In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
NEIGHBORHOODS UNITED, ) ) Respondent, ) WD87236 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) JULY 29, 2025 MONIQUE VAUGHN, ) ) Appellant. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable Jessica Agnelly, Judge
Before Division Three: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Janet Sutton, Judge
Monique Vaughn ("Vaughn") appeals from the trial court's judgment regarding a
tract of real property subject to the Missouri Abandoned Housing Act.1 The judgment
granted Vaughn's request for restoration of possession of the property pursuant to section
447.638 conditioned on Vaughn reimbursing Neighborhoods United for approved costs
to rehabilitate the property in the amount of $184,969.18. Vaughn asserts that the trial
1 Sections 447.620 through 447.640. All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented through April 26, 2024, the date of the judgment, unless otherwise indicated. court committed error: (1) in denying Vaughn's original motion to restore possession of
the property without holding a statutorily required hearing; and (2) in calculating the
amount of the reimbursement that Vaughn had to pay Neighborhoods United before she
could resume possession of the property. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background2
On September 16, 2022, Neighborhoods United, a Missouri not-for-profit
corporation organized and existing for the purpose of providing and enhancing housing
opportunities, filed a petition in the Jackson County Circuit Court ("trial court") pursuant
to section 447.622. The petition alleged that a home located at 7330 Flora Avenue,
Kansas City, Missouri ("Property")3 had been continuously unoccupied by persons with
lawful possession for at least six months, that taxes assessed on the Property were
delinquent, and that the Property was a nuisance and blight to the surrounding area. The
petition further alleged that Neighborhoods United intended to rehabilitate the Property.
Neighborhoods United's petition asked the trial court to declare that the Property had
been abandoned, to approve its rehabilitation plan, to grant it temporary possession of the
Property, and to direct the court administrator to issue a deed conveying title of the
2 "In the appeal of a bench-tried case, we view the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment, disregarding evidence and inferences to the contrary." Copper v. Ringen, 671 S.W.3d 409, 412 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting Sweeney v. Ashcroft, 652 S.W.3d 711, 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). 3 The Property is legally described as:
The North 20 feet of Lot 1088 and the South 32.50 feet of Lot 1089, MARLBOROUGH HEIGHTS, a subdivision in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, according to the recorded plat thereof. 2 Property to Neighborhoods United upon completion of rehabilitation if no owner
regained the right to possession pursuant to section 447.638.
The petition named Vaughn and the estate of her father, as each owned a one-half
interest in the Property. The petition also named the City of Kansas City, as the Property
was subject to liens in the City's favor for unpaid sewer and water service. After the
petition was filed and served, Neighborhoods United secured an order from the trial court
permitting it to enter the Property in order to develop a rehabilitation plan and to secure
the Property.
The trial court held a rehabilitation proposal hearing on February 1, 2023.
Neighborhoods United's executive director ("Executive Director"), who is also the
principal of Kimble's Design and Contracting Company ("Kimble's"), was the only
witness. The Executive Director testified that the Property had been abandoned for
approximately twenty years and needed significant rehabilitation. According to the
Executive Director, the Property had been overtaken by animals, vandalized by people
stealing copper, and damaged by smoke and fire. The Executive Director testified that
the interior of the Property needed to be gutted and remodeled. The Property also
required repairs to the exterior, including concrete work, landscaping, and a new roof,
gutters, and garage doors. The Executive Director testified that he had prepared an
estimate for the Property's rehabilitation on behalf of Kimble's in the amount of $76,015.
The evidence later established that this estimate was prepared before the Executive
Director or Kimble's fully appreciated the extent of required rehabilitation.
3 On February 2, 2023, the trial court entered an order finding that the Property is
abandoned; that the Property has been continuously unoccupied by persons with lawful
possession for more than six months; that the Property's real estate taxes are delinquent;
and that the Property is a nuisance and a blight on the surrounding area. The order found
that Neighborhoods United had demonstrated at the rehabilitation proposal hearing that it
has adequate resources to rehabilitate the Property and that its rehabilitation plan is
feasible. The order approved Neighborhoods United's rehabilitation plan, granted
Neighborhoods United temporary possession of the Property, and ordered Neighborhoods
United to file quarterly reports pursuant to section 447.636.
