National Labor Relations Board v. Texas Utilities Co.

214 F.2d 732, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 3819
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJuly 9, 1954
Docket14865
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 214 F.2d 732 (National Labor Relations Board v. Texas Utilities Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Labor Relations Board v. Texas Utilities Co., 214 F.2d 732, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 3819 (5th Cir. 1954).

Opinions

DAWKINS, District judge.

This a petition by the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement order_ directing respondent, West Texas Utilities Company, to bargain with Electrical Workers Locals 898, 920 and 1044, AFL, called Union, dated August 25, 1953, under the National Labor Relations Act.1

Respondent based its refusal to bargain Upon some ten points, which really resolve themselves in two: (1) the arbitrary and inappropriate composition of bargaining unit, and (2) the unfair and biased conduct of the Board’s agents in hoIding the election.

1. On July 18, 1951, the Union initiated the creation of the unit by filing its application to represent “all power [734]*734plant employees” in employer’s production department, and excluding “office and clerical employees, guards and watchmen, professional employees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act”. Hearing was had on September 5th following, at which respondent opposed the suggested unit, insisting (1) that it should include not only employees in the power plants, but also those in the transmission, distribution and service departments, (2) that it should be enlarged by adding metermen, relay men, substation operators, patrolmen, radiomen, tank men and shop workers.

The Board approved the unit requested by the Union.

Respondent insists that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously, for the reason the order was not supported by substantial evidence, and was contrary to the Board’s practice and policy; that the only evidence at the hearing for determining the character of the unit was that by respondent which disclosed that the employees in its distribution, production, transmission and service departments were interchangeable and worked accordingly; that any other arrangement by which some of these employees were left out or placed in another unit would cause confusion and conflict in the matter of working conditions, wages, hours, etc. It also called attention to the fact that the Board had, in 1946, approved a unit embracing all employees contended for by respondent, but it appears m that instance it was done by consent of the parties. The Board further pointed out that on another occasion it had refused to approve a unit embracing a single plant of respondent.

An examination of the record discloses that some of the employees, in the categories contended for by respondent, were already represented in other units, and while a different set-up might have been more convenient for respondent and advantageous to some employees, the one selected cannot be said to be without reasonable basis. Of course, the employer’s methods of doing business and practices with respect to interehanging of employees, making up payrolls and dealing with its employees as to wages, hours and conditions of work, are entitled to consideration. One of the main purposes of the law is to insure “freedom in exercising their rights” by employees, and the Board’s action should not be disturbed except in a clear case of abuse of discretion. The power to select the unit has been committed to the Board by the Act and we do not find any arbitrary or gross abuse of that discretion. As was said by this Court in N. L. R. B. v. Smythe, 5 Cir., 212 F.2d 664:

“It is not denied that the broader bargaining unit contended for by respondent would be an appropriate unit. However, neither respondent nor this court has the function to determine whether a more appropriate unit than that certified by the Board would ‘assure the employees of the fullest freedom in exercising the nights guaranteed’ them by the Act. Congress has authorized the Board to make this determination and has vested m it a wide discretion to do so. Such determination is binding upon us unless the Board has abused this discretion or otherwise violated the mandate of the statute. We find no such abuse here ff

See also Packard Motor Car Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 U.S. 485, 491, 67 S.Ct. 789, 91 L.Ed. 1040.

Respondent complains that in notiee of the election the Board used expression “power house” employees instead of power plant> which it illegally attempted to change, thereby creating confusion among its employees as to who was entitled to vote. The attempted cor-rection was by telegram from the Board instructing the erasure of “house” and the insertion of “plant” when the very notice itself warned that no one had any power to make any change. It is true that there were some 213 eligible voters in the proposed unit and that only 152 actually voted. However, in the present state of the record we do not find sub[735]*735stantial proof that others were kept away from participating in the election because of this mistake in the notice in so far as the creation of the unit was concerned. We therefore conclude that the objection to the unit should be overruled.

2. The election ordered by the Board was held at 18 different places in a wide area, some separated by hundreds of miles, in the State of Texas, on Decern-ber 19 and 20, 1951, and on the latter date the results were immediately tabulated and certified by one of the Board’s three agents who conducted the election, John F. White, as follows:

“Approximate number of eligible
voters 213
“Void ballots 1
«Vnf-pc fnr Union 59
“Votes cast against Union 47
“Valid votes 106
“Challenged ballots 45
“Valid votes counted plus chai- , . b « t ifi »
(R 37)

On December 28th following, respondent filed its objections:

„ , ,, . , , (1) That there was a mistake in notice of election above mentioned which read'

“THOSE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:
„ . „ - , . All power house employees in em- . , . , x , ployer s production department who ^ were employed for 90 days immediately preceding November 29, 1951.” (Emphasis by the writer.)

Respondent contended that this was cal- . , . , ,, . , culated to contuse the employees as to . ,. .. . ,, . „ who was eligible, the expression power , „ , . ’ . ,,, house being a term unknown to the . , , ,, company, and never used by either the ., , ,, .j ■ company, its employees or the Union; ,, . .. j , • .• ,, -n , that it filed objections with the Board , - , , ,, m , and it was ordered by the Washington office that “house” be scratched out and “plant” substituted in spite of the fact that the notice itself stated plainly “This is the only official notice of this election and must not be defaced by anyone” ; and that this change and posting of the telegram from the Board, along with the notice, caused “utmost confusion as to who was eligible to vote”,

(2) That on several occasions more than one person was allowed in the polling places at a time, and that voting procedure, challenges, unions, etc., were fully discussed in the presence of persons voting and waiting to vote, which also added heavily to the “confusion and misdirection”.

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Bluebook (online)
214 F.2d 732, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 3819, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-labor-relations-board-v-texas-utilities-co-ca5-1954.