CLERKS OFFICE US DISTRICT □□□□ AT ROANOKE, VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 10, 2026 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK ROANOKE DIVISION By: /s/ M. Poff DEPUTY CLERK NATHANIEL BRUCE DUNMORE, _ ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:25-cv-00678 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) MS. KENNY and IR.S. SUPERVISOR, _) By: | Hon. Thomas T. Cullen ) United States District Judge Defendants. )
Plaintiff Nathaniel Bruce Dunmore, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny against Defendants Ms. Kenny and LR.S. Supervisor. (See Compl. [ECF No. 1].) This matter is before the court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim and his Complaint must be dismissed. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, while incarcerated, he did not receive certain economic impact payments (““EIPs”’) authorized by the CARES Act.! (See Compl. at 5.) He further alleges that on February 15, 2025, he wrote to Kenny—who ts the “I.R.S. Kansas City operations manager”—to inform her that he did not receive the EIPs. (Id) Kenny, however, did not respond. (/d.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ actions violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (/Z) As to the former claim, Plaintiff asserts that because
'“The CARES Act, codified in part at [§] 6428 of the Internal Revenue Code, . . . established a mechanism for the [Internal Revenue Service (IRS)] to issue economic impact payments .. . to eligible individuals.” Stevens v. Dept of Treasury Internal Revenue Serv. No. 1:21-cv-01437, 2022 WL 1228769, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2110516 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2022).
other United States citizens received the EIPs and he did not, he has been discriminated against in violation of the Constitution. (Id.) Before or soon after docketing, the court must review the complaint in any “civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Following its review, the court must dismiss the
complaint, or any portion thereof, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In assessing whether a prisoner’s complaint fails to state a claim for purposes of § 1915A, the court applies the same standard as under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Fields v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 109 F.4th 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 606 U.S. 942 (2025). The court therefore accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences
in Plaintiff’s favor and asks whether those allegations state a plausible claim for relief. See id.; Hodges v. Meletis, 109 F.4th 252, 259 (4th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). Further, when a prisoner files his complaint pro se, the court construes the allegations in his favor liberally and should not dismiss his claim unless “it appears certain that [he] cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 127 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 2017)). Similarly,
when an action implicates civil rights interests, the court “must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged” and “must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged.” Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s claims arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny.2 In Bivens, the Supreme Court first recognized an implied cause of action for a constitutional violation by federal officers, holding that there was an implied claim for monetary damages available under the Fourth Amendment where the plaintiff alleged that federal officers had searched his apartment and arrested him without a
warrant or probable cause and used unreasonable force in doing so. Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 520 (4th Cir. 2019) (describing Bivens). Since then, the Court extended Bivens to other factual situations only in two cases: In the first, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court held that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause provided a damages remedy for an administrative assistant who alleged that a Congressman fired her because she was a woman. See id. at 248–49. And in the second, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause provided a damages remedy for the estate of a prisoner who died due to the alleged failure of federal jailers to treat his asthma. See id. at 19.
Tun-Cos, 922 F.3d at 521. The Supreme Court has not recognized a Bivens-type remedy outside of those contexts, however, and has repeatedly declined to do so “in any additional context.” Id. (collecting authority) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Supreme Court “has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Id. at 522 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). In assessing whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Supreme Court “has applied a two-step test.” Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942, 944 (2025). At the first step, the court should
2 Although Plaintiff indicated on his complaint that his claims also arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see Compl. at 2), this is incorrect, as Defendants are federal officers. See Earle v. Shreves, 990 F.3d 774, 777 (4th Cir. 2021) decide whether the claims arise in “a new Bivens context.” Tun-Cos, 922 F.3d at 522 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 134–40 (2017)). A context is new when “different in a meaningful way” from the three previous Bivens cases. Tate v. Harmon, 54 F.4th 839, 844 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139). The Tate court emphasized that “‘new context’ must be understood broadly [and] that a new context may arise if even one distinguishing fact has the
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CLERKS OFFICE US DISTRICT □□□□ AT ROANOKE, VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 10, 2026 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK ROANOKE DIVISION By: /s/ M. Poff DEPUTY CLERK NATHANIEL BRUCE DUNMORE, _ ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:25-cv-00678 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) MS. KENNY and IR.S. SUPERVISOR, _) By: | Hon. Thomas T. Cullen ) United States District Judge Defendants. )
Plaintiff Nathaniel Bruce Dunmore, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny against Defendants Ms. Kenny and LR.S. Supervisor. (See Compl. [ECF No. 1].) This matter is before the court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim and his Complaint must be dismissed. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, while incarcerated, he did not receive certain economic impact payments (““EIPs”’) authorized by the CARES Act.! (See Compl. at 5.) He further alleges that on February 15, 2025, he wrote to Kenny—who ts the “I.R.S. Kansas City operations manager”—to inform her that he did not receive the EIPs. (Id) Kenny, however, did not respond. (/d.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ actions violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (/Z) As to the former claim, Plaintiff asserts that because
'“The CARES Act, codified in part at [§] 6428 of the Internal Revenue Code, . . . established a mechanism for the [Internal Revenue Service (IRS)] to issue economic impact payments .. . to eligible individuals.” Stevens v. Dept of Treasury Internal Revenue Serv. No. 1:21-cv-01437, 2022 WL 1228769, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2110516 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2022).
