Natasha Mora v. Black Horse Capital Inc., et al.

S.D. California

Natasha Mora v. Black Horse Capital Inc., et al.

DecidedJanuary 23, 2026

Docket3:25-cv-00017

StatusUnknown

This text of Natasha Mora v. Black Horse Capital Inc., et al. (Natasha Mora v. Black Horse Capital Inc., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Natasha Mora v. Black Horse Capital Inc., et al., (S.D. Cal. 2026).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATASHA MORA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00017-RBM-AHG

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN 14 BLACK HORSE CAPITAL INC., et al., [Doc. 14]; 15 Defendants. (2) DENYING EX PARTE 16 APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 17 RESTRAINING ORDER AS MOOT [Doc. 15]; AND 18

19 (3) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED 20 COMPLAINT AS MOOT [Doc. 16] 21 22 23 On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff Natasha Mora (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion to 24 Reopen Case (Doc. 14), an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 25 Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction (“Second TRO Motion”) (Doc. 15), and a 26 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Doc. 16). 27 For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Reopen Case (Doc. 14) is DENIED 28 and the remaining Motions (Docs. 15–16) are DENIED AS MOOT. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This action relates to an unlawful detainer action adjudicated in the Superior Court 3 of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”) which concerned the 4 property located at 6389 Castejon Drive, La Jolla, California 92037 (the “Property”). (Doc. 5 1, Complaint [“Compl.”] ¶ 11 (citing Black Horse Capital Inc. v. Bula Devs. Inc., Case 6 Number: 24UD012825C); Doc. 6-1 at 1).)2 Plaintiff’s right of possession claim was denied 7 as invalid and a Writ of Possession was issued. (Doc. 6-2 at 1.)3 Possession of the Property 8 was restored to the landlord on January 8, 2025. (Doc. 6-1 at 1.) 9 Plaintiff filed this action in federal court on January 6, 2025, asserting a single cause 10 of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (Compl. ¶¶ 21– 11 28.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application to Rescind Post Judgment 12 Lockout (“First TRO Motion”) requesting this Court to rescind, or direct the Sheriff to 13 rescind, “its Restoration Notice served on Plaintiff on January 8, 2025 in connection with 14 its enforcement of post judgment lockout.” (Doc. 6 at 2.) On January 21, 2025, the Court 15 denied Plaintiff’s First TRO Motion and issued an Order to Show Cause why the action 16 should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 10.) The Court also 17 called into question the instant action’s propriety and noted that “Plaintiff’s attempts to 18 obtain possession of the Property have been rejected numerous times by different courts.” 19 (Id. at 10–11.) On July 9, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of 20 subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 12.) 21 22 1 The Court has previously summarized this action’s background in its Order Denying Ex 23 Parte Application to Rescind Post Judgment Lockout dated January 21, 2025. (Doc. 10.) The Court incorporates by reference the factual background set forth therein. (Id. at 2–3.) 24

25 2 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Complaint and the CM/ECF electronic pagination for other citations unless otherwise noted. 26

