Nathan P. Goldstein v. National Shoring LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJuly 15, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-10924
StatusUnknown

This text of Nathan P. Goldstein v. National Shoring LLC (Nathan P. Goldstein v. National Shoring LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nathan P. Goldstein v. National Shoring LLC, (D. Mass. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

) NATHAN P. GOLDSTEIN, as he is ) EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ) MASSACHUSETTS LABORERS’ ) BENEFIT FUNDS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No. 1:23-cv-10924-JEK ) v. ) ) NATIONAL SHORING LLC, ) ) Defendant. ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

KOBICK, J. Plaintiff Nathan P. Goldstein, the Executive Director and collection agent of the Massachusetts Laborers’ Benefit Funds, filed this action against defendant National Shoring LLC to recover unpaid contributions, interest, and damages owed to certain benefit funds. After National Shoring was served but failed to answer or otherwise defend this case, the clerk entered a notice of default against it. Goldstein now moves for default judgment against National Shoring. For the reasons explained below, Goldstein’s motion will be granted. BACKGROUND Goldstein initiated this action against National Shoring on behalf of the Massachusetts Laborers’ Benefit Funds. ECF 1, ¶ 9. As Executive Director of that organization, Goldstein serves as the collection agent for the contributions owed to five funds governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”): the Massachusetts Laborers’ Health and Welfare Fund, the Massachusetts Laborers’ Pension Fund, the Massachusetts Laborers’ Annuity Fund, the New England Laborers’ Training Trust Fund, and the Massachusetts Laborers’ Legal Services Fund (collectively the “ERISA Funds”). Id. ¶¶ 3-9. The ERISA Funds are all multi- employer plans within the meaning of § 3(37) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37). ECF 1, ¶ 8. Goldstein likewise has authority to collect contributions owed to the New England Laborers’

Labor-Management Cooperation Trust, the New England Laborers’ Health and Safety Fund, the Massachusetts Laborers’ Unified Trust, and the Construction Industries of Mass. Advancement Fund (collectively the “non-ERISA Funds”), as well as dues owed to the Massachusetts & Northern New England Laborers’ District Council (the “Union”). Id. ¶¶ 9, 14-15. Goldstein asserts two claims against National Shoring: a violation of section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (Count I) and a violation of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (Count II). ECF 1, ¶¶ 21-27. National Shoring did not file an answer or otherwise defend the case. As Goldstein requested, the clerk entered a notice of default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) on January 8, 2024. ECF 6, 8. On February 21, 2024, Goldstein moved for default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1),

requesting recovery of unpaid contributions, prejudgment interest, damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation costs. ECF 13, at 1. DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-step process for entry of a default judgment. First, “the clerk must enter” a notation of default “[w]hen a party against whom judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, default judgment may be entered if the court (1) has “jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties,” (2) “the allegations in the complaint state a specific, cognizable claim for relief,” and (3) “the defaulted party had fair notice of its opportunity to object.” In re The Home Restaurants, Inc., 285 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 2002). Where “the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain” and is supported by “an affidavit showing the amount due,” default judgment may, “on the plaintiff’s request,” be entered without a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). Here, all three prerequisites are met, and default judgment is appropriate.

I. Jurisdiction. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this federal question action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(c), 1132(e)(1) (establishing federal court jurisdiction in LMRA and ERISA actions); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992). The Court also has personal jurisdiction over National Shoring. In a federal question case, like this one, “a federal court’s power to assert personal jurisdiction is geographically expanded,” and “the Constitution requires only that the defendant have the requisite ‘minimum contacts’ with the United States, rather than with a particular forum state (as would be required in a diversity case).” Id. “[S]ufficient contacts to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction exist whenever the

defendant is served within the sovereign territory of the United States,” provided service is “grounded within a federal statute or Civil Rule.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). ERISA provides that a defendant “may be served in any . . . district where a defendant resides or may be found.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2); see Gambino v. Radiant Elec., LLC, No. 17-cv-10034- ADB, 2017 WL 6544823, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2017) (noting that ERISA allows for nationwide service of process and identifying Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) as the mechanism for service under ERISA). In this case, a return of service—which “serves as prima facie evidence that service was validly performed,” Blair v. City of Worcester, 522 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 2008)—was filed on June 1, 2023 and indicates that National Shoring was served with a summons and a copy of the complaint on May 8, 2023 in Pittsfield, Massachusetts through its registered agent. ECF 5. Thus, “[b]y virtue of the fact that [National Shoring] was lawfully served within the United States pursuant to a federal statute, under the law of this circuit, this Court has personal jurisdiction over [National Shoring].” Gambino, 2017 WL 6544823, at *2 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

II. Claims for Relief and Remedies. Goldstein has adequately alleged violations of section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, and section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. National Shoring is liable as a result. “A defaulting party ‘is taken to have conceded the truth of the factual allegations in the complaint as establishing the grounds for liability as to which damages will be calculated.’” Ortiz- Gonzalez v. Fonovisa, 277 F.3d 59, 62-63 (1st Cir.

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