Natavio, Jr. v. Administrative Director of the Courts

• Court: Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 14, 2026
• Docket: CAAP-24-0000642
• Status: Published

Opinion

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Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 14-JUL-2026 09:04 AM Dkt. 58 SO NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

TEOFANES Q. NATAVIO, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT HONOLULU DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DAA-24-00002)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and Guidry, JJ.)

Petitioner-Appellant Teofanes Q. Natavio, Jr.

(Natavio) takes this secondary appeal from the July 31, 2024

"Decision and Order" (D&O), and August 2, 2024 "Judgment on

Appeal" (Judgment), entered by the District Court of the First

Circuit (district court). 1 The D&O and Judgment affirmed the

Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office's (ADLRO)

March 30, 2023 Notice of Administrative Review Decision (ADLRO

1 The Honorable Thomas A. Haia presided. NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Decision), which administratively revoked Natavio's driver's

license for two years, and the January 12, 2024 "Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision," which sustained the

ADLRO Decision.

Natavio raises four points of error on appeal,

contending that the district court "was wrong in affirming the

ADLRO's": (1) "denial of Natavio's Motion to Disqualify"; (2)

"denial of Natavio's Motion to Rescind for Violation of Due

Process"; (3) "conclusion that it was not collaterally estopped

from finding reasonable suspicion for the stop of Natavio's

vehicle"; and (4) "conclusion there was probable cause to

believe that Natavio operated the vehicle while under the

influence of an intoxicant."

We review secondary appeals de novo, and apply the

standards set forth in Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-40

(2020) 2 to determine whether the district court's determinations

were right or wrong. Wolcott v. Admin. Dir. of the Cts., 148

Hawaiʻi 407, 413, 477 P.3d 847, 853 (2020) (cleaned up).

2 HRS § 291E-40(c) (2020) provides:

(c) The sole issues before the court shall be whether the [administrative director of the courts]: (1) Exceeded constitutional or statutory authority; (2) Erroneously interpreted the law; (3) Acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner; (4) Committed an abuse of discretion; or (5) Made a determination that was unsupported by the evidence in the record.

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Upon careful review of the record, briefs, and

relevant legal authorities, and having given due consideration

to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties,

we address Natavio's points of error as follows:

(1) Ex Parte Communication: Natavio contends that the

ADLRO erred by not rescinding his driver's license revocation,

or disqualifying itself, due to its alleged improper ex parte

communication with Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Sergeant

Jared Spiker (Sergeant Spiker) in unrelated cases. Natavio

contends that the "procedures used by the ADLRO" in

communicating ex parte with Sergeant Spiker "create[] a

tremendous risk of erroneous deprivation" of Natavio's due

process right to keep his driver's license, and ADLRO's failure

to inform Natavio of the substance of the alleged ex parte

communications denied Natavio an opportunity to be heard.

"A driver's license is a constitutionally protected

interest and due process must be provided before one can be

deprived of his or her license." Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1,

21, 856 P.2d 1207, 1218 (1993) (citation omitted). As such,

Natavio had a due process right "to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner." Id. at 22, 856 P.2d at 1218

(citations omitted). Determining the appropriate process due in

a given situation:

[R]equires consideration of three distinct factors: [1] the private interest that will be affected by the official

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action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens that the additional procedures would entail.

Id. at 22-23, 856 P.2d at 1218-19 (emphasis added) (citations

omitted).

Here, Natavio points to no evidence in the record that

the ADLRO engaged in any ex parte communications with Sergeant

Spiker about Natavio or his case. And Natavio cites no

authority to support the proposition that ex parte

communications in separate and unrelated revocation proceedings

create a blanket appearance of impropriety, such that the

ADLRO's disqualification is necessary to protect Natavio's due

process rights. Natavio's contention therefore lacks merit.

(2) Expeditious Hearing: Natavio contends that he was

denied his due process right to an expeditious hearing because

the HPD did not fully comply with the subpoena duces tecum

requesting Sergeant Spiker's personnel records. Specifically,

Natavio claims that HPD refused to produce an alleged 874-page

Professional Standards Office (PSO) investigation document

relating to Sergeant Spiker, and that HPD's refusal caused him

to have "to choose between having a full and fair hearing and an

expeditious one."

