FILED JULY 28, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
NEIL GRENNING, ) ) No. 41148-6-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) JANET NELSON, et al., ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )
STAAB, C.J. — Neil Grenning, an incarcerated individual, sued various
Department of Corrections employees (collectively, “DOC employees”) in their
individual and official capacities1, raising claims of trespass to chattels and conversion
related to his personal mail. The DOC employees moved for summary judgment
dismissal of his claims, arguing he could not prove he had a right to possess the materials
at issue or that the DOC employees’ interference with or taking of the materials was
unlawful. Grenning initially responded by requesting enlargement of his time to respond.
The court denied his request finding that it was untimely and that he failed to demonstrate
excusable neglect. The court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC
1 Grenning named the employees individually but did not name DOC as a defendant; thus we refer to the employees and not the agency. No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
employees, dismissed Grenning’s claims with prejudice, and issued him a strike pursuant
to RCW 4.24.430.
Grenning appeals, arguing (1) his request to enlarge time was not untimely and
should have been granted, (2) summary judgment in favor of the DOC employees was
improper, and (3) he should not have been issued a strike.
We agree that Grenning’s request to enlarge time was not untimely. Nevertheless,
since our review is de novo, the record is sufficiently developed, and the issues
sufficiently briefed, we review the substantive issues and affirm summary judgment
dismissal in favor of the DOC employees. We also affirm the issuance of the strike
against Grenning under RCW 4.24.430.
BACKGROUND
While incarcerated, Grenning filed a lawsuit against numerous DOC employees,
both in their individual and official capacities. Grenning’s lawsuit alleged two causes of
action related to three pieces of mail: conversion of his mail and trespass to chattels. As
to his first claim, Grenning alleged the DOC employees withheld “a published
Washington Supreme Court decision sent to [Grenning] by the Clerk of the Washington
Supreme Court” at his request. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 22. He next claimed the DOC
employees withheld PRA2 documents sent to him through the mail. As to his third claim,
2 Public Records Act, ch. 42.56 RCW.
2 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
Grenning alleged the DOC employees withheld “hundreds of personal letters sent to
[Grenning] by friends and family, destroy[ed] the letters, and substitute[d] black and
white, poor photocopies with contents removed, or with entire pages or content omitted.”
CP at 22.
After filing an answer, the DOC employees moved for summary judgment
dismissal of Grenning’s claims. In their motion, the DOC employees argued Grenning
could not prove an unlawful taking of his property. The DOC employees based their
argument on various DOC policies and regulations that give the DOC authority and
discretion to confiscate and reject mail, and to determine the type and amount of property
incarcerated individuals may possess while in DOC custody. Numerous declarations,
DOC policies, and emails were filed with the DOC employees’ motion. The motion was
noted for a hearing without oral argument on January 24, 2025.
On Saturday, January 11, 2025, Grenning deposited into the jail’s mail a motion
requesting an enlargement of time to respond to the DOC employees’ summary judgment
motion under CR 6(b). Grenning’s request for an enlargement of time was based on his
claim that LexisNexis was temporarily unavailable and he needed more time given his
work schedule and other legal matters. The DOC employees opposed Grenning’s request
for an enlargement of time, arguing it was untimely and that he “failed to show excusable
neglect.” CP at 454.
3 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
Grenning subsequently mailed his response to the motion for summary judgment
on February 19, 2025, and it was stamped as received by the court on February 25, 2025.
On the same day, February 25, the court denied Grenning’s motion to enlarge time to
respond to the motion for summary judgment finding his request “untimely as his
response date has passed.” CP at 491. It also found Grenning failed to show excusable
neglect. Contemporaneously, the court filed an order granting the DOC employees’
motion for summary judgment and dismissed Grenning’s claims with prejudice.3 Finally,
the court issued a “strike” against Grenning pursuant to RCW 4.24.430.4
Grenning appeals.
