Narcisa De Jesus Yugla Alomaliza v. Timothy S. Robbins, Field Office Director of the Los Angeles Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01735
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 NARCISA DE JESUS YUGLA No. 1:25-cv-01735 WBS CKD 13 ALOMALIZA,

14 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 v. PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 16 Timothy S. ROBBINS, Field Office Director of the Los Angeles 17 Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs enforcement; Todd M. 18 LYONS, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, Kristi 20 NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 21 Christopher CHESTNUT, Warden, California City Corrections 22 Center, and Pamela BONDI, Attorney General of the United 23 States, 24 Respondents. 25 26 ----oo0oo---- 27 Before the court is petitioner Narcisa De Jesus Yugla 28 Alomaliza’s motion for a temporary restraining order, in which 1 petitioner asks the court to order her immediate release from 2 custody on the grounds that her detention violates the procedural 3 protections conferred by the Due Process Clause. (Docket No. 2 4 at 2, 14.) 5 Petitioner alleges that she and her family arrived in 6 the United States on March 29, 2024, and that she was 7 subsequently detained by federal agents and released the 8 following day on parole. (Id. at 2-3.) Her parole was 9 conditioned on, among other things, taking and submitting photos 10 of herself every month to Immigration & Customs Enforcement 11 (“ICE”). (Id. at 4.) After violating this requirement on two 12 occasions (August 2024 and October 2025), on November 1, 2025, 13 petitioner was arrested at her home in San Mateo, California, for 14 those parole violations. (Id. at 5.) 15 “The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is 16 the same as for a preliminary injunction.” Rovio Entm't Ltd. v. 17 Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 18 2012) (citing Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 19 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A plaintiff seeking a 20 preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 21 succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 22 harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 23 equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 24 public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 25 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The last two factors “merge when the 26 Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 27 435 (2009). 28 1 Likelihood of success on the merits is “the most 2 important factor in determining whether a preliminary injunction 3 is warranted.” Garcia v. County of Alameda, 150 F. 4th 1224, 4 1230 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal citations and quotation marks 5 omitted). A mere possibility of success is insufficient to meet 6 this factor; instead, a petitioner must demonstrate “a strong 7 likelihood of success on the merits.” Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. 8 Flowers, 408 F. 3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). 9 Petitioner argues that her detention violates due 10 process because she was detained without a hearing. Neither 11 party addresses whether petitioner was denied substantive due 12 process; the sole issue is whether petitioner was denied 13 procedural due process. Petitioner is seemingly unable to 14 identify the statute under which she was detained on November 1, 15 2025, in part because she “did not look at” her warrant for 16 arrest (Docket No. 2-2 at 4). Particularly, nowhere in her 17 petition does she suggest that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to her 18 detention, but rather appears to concede that 8 U.S.C. § 19 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2) apply. (See Docket No. 2 at 10). 20 Petitioner has failed to establish that she is likely 21 to succeed on the merits of her procedural due process claim. 22 Acccording to the petition, she has been on parole in the United 23 States pending determination of her admissibility, and she has 24 not effected an “entry” into the United States. See, e.g., Leng 25 May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188-90 (1958) (finding noncitizen 26 “paroled” into United States pending admissibility determination 27 had not “entered” United States); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. 28 1 Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020) (“[A]liens who arrive at 2 ports of entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country for 3 years pending removal—are treated for due process purposes as if 4 stopped at the border.” (citation modified)); Barrera-Echavarria 5 v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although aliens 6 seeking admission into the United States may physically be 7 allowed within its borders pending a determination of 8 admissibility, such aliens are legally considered to be detained 9 at the border and hence as never having effected entry into this 10 country.” (citation modified)). 11 Accordingly, “the procedure authorized by Congress” in 12 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) constitutes procedural “due process” as far as 13 petitioner is concerned. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 212; see also 14 Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2015) (for noncitizen 15 who “never technically ‘entered’ the United States,” “procedural 16 due process is simply whatever the procedure authorized by 17 Congress happens to be.” (citation modified)); Grigoryan v. Barr, 18 959 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). And because 8 U.S.C. 19 § 1225(b) does not “say[] anything whatsoever about bond 20 hearings,” petitioner is not entitled to one. Jennings v. 21 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018). 22 Because petitioner has failed to demonstrate a strong 23 likelihood of success on the merits of her due process claim, the 24 court “need not consider the other [preliminary injunction] 25 factors.” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir. 2018). 26 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for a 27 temporary restraining order (Docket No. 2) be, and the same 28 eee eee EE IEE OSE I IIE ED EE

1 . hereby is, DENIED. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3 636(b) (1) (B) and Local General Order No. 262, the case is 4 referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for further 5 a □ proceedings. - ° d b 5, 2025 wv Dated: December I I CCT 7 ’ WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 1 The court sees no need to call for a response from the government to petitioner’s motion inasmuch as counsel’s arguments 24 are substantially identical to those he raised in another recent case, in which after considering the briefs and hearing oral 29 argument from both sides, the court denied his motion for a 26 temporary restraining order. (See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, De La Cruz Bejarano v. Robbins et al., No. 27 1:25-cv-01537 WBS CKD (E.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2025), Dkt. No. 2.) Accordingly, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the court takes the 28 | motion under consideration withopt oral argument.