Neefeldt v. Tompkinson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Neefeldt v. Tompkinson

288 A.D.2d 198, 732 N.Y.S.2d 351, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10496

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 5, 2001

StatusPublished

This text of 288 A.D.2d 198 (Neefeldt v. Tompkinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Neefeldt v. Tompkinson, 288 A.D.2d 198, 732 N.Y.S.2d 351, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10496 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), dated December 6, 2000, as denied that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. The plaintiffs commenced this action on November 16, 1999, pursuant to the revival provisions of General Municipal Law § 205-e, as amended in 1999. The revival provisions of the 1999 amendment to General Municipal Law § 205-e apply to the instant action, which was commenced on or before June 30, 2000 (see, Schiavone v City of New York, 92 NY2d 308, 314; Marrero v City of New York, 275 AD2d 304, 305; Giblin v City of New York, 267 AD2d 127). Altman, J. P., Friedmann, Schmidt and Adams, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), dated December 6, 2000, as denied that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5).

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. The plaintiffs commenced this action on November 16, 1999, pursuant to the revival provisions of General Municipal Law § 205-e, as amended in 1999. The revival provisions of the 1999 amendment to General Municipal Law § 205-e apply to the instant action, which was commenced on or before June 30, 2000 (see, Schiavone v City of New York, 92 NY2d 308, 314; Marrero v City of New York, 275 AD2d 304, 305; Giblin v City of New York, 267 AD2d 127). Altman, J. P., Friedmann, Schmidt and Adams, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

288 A.D.2d 198, 732 N.Y.S.2d 351, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10496, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neefeldt-v-tompkinson-nyappdiv-2001.

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