ANALYSIS
1. TIMELINESS OF MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT
Grenning argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to
enlarge the time to respond to the DOC employees’ summary judgment motion. We
agree. The court’s ruling appears to rest on the premise that Grenning’s motion was
3 The order was stamped “FILED” on February 25, 2025, but was dated February 21, 2025. 4 “If a person serving a criminal sentence in a . . . correctional facility seeks leave to proceed in state court without payment of filing fees in any civil action or appeal . . . the court shall deny the request for waiver of the court filing fees if the person has, on three or more occasions while incarcerated or detained in any such facility, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed by a state or federal court on grounds that it was frivolous or malicious.”
4 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
untimely and therefore required a showing of excusable neglect. But under the governing
rules, Grenning’s filing was timely.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to enlarge time under CR 6(b) for
an abuse of discretion. See Clipse v. Com. Driver Servs., Inc., 189 Wn. App. 776, 786,
358 P.3d 464 (2015). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. State v.
Barry, 184 Wn. App. 790, 802, 339 P.3d 200 (2014). A misapplication of the law also
constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Neal, 144 Wn.2d 600, 609, 30 P.3d 1255
(2001).
Motions to enlarge time are governed by CR 6(b). Under this rule, the court may,
in its discretion, “order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed.” CR 6(b)(1). On the other hand, if a
motion to enlarge is made after the expiration “of the specified time period,” the court
may “permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect.” CR 6(b)(2).
Additionally, GR 3.1(a) provides a separate filing timing rule applicable to
incarcerated persons: “If an incarcerated person files a document in any proceeding, the
document is timely filed if deposited in the institution’s internal mail system within the
time permitted for filing.”
5 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
CR 56(c) sets the default statewide deadline for responding to a motion for
summary judgment. It provides that the nonmoving party to a summary judgment motion
“may file and serve opposing affidavits, memoranda of law or other documentation not
later than 11 calendar days before the hearing.” CR 56(c). By contrast, the Spokane
County Superior Court Local Court Rule (LCR) 56 in effect at the time of DOC’s
summary judgment motion required the nonmoving party to file any responsive
documents “at least fourteen (14) calendar days before the hearing.” Former LCR 56
(2019).5
As an initial matter, we note that the local rule cannot supersede the state rule.
“‘[L]ocal rules may not be applied in a manner inconsistent with the civil rules’
promulgated by the Supreme Court.” State v. Wade, 28 Wn. App. 2d 100, 113, 534 P.3d
1221 (2023) (quoting Jones v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn.2d 322, 344, 314 P.3d 380 (2013)).
“Local rules that restrict the exercise of a right created by a state-wide rule by imposing a
different time requirement are inconsistent with the state-wide rule.” State v. Fuller, 31
Wn. App. 2d 88, 96, 547 P.3d 939 (2024).
Here, Grenning’s motion was timely under the applicable rules because it was
filed before the expiration of his time to file a response. The motion on summary
judgment was set for hearing on January 24, 2025. Under CR 56, Grenning’s response or
5 LCR 56 was amended and, effective September 1, 2025, the rule now comports with the state rule.
6 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
motion to enlarge time was due on Monday, January 13, 2025, 11 calendar days before
the hearing. Grenning deposited his motion to enlarge in the prison mail system—and
thus accomplished filing—on Saturday, January 11, 2025, two days before the deadline.
Because Grenning’s request was timely, he was not required to show excusable
neglect under CR 6(b)(2). Instead, his request should have been evaluated under CR
6(b)(1). The trial court therefore abused its discretion by treating the request as untimely,
requiring Grenning to meet a higher burden, and denying relief on that basis.
2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
While remand is appropriate in light of our conclusion, we nevertheless exercise
our discretion to consider the motion on summary judgment. The issue raised on
summary judgment is likely to reoccur, the record on appeal—including Grenning’s
response to the motion—is complete, the parties have thoroughly briefed the issue on
appeal, and our review of the DOC employees’ motion is de novo. Loun v. U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n, 26 Wn. App. 2d 228, 239, 525 P.3d 1280 (2023) (“In the interest of judicial
economy, an appellate court may consider an issue that is likely to occur following
remand if the parties have briefed and argued the issue in detail.”).
