Navas Chabran v. Santiago Nieves

666 F. Supp. 16, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7414
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 24, 1987
DocketCiv. 85-0922(JP)
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 666 F. Supp. 16 (Navas Chabran v. Santiago Nieves) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Navas Chabran v. Santiago Nieves, 666 F. Supp. 16, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7414 (prd 1987).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Gonzalo Navas Chabrán brought this action for back pay, damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief against Alejandro Santiago Nieves, individually and as Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges a cause of action arising under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution for this dismissal from his trust position of Regional Director II in Arecibo. He alleges he was fired because of his political affiliation.

The matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of its motion, defendant argues that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office.

The record reveals the following uncontested material facts.

Plaintiff, over 50 years of age, has been employed since February 9, 1977, in the Department of Natural Resources as a Specialist in Natural Resources IV, a trust position. On March 1, 1979, he was appointed Regional Director II in Arecibo, also a trust position. He received a letter of termination dated March 7, 1985, and signed by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources, Alejandro Santiago *17 Nieves. Plaintiff was provided no hearing prior to his termination. The OP-16 job classification form that describes plaintiffs position is^ signed by the plaintiff.

Defendant Alejandro Santiago Nieves is a member of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), the political party whose candidate, Rafael Hernández Colón, was elected Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the general elections held on November 6, 1984, and who presently holds said office. Santiago Nieves was appointed Secretary by Governor Hernández Colón after the latter had taken office as the Governor on January 2, 1985. In his capacity as Secretary, defendant is responsible for the administration of the agency, including personnel selection. Plaintiff is a member of the New Progressive Party (NPP), the political party whose candidate lost the general elections of November 6, 1984.

I. The Standard for

Summary Judgment

Summary Judgment is proper only if the pleadings and other evidence in the record “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In passing on a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the record and draw inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976). With these principles in mind, we now examine defendant’s motion.

II. Qualified Immunity

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). On a motion for summary judgment, it is appropriate for a trial court to determine whether the law was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. De Abadía v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187 (1st Cir.1986). At the time of plaintiffs demotion, the law was clearly established that public employees are protected by the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and association from being discharged or demoted solely because of political affiliation, unless political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the office involved. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1294, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2686-87, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). In Branti and Elrod, the Supreme Court recognized that in certain positions of government employment, where an employee’s private political beliefs would interfere with the performance of his public duties, his first amendment rights could be required to yield to the state’s vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517, 100 S.Ct. at 1294; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 366, 96 S.Ct. at 2686. The issue we must decide is whether, under an objective analysis, the defendant was reasonable in believing party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for plaintiff’s position. De Abadía, supra, 792 F.2d at 1191.

Under the Branti-Elrod analysis, the threshold inquiry is to determine whether the position at issue relate to partisan political interests or concerns. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 240 (1st Cir.1986). See also Collazo Rivera v. Torres Gaztambide, 812 F.2d 258, 260 (1st Cir.1987). If that issue is satisfied, then we must determine whether the inherent responsibilities of the position are such that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the job. Jiménez Fuentes, 803 F.2d at 6; Collazo Rivera, 812 F.2d at 261.

The First Circuit has further expanded the threshold inquiry by addressing whether the agency involved “handled matters potentially subject to political differences and to focus upon how the plaintiff’s position influenced the resolution of such mat *18 ters.” Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir.1987). This inquiry is designed to eliminate from further consideration those positions involving “strictly technical or professional” functions. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258.

The Department of Natural Resources is an administrative agency within the Department of Transportation and Public Works.

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Bluebook (online)
666 F. Supp. 16, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/navas-chabran-v-santiago-nieves-prd-1987.