Narrigan v. Goldberg

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-1395
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 25-1395

THOMAS R. NARRIGAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

DEBORAH B. GOLDBERG, in her official capacity as Treasurer and Receiver General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Mark G. Mastroianni, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Terry Rose Saunders, with whom The Saunders Law Firm, Arthur Susman, The Law Office of Arthur Susman, Edward A. Broderick, and Broderick Law, P.C. were on brief, for appellant.

Arjun Kent Jaikumar, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, with whom Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief, for appellee.

March 18, 2026 LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Thomas R. Narrigan brought a

putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Treasurer

and Receiver-General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

("Treasurer"). His complaint challenges Massachusetts's

Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 200A,

under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated

against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Narrigan alleges

that the Act's interest-payment provisions have resulted in an

uncompensated taking of his private property for public use. He

has not yet brought a claim to recover his property under Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 200A, § 10(a).

The district court granted the Treasurer's motion to

dismiss, finding that Narrigan lacked standing to seek injunctive

or declaratory relief, that his claims were barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, and that he did not state a plausible claim for relief.

Narrigan's arguments are susceptible to two readings,

both of which fail. First, we hold that Narrigan's apparent

challenge to the interest rate he would be provided under the

statute is not ripe. Second, we hold that Narrigan lacks standing

to seek injunctive or declaratory relief based on his assertion

that his unclaimed property has already been taken. Accordingly,

we affirm the district court's dismissal.

- 2 - I.

Massachusetts enacted the Disposition of Unclaimed

Property Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 200A, in 1950. Under the

statute, certain property that is held by one other than its owner

and unclaimed for a set time is presumed abandoned. Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 200A, §§ 1A-6E. Once property valued at one hundred

dollars or more is presumed abandoned, its holder must attempt to

notify the property's apparent owner at his or her last known

address of the available process to rebut that presumption. Id.

§ 7A. If the owner does not come forward, the holder must file a

report, which for most property must include the owner's name and

last known address. Id. § 7. The property will then be

surrendered to the Treasurer, id. § 8A, who must provide public

notice containing the "names of persons appearing to be owners of

[the] unclaimed property," id. § 8(b) (emphasis added). The

statute directs the Treasurer to "proceed with the liquidation of

property" surrendered to her "not earlier than one year after its

delivery," id. § 9(b), with all monies received placed in an

"Unclaimed Property Fund," id. § 9(e). Whenever such fund exceeds

five hundred thousand dollars, the excess is credited to the

"General Fund." Id.

Individuals asserting "an interest in property

surrendered to" the Treasurer may make a claim to recover the

property at any time. Id. § 10(a). The claimant may request an

- 3 - administrative hearing before the Treasurer, and the Treasurer's

final decision is subject to judicial review in state court. Id.

§ 10(b), (d).

If an individual submits a successful claim, the statute

provides for interest depending on the nature of his property.

Id. § 10(e). If the property did not earn interest before delivery

to the Commonwealth, the Act provides that the owner will receive

1% interest per year from the time of delivery to the Commonwealth.

Id. If the property did earn interest prior to delivery to the

Commonwealth, the Commonwealth will pay the preexisting interest

rate up to 5% per year. Id.

Narrigan's complaint alleged that "[a]ccording to the

Defendant's online records, Defendant holds Plaintiff's property."

His complaint contained a screenshot from the Commonwealth's

website, which displayed a list of information about the abandoned

property in the Treasurer's possession, including the "Owner

Name," "Address," and "Property Type." The screenshot showed two

entries -- labeled as "miscellaneous intangible property" and

"refunds," respectively -- associated with the name Thomas

Narrigan and an address. Narrigan's complaint did not describe

his connection to the address given in the Treasurer's records,

nor did it explain what the "miscellaneous intangible property" or

"refunds" in question were.

- 4 - The complaint alleged that the Commonwealth's interest

scheme deprives unclaimed-property owners of just compensation for

the taking of their property because the interest rates specified

in the statute are "not based on or related to the benefits to the

Commonwealth from the use of the property." On behalf of a

proposed class of similarly situated individuals, Narrigan sought

a declaration that the Commonwealth's use of unclaimed property

constitutes a taking and violates the Fifth Amendment and an

injunction requiring the Commonwealth to comply with that

declaration in dealing with future unclaimed-property disputes.