Grenning argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
the DOC employees on his conversion and trespass to chattels claims. The DOC
employees respond that summary judgment was proper because Grenning cannot
establish essential elements of either claim.
7 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
We review an order dismissing a complaint on summary judgment de novo,
undertaking the same inquiry as the trial court. Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265,
275, 979 P.2d 400 (1999). Summary judgment is properly granted where there is no
genuine issue as to a material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. CR 56(c). On summary judgment, once a moving party establishes this
initial burden, the nonmoving party must rebut the moving party’s contentions by setting
forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Seven Gables Corp. v.
MGM/UA Ent. Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986); CR 56(e). “But a question of
fact may be determined as a matter of law when reasonable minds can reach only one
conclusion.” Miller v. Likins, 109 Wn. App. 140, 144, 34 P.3d 835 (2001). Furthermore,
we may affirm an order granting summary judgment on any legal basis supported by the
record. Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, Inc., 196 Wn.2d 506, 514, 475 P.3d
164 (2020).
“Conversion involves three elements: (1) willful interference with chattel
belonging to the plaintiff, (2) by either taking or unlawful retention, and (3) thereby
depriving the owner of possession.” Burton v. City of Spokane, 16 Wn. App. 2d 769,
773, 482 P.3d 968 (2021). “The burden is on the plaintiff to establish ownership and a
right to possession of the converted property.” Meyers Way Dev. Ltd. P’ship v. Univ.
Sav. Bank, 80 Wn. App. 655, 675, 910 P.2d 1308 (1996).
8 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
Similarly, trespass to chattels requires an intentional interference with a party’s
personal property, without justification, that deprives the owner of possession or use. 16
DAVID K. DEWOLF & KELLER W. ALLEN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: TORT LAW AND PRACTICE §
14:15, at 692 (5th ed. 2020); see also Repin v. State, 198 Wn. App. 243, 268-69, 392 P.3d
1174 (2017) (recognizing trespass to chattels cause of action).
The primary objective of the DOC is “‘to provide the maximum feasible safety’
for the public, staff, and inmates.” Livingston v. Cedano, 164 Wn.2d 46, 52-53, 186 P.3d
1055 (2008) (quoting RCW 72.09.010(1)). To that end, the DOC secretary is authorized
to establish a method of reviewing all incoming mail for the purpose of confiscating
anything deemed to be contraband arriving in the prison mail system. RCW 72.09.530.
Contraband means, in part, items an inmate may not have in his possession as defined in
regulations adopted by the DOC. WAC 137-36-020(1); see also RCW 72.09.015(5).
Furthermore, RCW 72.02.045(3) permits a superintendent to “determine the types and
amounts of property that convicted persons may possess in department facilities.”
Notably, Grenning does not challenge the validity or constitutionality of any of these
implicated DOC policies.
Grenning’s tort claims fail because, as to each set of documents at issue, he cannot
show both a right to possess the item and an unlawful interference by the DOC
employees. The items identified in his complaint are: (1) a copy of a Supreme Court
decision concerning another inmate, (2) PRA materials rejected as duplicative, and (3)
9 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
original personal mail for which DOC provided photocopies instead. We consider each
claim in turn.
A. Supreme Court Decision
Grenning first contends the DOC employees converted a copy of a Supreme Court
decision. But DOC Policy 590.500(IV)(A)(3) states: “Individuals will not possess legal
materials (e.g., case law, legal documents) containing specific information about another
currently incarcerated Washington State individual.” (Emphasis added.) Inmates are,
however, permitted to possess another offender’s legal documents in the law library when
both offenders are present. DOC Policy 590.500(II)(D). Thus, pursuant to this
unchallenged DOC policy, Grenning was prohibited from possessing the Supreme Court
decision and he therefore cannot show that he had a right to possess a copy of the
decision. Indeed, he had no right to possess it anywhere other than the law library with
the offender at issue in the decision present.
