Stolz, Judge.
In the complaint as finally amended, Richard Berry, individually and as temporary administrator of the estate of Earnest Calvin Berry (his deceased son), Mary Berry, Bertha M. Berry and Joe L. Berry, sued National Indemnity Company, Juddy Rabun d/b/a Rabun Insurance Agency, and Richard Berry, as temporary administrator of the estate of Warren Brinson, in the Superior Court of Columbia County. The suit arose out of an automobile collision on October 17, 1970, in Jefferson County, Ga., in which Earnest Calvin Berry was killed while a passenger in a vehicle driven by Bertha Berry, the wife of Joe L. Berry, which was owned by Richard Berry. Warren Brinson, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision, was also killed thereby and was an uninsured motorist.
The record reveals that since 1967 Richard Berry had purchased liability insurance from defendant Juddy Rabun, d/b/a Rabun Insurance Agency (Rabun), in Wrens, Jefferson County, Georgia (R. 150) under an arrangement whereby Rabun would keep Richard Berry insured and allow Richard Berry to pay him from time to time. (R. 85, 135-137) Initially, Rabun placed Richard Berry’s liability insurance with Charter Oak (Travelers) Fire Insurance Co. In September, 1969, as the result of a substantial increase in premiums, Rabun and Richard Berry decided not to renew the Charter Oak policy and placed Richard Berry’s liability coverage with defendant National Indemnity Co. A liability policy was issued to Richard Berry by that company for the period October 16, 1969 to October 16, 1970. The record shows that, while Rabun had the authority to issue binders and policies for several insurance companies, he did not have any such authority from National Indemnity Co. The only entity in this state with authority to service, underwrite, sell, or produce insurance policies for National Indemnity Co. was Southern Insurance Underwriters, Inc., by and through W. C. Duesenberg. (R. 52) There was never a contractual relationship between [546]*546Rabun and National Indemnity Co. and/or Southern Insurance Underwriters, Inc. (R. 52, 86-87, 105)
When Rabun received the National Indemnity Co. policy on October 23, 1969, he sent the original to First State Bank, the auto lienholder, and a copy to Richard Berry with an annual premium quotation of $561. (R. 101) On October 30,1969, Richard Berry paid Rabun $100 on the premium (R. 102), but did not pay the full premium during the policy year. (R. 103-104) On September 14, 1970, Rabun wrote Richard Berry, "There is a balance on the ledger of $121.00. Your policy will expire October 16, 1970 and it will have to be renewed. Please let us hear what your wishes are in the matter.” (R. 105; Exhibit p. 6) Richard Berry denied receiving this letter. On September 23, 1970, Southern Insurance Underwriters, Inc., as agent for National Indemnity Co., notified Rabun of the policy’s expiration on October 16,1970, quoted the next year’s premium, advised that it could be paid in instalments, and enclosed a renewal application. (R. 58, 126; Exhibit p. 7) Richard Berry did nothing to renew his policy or keep it in effect, even though he knew the policy was to expire on October 16, 1970, and that he wouldn’t have any insurance after the date. (R. 149, 168) The collision in question occurred on Saturday, October 17, 1970. Richard Berry testified that on the following Monday he went to Rabun’s office and offered to pay the $121 and to renew the policy, but was refused. (R. 142).
The liability insurance policy had expired by its terms and could not be the basis of a suit against National Indemnity Co. "Most of the issues before us are controlled by general contract law, insurance being a matter of contract. Cherokee Credit Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 119 Ga. App. 579 (1) (168 SE2d 171). There is no greater sanctity and no more mystery about a contract of insurance than any other. The same rules of construction apply to it as to other contracts.’ Clay v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 97 Ga. 44, 53 (25 SE 417). Accord: North British &c. Ins. Co. v. Tye, 1 Ga. App. 380 (1) (58 SE 110). ' "It is well to keep in mind . . . that insurance is purely a matter of contract.” ’ Mitchell v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 57 Ga. App. 206, 208 (194 SE 921).” Parris & Son v. Campbell, 128 Ga. App. 165, 168 [547]*547(1) (196 SE2d 334). See also Code Ann. §§ 56-2402, 56-2403, 56-2407.
