National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews

418 F. Supp. 394, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14289
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 2, 1976
Docket73 Civ. 3348
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 418 F. Supp. 394 (National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 418 F. Supp. 394, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14289 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

Opinion

OPINION

FRANKEL, District Judge.

This case, on remand now “to conduct an Overton-type hearing,” National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 827, 96 S.Ct. 44, 46 L.Ed.2d 44 (1975), was brought in August of 1973, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against regulations of the Food and Drug Administration requiring that preparations of Vitamins A and D in excess of 10,000 IU (international units) per dosage unit and 400 IU per dosage unit, respectively, be restricted to prescription sale, and that such vitamins be labelled accordingly, 21 C.F.R. §§ 250.109 and 250.110 (1976). Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction was denied on September 25, 1973, 366 F.Supp. 1341 (S.D.N. Y.), aff’d, 491 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1973), and the regulations became effective on October 1,1973. Defendants’ subsequent motion for summary judgment was granted, 376 F.Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y.1974), a decision which has been, as noted, vacated and remanded. Moving at a rather leisurely pace, the parties have now submitted additional materials and arguments, supplementing those already before the court from the two previous motions. For the reasons hereinafter outlined, the regulations are upheld as not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and the complaint will be dismissed.

I.

A couple of procedural issues are presented at the threshold. Plaintiffs argue, on principle and under the terms of the mandate of the Court of Appeals, that Commissioner Schmidt should be subjected to cross-examination concerning the grounds on which he classified high-potency Vitamins A and D products as “drugs.” In addition, there is a question as to the scope of the “record” upon which the court should make its determination. On both subjects, the court is in disagreement with plaintiffs’ position.

A. “The great developer is responsibility.” 1 That familiar bit of Brandéis wisdom remains vital. Time and travail, even Watergates, should and must not close it from our minds. There may be imaginable occasions when judges ought rightly to summon high agency officials to undergo cross-examination about the legislative premises underlying their formally published rules. There may even be occasions when legislators could be commanded to do likewise. But the instances would surely be rare, marked by circumstances of some extraordinary character.

An Overton-type hearing is not an open invitation, much less a direction, to cast aside this familiar learning, recognized for administrative decisionmaking since United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941). The case for which the present “hearing” is named recognizes, first, the limited circumstances in which the administrator’s mind may be probed by examination, and, second, the discretionary nature of such an examination even when the exceptional circumstances have been met. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420-21, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 — 43, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). 2 The Court of Appeals demanded no more in this case, 512 F.2d at 703 (“including such affidavits or testimony as to the Commissioner’s reasoning as the court deems necessary”).

*397 In this light, the court requested, and received an affidavit from the Commissioner. Plaintiffs have pitched various arguments against the affidavit, and these have been considered. Their contention that they are entitled to more — entitled to cross-examination the Commissioner as well — is unfounded as a matter of law, and unsupported, insofar as it is a matter of discretion, by any demonstration of great necessity. The niceties of the Administrative Procedure Act were nowhere neglected in this case. The indicia of due notice, full deliberation, and general regularity are all present. There is nothing so irregular or peculiar as to justify the expedient of having the agency head grilled on the witness stand about what he thought he knew, what he now thinks he believes, and how he may have reasoned, in making the mixed judgments of fact, policy, and law which underlay the decision to define these high-potency vitamin pills as “drugs.”

B. The question about the “record” is narrower, and still less gripping. The record originally before this court consisted of the materials produced by the “notice and comment” provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act — to wit: (1) the official notices by the F.D.A., with cited reference materials incorporated by reference; (2) the voluminous comments, some 45 folders full, received in response; and (3) the promulgated rules and their published explanations. The agency contends that this satisfies the proper definition of the record. 3 Even so, in a spirit of accommodation, the Commissioner has now placed before the plaintiffs and the court other material found in his files, namely, correspondence with third parties antedating the proposed regulations and postdating the final regulations, a few additional medical arti-cíes, and five other “miscellaneous” pieces of paper. The only items withheld from plaintiffs are a sheaf of some two dozen papers, all consisting of internal F.D.A. memoranda or proposed drafts of the original notice. 4

Plaintiffs press for these papers as well, contending that they should be treated as a part of the agency record. 5 The contention is not persuasive. What plaintiffs seek are presumptively privileged documents, whose privacy is left untouched by the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption from disclosure for “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). There is no reason to think that the need to compile a “record” for a judicial review proceeding makes this limitation inapplicable, especially in light of the general proscription against probing the mind of the administrator. And there is, in any event, no showing of justification for the kind of invasion plaintiffs propose.

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557 F.2d 325 (Second Circuit, 1977)
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418 F. Supp. 394, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14289, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-nutritional-foods-assn-v-mathews-nysd-1976.