Grenning argues the Supreme Court decision was not another inmate’s “legal
papers,” but was instead a published decision to be used as legal authority in briefing. He
also points to an assistant attorney general’s email suggesting there may not have been a
“solid basis to reject [the Supreme Court decision].” Appellant’s Br at 9, 34 (citing CP at
521)). But DOC Policy 590.500 explicitly prohibits inmates from possessing another
inmate’s legal materials, including case law, and one attorney’s subjective opinion that
“there is no basis to confiscate the material” is of no consequence here.
10 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
Accordingly, because Grenning cannot show a right to possess the Supreme Court
decision in his cell, his conversion and trespass to chattels claims as to that item fail as a
matter of law.
B. Duplicate Copies
Grenning next argues the DOC employees wrongfully withheld PRA documents
on the ground that they were duplicative. This claim also fails because the DOC had
regulatory authority to reject the mailing.
WAC 137-48-040(1)(f) states:
(1) Incoming mail to individuals may be disapproved for receipt for any one of the following reasons: .... (f) The mail contains items identified by the department secretary or designee as not authorized including, but not limited to, multiple copies of documents, mailings soliciting or offering games of chance, clippings from books or magazines.
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the rejection notice informed Grenning his incoming mail was being rejected
because it “contained 5 copies of the same document” and because the documents
“contained information on an individual currently under [DOC] supervision.” CP at 190.
Because the mailing contained multiple copies of the same document, Grenning was not
entitled to possess it under WAC 137-48-040(1)(f). Therefore, his conversion and
trespass to chattels claims related to the duplicate copies fail.
11 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
Grenning asserts that the seized documents were not duplicates and instead were
unique because they had different Bates numbers affixed to them. But the plain language
of WAC 137-48-040(1)(f) allows the department secretary or a designee to determine if
the mailing is not authorized. Here, the DOC employees determined that the documents
were duplicates and therefore rejected them under the regulation.
Grenning also contends the documents could not have been duplicates because
they were produced in response to a PRA request, and he reasons that DOC would have
violated the PRA if it disclosed multiple copies of the same record. But it is not a
violation of the PRA to disclose duplicate copies of public records. Instead, we have held
it is merely imprudent for agencies to make duplicative disclosures. See Mitchell v. Dep’t
of Corr., 164 Wn. App. 597, 607, 277 P.3d 670 (2011) (“[D]uplication of effort is outside
the agency’s obligation of ‘fullest assistance’ under the PRA.”); see also Rental Hous.
Ass’n of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, 165 Wn.2d 525, 536, 199 P.3d 393 (2009).
Thus, even if the materials came from a PRA response, it would not establish they were
necessarily distinct nor that DOC lacked authority to reject them as duplicates under the
WAC.
Because the DOC had authority to reject incoming mail containing multiple copies
of documents, Grenning cannot establish either a wrongful taking or a right to possess the
rejected duplicate materials. His tort claims based on those documents therefore fail.
12 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
C. Copies of Personal Mail
Finally, Grenning argues the DOC employees wrongfully withheld his original
personal mail and gave him photocopies instead. This argument fails because DOC
Policy 450.100 expressly permits that practice. The policy states: “In lieu of the original,
photocopies of the envelope and/or contents may be provided to the individual for safety
and security reasons” and “[p]roviding photocopies does not require a mail rejection
notice.” DOC Policy 450.100(IV)(E). Because DOC policy permitted the DOC
employees to provide photocopies instead of original mail, Grenning cannot show he had
a right to possess the original mail at issue while incarcerated. Without such a right, his
conversion and trespass to chattels claims fail.
Grenning argues the originals should not have been withheld because there was no
evidence the mail was contraband. But this argument mischaracterizes what occurred.
Grenning’s original mail was not rejected. Instead, it was photocopied pursuant to DOC
Policy 450.100. Grenning acknowledges he received photocopies of his mail. And
nothing in DOC Policy 450.100 conditions the use of photocopies on a determination that
the original mail is contraband. Thus, even assuming the mail was not contraband, it
would not establish that Grenning had a right to possess the originals.
