National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Morris

402 S.W.2d 297, 1966 Tex. App. LEXIS 2705
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 20, 1966
Docket11388
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 402 S.W.2d 297 (National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Morris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Morris, 402 S.W.2d 297, 1966 Tex. App. LEXIS 2705 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinions

ARCHER, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court, based on findings of a jury, in favor of appellee for $2250.00 for benefits due from the accidental death of the named insured, $270.00 statutory penalty of 12% of the principal amount and $800.00 attorney’s fee, with interest at the rate of 6% and costs.

The policy was written upon the life of L. Dow Morris, husband of plaintiff Wood-ie Mae Morris. The policy provided for the payment of a face amount of $750.00 with no suicide exclusions, and which had been paid prior to this suit.

The controversy in this case centers around the payment of additional benefits equal to three times the face amount of the policy if the death of the deceased resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means. These accidental triple indemnity payments are subject to a suicide exclusion.

The case was submitted to a jury on special issues who found that the death of the deceased resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, and that the death was not caused solely by cyanide poisoning, and [299]*299that cyanide poisoning did not contribute to the death.

Appellant’s position is that the cause of death was not established by competent evidence.

The appeal is based on seventeen points but may be consolidated into two divisions. The first division is directed to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings to give fair notice as to the cause of the death of Mr. Morris.

Paragraph five of the pleadings is as follows:

“5. Shortly after noon on October 27, 1963, L. Dow Morris was riding as a passenger in an automobile proceeding east on Beauregard Avenue in the City of San Angelo. At the intersection of Beauregard and Oakes Street, the Morris automobile was struck by a truck traveling North on Oakes Street. In the grinding accidental collision between the truck and the automobile in which L. Dow Morris was riding, L. Dow Morris was thrown about the interior of the automobile, striking his head, chest and other parts of his body on the hard objects of the automobile, causing L. Dow Morris to suffer certain physical injuries, specifically a concussion of the brain, multiple bruises, contusions and lacerations, damaging and injuring the bones, muscles, ligaments, tendons, nerves, blood vessels and soft tissues of his head, neck and chest, all of which severally or in concurrence proximately and directly caused his resulting death, which death occurred in the emergency room of the Shannon Hospital at 1:45 p. m. that day.”

Paragraph six is as follows:

“6. Plaintiff would further show that the injuries described in Paragraph Five (5) above directly and proximately and independently of all other causes, caused the death of L. Dow Morris, which death resulted from the bodily injuries effected solely through the accidental collision described before, and which death was caused solely by external, violent and accidental means.”

We believe that the pleading does give defendant a fair notice as to the cause of death of Mr. Morris.

The defendant knew of the accident and the death of Morris on the day following and at a time when the body had not been placed in the casket, and defendant’s agent had already picked up the policy.

The trial court’s ruling that the pleadings were sufficient will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse. A large measure of discretion is lodged in the trial court in passing on the exceptions to the pleadings. Southern Underwriters v. Hodges, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 707, er. ref.

Appellant’s remaining points may be considered as another division and disposed of together, since all the points are directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the jury, and the admission of the testimony of Dr. Robert Martinez that the accident was the cause of the death of Mr. Morris, over defendant’s objection that the witness did not have adequate factual basis to form an opinion either from actual observation and knowledge or from hypothetical questions based upon other evidence in the record.

The testimony of Dr. Martinez, in part, is:

Did you receive a call that date to the Emergency Room? a
Yes, sir, I did. S>
Whom did you administer to at the Emergency Room of the Shannon? ¡O
Mr. Dow Morris.
Mr. Dow Morris. Was he the only one?
No, sir. There were two others. >
And you administered to them too? ¡O
Yes, sir. >
Was one of them Mrs. Morris? ©
Yes, sir. ¡>
[300]*300Q Now, what we are interested in, Dr. Martinez, is the condition'of Mr. Dow Morris at the time you saw him there in the Emergency Room.
A Well, as I walked into the Emergency Room there was a very strong odor of cyanide. The nurse told me that he had taken cyanide poison; and I walked up to him and I was surprised to see him alive because of the strong odor of cyanide; and he was breathing, he had a pulse of 80, which was thready, and had no blood pressure. So immediately I started intravenous fluids to bring his blood pressure back up; however, he expired about five minutes after we started the fluids on him. I attempted external cardiac massage for a few minutes, and that did not help, and finally pronounced him dead.
Q You say he expired five minutes, about five minutes after you started the intravenous fluids?
A Yes, sir.
⅝ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ijs ¾?
Q What about his appearance, Dr. Martinez ?
A Well, he was quite pale all the time I was there, and when he expired he was very pale. He had several superficial lacerations about his face and had a bruise over his forehead.
Q What part of the forehead, sir?
A Over the—
Q Just show with your hand.
A More or less over the middle and right side (indicating).
Q A bruise?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was this rather pronounced or was it just a slight bruise?
A Oh, it wasn’t a severe bruise.
* * * * * *
Did he have cuts over his neck, on his throat? Ol
Yes, sir, on the sides.
On the sides of the throat?
Yes, sir.
Was the midportion of his face bruised or lacerated?
The what? c
The midportion of his face, Doctor, was it— a
I don’t recall. I just recall the bruise on his forehead.

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402 S.W.2d 297, 1966 Tex. App. LEXIS 2705, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-life-and-accident-insurance-co-v-morris-texapp-1966.