UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC ) PRESERVATION IN THE UNITED ) STATES, ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Case No. 25-4316 (RJL) v. ) ) NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _ ___ ___ ___ )
~ MEMORANDUM OPINION February 2'=> , 2026 [Dkt. #2]
The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States ("Plaintiff' or "the
National Trust") challenges the President's authority to destruct and construct the East
Wing of the White House without the prior approval of Congress and with private funds.
Plaintiff bases its challenge on a ragtag group of theories under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") and the Constitution. The President, not surprisingly, disagrees,
claiming that the White House is not covered by the APA and that his authority is statutory
in nature, not constitutional.
Unfortunately for Plaintiff, its challenge fails because the White House office in
question is not an "agency" under the APA and because Plaintiff did not bring the ultra
vires claim necessary to challenge the President's statutory authority to complete his
construction project with private funds and without congressional approval!
1 As such, unless and until Plaintiff amends its existing complaint to include the
necessary ultra vires claim, the Court cannot address the merits of the novel and weighty
issues raised by this statutory challenge, and Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction
must therefore be DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The White House Ballroom Project
The White House is the official residence of the President. Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 19]
,-r 25. It is part of President's Park, which is a federal park administered by the National
Park Service. Id. The White House is flanked by the East and West Wings. Id. ,-i 30.
Before its demolition in October 2025, the East Wing housed the offices of the First Lady
and contained a small theater. Id. ,-i,-i 30-33, 64.
On July 31, 2025, the White House issued a press release announcing plans for a
"White House State Ballroom." Id. ,-i 36; see also Ex. J to Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj.
[Dkt. #2-14]. According to the press release, the ballroom would be "approximately 90,000
total square feet," "substantially separated from the main building of the White House,"
and located on the site of the "small, heavily changed, and reconstructed East Wing." Ex. J.
The press release indicated that the President was "fully committed to working with the
appropriate organizations to preserving [sic] the special history of the White House," and
that the President had "held several meetings with members of the White House Staff, the
National Park Service, the White House Military Office, and the United States Secret
Service to discuss design features and planning." Id.
2 On October 20, 2025-without advance notice-President Trump posted on social
media that "ground ha[ d] been broken on the White House grounds to build the new, big,
beautiful White House Ballroom." Am. Comp1. ,r 51. On October 21, media outlets
reported that heavy machinery was tearing down the East Wing. Id. ,r 53. The entire East
Wing was demolished over the next few days. Id. ,r 64.
The site of the former East Wing is now "a bustling project site," with "heavy
construction machinery" and a "construction crane" present. Id. ,r,r 78, 81. Defendants
have indicated that "work on the footings and below-grade structural concrete" will
commence "in the East Wing area in February." Deel. of John Stanwich ("Stanwich Deel.")
[Dkt. # 14-6] ,r 20. "Above grade structural work is not anticipated to begin until April
2026, at the earliest." Id.
II. The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States
The National Trust is a private, charitable, educational non-profit chartered by
Congress. Am. Compl. ,r 4. Its purpose "is to further the historic preservation policy of
the United States and to promote the public's awareness of and ability to comment on any
activity that might damage or destroy our nation's architectural heritage." Id. The National
Trust "stewards twenty-seven historic sites" and "takes legal action to protect threatened
sites where necessary." Id. ,I 21. The National Trust "has thousands of members," who
"use, enjoy, derive personal and professional benefit from, and have a substantial interest
in preserving and protecting historic and cultural resources in Washington, D.C." Id. ,r 22.
After the demolition of the East Wing, the National Trust contacted the National
Park Service, the National Capital Planning Commission, and the Commission of Fine Arts
3 expressing concerns about the "massing and height of the proposed new construction." Id.
,r,r 54-55. The National Trust wrote that the ballroom could "permanently disrupt the carefully balanced classical design of the White House with its two smaller, and lower, East
and West Wings." Id. ,r 55. The National Trust "urge[d] the Administration and the
National Park Service to pause demolition until plans for the proposed ballroom [go]
through the legally required public review process." Id. ,r 56. Curiously, the National Trust
"received no response." Id. ,r 57.
III. This Lawsuit
On December 12, 2025, the National Trust sued the National Park Service and its
Acting Director, the Superintendent of the White House and President's Park, the
Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, the General Services
Administration, the Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration, and the
President ("Defendants"). See Compl. [Dkt. #1]. The National Trust brought claims under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Constitution, alleging that Defendants
had failed to consult with the National Capital Planning Commission and the Commission
of Fine Arts, comply with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and obtain
congressional authorization for the ballroom. See id. ,r,r 105-69. The National Trust
moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction halting construction of
the ballroom. Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. #2].