Grenning also argues the DOC employees were required to provide rejection
notices under WAC 137-48-050(2). But that argument fails for the same reason.
13 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
Because the mail was not rejected, the rejection-notice requirement did not apply. See
DOC Policy 450.100(IV)(E).
Accordingly, Grenning cannot establish that he had a right to possess the original
personal mail at issue. Because he cannot prove this necessary element, summary
judgment on his conversion and trespass to chattels claims was proper.
After considering Grenning’s response to the motion along with the other
documents submitted, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing
Grenning’s claims on summary judgment. Grenning’s conversion and trespass to chattels
claims fail as a matter of law.
3. STRIKE PURSUANT TO RCW 4.24.430
Grenning argues the trial court erred when it issued a “strike”6 against him under
RCW 4.24.430. The DOC employees contend the court did not abuse its discretion when
it issued the strike. We agree with the DOC employees.
RCW 4.24.430 provides that, if a person serving a criminal sentence in a
correctional facility “seeks leave to proceed in state court without payment of filing fees
in any civil action . . . the court shall deny the request for [a] waiver . . . if the person has,
6 We adopt the parties’ use of the term “strike” for a qualifying dismissal under RCW 4.24.430. Although the term “strike” is not used in the statute, Division Two used that term in reference to the statute. See also In re Pers. Restraint of Troupe, 4 Wn. App. 2d 715, 727-29, 423 P.3d 878 (2018) (using the term “strike”).
14 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
on three or more occasions while incarcerated, . . . brought an action or appeal that was
dismissed by a . . . court on the grounds that it was frivolous or malicious.”7
While there is scant Washington case law addressing RCW 4.24.430, there is a
wealth of case law addressing frivolousness determinations. Under Washington law,
“ʻ[a] lawsuit is frivolous when it cannot be supported by any rational argument on the
law or facts.’” Skimming v. Boxer, 119 Wn. App. 748, 756, 82 P.3d 707 (2004) (quoting
Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Licensing, 88 Wn. App. 925, 938, 946 P.2d 1235 (1997)). “It
must be frivolous in its entirety; if any of the asserted claims are not frivolous, the action
is not frivolous.” Skimming, 119 Wn. App. at 756. We review a trial court’s
determination that an action is frivolous for an abuse of discretion.8 Alexander v.
Sanford, 181 Wn. App. 135, 184, 325 P.3d 341 (2014).
Here, in its order granting the DOC employees’ motion for summary judgment,
the court issued Grenning “a strike pursuant to RCW 4.24.430.” CP at 492. Although
the court’s written order does not contain the court’s reasoning for the strike, Grenning
7 “The text and legislative history of RCW 4.24.430 show that the legislature’s intent when it enacted that statute was to conserve state resources and reduce abusive inmate litigation. The statute penalizes inmates who have a history of filing frivolous or malicious lawsuits by effectively preventing them from proceeding at public expense in state court.” Id. at 734. 8 Grenning argues review of the court’s decision to issue him a strike is de novo. Though there is no case law directly addressing what standard of review applies to a court’s decision to issue a strike pursuant to RCW 4.24.430, a trial court’s determination that an action is frivolous is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
15 No. 41148-6-III Grenning v. Nelson
failed to challenge any of the DOC policies related to his tort claims. Without
challenging those underlying policies, Grenning’s claims could not be supported by any
rational argument in law or facts.
Grenning argues that his prior lawsuits and litigation have been “overwhelmingly
successful.” Appellant’s Br. at 39-40. But Grenning’s past successes do not prove that
his current lawsuit is not frivolous.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued Grenning a strike under
RCW 4.24.430.
CONCLUSION
Although we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by incorrectly applying
the rules related to timing of a motion to enlarge time, we nonetheless affirm the order
granting the DOC employees’ motion on summary judgment.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________ Staab, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________ _________________________________ Hill, J. Cooney, J.