HRS § 291E-38 (2020) "mandates that absent a

continuance for good cause shown, an administrative hearing to

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review the revocation of a driver's license must be commenced

within twenty-five days from the date the notice of

administrative revocation was issued." Robinson v. Admin. Dir.

of the Cts., 93 Hawaiʻi 337, 341, 3 P.3d 503, 507 (App. 2000)

(cleaned up). The record reflects that all continuances in this

matter were granted at Natavio's request. Natavio "cannot by

his own voluntary conduct invite error and then seek to profit

thereby." State v. Jones, No. 29301, 2010 WL 3133549, at *6

(Haw. App. Aug. 5, 2010) (mem. op.) (citations omitted).

Moreover, the record reflects that the ADLRO granted

Natavio a subpoena duces tecum for Sergeant Spiker's records

after Natavio filed a written request for the "Disciplinary

Records regarding Sergeant [] Spiker" including "Form HPD-384

for Sergeant [] Spiker's 2021 PSO investigation." The documents

produced by HPD appear to be responsive to Natavio's request,

and Natavio does not contend otherwise.

Natavio argues that the HPD documents were

incomplete, as they did not include the "HPD-384" form and the

results of a "21-0649" PSO investigation against Sergeant

Spiker. 3 Natavio represented below that he would submit

3 HPD produced 127 pages of responsive documents. The cover page of the subpoenaed documents includes a letter from HPD Major Brandon Nakasato representing, inter alia, that "findings related to untruthfulness and veracity for HPD Sergeant [] Spiker do not exist. Additionally, HPD Sergeant [] Spiker did not and has never received an 'HPD-384' for a 2021 PSO Investigation for untruthfulness and veracity."

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transcripts establishing the existence of additional responsive

documents not provided by the HPD, but Natavio never submitted

this additional offer of proof. On this record, we conclude

that the ADLRO had no basis to determine that the documents

produced by HPD were incomplete, false, or not responsive.

(3) Reasonable Suspicion: Natavio contends that the

ADLRO erred in determining that the district court's decision in

a related case, case no. 1DTI-23-053329 4 (Traffic Case), did not

collaterally estop the ADLRO from finding reasonable suspicion

in this case. In the Traffic Case, Natavio was charged with

disregarding a red traffic signal, the act which precipitated

Natavio's arrest for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of

an Intoxicant (OVUII). The Traffic Case was subsequently

dismissed with prejudice. Natavio contends that "[t]he issue

decided [in the Traffic Case] is identical to the issue

presented at the ADLRO hearing."

An administrative revocation shall be affirmed only

if, inter alia, there existed reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle. HRS § 291E-38(f)(1) (Supp. 2026). 5 Collateral estoppel

bars relitigation of an issue when the following factors are

4 The Honorable Timothy E. Ho presided.

5 The Supplemental Volume of the HRS for 2026 has not yet been issued. The portion of HRS § 291E-38 which refers to the ADLRO's requirement to affirm the existence of reasonable suspicion was amended as subsection (f) by H.B. 2097, H.D. 1, S.D. 1, 33rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (2026). Therefore, the forthcoming 2026 Supplemental Volume is cited.

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satisfied: (1) the issue decided in the prior suit is identical

to the issue presented in the action in question; (2) there was

a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit; (3) the party

against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in

privity with a party to the prior suit; and (4) the fact or

issue decided in the prior action was actually litigated,

finally decided, and essential to the earlier valid and final

judgment. Smallwood v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 118 Hawaiʻi

139, 147, 185 P.3d 887, 895 (App. 2008) (citations omitted);

Tradewind Ins. Co. v. Stout, 85 Hawaiʻi 177, 184, 938 P.2d 1196,

1203 (App. 1997) (citations omitted).

