Neese v. Arpaio

397 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27414, 2005 WL 3021804
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedNovember 9, 2005
Docket05-0083 PHX NVW(MEA)
StatusPublished

This text of 397 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (Neese v. Arpaio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Neese v. Arpaio, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27414, 2005 WL 3021804 (D. Ariz. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WAKE, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. # 6).

Background

Plaintiff, while incarcerated in the Mari-copa County Durango jail, filed a pro se civil rights complaint (Doc. # 1) on January 6, 2005, alleging violation of his civil rights by Defendant while Plaintiff was detained at Maricopa County jail facilities. 1 On April 12, 2005, the Court ordered Defendant to answer Plaintiffs allegation that Defendant violated Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights by serving him inadequate meals and spoiled food, and by subjecting him to overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions. (Doc. # 3).

Defendant waived service and filed a motion to dismiss on July 7, 2005. (Doc. # 6). Defendant asserts that the complaint must be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by pursuing his claims through the Maricopa County jail inmate grievance process prior to filing his section 1983 complaint. Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. # 9) to the *1180 motion to dismiss on August 2, 2005, asserting that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies because he had been prevented from doing so by jail officers. On August 15, 2005, Defendant filed a reply (Doc. # 10) to the response.

After considering the pleadings regarding the motion to dismiss, in an order entered September 14, 2005, the Court noted that an inmate plaintiffs section 1983 claims may be considered exhausted if the plaintiff was foreclosed from accessing the administrative grievance process by jail officers. (Doc. # 13). The Court allowed Plaintiff until October 7, 2005, to provide a supplemental declaration in response to the motion to dismiss delineating the exact circumstances leading to Plaintiffs conclusion that his claims were not grievable. 2

In response to the Court’s order, Plaintiff submitted identical sworn and notarized affidavits to the Court on September 28, 2005 and October 5, 2005. (Doc. # 14 & Doc. # 15). Defendant filed a response to Plaintiffs affidavits on October 24, 2005. (Doc. # 16).

Discussion

A. Standard for granting a motion to dismiss

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.2002); Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996). Additionally, pro se complaints are held to a less strict standard than those drafted by counsel. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). It is not appropriate to dismiss a pro se prisoner’s civil rights action unless it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id.See also Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir.1987).

B. Exhaustion

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statute provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003 & Supp.2005). This language has been interpreted to require “that an inmate must exhaust [available remedies] irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002).

A plaintiff must fully exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a section 1983 complaint. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.2002). To fully exhaust a section 1983 claim, a prisoner must pursue his inmate grievance to the highest administrative level available to him. See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir.2003); Harper v. *1181 Jenkin, 179 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999); Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 990-91 & n. 13 (D.Ariz. 2003).

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; establishing exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is not a pleading requirement or a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810, 124 S.Ct. 50, 157 L.Ed.2d 23 (2003); Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 675 (2d Cir.2004). Therefore, Defendants “have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. See also Morgan, 259 F.Supp.2d at 990-91 n. 13. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is treated as a matter in abatement and is properly raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. “In deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. “If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120.

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Related

Harper v. Jenkin
179 F.3d 1311 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Booth v. Churner
532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Jernigan v. Stuchell
304 F.3d 1030 (Tenth Circuit, 2002)
Akao v. Shimoda
832 F.2d 119 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
Miller v. Norris
247 F.3d 736 (Eighth Circuit, 2001)
Giano v. Goord
250 F.3d 146 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Galbraith v. County Of Santa Clara
307 F.3d 1119 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
Mark Mitchell v. Martin F. Horn
318 F.3d 523 (Third Circuit, 2003)
Giano v. Goord
380 F.3d 670 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Morgan v. Maricopa County
259 F. Supp. 2d 985 (D. Arizona, 2003)
Scott v. Gardner
287 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D. New York, 2003)
Brown v. Valoff
422 F.3d 926 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Wyatt v. Terhune
315 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
397 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27414, 2005 WL 3021804, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neese-v-arpaio-azd-2005.