On March 14, 2023, Vaughn, in her individual capacity and in her capacity as the
personal representative of her father's estate, filed a motion for restoration of possession
of the Property pursuant to section 447.638 ("March 2023 Motion for Possession"). The
March 2023 Motion for Possession alleged that, after taking possession of the Property,
Neighborhoods United removed personal property and deposited the personal property on
the Property's front lawn. The March 2023 Motion for Possession alleged that Vaughn
has the resources necessary to rehabilitate the Property. The March 2023 Motion for
Possession asked the trial court to vacate its February 2, 2023 order and to restore
possession of the Property to Vaughn to be rehabilitated.
On April 17, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the March 2023 Motion
for Possession. No hearing was conducted in advance of the entry of this order, although
Vaughn had requested a hearing in the March 2023 Motion for Possession.
4 On August 8, 2023, Vaughn filed a second request for restoration of possession of
property pursuant to section 447.638 ("August 2023 Petition for Possession"). The
August 2023 Petition for Possession disputed "any and all expenditures paid by
[Neighborhoods United] . . . to Kimble's . . . as [Neighborhoods United] has failed to file
all quarterly reports to the [trial court] as required by [section] 447.636." The August
2023 Petition for Possession asked the trial court to hold a hearing "to determine any
compensation . . . in accordance with [sections] 447.636-447.638, so that [Vaughn] can
regain possession of [the Property] as she has the capacity and the resources to complete
rehabilitation of the Property."
Ten days later, Neighborhoods United filed an answer to the August 2023 Petition
for Possession, and alleged that its rehabilitation of the Property was approximately 95
percent complete, and that approximately $158,000 had been spent to date on the
rehabilitation. On August 28, 2023, Neighborhoods United filed its first, and only, report
of rehabilitation pursuant to section 447.636. The report included an invoice from
Kimble's in the amount of $158,965, which itemized the work completed to that point.
On October 31, 2023, Neighborhoods United filed a motion for judgment granting
a court administrator's deed ("Motion for a Court Administrator's Deed").
Neighborhoods United alleged that it had completed rehabilitation of the Property, and
asked for the entry of a judgment directing the court administrator to execute a deed
transferring title of the Property to Neighborhoods United. While the Motion for a Court
Administrator's Deed was pending, the estate of Vaughn's father was closed, and Vaughn
became the sole owner of the Property.
5 The trial court held a hearing on March 22, 2024, on Vaughn's August 2023
Petition for Possession and on Neighborhoods United's Motion for a Court
Administrator's Deed. The trial court reviewed photographs that depicted the condition
of the Property before and after its rehabilitation. The trial court reviewed an October
2023 invoice from Kimble's that reflected that the actual cost to complete the
rehabilitation of the Property had been $186,355, plus a 15 percent management fee of
$25,953.25, for a total of $214,308.25. The Executive Director testified that the standard
construction management fee in the industry is 20 percent. The trial court reviewed a
copy of a check in the amount of $6,410.61 from Neighborhoods United to the City of
Kansas City to secure a release of its lien on the Property, and a copy of check in the
amount of $912.32 from Neighborhoods United to "Collections Department" to pay
delinquent 2022 real estate taxes. The trial court also reviewed a letter approving
Vaughn for a $133,000 loan to rehabilitate the Property. In addition, Vaughn testified
that she has the financial means to reimburse Neighborhoods United for rehabilitation of
the Property, though she argued that the amount Neighborhoods United was attempting
to recover for rehabilitation was "astronomical." Vaughn testified that she had
previously received a $70,000 bid that would have been sufficient to render the Property
habitable.