The district court's dismissal of the Traffic Case,

standing alone, does not compel our conclusion that the traffic

stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Natavio

introduced the district court's judgment that dismissed the

Traffic Case with prejudice to support his collateral estoppel

argument. However, the Traffic Case judgment did not include an

affirmative finding that Officer Alvin Koike (Officer Koike),

the officer making the traffic stop, was not credible, nor that

the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. "To

determine whether the officer indeed had specific and

articulable facts to justify the investigative stop, we examine

the totality of the circumstances measured by an objective

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standard." State v. Prendergast, 103 Hawaiʻi 451, 454, 83 P.3d

714, 717 (2004).

Here, Officer Koike's sworn statement in the arrest

report states that he observed Natavio's vehicle "approach[] the

traffic signal, which was red, and turn[] without coming to a

complete stop." Officer Koike's report pointed to specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with the rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted a stop for a

suspected traffic infraction. ADLRO was not collaterally

estopped from making its own assessment of reasonable suspicion

for the traffic stop.

(4) Probable Cause: Natavio contends that the ADLRO

erred in finding probable cause that Natavio committed OVUII.

"Probable cause is established by a state of facts as would lead

a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and

conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of guilt of the

accused." State v. Ontai, 84 Hawaiʻi 56, 63, 929 P.2d 69, 76

(1996) (cleaned up). Probable cause requires more than a mere

suspicion, but less than a certainty. State v. Maganis, 109

Hawaiʻi 84, 86, 123 P.3d 679, 681 (2005) (citations omitted).

Natavio disputes Sergeant Spiker's observation of his

poor performance on the standardized field sobriety test (SFST),

and contends that he was unable to dispute Sergeant Spiker's

credibility because he could not obtain impeachment materials.

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In section (2), supra, we concluded that the ADLRO did not deny

Natavio's due process right to conduct discovery of Sergeant

Spiker's HPD records. We therefore reject Natavio's contention

that "he was not allowed to adequately challenge Sergeant

Spiker's credibility."

Sergeant Spiker testified that, during the SFST,

Natavio could not keep his balance, stepped on his own feet,

swayed during the one-leg stand test, and admitted to having

"three drinks." In the arrest report, which was introduced into

evidence, Sergeant Spiker also observed that Natavio had a

strong odor of intoxicants, and red, watery, and glassy eyes.

The arrest report also included sworn statements from

Officer Koike and Officer Cheeravath Aphipunyo (Officer

Aphipunyo), which corroborate Sergeant Spiker's observations of

Natavio's intoxication. Officer Koike's observed that,

After initiating the traffic stop, [Officer Koike] approached the driver's window to speak with [Natavio] and could smell a strong odor of an alcoholic type beverage coming from [Natavio's] breath as he spoke, and saw [Natavio's] eyes to be watery and glassy. [Officer Koike] confirmed that this odor of an alcoholic type beverage did indeed come from [Natavio] when [Officer Koike] spoke with [Natavio] alone. [Natavio's] speech was slurred as well.

(Emphasis added.) Officer Aphipunyo represented that he arrived

a few minutes after the traffic stop, Officer Spiker was at the

scene, and "[u]pon [Officer Aphipunyo's] initial encounter with

[Natavio], [Officer Aphipunyo] immediately detected a strong

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odor of alcohol on [Natavio's] breath. [Natavio's] eyes were

red, watery, and glassy."

Officer Koike and Officer Aphipunyo's independent

observations of Natavio's red, watery, and glassy eyes, his

slurred words, and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath,

support the ADLRO's determination of probable cause for OVUII.

See State v. Wilson, 92 Hawaiʻi 45, 54 n.14, 987 P.2d 268, 277

n.14 (1999) ("[T]here is nothing to prevent the prosecution from

relying on other relevant evidence of intoxication . . . e.g.,

the manner in which [driver] was observed to have driven his

vehicle, his conduct in performing the requisite alcohol tests,

his appearance, demeanor, and other valid police observations of

signs of intoxication."); see also Bicalho v. Admin. Dir. of the

Cts., No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2026 WL 1033119, at *2-3 (Haw. App.

Apr. 16, 2026) (SDO).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district

court's D&O and Judgment.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, July 14, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone Alen M.K. Kaneshiro, Chief Judge Christopher M. Phillips, for Petitioner-Appellant. /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge Alyssa-Marie Y. Kau, Deputy Attorney General, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry for Respondent-Appellee. Associate Judge