National Council of Railway Patrolmen's Union v. Sealy

56 F. Supp. 720, 1944 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2019
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 4, 1944
DocketCivil Action No. 302
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 56 F. Supp. 720 (National Council of Railway Patrolmen's Union v. Sealy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Council of Railway Patrolmen's Union v. Sealy, 56 F. Supp. 720, 1944 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2019 (S.D. Tex. 1944).

Opinion

KENNERLY, District Judge.

Since about December 1, 1940, the City of Galveston, in this District and Division, has owned and operated properties known as the Galveston Wharf Properties (formerly ‘ operated by the Galveston Wharf Company), consisting of an extensive system of approximately 50 miles of railway tracks, locomotives, and other rolling stock, roundhouses, repair yards, grain elevators, warehouses, cotton sheds, and wharves, etc. Such system is handled by and is under the general control and direction of defendants, George Sealy et al., who are called Trustees. Such City and/or such Trustees have in their employ numerous switchmen, engine men, firemen, maintenance men, etc. Also approximately 70 watchmen. Apparently such switchmen, engine men, firemen, maintenance men, etc., and their Labor Unions, on the one hand, and such Trustees and City, on the other hand, are not in disagreement as to the coverage of the Railway Labor Act as amended June 21, 1934, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq., and as to wages, etc., thereunder. But when such watchmen and the Local and National Labor Union to which they belong called upon such Trustees to treat with them with respect to a wage controversy or scale of wages, etc., the Trustees took the position that such watchmen are regularly appointed, bonded and sworn police officers of the City of Galveston, and not within the coverage of such Act. This suit, to which the City has not been made a party, seeking to compel the Trustees to treat with Plaintiffs, followed. This is a hearing of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and of the case on the merits.

The facts are substantially as follows:

(a) For many years prior to December 1, 1940, the Galveston Wharf Company, a private corporation, organized under the Laws of Texas, owned in part1 and operated these properties. It employed, in substantially the same way as they are now employed by the Trustees and City, a large number of switchmen, engine men, firemen, maintenance men, etc.

(b) The Wharf Company, in like manner, also employed a number of watchmen, and under an Ordinance of the City of Galveston, dated October 7, 1920, such watchmen were appointed Police Officers by the City, but were paid by the Wharf Company.[721]*7212 After the City purchased and its Trustees took charge of the properties, such watchmen were paid by the Trustees out of funds belonging to the City of Galveston,

(c) The watchmen who served the Wharf Company-and those who served and now serve the Trustees and City and who were as stated appointed police officers by the City of Galveston, gave Bond3 and took [722]*722the oath of office 4 required of all police officers. They are, however, not directly under the supervision and control of the Chief of Police of the City of Galveston, but are under the supervision and control of the Captain of Wharf Police, who is himself a regularly sworn and bonded police officer.

(d) The appointment of the watchmen as police officers is made by the Mayor and Board of Commissioners of the City,5 but neither the Mayor nor the Board, nor the Commissioner of Fire and Police, exercise direct supervision over them, but, as stated, they are supervised and directed by the Trustees through the Captain of Wharf Police.

(e) After such watchmen have given bond and taken the oath of office, there is issued to each by the City a Certificate of Appointment.6

(f) The City of Galveston is authorized to own and operate these properties under its Charter, and may do so through Trustees.7 When it acquired the properties, provision was made for the appointment from time to time of Trustees, some being appointed by the creditors of the City and some by the City itself. They were given full plenary powers with respect to the management of such properties.

1. That this Court has jurisdiction to require Defendants to treat with Plaintiffs if the wage controversy between them comes within the coverage of the Railway Labor Act seems settled. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40 et al., 4 Cir., 84 F.2d 641. Most of the cases cited by Plaintiffs 8 throw some light on the question of coverage, but are not controlling. United States v. California, 297 U.[723]*723S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567; State of California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 257, 59 S.Ct. 166, 83 L.Ed. 159, and State of California v. Anglim, 9 Cir., 129 F.2d 455, of course, settle it that a railroad, etc., owned by the State or as here by a City which is an agency of the State is, under certain circumstances and perhaps generally speaking, within the coverage of the Act. But there are presented here facts which I think clearly show that Plaindffs and Defendants and the wage controversy between them are not within such coverage. Here, while the City and Trustees (an agency of the State) saw fit to employ switchmen, engine men, firemen, maintenance men, etc., in the ordinary way that railroad companies generally employ such employees, when it came to what they apparently regarded as more important employees, i. e., watchmen who were charged with the higher duty of the policing and preservation of its properties, they chose to employ only its own regularly appointed, bonded and sworn officers. My conclusion is that they are not within the coverage of the Act, and that it was not the intention of the Congress to place them within such coverage.

There is a clear line of demarcation between the switchmen, engine men, firemen, maintenance men, etc., on the one hand, and the watchmen, on the other hand. The duties of the first named are to operate the properties and make money for the City. The duties of the watchmen are to police and preserve the properties of the City. It is entirely consistent and reasonable for the City to have this last named important duty of policing and protecting its properties performed by its own appointed, bonded and swmrn officers. It is entirely consistent and reasonable for the City, in the protection of its properties, to exercise its governmental functions, rather than its proprietary functions.

The fact that such watchmen are not under the immediate direction and control of the Chief of Police of the City, as are other policemen, does not matter. They are nevertheless officers appointed by the City, have given bond as such to the City, and have taken the oath of office required to be taken by officers under the Constitution and other Laws of Texas. They are officers of the State. Articles 998 and 999, Vernon’s Civil Statutes of Texas. Article 346, Penal Code and Article 36, Code Criminal Procedure (Vernon’s Annotated Criminal Statutes). Ex parte Preston, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 17, 161 S.W. 115, 116; Rusher v. Dallas, 83 Tex. 151, 18 S.W. 333; Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53, 55, 37 S.Ct. 70, 61 L.Ed. 145.

Neither does it matter that their duties are to be performed on the wharf property, and not about over the City, nor that they are permitted to carry arms only while on such properties. This does not change their status as Officers.

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Bluebook (online)
56 F. Supp. 720, 1944 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2019, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-council-of-railway-patrolmens-union-v-sealy-txsd-1944.