The trial court issued its judgment on April 26, 2024 ("Judgment"). The Judgment
found that other than a second "roofing cost" totaling $6,225, and half of the "electrical
wiring" cost, the itemized costs submitted in Neighborhoods United's August 28, 2023
rehabilitation report were reasonable. The Judgment found that additional costs for
6 outside railing and sheetrock incurred since the rehabilitation report was filed, and
included in Kimble's October 2023 invoice, were reasonable. The Judgment thus found
that Neighborhoods United incurred reasonable costs to rehabilitate the Property in the
total amount of $154,475, and that this amount should be increased by a 15 percent
management fee. The Judgment also found that Neighborhoods United was entitled to be
reimbursed $6,410.61 for the amount paid to release the City of Kansas City's lien, and
$912.32 for the amount paid for delinquent 2022 taxes. Collectively, the Judgment found
that Neighborhoods United was entitled to be reimbursed in the total amount of
$184,969.18.
The Judgment granted Vaughn's August 2023 Petition for Possession to the extent
it requested restoration of possession of the Property; ordered Vaughn to reimburse
Neighborhoods United $184,969.18 within sixty days as a condition to resuming
possession of the Property; and denied Neighborhoods United's Motion for a Court
Administrator's Deed.
Vaughn appeals. Additional facts will be addressed as relevant to the discussion
of Vaughn's points on appeal.
Standard of Review
Our review of a court-tried case is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30
(Mo. banc 1976). Nat'l Hist. Soul Jazz Blues Walker Found. v. AltCap, 681 S.W.3d 202,
209 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). We will affirm the trial court's judgment "unless there is no
substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it
erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Murphy, 536
7 S.W.2d at 32. The appellant bears the burden of proving trial court error. Nat'l Hist. Soul
Jazz Blues Walker Found., 681 S.W.3d at 209.
In reviewing the trial court's factual determinations, we view the evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment. Id.
"The trial [court] has absolute discretion as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight
of their testimony is a matter for the trial court, and its findings on witness credibility are
never reviewable by the appellate court." Id. (quoting Blair v. Blair, 147 S.W.3d 882,
886 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004)). Challenges to the trial court's declarations of law or
application of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
Analysis
Vaughn presents two points on appeal. We address them separately.
Point One: Failure to Conduct a Hearing Before Denying March 2023 Motion for Possession
In her first point on appeal, Vaughn asserts that the trial court committed error in
denying her March 2023 Motion for Possession without first conducting a hearing as
required by section 447.638 ("Point One"). Vaughn claims that, had a hearing been
conducted, she "would have been able to prove in March 2023 [that] she had the capacity
and the resources to complete the rehabilitation of the Property without the loss of all of
her personal property and without the trespass and interference of Neighborhoods
United." [Appellant's Brief, p. 23] Vaughn argues that, had the trial court conducted a
hearing and found Vaughn's evidence credible, the trial court would have restored
Vaughn's possession of the property; she would have rehabilitated the Property; she
8 would have compensated Neighborhoods United for its partial rehabilitation of the
Property as the trial court deemed reasonable and necessary; and the case would have
been terminated.
Vaughn filed the March 2023 Motion for Possession pursuant to section 447.638,
which provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he owner [of property subject to the Missouri
Abandoned Housing Act] may petition the circuit court for restoration of the property
and, upon due notice to the plaintiff organization [previously granted possession for the
purpose of rehabilitating the property], for a hearing on such petition." The trial court did
not conduct a hearing on the March 2023 Motion for Possession though a hearing was
requested in the Motion. Instead, the trial court entered an order denying the Motion,
noting that Neighborhoods United "was granted temporary possession" of the Property on
February 2, 2023. Vaughn took no action to bring the error of denying the Motion
without a hearing to the trial court's attention.4
In order to preserve a claim that a trial court has failed to comply with a statutory
mandate, the appellant must have timely raised the error in the trial court. In Interest of
K.G.K., 709 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025). To timely raise an error in the trial
court, "a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, [must]
make[] known to the court the action that the party desires the court to take or objections
to the action of the court and grounds therefor." Rule 78.09.5 In other words, a party
4 In the Judgment, the trial court noted that it is "unclear" why a hearing was not granted before the March 2023 Motion for Possession was denied. 5 All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I--State, 2024 unless otherwise noted. 9 must call the alleged error to the trial court's attention and give the trial court an
opportunity to rule on the question. In Matter of Spruill, 709 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Mo. App.
