Nassar v. Fletcher

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Nassar v. Fletcher

372 So. 2d 1243, 1979 La. App. LEXIS 3584

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal

DecidedMay 17, 1979

DocketNo. 10523

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 372 So. 2d 1243 (Nassar v. Fletcher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Nassar v. Fletcher, 372 So. 2d 1243, 1979 La. App. LEXIS 3584 (La. Ct. App. 1979).

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Opinion

ORDER

From defendant’s application for new trial as against the individual plaintiff alone (and not as against the subrogated insurer, plaintiff in the consolidated case), and from the wording of the application for new trial, it appears that the application asks for new trial on the ground that quantum is excessive. Notwithstanding that the application asked only for new trial, C.C.P. 1813 provides the court “may” indicate a period for remittitur as an alternative to granting a new trial. Under the circumstance that liability is established in the trial judge’s own $4,812.96 judgment for the subrogated insurer, this might well be an appropriate ease for remittitur. Unlike the trial judge in Fontenot v. Fidelity and Gas. Co. of N. Y., La.App. 3 Cir. 1969, 217 So.2d 702, our trial judge does not reject new trial as an imposition. To the contrary, he has granted a new trial, a burden he presumably does not need and could avoid by granting remit-titur, but only if plaintiff consented. Perhaps the trial judge has had informal indications from plaintiff (as did the trial judge in Fontenot) that plaintiff would not consent to the remittitur the trial judge deemed proper. We are unable from our point of view to say that C.C.P. 1813’s “may” in this case means “must”.

The application is therefore denied.

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ORDER

From defendant’s application for new trial as against the individual plaintiff alone (and not as against the subrogated insurer, plaintiff in the consolidated case), and from the wording of the application for new trial, it appears that the application asks for new trial on the ground that quantum is excessive. Notwithstanding that the application asked only for new trial, C.C.P. 1813 provides the court “may” indicate a period for remittitur as an alternative to granting a new trial. Under the circumstance that liability is established in the trial judge’s own $4,812.96 judgment for the subrogated insurer, this might well be an appropriate ease for remittitur. Unlike the trial judge in Fontenot v. Fidelity and Gas. Co. of N. Y., La.App. 3 Cir. 1969, 217 So.2d 702, our trial judge does not reject new trial as an imposition. To the contrary, he has granted a new trial, a burden he presumably does not need and could avoid by granting remit-titur, but only if plaintiff consented. Perhaps the trial judge has had informal indications from plaintiff (as did the trial judge in Fontenot) that plaintiff would not consent to the remittitur the trial judge deemed proper. We are unable from our point of view to say that C.C.P. 1813’s “may” in this case means “must”.

The application is therefore denied.

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Bluebook (online)

372 So. 2d 1243, 1979 La. App. LEXIS 3584, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nassar-v-fletcher-lactapp-1979.

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