National Bank of Washington, a Corporation v. Sally Dixon

301 F.2d 507, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 3085

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: November 30, 1961
• Docket: 16285_1
• Status: Published

Opinions

PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant National Bank of Washington was the owner, as trustee under a will, of a tenement property. At the time the Bank became trustee, a lease was on the property, executed by Floyd E. Davis Company, as lessor, to one William Mar-cum.¹ Marcum leased a furnished room in the basement to appellee Dixon and her husband. The floor of the room was wooden, covered with linoleum which was “nailed down on the edges.” On May 11,1959, Mrs. Dixon stepped upon a chair to get a coat hanger. The leg of the chair went through the linoleum and entered a wide crack in the floor beneath, causing the chair to tilt. She fell and broke her arm. Mr. and Mrs. Dixon filed suit against the Bank for negligence. The theory of the case was that her injuries were the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Bank, as the owner of the premises, through its failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, the failure being in violation of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Dixon.²

The pertinent provisions of the Housing Regulations are:

“Evei-y premises accommodating one or more habitations shall be maintained and kept in repair so as to provide decent living accommodations for the occupants. This part of this Code contemplates more than mere basic repairs and maintenance to keep out the elements; its purpose is to include repaii-s and maintenance designed to make a premises or neighborhood healthy and safe.” ³

“Each floor shall be structurally sound, reasonably level, and free of holes and wide cracks. Each floor shall be free of loose, splintered, protruding, or rotting floor boards.”⁴

“No owner, licensee, or tenant shall occupy or permit the occupancy of any habitation in violation of these regulations.” ⁵

The Regulations were validly adopted under statutory authority.⁶ The Bank was the owner of the habitation. The floor was not free of holes, wide cracks, or rotting floor boards. The trial court submitted to the jury not only the question as to the negligence of the owner but the question of contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Dixon.

The Bank contends that it had no notice, actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the floor in the leased premises. However, the Bank had been the owner, as trustee, for two years and seven months prior to the accident. Mr. Dixon testified that in the fall of 1958 he called Marcum’s attention to “several spots” in the floor; and that he believed termites had to be under the floor. After the accident, with Marcum’s permission, he tore off a piece of the linoleum “[t]o keep anybody from making the same mistake [Mrs. Dixon] made, so they could see it. There was a hole in the floor and the floor was rotten.” The lessee, Mr. Marcum, testified that he had no license for the premises as a rooming house or tenement until 1960; and, asked why no license was issued, he responded, “I had to have running water in each room, and the hallway to the basement, I had to take the old floor up and put concrete through the hallway.” He testified that the hallway was made of the same type of wood as was the room occupied by the Dixons. He further testified that he did not know- of anybody from the Bank ever going down to look over the property. No evidence contrary to the latter statement was presented. In Whetzel we said: “ * * * it is enough if, in the exercise of reasonable care, appellee should have known that the condition of the ceiling violated the standards of the Housing Code.” ⁷ We think that here there was enough evidence on this score to take the case to the jury. The owner of a habitation subject to the Housing Regulations should not be able to shield himself from liability for violation of the Regulations by failing to inspect the property or to ascertain its condition during a period of time such as is here involved.

We find no reversible error.

Affirmed.

1 . It appears that Floyd E. Davis Company was a real estate firm which had managed the property for a former owner and continued to do so for the Bank after it acquired title. It further appears that the Davis firm had no lease from anyone, or any proprietary interest in the property. It could, according to the Bank’s counsel, have been replaced by another agent at any time, or the Bank itself could have assumed active management.

2 . The jury returned a verdict for the defendant Bank against Mr. Dixon.

3 . Sec. 2501 — General Maintenance and Repair.

4 . Sec. 2505 — Floors.

5 . Sec. 2301 — Use and Occupancy.

6 . Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 108 U.S.App.D.C. 385, 282 F.2d 943 (D.C.Cir.1960).

7 . Id., 108 U.S.App.D.C. at 393, 282 F.2d at 951.