Opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON.
WALD, Circuit Judge:
The National Association of Home Builders of the United States, the Building Industry Legal Defense Fund, the County of San Bernardino, and the City of Colton, California brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge an application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person to “take” — i.e., “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct,” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)— any endangered species. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the application of section 9 of the ESA to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (“the Fly”), which is located only in California, exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause power and an injunction against application of the section to the plaintiff’s construction activities in areas containing Fly habitat.
This dispute arose when the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) placed the Fly, an insect that is native to the San Bernardino area of California, on the endangered species list. The listing of the Fly, the habitat of which is located entirely within an eight mile radius in southwestern San Bernardino County and northwestern Riverside County, California, forced San Bernardino County to alter plans to construct a new hospital on a recently purchased site that the FWS had determined contained Fly habitat. The FWS and San Bernardino County agreed on a plan that would allow the County to build the hospital and a power plant in the area designated as Fly habitat in return for modification of the construction plans and purchase and set aside of nearby land as Fly habitat. In November 1995, FWS issued a permit to allow construction of the power plant. During the same month, however, the County notified the FWS that it planned to redesign a nearby intersection to improve emergency vehicle access to the hospital. The FWS informed the County that expansion of the intersection as planned would likely lead to a “taking” of the Fly in violation of ESA section 9(a). After brief unsuccessful negotiations between the County and FWS, the County filed suit in district court challenging the application of section 9(a)(1) to the Fly.
The district court held that application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act to the Fly is a valid exercise of Congress’ power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment on behalf of the government. See National Association of Home Builders v. Babbit, 949 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1996). Because we also find that the application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act to the Fly does not exceed Congress’ Commerce Clause power, we affirm the district court’s decision to grant the government’s motion for summary judgment.1
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, which lives only in the “Delhi series” soils found in southwestern San Bernardino County and northwestern Riverside County, California, is the only remaining subspecies of its species. The other subspecies, the El Segundo Flower-Loving Fly, is believed to be extinct due to destruction of its habitat through urban development. See Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Marine Conservation, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, National Audubon Society, and World Wildlife Fund (“Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellees”) at 4. The Fly is also one of only a few North American species in the “mydas flies” family and one of only a few species in that family that visit flowers in [1044]*1044search of nectar, thereby pollinating native plant species. See id. at 1.
Over 97 percent of the historic habitat of the Fly has been eliminated, and, prior to its listing as endangered, its remaining habitat was threatened by urban development, unauthorized trash dumping, and off-road vehicle use. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 58 Fed.Reg. 49,881, 49,885 (1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). There are currently 11 known populations of the Fly, all of which occur within an eight mile radius of one another. See Declaration of Christopher D. Nagano (Apr. 30, 1996) at ¶ 14 (“Nagano Declaration”). The size of the entire population of Flies was recently estimated in the low hundreds. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Technical/Agency Draft Recovery Plan for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly 12 (1996).
In 1990, after receiving two petitions asking that the Fly be placed on the endangered species list, the FWS began an investigation into whether listing of the Fly as endangered was warranted. Soon thereafter, the FWS found that substantial information had been presented to indicate that the Fly was an endangered species. Two years later, the FWS published its final determination that the Fly is “in imminent danger of extinction due to extensive habitat loss and degradation that has reduced its range by 97 percent.” 58 Fed.Reg. at 49,881. The listing of the Fly as endangered triggered the automatic statutory prohibitions of section 9(a)(1) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). As a result, commercial trade in the species could no longer occur lawfully and no person could “take” individuals of the species without a permit or an exemption.
For several years prior to the listing of the Fly as endangered, the County of San Ber-nardino had been planning to build a $470 million earthquake-proof “state of the art” hospital to serve as the central emergency medical center for the San Bernardino County area in the event of an earthquake and to serve as a primary burn care center and teaching facility. In July 1992, two years after the FWS had published its notice that sufficient information had been presented to justify listing the Fly as endangered but before the Fly was actually so listed, the Board of the new San Bernardino County hospital acquired the final site parcels for the hospital. The 76-acre site that the board acquired contained habitat of the Fly.