The Treasurer brought a motion to dismiss, arguing the

case was not ripe because Narrigan had not yet made a claim for

the property, so it was speculative whether he would ultimately be

deprived of interest or just compensation as to the unclaimed

property. The Treasurer further argued (i) that Narrigan's

constitutional claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and

sovereign immunity, (ii) that Narrigan lacked standing, and

(iii) that Narrigan failed to state a claim.

On March 25, 2025, the district court dismissed

Narrigan's claims on standing, sovereign immunity, and merits

grounds. Narrigan v. Goldberg, 772 F. Supp. 3d 182, 187 (D. Mass.

2025). The court held that Narrigan lacked standing to seek

prospective relief because he could not point to any future harm

justifying the prospective relief that he sought. Id. at 191-92.

- 5 - The court further found that the Commonwealth had not waived its

Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Narrigan had not adequately

invoked the Ex parte Young doctrine because the relief he sought

was not truly prospective and was effectively a request for

monetary compensation for a past violation. Id. at 192-96.

Finally, as to the Takings Clause claim itself, the court reasoned

that the state assuming possession of abandoned property is

traditionally not considered a "taking," that Narrigan's property

was "abandoned through his own neglect," and that the Commonwealth

"provides a mechanism for [Narrigan] to reclaim his property in

full." Id. at 196-97. The district court did not reach the

Treasurer's ripeness argument.

II.

Whether a plaintiff has standing is a legal question

that we review de novo. Kerin v. Titeflex Corp., 770 F.3d 978,

981 (1st Cir. 2014). Because the class was not certified below,

our review is limited to whether the named plaintiff has standing.

Id. To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff "must show (i) that he

suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and

actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the

defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by

judicial relief." TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423

(2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61

(1992)). A plaintiff's past injury, standing alone, is

- 6 - insufficient to confer standing for prospective declaratory or

injunctive relief; the plaintiff must show either a continuing

injury or a "sufficient threat that the injury will recur." Roe

v. Healey, 78 F.4th 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2023).

The doctrines of standing and ripeness are closely

related, arising from the same Article III limitation. See Susan

B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 n.5 (2014).

Ripeness is a "doctrine[] of justiciability . . . originating in

the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Trump v. New

York, 592 U.S. 125, 131 (2020). To be ripe for consideration under

Article III, a case must present "'a substantial controversy,

between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient

immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of' the judicial

relief sought." Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 2017)

(quoting Lab. Rels. Div. of Constr. Indus. of Mass., Inc. v.

Healey, 844 F.3d 318, 326 (1st Cir. 2016)). "The ripeness of a

dispute is determined de novo." Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 138

(1st Cir. 2003).1

1 In the district court, the Treasurer moved to dismiss on ripeness grounds. On appeal, the parties do not address ripeness but focus largely on standing. Nevertheless, "federal courts have an omnipresent duty to take notice of jurisdictional defects, on their own initiative if necessary." Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo, 564 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2009). - 7 - III.

We first consider Narrigan's claim under the

construction of his complaint most favorable to his request for

prospective relief: that the statutory rate paid by the Treasurer

for the time-value of his property fails to sufficiently repay him

interest on the unclaimed property. In his reply brief, Narrigan

identifies his future injury as deriving from the Commonwealth's

"ongoing use of his property and the consequent ongoing loss of

the time value." Under this framing, Narrigan's assertion of a

Takings Clause claim does not meet the Article III ripeness

requirement.

To be sure, Narrigan has a right to reasonable interest

accruing on any interest-bearing unclaimed property. As Judge

Posner held in Cerajeski v. Zoeller, "[i]nterest on

interest-bearing unclaimed property is unclaimed property too, and

so the property owner can claim it upon proving title, unless the

property has been escheated."2 735 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, a taking has not yet occurred as to that interest. The

Treasurer took possession of Narrigan's unclaimed property when it

was delivered to her custody. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 588

U.S. 180, 189 (2019) ("[A] property owner has a claim for a

2 Cerajeski also recognized that the "state can charge a fee for custodianship and for searching for the owner" of the unclaimed property, "but the interest on the principal in a bank account is not a fee for those services." 735 F.3d at 583. - 8 - violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his

property for public use without paying for it."). But the

Treasurer does not take the time-value of that property unless and

until Narrigan claims the underlying property and the Treasurer

then refuses to remit reasonable interest to him attributable to

that time-value.

Narrigan admits that he has not yet made such a claim.