On December 15, 2025, Defendants filed their opposition brief. See Mem. in Opp'n
to Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' Opp'n") [Dkt. #15-1]. Defendants argued that the
"President possesses statutory authority to modify the structure of his residence, and that
4 authority is supported by background principles of Executive power." Id. at 2. Defendants
indicated that consultations with the National Capital Planning Commission and the
Commission of Fine Arts would "soon be underway." Id. Defendants attached a
previously-unpublished Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
and argued that these documents satisfied their procedural obligations under NEPA. See
Defs.' Opp'n at 20-21; Ex. IA to Defs.' Opp'n [Dkt. #14-2]; Ex. 1B to Defs.' Opp'n [Dkt.
#14-3]. And Defendants indicated that the ballroom construction was "now proceeding
under the leadership of the Office of the Executive Residence." Defs.' Opp'n at 6.
On December 16, 2025, I held a hearing on the National Trust's motion for a
temporary restraining order. See Dec. 16, 2025 Hr'g Tr. [Dkt. #18]. The following day, I
denied the National Trust's motion for lack of "irreparable harm before this Court can
consider plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction." Nat'/ Tr. for Historic Pres. v.
Nat'/ Park Serv., _ F. Supp. 3d _, 2025 WL 3672837, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2025)
(internal quotation marks omitted). I deferred my decision on the National Trust's motion
for a preliminary injunction and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs
addressing the following questions: "[1] Whether and to what extent, past Presidents have
obtained congressional authorization and/or regulatory approval for construction and
modifications to the White House structure and grounds. [2] Whether the President has
independent constitutional and/or statutory authority to construct a ballroom on White
House grounds. [3] Whether the entities directing the ballroom construction, including the
Office of the Executive Residence, are 'agencies' within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act." Id. at *2.
5 On December 29, 2025, the National Trust filed an amended complaint, see Am.
Compl., and its supplemental brief in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction,
see Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Pl. 's Suppl. Br.") [Dkt. #20]. The
National Trust added the Executive Office of the President, the White House Chief of Staff,
the Office of the Executive Residence, and the White House Chief Usher as Defendants,
and added a new claim alleging that placing responsibility for the ballroom with the Office
of the Executive Residence violated the separation of powers. See Am. Compl. ,r,r 17-20,
188-96.
On January 15, 2026, Defendants filed their supplemental brief. Defs.' Suppl. Resp.
Br. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' Suppl. Br.") [Dkt. #30]. In it,
Defendants for the first time disclaimed the President's constitutional authority to build the
ballroom and instead rested entirely on certain statutory authority! Id. at 12, 30. On
January 20, the National Trust filed its reply brief ("Pl.'s Reply") [Dkt. #33], and on
January 22, I held a hearing on the National Trust's motion for a preliminary injunction.
See Jan. 22, 2026 Hr'g Tr. [Dkt. #38].
LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded
upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant "must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest." Id. at 20.
6 ANALYSIS
I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
"[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first
determining that it has" "subject-matter jurisdiction." Sinochem Int 'l Co. v. Malaysia Int 'l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens/or Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)). Before reaching the parties' substantive arguments about the
APA and the Constitution, therefore, this Court must decide whether the National Trust has
established a "substantial likelihood of standing." Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vi/sack,
808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015). For the following reasons, I conclude that it has done
so.
To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must show (1) it has "suffered an injury in
fact" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent"; (2) the injury is "fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"; and (3) the injury is "likely" to "be
redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Deft. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(cleaned up). As an organization, the National Trust "can assert standing on its own behalf,
on behalf of its members or both." Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136,
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
The standing inquiry here begins and ends with associational standing. 1 "[A ]n
association has standing to bring suit on behalf ofits members when: (a) its members would
1 The National Trust also argues for organizational standing. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for TRO & Prelim. lnj. [Dkt. #2-1] at 36; Pl. 's Reply at 2-4; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982). Because I conclude that the National Trust has adequately demonstrated associational standing, I need not address the parties' organizational standing arguments at this time. 7 otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." WildEarth
Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298,305 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm 'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
To satisfy the first element, the National Trust must show that "at least one of its
members" has suffered an "actual or imminent" "injury-in-fact" that is "fairly traceable to
the challenged action" and "likely" to "be redressed by a favorable decision." Sierra Club
v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000)).