In Garner v. Govt. Employees Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 235, 236 (199 SE2d 350), this court quoted from Code Ann. § 56-2430.1(C) as follows: " '(1) No insurer shall fail to renew a policy to which this section applies unless a written notice of nonrenewal is mailed or delivered to the named insured, at the address shown on the policy, at least 20 days prior to the expiration date of the policy, . . .,’ and '(2) This subsection shall not apply . . .(c) if the insurer has manifested its willingness to renew by delivery a renewal policy, renewal certificate or other evidence of renewal to the named insured or his representative or by offering to issue a renewal policy, certificate or other evidence of renewal, or has manifested such intention by any other means. ’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) It then held, "While mailing alone as to a notice of intent not to renew is expressly provided by the statute to be a sufficient giving of that notice (Code § 56-2430.1(D)); yet no such express provision is made for the giving of the notice of willingness or intent to renew, so as to prevent the automatic renewal of the policy because of failure to give .the notice which could have been made by mailing alone. Under either of the well-known rules as to construction of legislative enactments expressio unius est, exclusio alterius, or expressum facit cessare taciturn, we cannot, by implication hold that the mere mailing, without receipt by the addressee, constitutes notice of intent or willingness to renew.” P. 236 (2).
Here it should be noted that in Garner the purported intention to renew was mailed to, but not received by, the insured. In the case before us, the intention to renew was mailed to Rabun Insurance Agency, as representative of Richard Berry. There is no issue presented under the evidence before us as to the receipt of this notice by Rabun Insurance Agency or that the insured, Richard Berry, knew that his policy was going to expire on October 16, 1970, unless he renewed it by payment of premium or that Rabun Insurance Agency was not the agent of National Indemnity Co. but merely an insurance broker and agent for Richard Berry.
[548]*548In deposition, Juddy Rabun, d/b/a Rabun Insurance Agency, deposed that he did not have binding authority with National Indemnity Co. (R. 86), that he did have binding authority with Travelers Insurance Company (R. 87), that he has binding authority with all the companies he has a contract with — St. Paul Fire and Marine, General Insurance Co. of America, Southern Guaranty Insurance Co., Safeco Insurance Co. (R. 88), that he did not represent National Indemnity Co. and had no authority to bind, cancel, renew, or issue endorsements of any kind (R. 105), that he had no authority to act for National Indemnity Co. (R. 111-112), that he received no instructions from the company (R. 114), that he has no working arrangement or connection with National Indemnity Co. (R. 114-115, 124).
"Ordinarily an insurance agent represents the company, as stated in the title Insurance § 138, 32 C. J. p. 1053 notes 60-62, whereas an insurance broker represents insured, as stated in the same title § 140, 32 C. J. p. 1054 note 73-p 1055 note 81.
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Stolz, Judge.
In the complaint as finally amended, Richard Berry, individually and as temporary administrator of the estate of Earnest Calvin Berry (his deceased son), Mary Berry, Bertha M. Berry and Joe L. Berry, sued National Indemnity Company, Juddy Rabun d/b/a Rabun Insurance Agency, and Richard Berry, as temporary administrator of the estate of Warren Brinson, in the Superior Court of Columbia County. The suit arose out of an automobile collision on October 17, 1970, in Jefferson County, Ga., in which Earnest Calvin Berry was killed while a passenger in a vehicle driven by Bertha Berry, the wife of Joe L. Berry, which was owned by Richard Berry. Warren Brinson, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision, was also killed thereby and was an uninsured motorist.