In November 1992, the FWS notified the County that the Fly was likely to be listed as endangered, and in May 1993 — after the Fly was listed — the FWS advised the County that the hospital site was occupied by the Fly and that construction of the facility as then proposed would likely “take” members of the species in violation of the ESA. The County decided to modify the layout and design of the hospital to eliminate direct and indirect impacts to the Fly and to eliminate the need for a section 10 “incidental take permit.”2 One of the modifications to the original design for the hospital included in the plan was to move the hospital 250 feet north to “avoid[] direct impact to the entire area identified as occupied or suitable Delhi Fly habitat.” Habitat Preservation, Habitat En-changement [sic] and Impact Avoidance Plan for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly at the San Bernardino County Hospital Replacement Site 8 (Dec. 1, 1993). This resulted in an 8.35 acre Delhi Fly habitat preserve. Id. The plan also created a 100-foot wide corridor to link two Fly habitat areas and permit interbreeding between Fly colonies.
In October 1994, the County approached FWS with a proposal to construct a substation to power the hospital on “the best remaining habitat” for the Fly. See Declaration of Jeffery M. Newman 8 (Apr. 29, 1996) (“Newman Declaration”). The County submitted an application for incidental “take” of [1045]*1045the Fly, which would permit it to build on about 4 acres of Fly habitat. To offset this reduction in Fly habitat, the County proposed to acquire and manage a nearby 7.5 acre site as Fly habitat. In November 1995, the FWS issued the section 10 permit for the substation and construction began shortly thereafter. See id. at 9.
In November 1995, the County informed FWS of its plans to redesign an intersection near the hospital that the County argues is critical to emergency vehicle access to the new hospital. The FWS determined that the plan, which called for a reduction of the 100 foot wide corridor to an 18 foot wide corridor, a reduction of 70 to 80 percent, would “greatly reduce, if not effectively eliminate, the entire corridor area set aside as a critical part of the County’s efforts to avoid a take” of the Fly. Newman Declaration at 7. The FWS advised the County that the redesign of the intersection would probably cause a “take” of the Fly in violation of section 9 of the ESA.
On October 20, 1995, the National Association of Home Builders of the United States, the Building Industry Legal Defense Fund, the County of San Bernardino, and the City of Colton, California filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the taking prohibition of section 9 of the ESA was unconstitutional as applied to “takes” of the Fly and asking for an injunction barring application of the provision. An amended complaint later added the California Building Industry Association and the City of Fontana as plaintiffs. On December 6, 1996, the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment. See National Association of Home Builders, 949 F.Supp. 1. This appeal ensued.
II. Discussion
Appellants challenge the application of section 9(a)(1) of the ESA, which makes it unlawful for any person to “take any [endangered or threatened] species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly. See also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 115 S.Ct. 2407, 132 L.Ed.2d 597 (1995) (upholding agency’s interpretation of the term “take” to include significant habitat degradation). Appellants argue that the federal government does not have the authority to regulate the use of non-federal lands in order to protect the Fly, which is found only within a single state. Indeed, they claim that “the Constitution of the United States does not grant the federal government the authority to regulate wildlife, nor does it authorize federal regulation of nonfederal lands.” Brief for Appellants at 17.
The district court held that the application of section 9(a)(1) of the ESA to the Fly is constitutional. It concluded that the federal government’s “limited and enumerated” powers include the power to regulate wildlife and non-federal lands that serve as the habitat for endangered species. The court also concluded that the ESA provides for a regulatory scheme that is within the bounds of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. The district court thus granted the government’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the district court’s decision.