To do so, the National Trust relies on a declaration from Alison K. Hoagland, a
Washington, D.C.-based professor of history and historic preservation and member of the
National Trust. See Deel. of Alison K. Hoagland ("Hoagland Deel.") [Dkt. #2-3] ,r,r 2--4.
Hoagland has lived in Washington, D.C. for a total of over thirty years and currently lives
two miles from the White House in Capitol Hill. Id. ,r 9. She "travel[s] to the White House
neighborhood frequently" and "regularly walk[s] through portions of President's Park,
including Lafayette Square, in order to enjoy the historic buildings" and "the beauty of the
L'Enfant Plan." Id. She also "regularly view[s] the White House from the south side,
whether driving by on Constitution Avenue or walking on the Mall." Id. She has given
"walking tours ... on various aspects of Washington's historic architecture" and has
"published scholarly articles on the topic." Id. ,r 8. The White House is relevant to her
8 "research on more locally focused architecture" because the White House "drove
development around it" and was "on the leading edge of all improvements" in Washington.
Id.,r11. Hoagland intends to continue visiting President's Park roughly once a month. Id.
,r 12. She asserts that construction of a ballroom of the form and scale proposed by the President would disrupt her enjoyment and use of President's Park and cause her to "suffer
both professional and personal injuries, including to [her] aesthetic, cultural, and historical
interests." Id. ,r 13-14. The President's proposed ballroom would, in Hoagland's words,
"overshadow[]" the White House and "diminish [its] primacy," thereby disrupting the
message that "our president lives in a house." Id. ,r 13.
Based on her claims of aesthetic injury, Hoagland could sue in her own right. It is
well-settled that the "desire to use or observe" something, "even for purely [a]esthetic
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing." Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 562-63. Hoagland, who is a longtime D.C. resident and scholar of history and historic
preservation, "use[s] the affected area" around the White House and is the type of person
"for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by" the
ballroom. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 735 (1972)). She alleges that Defendants' construction of"a ballroom of the proposed
form and scale" would "cause permanent and irreparable harm to the White House and
President's Park," thereby damaging her own "aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests"
in the property. Hoagland Deel. ,r,r 13-14.
9 Moreover, Hoagland asserts more than a "vague desire" to visit the affected space
sometime in the future. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009). She
instead provides "specific facts and concrete plans," Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 146 F.4th 1144, 1157-58 (D.C. Cir. 2025), namely that she will
continue to visit President's Park "about once a month" to enjoy the historic character of
the setting and attend upcoming meetings in the neighboring Decatur House, see Hoagland
Deel. ,r 12. The construction of the planned ballroom would, as Hoagland alleges, diminish
the "architectural statement" of the White House, thereby undermining her enjoyment and
appreciation of the grounds. Id. ,i 13. These are "here-and-now injuries" that will
undoubtedly come to pass if construction proceeds as planned. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, 146 F.4th at 1157-58. Accordingly, Hoagland has demonstrated an "imminent"
injury-in-fact. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Indeed, Hoagland's declaration goes much further than the declaration relied upon
unsuccessfully by the plaintiff in Environmental Defense Fund v. FERC, 2 F.4th 953 (D.C.
Cir. 2021 ), which Defendants cite in their supplemental brief. Hoagland is not a mere
bystander who "incidentally views something unpleasant." Id. at 970. To the contrary,
Hoagland expressly articulates her "particularized connection to the land." Id. She
describes how she "derived aesthetic value" from the White House as it existed before the
construction and explains that her "future uses," including research and aesthetic
enjoyment, would be diminished by the President's proposed ballroom. Id. at 969. Further,
in Hoagland's personal view, the White House is "one of the most historically significant
buildings in the country" and "was designed to be a symbol of the new nation." Hoagland
10 Deel. il 10. To say the least, this is a far cry from an "eyesore" on the side of a road. Envt 'l
Def Fund, 2 F.4th at 969-70.
Our Circuit has routinely found Article III injury in similar circumstances. See
Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 66 (standing based on allegations of aesthetic and recreational
harms from "greater tanker traffic" in waterway); Sierra Club v. US. Dep 't ofTransp., 125
F.4th 1170, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (standing where train traffic caused "increased
disruption" to members' "homes and in nearby scenic areas"); Ctr.for Sustainable Econ. v.
Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (members who used waterways for
recreational purposes would suffer harm to "aesthetic interests" by "additional leasing" in
those waterways); WildEarth, 738 F.3d at 305-06 (members' "aesthetic interests in the
land" and "specific plans to visit the area regularly for recreational purposes" sufficient for
standing). 2
Hoagland's alleged harms are also "fairly traceable to the challenged action" and
likely to "be redressed by a favorable decision." Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 65. Defendants
do not address these elements. See Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 8-12. Indeed, there can be no
dispute that Hoagland's alleged aesthetic harm stems directly from construction of a
ballroom in the manner proposed by the President. And a decision from this Court halting
2 Defendants quibble with the intensity and frequency ofHoagland's alleged aesthetic interests because she lives "2 miles from the White House," "several times further away than the [Environmental Defense Fund] plaintiff'' lived from the metering station, and because Hoagland only intends to visit the White House area "once a month" instead of "several times a week." Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 10. Neither our Circuit nor the Supreme Court have parsed alleged aesthetic harms so finely for purposes of standing, and it would be incongruous for this Court to do so now. Defendants' objection that Hoagland's injury is not "sufficiently imminent" because "the East Wing plans are not finalized" is similarly meritless. Id. at 11. Construction is well underway, see Stanwich Deel. ,-i 20, and Defendants identify no authority for the proposition that an aesthetic injury must fully materialize before it may be cognizable. 11 that project for lack of statutory authority would redress Hoagland's alleged harm. In sum,
Hoagland has standing to sue on her own.
Having established that one of its members has standing, the National Trust must
also demonstrate that the interests it seeks to protect are "germane to the organization's
purpose." Ctr. for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at 596 (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343). It
has done so! The National Trust was established by Congress "to facilitate public
participation in the preservation of sites, buildings, and objects of national significance or
interest." 54 U.S.C. § 312102(a). It exists to "protect[] America's historic sites through
stewardship, advocacy, and direct assistance" and to "take[] legal action to protect
threatened sites where necessary." Am. Comp!. ,-r 21. As such, the National Trust has an
"obvious interest" in challenging the construction of a massive new ballroom on White
House grounds that could likely alter the aesthetic, cultural, and historical integrity of one
of the most historic sites in the country. Cf Ctr.for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F.3d
174, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety
Admin., 724 F.3d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (concluding that an organization "dedicated
to the protection and enjoyment of the environment" had an "obvious interest in
challenging" the authorization of a pesticide).
Finally, as Defendants do not dispute, this lawsuit does not "require[] the
participation of' Professor Hoagland. Ctr. for Sustainable Econ., 779 F.3d at 596 (quoting
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343). Indeed, "neither the claim asserted ... nor the relief
requested ... requires any [National Trust] member to participate as a named plaintiff in
the lawsuit." Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 861 F.3d at 182.
12 Accordingly, the National Trust has established a substantial likelihood of Article
III standing.
II. Availability of Judicial Review
Having concluded that the National Trust has standing, I may now consider whether
judicial review is available for the National Trust's claims. Defendants advance two
arguments to the contrary. First, Defendants argue that the Office of the Executive
Residence ("EXR") is not an "agency," so there is no "agency action" to enjoin under the
APA. Second, Defendants argue that the National Trust cannot bring freestanding
constitutional claims because its claims in the final analysis are statutory in nature.
Unfortunately for the National Trust, and based on the claims presently before the Court, I
agree with Defendants on these two points and conclude that I lack authority to reach the
merits of the National Trust's claims.
A. Administrative Procedure Act Claims
To find a likelihood of success on the National Trust's APA claims, the National
Trust must show that the relevant defendant is an "agency," such that there could be "final
agency action" or "agency action unlawfully withheld." 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(1).
According to Defendants, EXR, which is part of the Executive Office of the President, is
now "the entity managing the East Wing project." Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 13. I agree that
EXR is likely not an "agency" under the APA.
Our Circuit held in Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1995), that the "staff
of the Executive Residence is not an agency as defined in" the Freedom of Information
13 Act. Id. at 855. 3 Whether an entity that has been determined to be a "non-agency" can
subsequently become an agency by taking on agency responsibilities has not been resolved
by our Circuit. Compare Ryan v. Dep 't ofJust., 617 F.2d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Once
a unit is found to be an agency, this determination will not vary according to its specific
function in each individual case."), with Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisers, 762 F.2d
1038, 1042 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (suggesting that "[i]fthe President adds duties to an entity
which bring it outside the sole-function test, Congress would want the entity to be covered"
by FOIA). But even if EXR could be considered an agency due to the change in its
responsibilities, the current record does not support finding EXR an "agency." How so?
