Nash v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided May 10, 2018·No. 15-1587·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 15-1587V

Filed: February 5, 2018

UNPUBLISHED

STACEY NASH,

Petitioner,

v. Special Processing Unit (SPU);

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Caroline Noel Valentino, Oakland, CA, for petitioner. Sarah Christina Duncan, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master:

On December 29, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq., 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered Guillain-Barre Syndrome (“GBS”) caused by her January 3, 2013 influenza (“flu”) vaccination. Petition at 1. On June 27, 2017, the undersigned issued a decision awarding compensation to petitioner based on the parties’ stipulation. (ECF No. 49.)

I. Procedural History

On January 15, 2018, petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

(ECF No. 52.) Petitioner requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,051.00 and

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012).

attorneys’ costs in the amount of $427.00. (Id. at 1.) In compliance with General Order #9, petitioner filed a signed statement indicating that petitioner incurred no out-of-pocket expenses. (Id. at 2.) Thus, the total amount requested is $45,478.00.

On January 26, 2018, respondent filed a response to petitioner’s motion. (ECF No. 53.) Respondent argues that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for respondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Id. at 1.) Respondent adds, however, that he “is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” (Id. at 2.) Respondent “respectfully recommends that the Chief Special Master exercise her discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Id. at 3.)

Petitioner has filed no reply.

The undersigned has reviewed the billing records submitted with petitioner’s request and finds a reduction in the amount of fees to be awarded appropriate for the reasons listed below.

II. Legal Standard for Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Under the Vaccine Act, the special master shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for any petition that results in an award of compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa- 15(e)(1). Petitioner in this case was awarded compensation; she is therefore entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 3

The Federal Circuit has approved use of the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Using the lodestar approach, a court first determines “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fee by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347–58 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Then, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on other specific findings. (Id. at 1348.)

Counsel must submit fee requests that include contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the service. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316–18 (2008). Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cl. 1993) (quoting

3 In addition, § 300aa–15(e)(3) states that “[n]o attorney may charge any fee for services in connection with a petition filed under section 300aa–11 of this title which is in addition to any amount awarded as compensation by the special master or court under paragraph (1).” This would include any amounts requested by counsel that the undersigned finds non-compensable.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is “well within the special master’s discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done.” Id. at 1522. Furthermore, the special master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing a petitioner notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009).

An application for fees and costs must sufficiently detail and explain the time billed so that a special master may determine, from the application and the case file, whether the amount requested is reasonable. Bell v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 18 Cl. Ct. 751, 760 (1989); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 06–559V, 2009 WL 2568468 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 27, 2009). Petitioners bear the burden of documenting the fees and costs claimed. Rodriguez, 2009 WL 2568468, at *8. Block billing, or billing large amounts of time without sufficient detail as to what tasks were performed, is clearly disfavored. See, e.g., Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 07-137V, 2008 WL 5456319, at *4-5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 17, 2008).

In determining a reasonable number of hours expended, a line-by-line evaluation of the fee application is not required. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl.Ct. 482, 484, aff’d in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special masters may rely on their experience with the Vaccine Act and its attorneys to determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Id. Just as “[t]rial courts routinely use their prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the number of hours claimed in attorney fee requests .... [v]accine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521.

III. Appropriate Hourly Rates

Petitioner requests compensation for Ms. Valentino at a rate of $375 per hour for time billed in 2013 and 2014; $400 per hour for 2015 and 2016; and $425 per hour for 2017 and 2018. (ECF No. 52-1 at 15.) Due to Ms. Valentino’s inexperience in the Vaccine Program 4, the undersigned does find cause to reduce the hourly rates to $350 an hour for time billed in 2013 – 2015 and to $385.00 for time billed in 2016 - 2018. 5

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Nash v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2018).

Nash v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Nash v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related