Appellants’ Commerce Clause challenge to the application of section 9(a)(1) of the ESA to the Fly rests on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,18 U.S.C. § 922(q), which made possession of a gun within a school zone a federal offense, exceeded Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. Drawing on its earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see especially Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1359-60, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971), the Lopez Court explained that Congress could regulate three broad categories of activity: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities,” and (3) “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (citations omitted). Possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school, the Court explained, clearly did not fit .the first two categories. In addition, it could not be regulated under the third category as an activity [1046]*1046that “substantially affects” interstate commerce because it was not commercial in nature and was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity. Moreover, the Court explained, Congress had made no findings about the effect of gun possession in school zones on interstate commerce. Thus, concluding that Congress had no rational basis for finding that gun possession within school zones had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Court declared the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 567-68, 115 S.Ct. at 1633-34.
It is clear that, in this instance, section 9(a)(1) of the ESA is not a regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of persons or things in interstate commerce. As a result, only the first and the third categories of activity discussed in Lopez will be examined. In evaluating whether ESA section 9(a)(1) is a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce or of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, we may look not only to the effect of the extinction of the individual endangered species at issue in this case, but also to the aggregate effect of the extinction of all similarly situated endangered species. As the Lopez Court explained, “ ‘where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.’ ” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 2024 n. 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968), overruled on other grounds, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) (first emphasis added)). If a statute regulates “a class of activities ... within reach of the federal power,” Perez, 402 U.S. at 154, 91 S.Ct. at 1361, the courts have “no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class,” id. Because section 9(a)(1) of the ESA regulates a class of activities — takings of endangered species— that is within Congress’ Commerce Clause power under both the first and third Lopez categories, application of section 9(a)(1) to the Fly is constitutional.3 •
A. Channels of Interstate Commerce
Application of section 9(a)(1) of the ESA to the Fly can be viewed as a proper exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power over the first category of activity that the Lopez Court identified: the use of the “channels of interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. at 1629. Although this category is commonly used to uphold regulations of interstate transport of persons or goods, it need not be so limited. Indeed, the power of Congress to regulate the channels of interstate commerce provides a justification for section 9(a)(1) of the ESA for two reasons. First, the prohibition against takings of an endangered species is necessary to enable the government to control the transport of the endangered species in interstate commerce. Second, the prohibition on takings of endangered animals falls under Congress’ authority “‘to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.’ ” Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256, 85 S.Ct. 348, 356-57, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964)).4
The ESA’s prohibition on takings of endangered species can be justified as a neces[1047]*1047sary aid to the prohibitions in the ESA on transporting and selling endangered species in interstate commerce. In this sense, the prohibition against takings of endangered species is analogous to the prohibition against transfer and possession of machine guns (including purely intrastate possession) of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which has been upheld by the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. In United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 72, 136 L.Ed.2d 32 (1996), for instance, the Ninth Circuit upheld section 922(o) against a Lopez-inspired Commerce Clause challenge. The court held that the statute was a “ ‘regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce’ ” because “[b]y regulating the market in maehineguns, including regulating intrastate machinegun possession, Congress has effectively regulated the interstate trafficking in maehineguns.” Id. at 952 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30).5 Thus, section 922(o) is properly classified as a first category regulation because “ ‘federal regulation of intrastate incidents of transfer and possession is essential to effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir.1995)), aff'd, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir.1997) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, — L.Ed.2d - (1997). In other words, it is necessary to regulate possession of machine-guns in order to effectively regulate the interstate traffic in maehineguns because it is impossible to sell maehineguns in interstate commerce without first possessing them. Similarly, the prohibition on “taking” endangered species is properly classified as a first category regulation because one of the most effective ways to prevent traffic in endangered species is to secure the habitat of the species from predatory invasion and destruction. Therefore, like section 922(o), section 9(a)(1) of the ESA can be properly upheld as a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce.6
[1048]*1048The prohibition on takings of endangered animals also falls under Congress’ authority to prevent the channels of interstate commerce from being used for immoral or injurious purposes. This authority was perhaps best described by the Supreme Court in Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, which the Lopez Court cited and quoted in its reference to Congress’ power to regulate the use of the “channels of interstate commerce.” In Heart of Atlanta, the Supreme Court upheld a prohibition on racial discrimination in places of public accommodation serving interstate travelers against a Commerce Clause challenge. The Court explained that ‘“the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.’ ” Id. at 256, 85 S.Ct. at 357 (citation omitted) (quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. at 1629). It does not matter if the activities that are regulated are of a “purely local character,” the Court elaborated, “ ‘[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.’” Id. at 258, 85 S.Ct. at 358 (citation omitted). Thus, the power of Congress over interstate commerce “also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.” Id. This same principle was elaborated in the seminal case of United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941), which was the only other case cited by the Lopez Court in its description of the first category of activity that Congress can regulate under its commerce power. In Darby, the Court upheld federal wage and hour regulations against a Commerce Clause challenge, noting that such regulations were necessary to prevent states with higher regulatory standards from being disadvantaged visa-vis states with lower regulatory standards. In upholding the regulation, the Court explained that “Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce,” is free to exclude from commerce goods that will have injurious effects in the state in which they are produced or to which they are destined. Id. at 114, 61 S.Ct. at 457. This is true even though the activity prohibited by the regulation at issue in Darby — failure to meet minimum wage and maximum hour requirements — might have had little or no direct effect outside the state in which the goods were produced.
This same reasoning that the Supreme Court applied in Darby and Heart of Atlanta is applicable to the case at hand. In those cases as well as here, Congress used its authority to rid the channels of interstate commerce of injurious uses to regulate the conditions under which goods are produced for interstate commerce. In Darby, Congress used this authority to prevent labor exploitation of employees producing lumber for interstate commerce. In Heart of Atlanta, Congress used this authority to prevent racial discrimination by a hotel serving an interstate clientele. Similarly, in this case, Congress used this authority to prevent the eradication of an endangered species by a hospital that is presumably being constructed using materials and people from outside the state and which will attract employees, patients, and students from both inside and outside the state. Thus, like regulations preventing racial discrimination or labor exploitation, regulations preventing the taking of endangered species prohibit interstate actors from using the channels of interstate commerce to “promot[e] or spread[ ] evil, whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.” North American Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686, 705, 66 S.Ct. 785, 796, 90 L.Ed. 945 (1946). Congress is therefore empowered by its authority to regulate the channels of interstate commerce to prevent the taking of endangered species in cases like this where the pressures of interstate commerce place the existence of species in peril.
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle claims that this analysis of Darby and Heart of Atlanta is “far off the mark.” Dissenting opinion [1049]*1049(“Diss. op.”) at 1063. It is his analysis, however, that is inconsistent with the reasoning and results in these cases. In Judge Sen-telle’s view, the only regulations that would qualify as a proper regulation of the channels of interstate commerce are direct regulations of persons or things that move across state lines. This view is simply not consistent with the Court’s decisions in Darby and Heart of Atlanta, which I again note are the only two cases the Lopez Court cited to illustrate its first category of authorized regulation. Neither Darby nor Heart of Atlanta involved a direct regulation of persons or things that moved across state lines. The statute challenged in Darby set wage and hour requirements for lumber factory employees, while the statute in Heart of Atlanta prohibited racial discrimination against hotel customers. Judge Sentelle’s argument thus proves too much: If only direct regulation of goods that travel in interstate commerce can be upheld as valid under the channels of interstate commerce prong of Lopez, both of these statutes must fail as well, a result patently inconsistent with the Court’s express affirmance of them in Lopez. Therefore, contrary to Judge Sentelle’s assertion, see Diss. op. at 1063-1064, the argument that access to the channels of interstate commerce may be regulated in order to prevent injurious local practices that in turn have a substantial harmful effect on interstate commerce either by discouraging such commerce or by inciting a race to the bottom is neither novel nor unduly extensive; indeed, it is the core reasoning of Darby and Heart of Atlanta.
B. Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce
The takings clause in the ESA can also be viewed as a regulation of the third category of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power. According to Lopez, the test of whether section 9(a)(1) of the ESA is within this category of activity “requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.” 514 U.S. at 559, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. A class of activities can substantially affect interstate commerce regardless of whether the activity at issue — in this case the taking of endangered species — is commercial or noncommercial. As the Lopez Court, quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), noted:
“[Ejven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’ ”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556, 115 S.Ct. at 1628 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 63 S.Ct. at 89).7
This interpretation of the Lopez decision is consistent with this court’s recent decision in Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2431, 138 L.Ed.2d 193 (1997). In Terry, we upheld the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act against a Commerce Clause challenge, concluding that the Lopez decision did not restrict Congress’ Commerce Clause power to activity that is “commercial.” We rejected the argument that Congress could not regulate protest in front of abortion clinics because protest is an intrastate, noncommercial activity, explaining that “Congress has authority to regulate ‘activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.’ ” Id. at 1417 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (emphasis added)). We further explained that in order to be subject to Congress’ Commerce Clause power, “[tjhe regulated activity — in this case, interfering with abortion clinics — need not be commercial, so long as its effect on interstate commerce is substantial.” Id.8
Other circuits have also held that a statute need not regulate economic activity directly [1050]*1050in order to fall under Congress’ Commerce Clause power. For instance, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act against a challenge alleging that the Act constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power because it proscribes intrastate, noncommercial activity. United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 669-70 (5th Cir.1997). Acknowledging that the statute regulates intrastate, noncommercial protest activity, the court held that the statute was a proper exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power because it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The court explained, “[a]fter Wick-ard — and its reaffirmance in Lopez — there can be no question that Congress is able to regulate noncommercial, intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. ...” Id. at 676. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recently upheld the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) against a Commerce Clause challenge by the operator of a chemical manufacturing facility that was required to pay for the cleanup of entirely localized environmental contamination caused by the facility. See U.S.A. v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.1997). The court explained that a statute need not “regulate economic activity directly to satisfy the Commerce Clause” because “Lopez reiterates that a statute will pass constitutional muster if it regulates an activity, whatever its nature, ‘that arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.’ ” Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31).
A recent Supreme Court decision confirms our holding in Terry, 101 F.3d 1412, that activity need not be commercial in character in order to be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 1602, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997), which involved a Commerce Clause challenge to an otherwise generally applicable state property tax exemption for charitable institutions that excluded organizations operated principally for the benefit of nonresidents, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Clause applies to activity regardless of whether it was undertaken with the intention of earning a profit. Citing its earlier opinion in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941), in which the Court had held that interstate transportation of indigent persons was “commerce” regardless of whether it was “commercial in character,” id. at 172 n. 1, 62 S.Ct. at 166 n. 1, the Court explained that it had “already held that the dormant Commerce Clause is applicable to activities undertaken without the intention of earning a profit.” — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1602. This decision confirms that the proper test of whether an activity can be regulated under the Commerce Clause is not whether the activity is itself commercial or economic but rather whether the activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
In evaluating the effect of the regulated activity on interstate commerce, I begin, as we did in Terry, 101 F.3d 1412, with the legislative history of the Act under challenge. As we explained in Terry, “we consider ‘even congressional committee findings’ regarding the effect on interstate commerce of the regulated activity.” 101 F.3d at 1415 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562, 115 S.Ct. at 1631).
The Committee Reports on the ESA reveal that one of the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect endangered species from “takings” was the importance of the continuing availability of a wide variety of species to interstate commerce. As the House Report explained:
... As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that they are in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their — and our own — genetic heritage.
[1051]*1051The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable----
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask.
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other scourges, present or future, may he locked up in the structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More to the point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential cures by eliminating those plants for all time? Sheer self interest impels us to be cautious.
