[s] a federal
4 claim.” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Broth. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 947 (9th 5 Cir. 2014) (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003)). It is a fundamental 6 principle of jurisdiction that the plaintiff is the “master of the claim.” Karambelas v. Hughes 7 Aircraft Co., 992 F.2d 971, 973 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 8 386, 392 (1987)). A “case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense.” 9 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. 10 The removal statute is construed narrowly, and any doubts about removal are resolved in 11 favor of remanding the case to the state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 12 1992). Accordingly, on a motion to remand, the removing defendant faces a strong presumption
13 against removal and bears the burden of establishing that removal was proper. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 14 566; see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (“[B]ecause we presume 15 that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record, the 16 party asserting federal jurisdiction when it is challenged has the burden of establishing it.”) 17 (citation modified). If at any time before final judgment, the court determines that it is without 18 subject matter jurisdiction, the action must be remanded to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 A. This Court does not have federal question jurisdiction. Petitioners argue that this Court lacks removal jurisdiction because the underlying state 21 court guardianship petition did not contain a federal claim. Dkt. 16 at 4–6. Respondent asserts, 22 without citation to any authority, that “the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply because 23 the basis for removal is the fact federal questions have arisen during the pendency of this case.” 24 1 Dkt. 19 at 4. He then reiterates his claims that the decisions of the superior court judge and 2 commissioner violated his constitutional rights. See generally Dkt. 19. 3 Petitioners are correct. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is
4 governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists 5 only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 6 complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. This rule “means that ‘a case may not be removed to 7 federal court on the basis of a federal defense.’” Retail Prop. Tr., 768 F.3d at 947 (quoting 8 Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393). Respondent’s grounds for removal are essentially defenses that go 9 to why the guardianship orders should not have been entered. There is no authority to support his 10 argument that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply because the alleged constitutional 11 problems arose during the litigation due to the actions of the state court judges. Because this 12 state-court guardianship case could not originally have been filed in federal court, there is no
13 removal jurisdiction, and the motion to remand must be granted. 14 B. Removal was untimely. 15 Although the jurisdictional issue is dispositive, the removal notice was also untimely. The 16 removal statute requires that the notice of removal “be filed within thirty days after the receipt by 17 the defendant” of the “paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is 18 or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The orders which Respondent claims created 19 a federal question were issued in October 2024 and June 2025. Respondent’s attempt to remove 20 the case in March 2026 was untimely. Respondent’s citation to Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical 21 Center does not help his argument; that case reiterates that the timelines in § 1446 “place strict 22 limits on a defendant who is put on notice of removability by a plaintiff” because a defendant
23 cannot “seek removal only when it becomes strategically advantageous to do so.” 720 F.3d 1121, 24 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). 1 C. Petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees. 2 The Court may award fees and costs incurred as a result of removal under 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1447(c). The Supreme Court has held that, “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award
4 attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable 5 basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should 6 be denied.” Martin, 546 U.S. at 141. The basis for removal is objectively reasonable if “a 7 reasonable litigant in [the defendant’s] position could have concluded that federal court was the 8 proper forum in which to litigate [the plaintiff’s] claims[.]” Gardner v. UICI, 508 F.3d 559, 562 9 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 Here, Respondent removed the case to this Court without an objectively reasonable basis 11 for doing so, likely to avoid the contempt hearing and delay the state court litigation. Because 12 this Court is facing a significant civil motions backlog due to an unprecedented influx of
13 immigration habeas litigation, this strategy regrettably had some success. Long-established law 14 holds that a federal defense is not a basis for removal, and the notice of removal was filed far 15 beyond the 30-day period allowed by the statute. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to reasonable 16 attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 17 V. CONCLUSION Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, the motion to remand (Dkt. 16) is 18 GRANTED. The Court ORDERS that: 19 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), all further proceedings in this case are 20 REMANDED to the Superior Court for Thurston County in the State of 21 Washington; 22 2. The Clerk shall mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of Court for 23 Thurston County Superior Court; 24 1 3. The Clerk shall transfer the record herein to the Clerk of Court for Thurston 2 County Superior Court; 3 4. The Clerk shall close this case; and
4 5. Defendants shall submit their fee petition within 14 days of this order, noting the 5 motion for 21 days after filing under LCR 7(d)(3). If the parties reach agreement 6 on the amount of reasonable fees and costs, they may submit a stipulated same- 7 day motion. If the motion is contested, Defendants are encouraged to submit 8 proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court will retain 9 jurisdiction solely over the fee petition. 10 11 Dated this 26th day of June, 2026. 12 a 13 Tiffany M. Cartwright 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24