Naro v. Walgreen Co

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 8, 2025·No. 4:22-cv-03170·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SERENA NARO, et al., Case No. 22-cv-03170-JST

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND 10 WALGREEN CO, et al., PAGA REPRESENTATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT Defendants. 11 Re: ECF No. 66 12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class action 14 settlement. ECF No. 60. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Plaintiffs Serena Naro and Trish Gonzales, representatives of the California Labor & 17 Workforce Development Agency (collectively “Plaintiffs”), bring suit against Defendants 18 Walgreen Co., Walgreen Pharmacy Services Midwest, LCC, and Does 1–15 (collectively, 19 “Defendants”). ECF No. 33 ¶ 1. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to “reimburse for 20 necessary business expenses, namely expenses incurred in purchasing replacement uniforms 21 which Defendants[] required Plaintiffs to wear each shift.” Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs allege violations of 22 the California Labor Code, including for failure to reimburse for business expenses (Cal. Lab. 23 Code § 2802); the Private Attorneys General Act (Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq.; “PAGA”); IWC 24 Wage Order No. 7 (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070; “Wage Order”); and the Unfair Competition 25 Law (Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200, et seq.; “UCL”). Id. 26 Plaintiffs filed this action on May 31, 2022. ECF No. 1. After briefing, the Court granted 27 Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. ECF No. 32. Plaintiffs amended their 1 discovery and ADR. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class 2 action and PAGA representation action settlement, ECF No. 60, which the Court denied without 3 prejudice, ECF No. 65. Plaintiffs filed their second unopposed motion for preliminary settlement 4 approval on February 13, 2025. ECF No. 66. 5 II. JURISDICTION 6 The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 7 III. LEGAL STANDARD 8 The Ninth Circuit maintains a “strong judicial policy” that favors the settlement of class 9 actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). Rule 23 requires 10 courts to employ a two-step process in evaluating a class action settlement. First, the parties must 11 show “that the court will likely be able to . . . (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2).” Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). In other words, a court must make a preliminary determination that the 13 settlement “is fair, reasonable, and adequate” when considering the factors set out in Rule 14 23(e)(2). If no class has yet been certified, a court must make a preliminary finding that it “will 15 likely be able to . . . (ii) certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. 16 P. 23(e)(1)(B). If the court makes these preliminary findings, it “must direct notice in a reasonable 17 manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Id. Second, courts must hold 18 a hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2) to make a final determination of whether the settlement is 19 “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 20 The Court’s task at the preliminary approval stage is to determine whether the settlement 21 falls “within the range of possible approval.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 22 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. 23 Supp. 2d 561, 570 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2001)). Courts “must be particularly vigilant not only for 24 explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their 25 own self-interests and that of certain class members to infect the negotiations.” In re Bluetooth 26 Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). Preliminary approval is 27 appropriate if “the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non- 1 treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible 2 approval.” Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (quoting Schwartz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 570 n.12). 3 The proposed settlement need not be ideal, but it must be fair and free of collusion, 4 consistent with counsel’s fiduciary obligations to the class. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 5 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 6 U.S. 338 (2011) (“Settlement is the offspring of compromise; the question we address is not 7 whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and 8 free from collusion.”). To assess a settlement proposal, courts must balance a number of factors:

9 [T]he strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class 10 action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; 11 the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed 12 settlement. 13 Id. at 1026 (quoting Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993)). 14 The proposed settlement must be “taken as a whole, rather than the individual component 15 parts,” in the examination for overall fairness. Id. Courts do not have the ability to “delete, 16 modify, or substitute certain provisions;” the settlement “must stand or fall in its entirety.” Id. 17 (quoting Officers for Justice v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 18 615, 630 (9th Cir. 1982). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 The Court previously denied the parties’ first proposed settlement agreement based on 21 deficiencies in the key terms of the settlement. See ECF No. 65. The Court now addresses each 22 deficiency in turn to determine whether the issues have been resolved. 23 1. Named Plaintiffs’ General Release 24 The Court first took issue with the Named Plaintiffs’ release provision because it placed 25 the Named Plaintiffs in conflict with the settlement class. ECF No. 65 at 1. The Court noted that 26 in addition to agreeing to release the claims asserted in the complaint, the Named Plaintiffs agreed 27 to “fully and finally release and discharge the Released Parties from all known and unknown 1 whatsoever, up to the date of the Court’s final approval of the Settlement Agreement,” ECF No. 2 66-1 ¶ 34(d), as a part of the consideration for a $10,000 incentive award. Id. The Court was 3 specifically concerned about the incentive payments awarded in exchange for general releases, 4 because they “appear to be completely divorced from any benefit or service to the class.” Roes, 1– 5 2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1056 (9th Cir. 2019). As such, the Court explained that 6 it would not approve a settlement agreement containing that provision. ECF No. 65 at 2. 7 In their renewed motion, the parties retained the general release language but replaced the 8 clause “[i]n consideration for the service payments being paid to Plaintiffs” with “[i]n exchange 9 for the consideration provided by Defendant.” ECF No. 66 at 11.

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