As a general matter, the Executive Office of the President is not an "agency" under
the APA. Am. Oversight v. Eiden, 2021 WL 4355576, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2021) (citing
United States v. Espy, 145 F.3d 1369, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). But certain entities within
the Executive Office of the President may be considered "agencies" if they "exercise[]
'substantial independent authority."' Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Podesta, 643 F. Supp. 3d
121, 126-27 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Armstrong v. Exec. Off of President, 90 F.3d 553,
557-58 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Courts consider "how close operationally the group is to the
President," "whether it has a self-contained structure," and "the nature of its delegat[ed]
authority." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Off
ofAdmin., 566 F.3d 219,222 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
3 The Freedom oflnformation Act ("FOIA") "incorporates and expands on the APA's definition of agency," Am. Oversight v. Biden, 2021 WL 4355576, at *6 n.6 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2021), so if EXR is not an agency under FOIA then it is not an agency under the APA. 14 Here, the limited record suggests that EXR has an "intimate organizational and
operating relationship" with the President himself. Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 560. Indeed, the
President directed EXR to manage the ballroom construction, see Deel. of Joshua Fisher
[Dkt. #30-1] ,i,i 7-8, and the National Trust has alleged that the President "is planning and
directing the construction of the Ballroom," Am. Compl. ,i 16; see also id. ,i 79 ("it was
reported that President Trump had been 'holding frequent meetings about [the Ballroom's]
design and materials"' and "personally select[ ed] the project's contractors" (first alteration
in original)). And while there are insufficient facts in the record to determine whether EXR
has a "self-contained structure," Competitive Enter. Inst., 643 F. Supp. 3d at 127, this factor
alone is not dispositive, see Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 559 (National Security Council had a
"firm structure, a staff, and a separate budget" but was not an agency (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Finally, EXR's responsibilities- "handling project management" for the
ballroom and "coordinating with NPS staff," Suppl. Deel. of Jessica Bowron [Dkt. #30-3]
,i 11-are distinguishable from the "delegat[ ed] authority" that has made certain entities
agencies, see Competitive Enter. Inst., 643 F. Supp. 3d at 127 (alteration in original); see
also Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Council on Environmental
Quality was an agency because it had authority to "coordinate federal environmental
programs," "issue guidelines to federal agencies," and "promulgate regulations"); Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Office of Science and Technology was an
agency because it took on the "function of evaluating federal programs").
15 For these reasons, EXR is likely not an agency under the APA, and the National
Trust therefore may not challenge EXR's actions under the APA. As a result, the National
Trust's APA claims are unlikely to succeed on the merits. 4
B. Constitutional Claims
Next, the parties dispute whether the National Trust's constitutional claims are
reviewable by this Court in equity-in other words, they dispute whether the National Trust
has a "cause of action" to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional actions by Defendants. As the
case now stands, under Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) and Global Health Council
v. Trump, 153 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2025), I have concluded that the National Trust lacks a
cause of action to assert its constitutional claims as presented. Therefore, I lack authority
to reach the merits of its statutory arguments.
The National Trust's principal constitutional argument is that Defendants'
construction of the ballroom usurps Congress's authority under the Property Clause. Am.
Compl. ,r,r 179-87. The National Trust also alleges that Defendants' reorganization of the
executive branch violates Congress's Article I power to "establish[] ... offices." Id.
,r,r 188-96. To obtain judicial review of their claims, the National Trust must have some basis
"to invoke the power of the courts," often referred to as having a "cause of action." See
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,239 (1979). For statutory claims, "private rights of action
4 Even if EXR were an agency, the National Trust's APA claims face additional hurdles. Defendants have represented that consultations with the National Capital Planning Commission and Commission of Fine Arts are ongoing, so those claims will likely become moot. And the National Trust's remaining procedural claim must overcome the "substantial deference" afforded to agencies in NEPA cases. Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 180 (2025). 16 to enforce federal law must be created by Congress." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
286 (2001). Though the National Trust invokes several statutes that it claims the President
is violating-including 40 U.S.C. § 8106, which prohibits the construction ofbuildings on
public grounds in the District of Columbia without congressional authorization, and 3
U.S.C. § 105(d)(l), which authorizes appropriation of funds for White House
maintenance-the National Trust has not argued that any of these statutes grant it a right
to sue to "judicially enforce" the statutes' requirements. Davis, 442 U.S. at 239.