other United States citizens received the EIPs and he did not, he has been discriminated against in violation of the Constitution. (Id.) Before or soon after docketing, the court must review the complaint in any “civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Following its review, the court must dismiss the
complaint, or any portion thereof, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In assessing whether a prisoner’s complaint fails to state a claim for purposes of § 1915A, the court applies the same standard as under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Fields v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 109 F.4th 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 606 U.S. 942 (2025). The court therefore accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences
in Plaintiff’s favor and asks whether those allegations state a plausible claim for relief. See id.; Hodges v. Meletis, 109 F.4th 252, 259 (4th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). Further, when a prisoner files his complaint pro se, the court construes the allegations in his favor liberally and should not dismiss his claim unless “it appears certain that [he] cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 127 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 2017)). Similarly,
when an action implicates civil rights interests, the court “must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged” and “must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged.” Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s claims arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny.2 In Bivens, the Supreme Court first recognized an implied cause of action for a constitutional violation by federal officers, holding that there was an implied claim for monetary damages available under the Fourth Amendment where the plaintiff alleged that federal officers had searched his apartment and arrested him without a
warrant or probable cause and used unreasonable force in doing so. Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 520 (4th Cir. 2019) (describing Bivens). Since then, the Court extended Bivens to other factual situations only in two cases: In the first, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), the Court held that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause provided a damages remedy for an administrative assistant who alleged that a Congressman fired her because she was a woman. See id. at 248–49. And in the second, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause provided a damages remedy for the estate of a prisoner who died due to the alleged failure of federal jailers to treat his asthma. See id. at 19.
Tun-Cos, 922 F.3d at 521. The Supreme Court has not recognized a Bivens-type remedy outside of those contexts, however, and has repeatedly declined to do so “in any additional context.” Id. (collecting authority) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Supreme Court “has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Id. at 522 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). In assessing whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Supreme Court “has applied a two-step test.” Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942, 944 (2025). At the first step, the court should
2 Although Plaintiff indicated on his complaint that his claims also arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see Compl. at 2), this is incorrect, as Defendants are federal officers. See Earle v. Shreves, 990 F.3d 774, 777 (4th Cir. 2021) decide whether the claims arise in “a new Bivens context.” Tun-Cos, 922 F.3d at 522 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 134–40 (2017)). A context is new when “different in a meaningful way” from the three previous Bivens cases. Tate v. Harmon, 54 F.4th 839, 844 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139). The Tate court emphasized that “‘new context’ must be understood broadly [and] that a new context may arise if even one distinguishing fact has the
potential to implicate separation-of-powers considerations.” Id. at 846 (citing Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 495 (2022)) (emphasis in original). “If the context is not new . . . then a Bivens remedy” is available. Tun-Cos, 922 F.3d. at 522–23 (emphasis in original). If the context is new, then the court turns to the second step, which requires it to determine whether “special factors counsel[ ] hesitation” in recognizing an implied cause of action. Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136. In Egbert, the court observed that “those
[two] steps often resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” 596 U.S. at 492. Indeed, if “there is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better suited” to resolve the cost/benefit analysis of letting a damages action lie, an implied action is precluded. Id. at 496 (emphasis in original). The Tate court recognized this conflation of the two steps as well, explaining that “in Egbert, . . . the Court recognized a substantial overlap between the factors
relevant to” the two steps, “often leading to an analysis that addresses just a single question: ‘whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.’” Tate, 54 F.4th at 847–48 (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492). Recently, another court in this district held that claims identical to those at issue here brought against the same Defendants “may not proceed under Bivens and its progeny.” Bethea v. Kenny, No. 7:25-cv-00642, 2026 WL 1257360, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Va. May 7, 2026) (Dillon, C.J.). Consistent with the Bethea decision, the court likewise concludes that Plaintiff’s claims may not proceed under Bivens. Accordingly, the court will dismiss this action. The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order to Plaintiff. ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2026.
/s/ Thomas T. Cullen HON. THOMAS T. CULLEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE