NATIONAL UNION INSURANCE CO. v. Mills

Court of Appeals of Georgia

NATIONAL UNION INSURANCE CO. v. Mills

109 S.E.2d 830, 99 Ga. App. 697, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 936

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMay 15, 1959

Docket37603

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 109 S.E.2d 830 (NATIONAL UNION INSURANCE CO. v. Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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NATIONAL UNION INSURANCE CO. v. Mills, 109 S.E.2d 830, 99 Ga. App. 697, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 936 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959).

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Opinions

[698]*698Gardner, Presiding Judge.

There was no contention regarding change in the condition of the employee. The question involved the respective liability of the two insurance carriers.

There is no provision relative to opening an award and granting a rehearing in such a situation, under Code § 114-106 et seq. There is no doubt as to' the liability of such insured employer to the claimant, but the question is only a matter of who pays the compensation.

When the agreement of the parties in September, 1956, was accepted by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation and made the award and order of the board (there being no appeal therefrom), it became conclusive and had the status of a judgment, there being no change in the condition of the claimant and no fraud involved. See Bourke v. U. S. Fidelity &c. Co., 187 Ga. 636 (1 S. E. 2d 728). See also Code §§ 114-106 and 114-111 and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Stephens, 76 Ga. App. 723 (47 S. E. 2d 108).

The approval by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation of an agreement between the parties for payment of compensation has the same effect as an award. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 199 Ga. 179 (33 S. E. 2d 336).

If the National Union Insurance Company is indebted to the Continental Casualty Company for any reason, such liability should be determined in a proper action and not by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation in the present proceeding.

It follows that the superior court erred in affirming the findings of fact and award of the full board. The agreement dated October 9, 1956, entered into in this case and the approval thereof constituted an award of the board dated October 16, 1956, and had the status and effect of a conclusive and binding-judgment. The case is therefore reversed with direction that the judge of the superior court enter an order directing the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation to vacate and set aside the award dated May 30, 1958, and that direction be further given to the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation k> order the Continental Casualty Company to resume paying compensation in accoi’dance with the original award of October 16, 1956, and until such time as the maximum compensation allowable by law [699]*699has been paid or until said award is set aside or modified in a manner provided by law.

Judgment reversed with direction.

Carlisle, J., concurs. Townsend, J., concurs specially.

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[698]*698Gardner, Presiding Judge.

There was no contention regarding change in the condition of the employee. The question involved the respective liability of the two insurance carriers.

There is no provision relative to opening an award and granting a rehearing in such a situation, under Code § 114-106 et seq. There is no doubt as to' the liability of such insured employer to the claimant, but the question is only a matter of who pays the compensation.

When the agreement of the parties in September, 1956, was accepted by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation and made the award and order of the board (there being no appeal therefrom), it became conclusive and had the status of a judgment, there being no change in the condition of the claimant and no fraud involved. See Bourke v. U. S. Fidelity &c. Co., 187 Ga. 636 (1 S. E. 2d 728). See also Code §§ 114-106 and 114-111 and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Stephens, 76 Ga. App. 723 (47 S. E. 2d 108).

The approval by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation of an agreement between the parties for payment of compensation has the same effect as an award. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 199 Ga. 179 (33 S. E. 2d 336).

If the National Union Insurance Company is indebted to the Continental Casualty Company for any reason, such liability should be determined in a proper action and not by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation in the present proceeding.

It follows that the superior court erred in affirming the findings of fact and award of the full board. The agreement dated October 9, 1956, entered into in this case and the approval thereof constituted an award of the board dated October 16, 1956, and had the status and effect of a conclusive and binding-judgment. The case is therefore reversed with direction that the judge of the superior court enter an order directing the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation to vacate and set aside the award dated May 30, 1958, and that direction be further given to the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation k> order the Continental Casualty Company to resume paying compensation in accoi’dance with the original award of October 16, 1956, and until such time as the maximum compensation allowable by law [699]*699has been paid or until said award is set aside or modified in a manner provided by law.

Judgment reversed with direction.

Carlisle, J., concurs. Townsend, J., concurs specially.

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109 S.E.2d 830, 99 Ga. App. 697, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 936, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-union-insurance-co-v-mills-gactapp-1959.

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