H.R.Rep. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate Report on the precursor to the ESA, noted:
... From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of an endangered species of wildlife with some commercial value may permit the regeneration of that species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be resumed. In such a case businessmen may profit from the trading and marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years, where otherwise it would have been completely eliminated from commercial channels in a very brief span of time. Potentially more important, however, is the fact that with each species we eliminate, we reduce the [genetic] pool ... available for use by man in future years. Since each living species and subspecies has developed in a unique way to adapt itself to the difficulty of living in the world’s environment, as a species is lost, its distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to mankind in improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or environmental contaminant, is also irretrievably lost.
S.Rep. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969).
This legislative history distinguishes the ESA from the statute at issue in Lopez. In Lopez, the Court noted that “as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings regarding effect on interstate commerce.” 514 U.S. at 562, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 (citations omitted). The Lopez Court found, however, that there were no “congressional findings [that] would enable [it] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.” Id. at 563, 115 S.Ct. at 1632. In this case, in contrast, the committee reports on the ESA discuss the value of preserving genetic diversity and the potential for future commerce related to that diversity. See also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2293-94, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (recognizing that one of the primary concerns underlying the Endangered Species Act was concern “about the unknown uses that endangered species might have and about the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain of life on this planet”).9
These congressional findings, while highly informative, are of course not sufficient by themselves to make the statute constitutional. The courts evaluating Commerce Clause challenges to federal statutes must determine that there was a rational basis for Congress’ conclusion that a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. As the Eleventh Circuit recently explained, “Lopez did not alter our approach to determining whether a particular statute falls within the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority____ When ruling on a Commerce Clause challenge, we must deter[1052]*1052mine, as always, ‘whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.’ ” United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1628-29); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2360, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (“The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.”) (citations omitted) (quoted in Terry, 101 F.3d at 1416).
Congress could rationally conclude that the intrastate activity regulated by section 9 of the ESA substantially affects interstate commerce for two primary reasons. First, the provision prevents the destruction of biodiversity and thereby protects the current and future interstate commerce that relies upon it. Second, the provision controls adverse effects of interstate competition.10
1. Biodiversity
Approximately 521 of the 1082 species in the United States currently designated as threatened or endangered are found in only one state. See Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellees at 20-21. The elimination of all or even some of these endangered species would have a staggering effect on biodiversity— defined as the presence of a large number of species of animals and plants — in the United States and, thereby, on the current and future interstate commerce that relies on the availability of a diverse array of species.
The variety of plants and animals in this country are, in a sense, a natural resource that commercial • actors can use to produce marketable products. In the most narrow view of economic value, endangered plants and animals are valuable as sources of medicine and genes.11 Fifty percent of the most frequently prescribed medicines are derived from wild plant and animal species.12 Such [1053]*1053medicines were estimated in 1983 to be worth over $15 billion a year. See id. at 11. In addition, the genetic material of wild species of plants and animals is inbred into domestic crops and animals to improve their commercial value and productivity. As Amici Cwri-ae explained: “Fortifying the genetic diversity of U.S. crops played a large part in the explosive growth in farm production since the 1930s, accounting for at least one-half of the doubling in yields of rice, soybeans, wheat, and sugarcane, and a three-fold increase in corn and potatoes. Genetic diversity provided by wild plants also protects domestic crops from disease and pest damage.” Id. at 12. Similar genetic engineering can be used with animals. For instance, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the genes of a wild pollinator species like the Fly might be inbred with the honeybee, which currently pollinates most major U.S. crops, to produce a pollinator that is more disease resistant.
