National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler

765 F. Supp. 937, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7231, 1991 WL 90881
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMay 28, 1991
Docket86 C 7888
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 765 F. Supp. 937 (National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7231, 1991 WL 90881 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HOLDERMAN, District Judge:

Plaintiffs National Organization for Women (“NOW”) and two women’s health centers brought this action against various antiabortion activists, antiabortion organizations, and a pathology testing laboratory alleging that defendants conspired to drive women’s health centers that perform abortions out of business through a pattern of concerted, unlawful activity in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and several pendent state claims.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, plaintiffs' second amended class action complaint alleges, inter alia, that defendants threatened and intimidated clinic personnel and patients, trespassed on clinic property, invaded clinics and damaged clinic equipment, blocked ingress and egress to clinics, destroyed clinic advertising, coordinated telephone campaigns to tie up clinic lines, *939 set up appointments under false pretenses to keep legitimate patients from making appointments, and established competing pregnancy testing and counseling facilities in the vicinities of the clinics.

Defendants Joseph Scheidler, Andrew Scholberg, Timothy Murphy, and the Pro-Life Action League, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

DISCUSSION

I. COUNT I: SECTION ONE OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT

Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint alleges. that defendants Scheidler, Ryan, Terry, Scholberg, Murphy, Wojnar, Migliorino, PLAL, PDAL, Operation Rescue, Project Life, and Vital-Med have restrained trade in violation of section one of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Defendants argue that the objective of their activities is “closing clinics by affecting public opinion, consumers’ choices, physicians’ revulsion, and legisators’ votes,” and “to convince others for non-economic reasons that the entire private abortion market ought to be banned, or ‘deeommodified.’ ” (Mem. in Support, pp. 13, 24.) Defendants assert that their activity “is non-economic but social, moral and political.” (Id. at 24.)

The threshold question is whether the Sherman Act was intended to cover the conduct alleged here. Given the unique issue presented by this case, guidance can be gleaned from an examination of United States Supreme Court cases concerning the application of antitrust laws to anticompeti-tive political conduct.

In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), the Supreme Court held that concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade in order to petition government officials are protected from antitrust liability. In Noerr, the defendant railroads engaged in a publicity campaign with the purpose of fostering the adoption and retention of laws that would be destructive of the trucking business. Id. 81 S.Ct. at 527. The Court characterized the publicity campaign as political activity and held that the “proscriptions of the [Sherman] Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.” Id. at 531. The Court refused to extend the Act to regulate political activities simply because they “have a commercial impact and involve conduct that can be termed unethical.” Id. Significantly, the Court pointed out the “essential dissimilarity” between the publicity campaign and “agreements traditionally condemned by § 1 of the [Sherman] Act.” Id. at 529.

Noerr immunity has been most recently discussed by the Supreme Court in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988) and F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 110 S.Ct. 768, 769, 107 L.Ed.2d 851 (1990) (hereinafter “D.C. Lawyers”). In Allied Tube, members of the steel industry packed an annual meeting of a private standard-setting association with new members solely to vote against a new type of electrical conduit that posed an economic threat to steel conduit. 108 S.Ct. at 1934-35. The Court found that the Noerr doctrine can immunize indirect as well as direct petitioning of the government. Id. at 1938. Applying Noerr, the Court focused on the context and nature of the anticom-petitive behavior. The Court compared the conduct at issue with conduct classically condemned by the Sherman Act. The Court denied petitioner the use of Noerr immunity because petitioner’s activity was the type of commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity determined by the antitrust laws themselves. Id. at 1939. Unlike Noerr, the behavior was not political activity that has traditionally been regulated with extreme caution or activity that bears little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1940.

The most recent Supreme Court case on Noerr immunity confirms the pivotal role that traditional anticompetitive conduct *940 plays in the doctrine’s application. In D. C. Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 110 S.Ct. 768, 769, 107 L.Ed.2d 851 (1990), a group of lawyers in private practice who regularly acted as court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants in District of Columbia criminal cases agreed to stop providing such representation until the District increased group members’ compensation. The Court held that the agreement was a boycott that “constituted a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” Id. 110 S.Ct. at 774. The horizontal agreement between the lawyers, who were in competition with one another prior to the boycott, constituted a “constriction of supply [which] is the essence of price fixing ... [and] ... was unquestionably a ‘naked restraint’ on price and output.” Id. at 774-75. Once again, the Court’s denial of Noerr immunity was based on its classification of the agreement as “classic” anticompetitive conduct as distinguished from political activity.

The court finds great similarity between this case and another case to which NOW was a party. State of Missouri v. Nat’l Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301

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765 F. Supp. 937, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7231, 1991 WL 90881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-organization-for-women-inc-v-scheidler-ilnd-1991.