Instead, the National Trust relies on a freestanding constitutional claim for
injunctive relief. But courts permit this kind of claim only when the claim is, in fact,
constitutional. To assess whether the National Trust may bring such a claim here, I must
determine whether "the underlying claim is properly characterized as statutory or
constitutional." Glob. Health Council, 153 F.4th at 14. If the claim is "properly
characterized as statutory," then it may not be "refram[ed]" as constitutional "to avoid
statutory limits on review." Id. (citing Dalton, 511 U.S. at 474).
Courts have recognized freestanding constitutional claims when the plaintiff
"challenge[s] the constitutionality of the statute itself," such as by arguing that there is
some structural constitutional defect. Id.; see also, e.g., Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220,
250 (2021) (reviewing separation-of-powers claim challenging statute's "for-cause
restriction on the President's removal authority"); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2, 492 (2010) (reviewing separation-of-powers claim
17 challenging statute with "dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board members").
The National Trust does not challenge the constitutionality of any of the statutes!
That forces the National Trust to confront the Supreme Court's decision in Dalton.
Dalton held that a plaintiff's claim that the President "violated the terms of [a statute] by
accepting procedurally flawed recommendations" could not be brought as a freestanding
separation-of-powers constitutional claim. 511 U.S. at 474. The Supreme Court clearly
explained that a "claim that the President exceeded his authority under [a statute] is not a
constitutional claim, but a statutory one." Id. at 476-77. "Our cases do not support the
proposition that every action by the President ... in excess of his statutory authority is ipso
facto in violation of the Constitution." Id. at 472.
Indeed, our Circuit recently applied Dalton to foreclose judicial review of a
"freestanding constitutional claim" alleging that "the government violated the Constitution
by infringing on the Congress's spending power through alleged violations of the 2024
Appropriations Act, the [Impoundment Control Act,] and the Anti-Deficiency Act." Glob.
Health Council, 153 F.4th at 17, 21. The Global Health plaintiffs' "alleged statutory
violations" were "the predicate acts for the constitutional claims because without an
appropriations statute there could be no improper impoundment." Id. at 15. These
"statutory claims c[ ould not] be transformed into constitutional ones." Id. at 16.
Here, the National Trust's constitutional claims are more "properly characterized"
as statutory! Id. at 14. The National Trust argues that the President "is wholly without
constitutional authority to build or demolish anything on federal grounds" and that "[t]here
is no statute that provides the President with the authority to demolish the White House or
18 construct a ballroom." Am. Compl. ,r,r 181, 184. Defendants themselves have disclaimed
any inherent constitutional authority and have instead argued that the President's authority
to construct the ballroom comes from a series of statutes. See Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 12 ("Nor
is the President relying here on constitutional authority[.]"), 28-35 (arguing that 3 U.S.C.
§ 105(d), 54 U.S.C. § 101101(2), 31 U.S.C. § 1321, and 31 U.S.C. § 1535 supply the
President's authority). Whether those statutes give the President authority to build the
ballroom is thus a statutory dispute! See Glob. Health Council, 153 F.4th at 14. The parties
dispute the scope of 3 U.S.C. § 105(d), see Pl.'s Suppl. Br. at 12-15; Defs.' Suppl. Br.
at 32-35, and whether 40 U.S.C. § 8106 may be read to constrain the President, see Defs.'
Suppl. Br. at 28-32; Pl. 's Reply at 8-11. Unfortunately for the National Trust, the Court's
equitable power to enjoin constitutional violations does not extend to this kind of statutory
dispute! See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 476-77; Glob. Health Council, 153 F.4th at 13; see also
Trump v. Sierra Club, 588 U.S. 930, 930 (2019) (staying injunction because "the
Government has made a sufficient showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of
action to obtain review of the Acting Secretary's compliance with Section 8005"). 5
The National Trust's reliance on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), see Pl.'s Reply at 23, is misplaced. "In Youngstown, the Government
disclaimed any statutory authority for the President's seizure of steel mills," so the "case
necessarily turned on whether the Constitution authorized the President's actions." Dalton,
5 The same goes for Plaintiff's unlawful reorganization claim. This claim is statutory because it is predicated on the statute "vesting [Congress's] authority over the management and regulation of the National Park System in the National Park Service." Am. Compl. 1190 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101). 19 511 U.S. at 473. Here, the situation is the exact opposite-Defendants have disclaimed
inherent constitutional authority to construct the ballroom. See Defs.' Suppl. Br. at 12, 30;
see also, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off of President, _ F. Supp.