Each time a species becomes extinct, the pool of wild species diminishes. This, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a natural resource that could otherwise be used for present and future commercial purposes. Unlike most other natural resources, however, the full value of the variety of plant and animal life that currently exists is uncertain. Plants and animals that are lost through extinction undoubtedly have economic uses that are, in some cases, as yet unknown but which could prove vitally important in the future.13 A species whose worth is still unmeasured has what economists call an “option value” — the value of the possibility that a future discovery will make useful a species that is currently thought of as useless. See Bryan Nolan, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantification in Valuing Biodiveristy, in Biodiversity 200, 202 (Edward O. Wilson ed., 1988). To allow even a single species whose value is not currently apparent to become extinct therefore deprives the economy of the option value of that species. Because our current knowledge of each species and its possible uses is limited, it is impossible to calculate the exact impact that the loss of the option value of a single species might have on interstate commerce.14 See Alan Randall, What Mainstream Economists Have to Say about the Value of Biodiversity, in Biodiversity, supra, at 217. In the aggregate, however, we can be certain that the extinction of species and the attendant de[1054]*1054cline in biodiversity will have a real and predictable effect on interstate commerce.
The few federal courts that have considered post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges to federal wildlife protection have found that the extinction of animals substantially affects interstate commerce.15 In United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.1996), the Ninth Circuit held that the Eagle Protection Act was a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power because “[e]xtinction of the eagle would substantially affect interstate commerce by foreclosing any possibility of several types of commercial activity.” Id. at 1481; see also United States v. Lundquist, 932 F.Supp. 1237, 1245 (D.Or.1996) (holding that “the possession of eagle parts is an activity which affects a broad regulatory scheme relating to commercial transactions and which, when viewed in the aggregate with similar activities nationwide, substantially affects interstate commerce”) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31). Similarly, in United States v. Romano, 929 F.Supp. 502, 507-09 (D.Mass.1996), the District Court of Massachusetts upheld the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78, which prohibits any person from importing, exporting, transporting, selling, receiving, acquiring, or purchasing in interstate or foreign commerce any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of state or foreign law. Citing Congress’ findings that the protection of endangered species protects future commercial activity, the court held that the Act was within Congress’ Commerce Clause power. See Romano, 929 F.Supp. at 508.16
I join these courts in concluding that the extinction of animals substantially affects interstate commerce. More specifically, I find that the scientific evidence that is currently available provides sufficient support for Congress’ conclusion that regulation of the “taking” of endangered animals is within its Commerce Clause power because such takings, if permitted, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by depriving commercial actors of access to an important natural resource — biodiversity.
2. Destructive Interstate Competition
The taking of the Fly and other endangered animals can also be regulated by Congress as an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce because it is the product of destructive interstate competition. It is a principle deeply rooted in Commerce Clause jurisprudence that Congress is empowered to act to prevent destructive interstate competition. As the Supreme Court explained in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (“Hodel v. [1055]*1055Virginia”), a case that the Lopez Court cited repeatedly, “prevention of ... destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 282, 101 S.Ct. at 2363.
The case at hand bears a substantial similarity to the three cases in which the Supreme Court best articulated the principle that Congress may act to prevent interstate competition that has a destructive effect: Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981) (“Hodel v. Indiana”), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941). In Hodel v. Virginia, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The Surface Mining Act required mine operators to restore the land after mining to its prior condition, including its approximate original contour, topsoil, hy-drologic balance, and vegetation in order to “protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.” 452 U.S. at 268, 101 S.Ct. at 2356. An association of coal producers in Virginia challenged the Act, which it claimed “regulat[ed] the use of private lands within the borders of the States,” as beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause power. Id. at 275, 101 S.Ct. at 2359. The Court held that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause because “Congress rationally determined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may result from that activity.” Id. at 281, 101 S.Ct. at 2363. Moreover, the Court concluded that “the power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough'to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.” Id. at 282, 101 S.Ct. at 2363.