27 3 Cesar Mora is named as a plaintiff in the Motions currently before the Court. As Cesar Mora was not named as a plaintiff in the Complaint, the Court refers to Plaintiff Natasha 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b), the Court may grant relief 3 from a final judgment or order based on: “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 4 newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged 5 judgment; or (6) extraordinary circumstances which would justify relief.” School Dist. No. 6 1J, Multnomah Cnty v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). “Motions for 7 relief from judgment pursuant to [Rule] 60(b) are committed to the sound discretion of the 8 trial judge.” Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Thompson v. 9 Housing Authority, 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986)). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Plaintiff moves to “reopen this action” under Rule 60(b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(6). (Doc. 12 14 at 3–4.) In doing so, Plaintiff effectively requests relief from this Court’s Order 13 dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 14 U.S. 524, 528–29 (2005) (describing Rule 60(b) as a request to reopen a case). 15 As a threshold matter, Plaintiff is represented by counsel in this action who has 16 neither moved for leave to withdraw or filed an application for substitution of attorney. 17 (See Doc. 3-1.) When a party is represented by counsel, she may not appear, file motions, 18 or otherwise act on her own behalf without leave of the court. See United States v. 19 Brayshaw, No. 2:14-mc-00088-MCE-KJN, 2018 WL 534120, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 20 2018) (noting that under Rule 11, a party “cannot both be represented and file her own 21 motions”). Unless Plaintiff’s counsel files a motion to withdrawal, Plaintiff may not file 22 motions on her own behalf. Plaintiff’s Motions are therefore improper. 23 Even if properly filed, nothing in Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen changes the Court’s 24 determination that it lacks jurisdiction over this action. Plaintiff argues that newly 25 discovered evidence and ongoing constitutional violations “materially alter[ ] the legal 26 landscape.” (Doc. 14 at 3, 5.) Such arguments, however, reinforce the Court’s prior 27 conclusion that Plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state 28 court” and “seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” (Doc. 12 at 4 (quoting Fontana 1 Empire Ctr., LLC v. City. of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)).) In fact, Plaintiff 2 attempts to proffer as evidence a Notice of Trustee’s Sale from November 2025 which she 3 claims “establishes that [her] eviction and seizure were predicated on a void instrument.” 4 (See Doc. 14 at 4.) But as this Court explained, “Plaintiff’s claims stem from the outcome 5 of unlawful detainer proceedings in San Diego Superior Court.” (Doc. 12 at 3.) 6 Although Plaintiff contends the eviction resulted in additional constitutional 7 violations (see Doc. 14 at 5), her claims remain “inextricably intertwined” with the state 8 court judgment because they “rely on the premise that Plaintiff . . . [was] in fact entitled to 9 remain in possession,” meaning the state court’s judgment was “wrongful.” See Koshak v. 10 Cnty. of Orange, No. SACV 13-01732-CJC(ANx), 2014 WL 12626351, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 11 Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 323 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Henrichs v. Valley View 12 Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting a request to declare a state court judgment 13 void “is squarely barred by Rooker-Feldman”). Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen must 14 therefore be denied on this additional basis. 15 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen (Doc. 14) is DENIED. Because this 16 action remains dismissed, and there is no underlying operative complaint, Plaintiff’s 17 Second TRO Motion (Doc. 15)4 and Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 18 (Doc. 16) are DENIED AS MOOT. See Olajide v. Brown, Case No. 18-cv-03991-CRB, 19 2018 WL 3328227, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2018) (dismissing the complaint and denying 20 the TRO motion as moot). 21 22 23 24 4 The Court also notes that Plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements for 25 ex parte applications mandated by the Local Rules and this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 83.3(g)(2); The Hon. Ruth Bermudez Montenegro Civ. Chambers R. 26 VI. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with Civil Local Rule 83.3(g) is an additional basis to deny 27 the Second TRO Motion. See Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATASHA MORA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00017-RBM-AHG

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN 14 BLACK HORSE CAPITAL INC., et al., [Doc. 14]; 15 Defendants. (2) DENYING EX PARTE 16 APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 17 RESTRAINING ORDER AS MOOT [Doc. 15]; AND 18

19 (3) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED 20 COMPLAINT AS MOOT [Doc. 16] 21 22 23 On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff Natasha Mora (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion to 24 Reopen Case (Doc. 14), an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 25 Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction (“Second TRO Motion”) (Doc. 15), and a 26 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Doc. 16). 27 For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Reopen Case (Doc. 14) is DENIED 28 and the remaining Motions (Docs. 15–16) are DENIED AS MOOT. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This action relates to an unlawful detainer action adjudicated in the Superior Court 3 of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”) which concerned the 4 property located at 6389 Castejon Drive, La Jolla, California 92037 (the “Property”). (Doc. 5 1, Complaint [“Compl.”] ¶ 11 (citing Black Horse Capital Inc. v. Bula Devs. Inc., Case 6 Number: 24UD012825C); Doc. 6-1 at 1).)2 Plaintiff’s right of possession claim was denied 7 as invalid and a Writ of Possession was issued. (Doc. 6-2 at 1.)3 Possession of the Property 8 was restored to the landlord on January 8, 2025. (Doc. 6-1 at 1.) 9 Plaintiff filed this action in federal court on January 6, 2025, asserting a single cause 10 of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (Compl. ¶¶ 21– 11 28.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application to Rescind Post Judgment 12 Lockout (“First TRO Motion”) requesting this Court to rescind, or direct the Sheriff to 13 rescind, “its Restoration Notice served on Plaintiff on January 8, 2025 in connection with 14 its enforcement of post judgment lockout.” (Doc. 6 at 2.) On January 21, 2025, the Court 15 denied Plaintiff’s First TRO Motion and issued an Order to Show Cause why the action 16 should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 10.) The Court also 17 called into question the instant action’s propriety and noted that “Plaintiff’s attempts to 18 obtain possession of the Property have been rejected numerous times by different courts.” 19 (Id. at 10–11.) On July 9, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of 20 subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 12.) 21 22 1 The Court has previously summarized this action’s background in its Order Denying Ex 23 Parte Application to Rescind Post Judgment Lockout dated January 21, 2025. (Doc. 10.) The Court incorporates by reference the factual background set forth therein. (Id. at 2–3.) 24

