National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas

197 U.S. 115, 25 S. Ct. 379, 49 L. Ed. 689, 1905 U.S. LEXIS 1222
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 27, 1905
Docket37
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 197 U.S. 115 (National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 25 S. Ct. 379, 49 L. Ed. 689, 1905 U.S. LEXIS 1222 (1905).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McKenna,

after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The charges made against the statutes of Texas are that they deny the oil company the equal protection of the law and take its property without due process of law. The answer to the first depends upon the effect of the statutes. The answer to the second involves their validity and broader considerations. We will deal with it first.

The specification in the demurrer of wherein the statutes deprive the oil company of its property without due process of law is indefinite and peculiar. It may be different from an attack on the validity of the statutes, but counsel have treated it as tantamount to such attack, and we will so treat it.

Defendant in error contends that it is not open to the oil company to attack the constitutionality of the statutes, either as discriminating against it or as depriving it of property without due process of law, and cites Waters-Pierce Oil Company v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28. Counsel for the. company contests the application of that case; and we will assume (not decide) with them that it is not determinative of . their contention.

The acts of 1889 and 1895 are set out at length in the Waters-Pierce Oil Company casé. The act of 1899, so far as the present question is concerned, is substantially the same as those acts. All of the acts are directed to the prohibition of combinations to restrict trade, oi; in any way limit competition in the pro *128 duction or sale of articles, or to increase or reduce their price in order to preclude a free and unrestricted competition in them. The various ways in which these purposes can be accomplished are enumerated and forbidden. Penalties are affixed to the violation of the acts, offending domestic corporations forfeit their charters, and offending foreign corporations forfeit their privileges to do business in the State.

There was also an act passed in 1903, which repealed all laws or parts of laws in conflict with it, and expressly repealed certain provisions of the Penal Code of the State, and the acts of 1895 and 1899. The right to recover penalties or to forfeit charters of domestic, or the permits of foreign, corporations, for acts committed before the going into effect of the statutes, was reserved.

The argument, which is directed against the validity of the statutes, is drawn from extremes. It is difficult to present its elements in a concise way. Its ultimate foundation is the right of individuals and corporations as well, under the Constitution of the United States, to make contracts and combine in business enterprises; and, it is argued, to prohibit them from so doing “ in the ordinary way through the making of purchases and sales and the 'fixing of prices, is clearly to work a deprivation of property without due process of law and to impair the well recognized liberty of contract, involved in the acquiring, using and dealing with property,” assured by the Federal Constitution.

To support the argument the usages and necessity of business are adduced, and partnerships and their effect are brought forward as illustrations. There are some things which counsel easily demonstrate. They easily demonstrate that some combination of “capital, skill or acts” is necessary to any business development, and that the result must inevitably be a cessation of competition. But this does not prove that all combinations are inviolable or that no restriction upon competition can be forbidden. To contend for these extremes is to overlook the difference in the effect of actions, and to limit too *129 much the function and power of government. By arguing from extremes almost every exercise of government can be shown to be a deprivation of individual liberty. It is commonplace to say that it is the purpose, and indeed duty, of government, to get all it can of good out of the activities of men, and limit or forbid them when they become or tend to evil. Of course, what is evil may not be always clear; but to be able to dispute the policy of a law is not to establish its invalidity. It is certainly the conception of a large body of public opinion that the control of prices through combinations tends to restraint of trade and to monopoly, and is evil. The foundations of the belief we are not called upon to discuss, nor does our purpose require us to distinguish between the kinds of combinations or the degrees of monopoly. It is enough to say that the idea of monopoly is not now confined to a grant of privileges. It is understood to include a “condition produced by the acts of mere individuals.” Its dominant thought now is, to quote another, “the notion of exclusiveness or unity;” in other words, the suppression of competition by the unification of interest or management, or it may be through agreement and concert of action. And the purpose is so definitely the control of prices that monopoly has been defined to be “unified tactics with regard to prices.” It is the power to control prices which makes the inducement of combinations and their profit. It is such power that makes it the concern of the law to prohibit or limit them. And this concern and the policy based upon it has not only expression in the Texas statutes; it has expression in the statutes of other States and in a well known national enactment. According to them, competition not combination, should be the law of trade. If there is evil in this it is accepted as less than that which may result from the unification of interest, and the power such unification gives. And that legislatures may so ordain this court has decided. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290; United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 *130 U. S. 505; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375.

In Smiley v. Kansas, decided at this term, 196 U. S. 447, a statute of Kansas is passed on which is identical in effect, and even in words, in all that concerns the present' controversy, with the Texas statutes. The statute was assailed as “an unwarranted attempt upon the part of the legislature to limit the rights of the individual in the matter of contracting and dealing with his fellow-men.” The right which Smiley claimed was to combine with certain grain dealers, persons, companies and corporations, who were competitors, to pool and fix the price of grain in the town of Bison, and to prevent competition in the purchase and sale of grain at that place. Wejfollowed the ruling of the.

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Bluebook (online)
197 U.S. 115, 25 S. Ct. 379, 49 L. Ed. 689, 1905 U.S. LEXIS 1222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-cotton-oil-co-v-texas-scotus-1905.