S.D. 2025). "Because appellate courts merely review for trial errors, there can be no
review of a matter which has not been presented to or expressly decided by the trial
court." Id. at 443.
Vaughn acknowledges that she never raised this issue with the trial court, but
argues nonetheless that Point One is preserved for appellate review pursuant to section
510.310 because it questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Judgment.
This is patently incorrect. Point One does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence,
and instead argues that the trial court committed legal error by denying the March 2023
Motion for Possession without first conducting a hearing as required by section 447.638.6
Vaughn's Point One on appeal is not preserved for appellate review.
Even if we could overlook the obvious preservation issue attendant to Point One,
we would reject Vaughn's request to reverse the Judgment and remand for the trial court
6 Thus, Vaughn's brief does not conform to Rule 84.04(e)'s requirement that the argument for each claim of error include "a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; [and] if so, how." In addition to this violation of Rule 84.04, Neighborhoods United correctly points out that Vaughn's Brief fails to comply with Rule 84.04(c) in that the statement of facts does not include specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal and is not "a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument." Neighborhoods United also correctly asserts that neither of Vaughn's points relied on identify the applicable Murphy v. Carron ground for reversal in violation of Rule 84.04(d)(1). However, Vaughn's brief is not "so deficient that it fails to give notice to this Court and to the other parties as to the issue presented on appeal." Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo. banc 1998)). As such, we have elected to review the merits of Vaughn's appeal. 10 to conduct a section 447.638 hearing on her first request for restoration of possession of
the Property. Vaughn filed a second request for restoration of possession pursuant to
section 447.638 (the August 2023 Petition for Possession) and requested a hearing. Her
second request for restoration of possession made no mention of the denial of her first
request without a hearing. On March 22, 2024, Vaughn was afforded a hearing on the
August 2023 Petition for Possession, and was thus afforded the very relief she seeks on
appeal.
At this juncture, reversing the Judgment to hold an additional hearing could have
no effect. While the timing of the statutorily required hearing was delayed, the issues
before the trial court were the same: "whether the owner has the capacity and the
resources to complete rehabilitation of the property if such work has not been completed
by the organization," and if such work has been completed by the organization, the
"proper compensation to the organization for its expenditures, including management
fees, based on the organization's report to the court." See section 447.638. By the time of
the March 22, 2024 hearing, Vaughn's ability to rehabilitate the Property on her own had
been rendered moot as Neighborhoods United had completed the rehabilitation of the
Property. And though the amount expended by Neighborhoods United to partially
rehabilitate the Property as of March 2023 would no doubt have been less than the
amount subsequently spent to fully rehabilitate the Property as approved in the Judgment,
the fact remains that the rehabilitation work is now completed. Vaughn's ability to secure
restoration of possession of the Property requires her to reimburse the amount incurred to
fully rehabilitate the Property, rendering the amount incurred as of March 2023
11 irrelevant. The trial court's error in failing to conduct a statutorily required hearing on the
March 2023 Motion for Possession has been rendered harmless. See Lin v. Clark, 666
S.W.3d 270, 277 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) ("This Court will find reversible error only when
it materially affects the merits of the action with a firm belief that the . . . judgment is
wrong. In other words, a party must not only demonstrate error but also show
prejudice.") (quoting Lollar v. Lollar, 609 S.W.3d 41, 47 (Mo. banc 2020)) (citation
omitted).
Point One is denied.