25 2 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Complaint and the CM/ECF electronic pagination for other citations unless otherwise noted. 26

27 3 Cesar Mora is named as a plaintiff in the Motions currently before the Court. As Cesar Mora was not named as a plaintiff in the Complaint, the Court refers to Plaintiff Natasha 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b), the Court may grant relief 3 from a final judgment or order based on: “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 4 newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged 5 judgment; or (6) extraordinary circumstances which would justify relief.” School Dist. No. 6 1J, Multnomah Cnty v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). “Motions for 7 relief from judgment pursuant to [Rule] 60(b) are committed to the sound discretion of the 8 trial judge.” Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Thompson v. 9 Housing Authority, 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986)). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 Plaintiff moves to “reopen this action” under Rule 60(b)(2), (b)(5), and (b)(6). (Doc. 12 14 at 3–4.) In doing so, Plaintiff effectively requests relief from this Court’s Order 13 dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 14 U.S. 524, 528–29 (2005) (describing Rule 60(b) as a request to reopen a case). 15 As a threshold matter, Plaintiff is represented by counsel in this action who has 16 neither moved for leave to withdraw or filed an application for substitution of attorney. 17 (See Doc. 3-1.) When a party is represented by counsel, she may not appear, file motions, 18 or otherwise act on her own behalf without leave of the court. See United States v. 19 Brayshaw, No. 2:14-mc-00088-MCE-KJN, 2018 WL 534120, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 20 2018) (noting that under Rule 11, a party “cannot both be represented and file her own 21 motions”). Unless Plaintiff’s counsel files a motion to withdrawal, Plaintiff may not file 22 motions on her own behalf. Plaintiff’s Motions are therefore improper. 23 Even if properly filed, nothing in Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen changes the Court’s 24 determination that it lacks jurisdiction over this action. Plaintiff argues that newly 25 discovered evidence and ongoing constitutional violations “materially alter[ ] the legal 26 landscape.” (Doc. 14 at 3, 5.) Such arguments, however, reinforce the Court’s prior 27 conclusion that Plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state 28 court” and “seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” (Doc. 12 at 4 (quoting Fontana 1 Empire Ctr., LLC v. City. of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)).) In fact, Plaintiff 2 attempts to proffer as evidence a Notice of Trustee’s Sale from November 2025 which she 3 claims “establishes that [her] eviction and seizure were predicated on a void instrument.” 4 (See Doc. 14 at 4.) But as this Court explained, “Plaintiff’s claims stem from the outcome 5 of unlawful detainer proceedings in San Diego Superior Court.” (Doc. 12 at 3.) 6 Although Plaintiff contends the eviction resulted in additional constitutional 7 violations (see Doc. 14 at 5), her claims remain “inextricably intertwined” with the state 8 court judgment because they “rely on the premise that Plaintiff . . . [was] in fact entitled to 9 remain in possession,” meaning the state court’s judgment was “wrongful.” See Koshak v. 10 Cnty. of Orange, No. SACV 13-01732-CJC(ANx), 2014 WL 12626351, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 11 Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 323 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Henrichs v. Valley View 12 Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting a request to declare a state court judgment 13 void “is squarely barred by Rooker-Feldman”). Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen must 14 therefore be denied on this additional basis. 15 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen (Doc. 14) is DENIED. Because this 16 action remains dismissed, and there is no underlying operative complaint, Plaintiff’s 17 Second TRO Motion (Doc. 15)4 and Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 18 (Doc. 16) are DENIED AS MOOT. See Olajide v. Brown, Case No. 18-cv-03991-CRB, 19 2018 WL 3328227, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2018) (dismissing the complaint and denying 20 the TRO motion as moot). 21 22 23 24 4 The Court also notes that Plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements for 25 ex parte applications mandated by the Local Rules and this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 83.3(g)(2); The Hon. Ruth Bermudez Montenegro Civ. Chambers R. 26 VI. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with Civil Local Rule 83.3(g) is an additional basis to deny 27 the Second TRO Motion. See Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local 28 l IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Reopen (Doc. 14) is DENIED. The Second 3 || TRO Motion (Doc. 15) and the Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Doc. 4 || 16) are therefore DENIED AS MOOT. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || DATE: January 23, 2026

8 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ'MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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