The record reveals that since 1967 Richard Berry had purchased liability insurance from defendant Juddy Rabun, d/b/a Rabun Insurance Agency (Rabun), in Wrens, Jefferson County, Georgia (R. 150) under an arrangement whereby Rabun would keep Richard Berry insured and allow Richard Berry to pay him from time to time. (R. 85, 135-137) Initially, Rabun placed Richard Berry’s liability insurance with Charter Oak (Travelers) Fire Insurance Co. In September, 1969, as the result of a substantial increase in premiums, Rabun and Richard Berry decided not to renew the Charter Oak policy and placed Richard Berry’s liability coverage with defendant National Indemnity Co. A liability policy was issued to Richard Berry by that company for the period October 16, 1969 to October 16, 1970. The record shows that, while Rabun had the authority to issue binders and policies for several insurance companies, he did not have any such authority from National Indemnity Co. The only entity in this state with authority to service, underwrite, sell, or produce insurance policies for National Indemnity Co. was Southern Insurance Underwriters, Inc., by and through W. C. Duesenberg. (R. 52) There was never a contractual relationship between [546]*546Rabun and National Indemnity Co. and/or Southern Insurance Underwriters, Inc. (R. 52, 86-87, 105)
When Rabun received the National Indemnity Co. policy on October 23, 1969, he sent the original to First State Bank, the auto lienholder, and a copy to Richard Berry with an annual premium quotation of $561. (R. 101) On October 30,1969, Richard Berry paid Rabun $100 on the premium (R. 102), but did not pay the full premium during the policy year. (R. 103-104) On September 14, 1970, Rabun wrote Richard Berry, "There is a balance on the ledger of $121.00. Your policy will expire October 16, 1970 and it will have to be renewed. Please let us hear what your wishes are in the matter.” (R. 105; Exhibit p. 6) Richard Berry denied receiving this letter. On September 23, 1970, Southern Insurance Underwriters, Inc., as agent for National Indemnity Co., notified Rabun of the policy’s expiration on October 16,1970, quoted the next year’s premium, advised that it could be paid in instalments, and enclosed a renewal application. (R. 58, 126; Exhibit p. 7) Richard Berry did nothing to renew his policy or keep it in effect, even though he knew the policy was to expire on October 16, 1970, and that he wouldn’t have any insurance after the date. (R. 149, 168) The collision in question occurred on Saturday, October 17, 1970. Richard Berry testified that on the following Monday he went to Rabun’s office and offered to pay the $121 and to renew the policy, but was refused. (R. 142).
The liability insurance policy had expired by its terms and could not be the basis of a suit against National Indemnity Co. "Most of the issues before us are controlled by general contract law, insurance being a matter of contract. Cherokee Credit Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 119 Ga. App. 579 (1) (168 SE2d 171). There is no greater sanctity and no more mystery about a contract of insurance than any other. The same rules of construction apply to it as to other contracts.’ Clay v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 97 Ga. 44, 53 (25 SE 417). Accord: North British &c. Ins. Co. v. Tye, 1 Ga. App. 380 (1) (58 SE 110). ' "It is well to keep in mind . . . that insurance is purely a matter of contract.” ’ Mitchell v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 57 Ga. App. 206, 208 (194 SE 921).” Parris & Son v. Campbell, 128 Ga. App. 165, 168 [547]*547(1) (196 SE2d 334). See also Code Ann. §§ 56-2402, 56-2403, 56-2407.
In Garner v. Govt. Employees Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 235, 236 (199 SE2d 350), this court quoted from Code Ann. § 56-2430.1(C) as follows: " '(1) No insurer shall fail to renew a policy to which this section applies unless a written notice of nonrenewal is mailed or delivered to the named insured, at the address shown on the policy, at least 20 days prior to the expiration date of the policy, . . .,’ and '(2) This subsection shall not apply . . .(c) if the insurer has manifested its willingness to renew by delivery a renewal policy, renewal certificate or other evidence of renewal to the named insured or his representative or by offering to issue a renewal policy, certificate or other evidence of renewal, or has manifested such intention by any other means. ’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) It then held, "While mailing alone as to a notice of intent not to renew is expressly provided by the statute to be a sufficient giving of that notice (Code § 56-2430.1(D)); yet no such express provision is made for the giving of the notice of willingness or intent to renew, so as to prevent the automatic renewal of the policy because of failure to give .the notice which could have been made by mailing alone. Under either of the well-known rules as to construction of legislative enactments expressio unius est, exclusio alterius, or expressum facit cessare taciturn, we cannot, by implication hold that the mere mailing, without receipt by the addressee, constitutes notice of intent or willingness to renew.” P. 236 (2).
Here it should be noted that in Garner the purported intention to renew was mailed to, but not received by, the insured. In the case before us, the intention to renew was mailed to Rabun Insurance Agency, as representative of Richard Berry. There is no issue presented under the evidence before us as to the receipt of this notice by Rabun Insurance Agency or that the insured, Richard Berry, knew that his policy was going to expire on October 16, 1970, unless he renewed it by payment of premium or that Rabun Insurance Agency was not the agent of National Indemnity Co. but merely an insurance broker and agent for Richard Berry.
[548]*548In deposition, Juddy Rabun, d/b/a Rabun Insurance Agency, deposed that he did not have binding authority with National Indemnity Co. (R. 86), that he did have binding authority with Travelers Insurance Company (R. 87), that he has binding authority with all the companies he has a contract with — St. Paul Fire and Marine, General Insurance Co. of America, Southern Guaranty Insurance Co., Safeco Insurance Co. (R. 88), that he did not represent National Indemnity Co. and had no authority to bind, cancel, renew, or issue endorsements of any kind (R. 105), that he had no authority to act for National Indemnity Co. (R. 111-112), that he received no instructions from the company (R. 114), that he has no working arrangement or connection with National Indemnity Co. (R. 114-115, 124).
"Ordinarily an insurance agent represents the company, as stated in the title Insurance § 138, 32 C. J. p. 1053 notes 60-62, whereas an insurance broker represents insured, as stated in the same title § 140, 32 C. J. p. 1054 note 73-p 1055 note 81. An insurance agent during his employment sustains a fixed and permanent relation to the company he represents; he is clothed with general powers, and assumes responsibilities not conferred on, or assumed by, a broker; and he owes a duty and allegiance to the company employing him, and seeks patronage only for the profit and benefit of such company and is precluded from soliciting insurance business for others; whereas an insurance broker, as generally understood, owes no duty or allegiance to any particular corporation.” 12 CJS 9, Brokers, § 3.
"An insurance agent is one employed by an insurance company to solicit risks and effect insurance, and in some jurisdictions this definition is in effect given by statute. As defined in Brokers § 1, an insurance broker is one who acts as a middleman between insured and the company; one who solicits contracts from the public under no employment from any special company, but having secured an order places the insurance with the company selected by insured, or, in the absence of any selection by him, with the company selected by such broker.” 44 CJS 797, Insurance, § 136.
"An insurance agent, as far as insurer is concerned, [549]*549is a person expressly or impliedly authorized to represent it in dealing with third persons in matters relating to insurance, and an insurance solicitor is one who acts as a middleman between insured and insurer, and who solicits insurance from the public under no employment from any special company, but, having secured an order, places the insurance with a company selected by insured or, in the absence of any selection by him, with a company selected by the solicitor.” 44 CJS 797, Insurance, § 137. See also 44 CJS 798, 802, Insurance, §§ 139, 140.
Georgia case law has recognized the distinction between an agent for the insurer and one for the insured. See State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 75 Ga. App. 335 (4) (43 SE2d 277); Georgia Ins. Service, Inc. v. Wise, 97 Ga. App. 461 (103 SE2d 445); Sutker v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 648 (155 SE2d 694).
The purpose of Code Ann. § 56-2430.1(C), supra, is to provide the insured with notice as to the status of his policy. When the record affirmatively shows compliance with the statute by the insurer, knowledge of the policy’s status, and admitted inactivity and nonresponse by the insured to effect a renewal thereof, the law should not create a contractual relationship due to after-the-fact circumstances. On the date of the collision in question, the liability insurance policy issued by National Indemnity Co. to Richard Berry had expired and afforded no insurance coverage to its holder.
The trial judge erroneously granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment holding the defendant National Indemnity Co. liable to the plaintiffs for damages as a matter of law. The trial judge erred in failing to grant the defendant National Indemnity Co.’s second defense alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim against such defendant upon which relief can be granted (which is treated herein as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Code Ann. § 81A-112 (b)). The judgment of the trial court is reversed with instructions that judgment be entered sustaining defendant National Indemnity Co.’s second defense.
Judgment reversed.
Bell, C. J., Pannell, P. J., Deen, P. J., Quillian, Clark, Webb and Marshall, JJ., concur. Evans, J., dissents.
[550]*550Argued April 29, 1975
Decided October 17, 1975
Rehearing denied November 14, 1975
Barwick, Bentley & Binford, Warren W. Wills, Jr., for appellant.
George B. Rushing, for appellees.