Indeed, he identifies his injury as a future one, asserting that

it would arise from "the Commonwealth's ongoing use of his property

and the consequent ongoing loss of the time value." But without

his making a demand for the underlying property, there has been no

refusal to pay interest and thus no completed taking as to the

time-value of the unclaimed property. Whether Narrigan is

constitutionally entitled to any interest depends on facts that

remain unknown, such as whether, absent the Commonwealth's alleged

taking, the value of the property would have increased even without

accruing interest so that Narrigan was deprived of that increase

in value. Similarly, any claim by Narrigan to the time-value of

his property is also dependent on the timing of his assertion of

a claim, for the value of property is not linear but may rise and

fall depending on the day. A party subject to a taking "is entitled

to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had

not been taken." Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216,

236 (2003) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255

- 9 - (1934)). Until Narrigan claims his property we cannot know what

that position might be, so any alleged taking of its time-value

remains speculative. Because Narrigan's complaint as so

characterized depends on contingent future events, it is not ripe

for adjudication. A claim is not ripe when it involves a "chain

of speculation or contingencies." Jensen v. R.I. Cannabis Control

Comm'n, 160 F.4th 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2025); see also Algonquin Gas

Transmission, LLC v. Weymouth, 919 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2019)

(asking "'whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent

events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all,'

thus rendering any opinion we might offer advisory" (quoting Ernst

& Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 536 (1st

Cir. 1995))).3

3 The Eleventh Circuit found ripe a Takings Clause claim under a quite different state statute for "earnings accrued on the property after the Department liquidates and invests it." Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer, 136 F.4th 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2025). The court reasoned that "[b]ecause the Act makes clear that those earnings will not be compensated, ripeness does not further require the Marons to file a claim with the Department for those earnings and be denied." Id. We note that the Supreme Court has cautioned that "the 'just compensation' required by the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property owner's loss rather than the government's gain." Brown, 538 U.S. at 235-36. Under Brown, the key is whether the statute will certainly deny a claimant the value that the property would have had had it remained in the claimant's possession (i.e., unliquidated and uninvested) the entire time. Unlike the statute at issue in Maron, Massachusetts's Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act may entitle Narrigan to receive the full interest rate on the property. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 200A § 10(e). After all, Narrigan, unlike the plaintiffs in Maron, does not supportably allege that he will "not be paid for earnings accrued on [his] property," Maron, 136 F.4th at 1333, given that - 10 - IV.

Narrigan's complaint can also plausibly be construed as

alleging that there has been a completed taking that occurred when

his unclaimed property was delivered to the Treasurer. Under this

construction, the claim would be ripe, but Narrigan would lack

standing to pursue prospective relief.

The Supreme Court has made clear that a property owner's

Takings Clause claim arises "as soon as a government takes [a

plaintiff's] property . . . without paying for it." Knick, 588

U.S. at 189. The Knick Court explained that "[c]ompensation under

the Takings Clause is a remedy for the 'constitutional violation'

that 'the landowner has already suffered' at the time of the

uncompensated taking." Id. at 193 (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec.

Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting)). Under that framework, a plaintiff suffers a

cognizable injury when he owns property and the Commonwealth takes

possession of it without providing just compensation. The

existence of that injury does not depend on whether the owner has

filed a claim for return of the property. See id. Here, Narrigan

alleges that he owned the unclaimed property at issue, the

Treasurer took possession of it, and she did so without paying

he does not allege that the interest rate on his property exceeds the rate the Treasurer is statutorily allowed to pay him. - 11 - just compensation. Under Knick, his injury has already occurred,

and so that claim is ripe.

But Narrigan seeks only prospective relief. To have

standing to pursue such relief, a plaintiff must show an ongoing

injury or a sufficient likelihood of future injury. See Nat'l

Ass'n of Gov't Emps., Inc. v. Yellen, 120 F.4th 904, 910 (1st Cir.

2024). If the taking alleged by Narrigan occurred at the moment

his property was delivered to the Treasurer, then the injury is no

longer ongoing. Nor does Narrigan allege any plausible threat

that the same injury will recur through a future taking. Narrigan

instead asserts that he faces ongoing harm because his property

remains in the Commonwealth's accounts. But even so, any such

taking itself constitutes a past harm that has already occurred.

See James v. Hegar, 86 F.4th 1076, 1082 (5th Cir. 2023)

(allegations of past unconstitutional taking insufficient to

confer standing for prospective relief). Because a completed

taking cannot support standing for injunctive relief, Narrigan's

claim must fail under this construction.

We conclude that this complaint, for the reasons stated,

does not meet the requirements of Article III. The district

court's dismissal is affirmed.

- 12 -