Point Two: Evidentiary Support for the Judgment
Vaughn's second point on appeal challenges the evidentiary support for the
Judgment's reimbursement award to Neighborhoods United in the amount of $184,969.18
("Point Two"). Point Two reads as follows:
The trial court erred in ruling that Neighborhoods United should be reimbursed in the amount of $184,969.18 because there is a lack of evidence to substantiate the trial court's finding when the judgment is against the weight of admitted evidence and stipulations from both parties in that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court, the original rehabilitation plan of Neighborhoods United was approved in the amount of $76,015.00, the failure of Neighborhoods United to file required quarterly reports of progress and costs thereof, Neighborhoods United's failure to submit reliable evidence at trial above $11,617.38 left the trial court with no evidence within which to arrive at the Vaughn reimbursement sum of $184,969.18, which in and of itself does not key into any evidence submitted in the case and is not within the range of credible admitted evidence.
Point Two is far from a model of clarity.
Rule 84.04(d)(1) requires a point relied on to include three components: (1)
"[i]dentify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges;" (2) "[s]tate
12 concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and" (3)
"[e]xplain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support
the claim of reversible error." Point Two identifies the reimbursement award as the trial
court action Vaughn challenges, but asserts that the legal basis for the challenge is both
"a lack of evidence to substantiate" the award, and a claim that the award is "against the
weight of admitted evidence."
These are two distinct claims of legal error. See Southside Ventures, LLC v. La
Crosse Lumber Co., 574 S.W.3d 771, 783 n.4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) ("[A] substantial-
evidence challenge . . . and an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge . . . are
distinct claims.") (quoting Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 199 n.11 (Mo. banc 2014)). "A
challenge of 'insufficient evidence' requires the appellant to demonstrate that there was no
substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision as opposed to a challenge that the
trial court's judgment was 'against the weight of the evidence,' which presupposes that
there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment." Cerna-Dyer v. Dyer, 540 S.W.3d
411, 415 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). A point relied on that collapses a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment with a claim that the judgment is
against the weight of the evidence is impermissibly multifarious. Millstone Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Nithyananda Dhyanapeetam of St. Louis, 701 S.W.3d 633, 641 n.5 (Mo.
banc 2024). Multifarious points relied on preserve nothing for appeal and are subject to
dismissal. Carron v. Schabbing, 707 S.W.3d 807, 811 n.1 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024).
We nonetheless elect to gratuitously review Vaughn's Point Two on appeal
because the argument developing the point is limited to challenging whether there is
13 substantial evidence to support the reimbursement award. "Substantial evidence is
evidence that, if believed, has some probative force on each fact that is necessary to
sustain the [trial] court's judgment." Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at 199. Evidence has a probative
force if it makes the existence of a material fact more or less likely. Id. To prevail on a
substantial-evidence challenge, the appellant "must demonstrate that there is no evidence
in the record tending to prove a fact that is necessary to sustain the [trial] court's
judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 200. In the argument portion of her Brief, Vaughn
complains: (1) that the trial court did not have evidence to determine rehabilitation
expenses because Neighborhoods United did not file quarterly reports as required by
section 447.636; (2) that no evidence supported a reimbursement award greater than
$76,015, the amount approved by the trial court in its February 2, 2023 order; (3) that no
evidence supported the inclusion of a 15 percent management fee in the reimbursement
award; and (4) that no evidence supported a reimbursement award beyond the amount of
$20,922.94 reflected in invoices and receipts entered into evidence at the March 22, 2024
hearing. We address these contentions separately.
Vaughn's second and fourth contentions are plainly without merit when the
"substantial evidence" analytical framework is applied. Section 447.638 addresses the
calculation of rehabilitation expenses following the complete rehabilitation of a property
by a not-for-profit organization pursuant to the Missouri Abandoned Housing Act.
Section 447.638 provides in relevant part:
If the court determines that the rehabilitation work has been completed by the organization . . . , the court shall then determine proper compensation to the organization for its expenditures, including management fees, based on
14 the organization's reports to the court. The court, in determining the proper compensation to the organization, may consider income or receipts received from the property by the organization.