The parallels between Hodel v. Virginia and the case at hand are obvious. The ESA and the Surface Mining Act both regulate activities — destruction of endangered species and destruction of the natural landscape— that are carried out entirely within a State and which are not themselves commercial in character. The activities, however, may be regulated because they have destructive effects, on environmental quality in one case and on the availability of a variety of species in the other, that are likely to affect more than one State.17 In each case, moreover, interstate competition provides incentives to states to adopt lower standards to gain an advantage vis-a-vis other states: In Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, the states were motivated to adopt lower environmental standards to improve the competitiveness of their coal production facilities, and in this ease, the states are motivated to adopt lower standards of endangered species protection in order to attract development.18
The Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40, which was decided on the same day as Hodel v. Virginia, and involved a challenge to different provisions of the same Act. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40, involved a constitutional challenge to the “prime farmland” provisions of the Surface Mining Act, which established special requirements for surface coal mining operations conducted on land that qualified as prime farmland and that had historically been used as cropland. The Court held that the provisions did not violate the Commerce Clause. The Act was [1056]*1056adopted, the Court explained, “to ensure that production of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety, injury to any of which interests would have deleterious effects on interstate commerce.” Id. at 329, 101 S.Ct. at 2385-86. Moreover, the Court noted, the Act reflected a congressional desire to “proteet[ ] mine operators in States adhering to high ... standards from disadvantageous competition with operators in States with less rigorous regulatory programs.” Id.
The parallels between Model v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40, and the case at hand are again striking. In both cases, the statutes under challenge regulated intrastate activity that is not itself commercial and that can be carried out entirely within a State: the destruction of farmland and the destruction of endangered species. Just as the prime farmland provisions of the Surface Mining Act were adopted to protect agriculture, the environment, and health and safety, injury to which would have deleterious effects on interstate commerce, section 9(a)(1) of the ESA was adopted to ensure that “growth and development,” H.R. 37 (“Endangered and Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1973”) (Findings, Purpose, and Policy), reprinted at 119 Cong. Rec. 25,694, 25,694 (1973), would not be at the expense of the conservation and protection of a variety of species, injury to which would have equally deleterious consequences for interstate commerce.19 Thus, in both cases, the activity at issue may be regulated because it is likely to have destructive effects on interstate commerce.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941), also concluded that activity could be regulated under the Commerce Clause if it involved destructive interstate competition. In Darby, the Court upheld wage and hour regulations for employees engaged in the production of lumber for interstate commerce. Although the statute “undertakes to regulate wages and hours within the state contrary to the policy of the state which has elected to leave them unregulated,” 312 U.S. at 114, 61 S.Ct. at 457, the Court held that the statute was within the Commerce Clause power because it was necessary to control destructive interstate competition. The Court explained that “Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may be appropriately imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate their use.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court further explained that “interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which the commerce flows.” Id. at 115, 61 S.Ct. at 457.
Like Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, the case at hand involves a regulation of the conditions under which commercial activity takes place. The statute in Darby regulated the wages and hours of workers in Georgia who were engaged in producing lumber for interstate commerce. Similarly, the statute in this case regulates the taking of endangered species in the process of constructing a hospital, power plant, and intersection that will likely serve an interstate population. In both cases, Congress passed the statute in part to prevent states from gaining a competitive advantage by enacting lower regulatory standards than other states. Congress was aware that no state could be expected to require significantly more rigorous labor standards or endangered species protection than other states, because for each individual state, the cost of providing better working conditions or preserving a species outweighs the benefits even though in aggregate, the benefits of better labor standards and biodiversity outweigh the costs.20
[1057]*1057As the cases discussed above illustrate, the Court has long held that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to prevent destructive interstate commerce similar to that at issue in this case. I therefore find that Congress has the power to prevent interstate competition that will result in the destruction of endangered species just as it has the power to prevent interstate competition that will result in harm to the environment, Hodel v. Virginia, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, the destruction of “prime farm land,” Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 324, 101 S.Ct. at 2383, or the employment of people under substandard labor conditions, Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act is within Congress’ Commerce Clause power and that the Fish and Wildlife Service’s application of the provision to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly was therefore constitutional.21 The district court’s decision granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment is therefore
Affirmed.