3d _, 2025 WL 3042704, at *25 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2025) (Dalton did not preclude implied
equitable constitutional claims where the defendants "invok[ ed] the Article II Vesting
Clause, arguing that the President has inherent constitutional authority"), appeal filed,
No. 25-5476 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 31, 2025).
To be fair, the President's source of legal authority to construct the ballroom was
not apparent before the National Trust brought its motion. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ,r 45
(alleging that "President Trump said that he had been told by two men that, as President,
he could do anything he wanted to the White House" (cleaned up)). And to make things
murkier, Defendants initially suggested that there was a dispute about the President's
constitutional authority. See Defs.' Opp'n at I ("The Constitution makes the President of
the United States the head of the Executive Branch and the sole organ of American foreign
policy, and it requires the President to 'receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers."'),
15 n.6 (discussing the Reception Clause). But Defendants' subsequent abandonment of
any constitutional claims of authority places this case-as it now stands-squarely in
Dalton territory. See Jan. 22, 2026 Hr'g Tr. at 24:25-25:2; Dalton, 511 U.S. at 474 n.6.
The National Trust argues that Defendants' "reading of Dalton would insulate a
wide swath of genuinely constitutional claims from review simply because the executive
has claimed some statutory authority for the challenged action." Pl. 's Reply at 23. Indeed,
it strikes me as incongruous that Defendants' choice to make "expansive" statutory
20 arguments, see Jan. 22, 2026 Hr'g Tr. at 37:7, forecloses judicial review of those arguments
in the context of constitutional claims!
But as several courts have recognized, where the question becomes one of the
President's statutory authority to act, ultra vires review is the proper vehicle to bring such
a challenge. See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 4 72 ( "If all executive actions in excess of statutory
authority were ipso facto unconstitutional ... , there would have been little need in [Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)] for our specifying
unconstitutional and ultra vires conduct as separate categories."); Chamber of Com. of U.S.
v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reviewing claim that "presidential action-
not one, it should be added, even contemplated by Congress-independently violates
[another] statute" under ultra vires theory). 6
The National Trust unfortunately did not bring an ultra vires claim, and the parties
as a result have not briefed whether ultra vires review is available or whether Defendants'
conduct rises to the level of acting ultra vires. See Nuclear Regul. Comm 'n v. Texas, 605
U.S. 665, 681 (2025) (noting the Court has "strictly limited nonstatutory ultra vires review
to the painstakingly delineated procedural boundaries of [Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184
(1958)]" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Changji Esque/ Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40
F.4th 716, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (describing "demanding" standard for successful ultra vires
6 Recent cases challenging executive action have proceeded under ultra vires theories. See, e.g., Illinois v. Trump, 2025 WL 2886645, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order on ultra vires claim), stay denied in part and granted in part by, Illinois v. Trump, 155 F.4th 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2025), stay denied by, Trump v. Illinois, 146 S. Ct. 432,434 (2025); V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1369-70 (Ct. Int'l Trade) (granting summary judgment on ultra vires claim), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, 149 F.4th 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2025), aff'd sub nom., Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 2026 WL 477534 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2026). 21 claims). Thus, absent an amended complaint raising ultra vires claims, I cannot reach the
merits of the National Trust's novel and weighty statutory arguments.
CONCLUSION
The parties have jockeyed for the most legally advantageous position to either
support, or oppose, the injunction that is the object of this suit.
Unfortunately, because both sides initially focused on the President's constitutional
authority to destruct and construct the East Wing of the White House, Plaintiff didn't bring
the necessary cause of action to test the statutory authority the President claims is the basis
to do this construction project without the blessing of Congress and with private funds.
If Plaintiff is inclined to amend its complaint with the necessary ultra vires cause of
action to test the President's statutory authority, the Court will expeditiously consider it
and, if viable, address the merits of the novel and weighty issues presented.
Until then, however, I have no choice but to deny Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction for lack of likelihood of success on the merits.
For all the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that the National Trust's
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. #2] is DENIED.
An Order consistent with the above will issue with this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge