National Forge & Ordnance Co. v. United States

139 Ct. Cl. 204
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 8, 1957
DocketNo. 132-56
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 139 Ct. Cl. 204 (National Forge & Ordnance Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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National Forge & Ordnance Co. v. United States, 139 Ct. Cl. 204 (cc 1957).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action to recover income and excess profits taxes paid for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1945.

In the fiscal year ending in 1946 the taxpayer sustained a net operating loss. Under the statute, it is permitted to carry back this net operating loss to reduce the income, first, of the second preceding taxable year, and, second, to the immediately preceding taxable year, etc. After the net operating loss has been applied against the income for the second preceding taxable year, the excess is then applied to the immediately preceding taxable year. Hence, in order to determine the amount the taxpayer is entitled to deduct from its income for the fiscal year ending in 1945, it is neces[206]*206sary to determine the amount by which the net loss carry-back exceeds the net income for 1944,1 if any.

1. In 1944 plaintiff had income derived in part from Government contracts. These contracts were renegotiated, and the amount of the excessive profits realized therefrom was settled in the year 1945. Plaintiff, however, deducted the amount of the excessive profits from its income for 1944, pursuant to a ruling of the Internal Revenue Bureau. (I. T. 3611; 1943 Cum. Bull. 978.) The propriety of the deduction of them in 1944 is the first question presented.

On October 21, 1942 Congress amended the 1939 Internal Revenue Code by adding section 3806, which in subsection (a) (1) provided that the contract price on Government contracts received or accrued in a taxable year should be reduced by the amount of excessive profits determined on renegotiation, whether the determination was made in the taxable year or not. In subsection (a) (3) it was provided that the amount of excessive profits repaid should not constitute a deduction in the year in which repaid or incurred.

Following the enactment of this section, the Bureau of Internal Revenue received an inquiry about the proper application of it in the computation of taxes for the year in which the contract price had accrued and for the year in which the excessive profits were repaid. In reply the Bureau issued I. T. 3611, supra. It permits a taxpayer on his return to report the amount of his income accrued on Government contracts within the year, reduced by the amount of excessive profits thereon, although determined in a later year, provided the taxpayer had not already filed his return and paid the taxes shown to be due thereon. This taxpayer had not filed its return, due to an extension of time for its filing, and, hence, it reported in 1944 the amount accrued under the Government contracts in that year, less the amount of excessive profits determined in the following year.

The statute (section 3806) did not give a taxpayer permission to file his return on this basis. In the preparation of his return a taxpayer was required to report the full amount accrued under his Government contracts within the [207]*207taxable year, although negotiations were pending on whether or not these profits had been excessive. This was because of the long standing rule, reaffirmed in United States v. Olympic Radio and Television, Inc., 349 U. S. 232, and Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U. S. 237, that in determining the amount accrued in a taxable year, you do not take into account events happening after the close of the taxable year. The statute only required the Commissioner, in auditing a taxpayer’s returns, to adjust its income in accordance with it. Under it, also, the taxpayer, who had reported on his return the entire income from renegotiated contracts, is permitted to file a claim for refund, based upon the reduction of his income by the excessive profits received by him and repaid.

But, the statute did not mention the presumably rare case where the determination that excessive profits had been received was made before the taxpayer had filed his return. In such case, to save the taxpayer from filing his return and paying the tax and then filing a claim for refund, I. T. 3611 permitted him to return his income from Government contracts within the taxable year, reduced by the amount of the repayment to be made in the subsequent year.

This is the ultimate result which section 3806 required, and I. T. 3611 merely permitted the taxpayer to do in the beginning that which would ultimately be done.

It was a departure from the principle of accruals on an annual basis, but it was a departure dictated by Congress.

At all events, it seems to have been well within the law for the taxpayer to have accrued in 1944 only the amount received on Government contracts, reduced by the amount it had to repay.

As stated, the Lewyt case, supra, reaffirmed the principle of accruals on an annual basis,, without taking into account events subsequently transpiring; but the Court in this case was not concerned with the proper application of section 3806 and I. T. 3611. The statute and the ruling make an exception to the annual accounting principle. Taxpayer’s income for 1944 should be computed accordingly.

2. The next question which the case presents is the proper computation of the excess profits tax for 1944, which section [208]*208122 (a), (b) and (d) (6) say must be deducted from the income of the second preceding taxable year before application of the net operating loss carry-back.

The Lewyt case says it must be computed on the income accrued within the taxable year. It is not necessarily the amount shown on the return, the court says, for items may not have been properly accrued. But the court said with equal clarity that events transpiring after the close of the taxable year were not to be taken into account. However, we must conclude that this means, “except those required by statute or valid regulation to be taken into account.” I. T. 3611 is a reasonable application of the statute, and we are, therefore, obliged to take it and the statute into account.

We hold, therefore, that in computing the excess-profits tax to be deducted from 1944 income, in order to determine the amount of the net loss for 1946 to be applied against it, we must compute it on its income accrued within the year, as extended by section 3806 and I. T. 3611.

After the deduction of these excess profits taxes, the net operating loss is to be applied against the remainder. If it exceeds the remainder, the excess is to be applied against 1945 net income.

We think this is in accord with the holding of the Olympic Radio and Television, Inc., and Lewyt Oorp., cases, supra.

Plaintiff’s 1945 net income must be computed on this basis.

8. Defendant says that that part of the excess-profits taxes for 1944 which were later refunded should be taxed in the year refunded or refundable, on the theory that the taxpayer received a tax benefit from the deduction of them from its 1944 net income. However, it concedes that this refund is not taxable unless it reduced the net income of the year in which they were deducted, and that section 23 (c) provides that excess profits taxes are not deductible in computing net income.

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