During the March 22, 2024 hearing, the trial court had the benefit of
Neighborhoods United's August 28, 2023 rehabilitation report which advised that the
rehabilitation work was close to being complete, and which attached a detailed invoice
from Kimble's in the amount of $158,965. In addition, during the March 22, 2024
hearing, the trial court had the benefit of Kimble's final invoice, which was filed on
October 31, 2023 with Neighborhoods United's Motion for a Court Administrator's Deed,
and which added the cost of additional completed work, including an amount for exterior
railing and interior sheetrock. The final invoice also included a 15 percent project
management fee charged by Kimble's. The trial court heard testimony from the
Executive Director about the assumptions made by Neighborhoods United regarding the
state of the Property when submitting its initial rehabilitation plan to the trial court; the
true condition of the Property before its rehabilitation, as discovered by Neighborhoods
United when it began rehabilitating the Property; the work necessary to make the
Property habitable; and the expenses incurred in rehabilitating the Property. In addition,
the trial court received exhibits showing the physical condition of the Property before and
after its rehabilitation.
This evidence was more than substantial to support the trial court's ultimate
determination that the reasonable cost to rehabilitate the Property, including a 15 percent
fee and amounts paid to secure the release of a lien and to pay delinquent taxes, was
15 $184,969.18. Vaughn's second and fourth challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the reimbursement award are without merit.
Vaughn's first challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the awarded
reimbursement amount is also without merit. Vaughn complains that because
Neighborhoods United failed to file quarterly reports required by section 447.636 and
referenced in section 447.638, the trial court had "no evidence" to support the
reimbursement award. Vaughn is correct that section 447.636 requires a not-for-profit
organization rehabilitating a parcel of property to "file a quarterly report of its
rehabilitation and use of the property, including a statement of all expenditures made by
the organization and all income and receipts from the property for the preceding
quarters." Vaughn is also correct that Neighborhoods United did not abide by this
statutory directive, and instead filed a report on August 28, 2023, when the rehabilitation
work was almost 95 percent complete.
However, Vaughn cites no authority for the proposition that the failure to file
quarterly reports as required by section 447.636 forecloses the right to recover costs
reasonably incurred to rehabilitate a property as a matter of law. Certainly, nothing in
section 447.636 suggests that a penalty will be imposed if quarterly reports are not filed.
We do not find that Neighborhoods United was foreclosed as a matter of law from
recovering its reasonable rehabilitation costs merely because it failed to file quarterly
reports, and instead relied on a single report filed when rehabilitation was approximately
95 percent complete, as supplemented by an invoice reflecting additional rehabilitation
costs thereinafter incurred. Substantial evidence supported the reimbursement award
16 despite Neighborhoods United's failure to submit quarterly rehabilitation reports.
Vaughn's first contention challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
reimbursement award is without merit.
Finally, Vaughn's third contention complains that no evidence supported including
a 15 percent management fee in the amount of the reimbursement award. Vaughn's
contention is facially belied by section 447.638 which expressly provides that a trial court
"shall" determine proper compensation for completed rehabilitation work, and "shall"
award a management fee. In Urban Renewal of K.C. v. Bank of New York, 289 S.W.3d
631 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), the owner of property argued that the not-for-profit
organization that rehabilitated the property was not entitled to either a contractor's fee or
a management fee because the not-for-profit organization was not a contractor, and did
not rent the property to any tenants as to support an award of a management fee. We held
that "proper compensation," as the phrase is used in section 447.638, includes a
contractor's fee, regardless of whether the not-for-profit organization was a general
contractor, if the evidence establishes that the not-for-profit organization hired a general
contractor to oversee the rehabilitation. Id. at 636. We also held that the evidence did
not support a "management fee" because the not-for-profit organization never rented the
property to anyone. Id.
Here, the evidence established that Neighborhoods United retained Kimble's as a
general contractor. It was thus proper for the trial court to include a 15 percent
"contractor's fee" in the reimbursement award. Though the Judgment referred to the fee
as a "management fee," that is a harmless matter of semantics. It is clear from the
17 evidence that the trial court awarded the 15 percent fee as a contractor's fee, as we found
to be appropriate in Urban Renewal. The Judgment's inclusion of a 15 percent fee in the
reimbursement award was supported by substantial evidence.
Point Two is denied.
Conclusion
The Judgment is affirmed.
Cynthia L. Martin, Judge
All concur