Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Company

153 So. 2d 395, 244 La. 569, 1963 La. LEXIS 2405
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedApril 29, 1963
Docket46326
StatusPublished
Cited by153 cases

This text of 153 So. 2d 395 (Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Company, 153 So. 2d 395, 244 La. 569, 1963 La. LEXIS 2405 (La. 1963).

Opinion

SANDERS, Justice.

This is a tort action. The plaintiff, Errol Naquin, seeks damages against the Town of Breaux Bridge and its liability insurer in the sum of $7,753.00 for the loss of the contents of his apartment, which was destroyed by an explosion and fire. The unfortunate incident occurred on November 11, 1958, at about 4:50 p. m.

The apartment, occupied by Naquin and his wife, was in the rear portion of the Carmen Theater Building, located at the intersection of South Main and Van Burén Streets in the Town of Breaux Bridge. Of brick construction, the apartment area consisted of two floors, or stories.

The petition alleges that the Town of Breaux Bridge owns, operates, and has the exclusive control of the natural gas distribution system in the Town; that a gas line adjacent to the theater building was in disrepair and had been leaking for some time ; that the escaping gas entered the apartment and caused an explosion, which destroyed the building and its contents; that the defendant Town was negligent in failing to maintain safe facilities, in failing to properly inspect the gas line, and in failing to make the necessary repairs after it knew or should have known of the leak. In addition, the plaintiff pleads the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

In answer to plaintiff’s petition, the Town and its insurer jointly filed exceptions of *573 want of interest, want of capacity, no right of action, and no cause of action. Each defendant also answered plaintiff’s petition, generally denying its allegations. In addition, the defendant insurer denied coverage under its policy of insurance. 1

The district court overruled the exceptions. After trial on the merits, the court rendered judgment in favor of defendants, from which the plaintiff perfected a devolutive appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed. 2 We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence did not establish that the escaping gas caused the explosion with that “certainty required by law.” We cannot agree with this holding. From our review of the case, it is evident that the court has imposed a higher standard of proof than the law requires on the issue of causal connection. As correctly noted in the dissent in that court, the standard adopted raises an insurmountable barrier to the proof of causation in a civil action.

In the recent case of Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646, we stated:

“Recognizing that the fact of causation is not susceptible of proof to a mathematical certainty, the law requires only that the evidence show that it was more probable than not that the harm was caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant.” 3

Causation may, of course, be proved by circumstantial evidence. In many instances, it can be proved only by such evidence. Taken as a whole, circumstantial evidence must exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of certainty. This does not mean, however, that it must negate all other possible causes. Otherwise, the mere identification by the record of another possibility, although not shown to be causally active, would break the chain of causation. 4

*575 Mr. and Mrs. Naquin departed from their apartment for an out-of-town visit on the evening of November 10th. As found by the Court of Appeal, two downstairs windows were left partially open, one and one-half to two (U/2 to 2) inches. Shortly before the explosion, several pedestrians observed a large natural gas leak in the service pipe, located about eight (8) feet from the apartment.

The defective pipe was introduced in evidence. The leakage came from an irregularly shaped, corrosion hole in the elbow joint of the pipe. The joint also evidences extensive, general corrosion. The main portion of the hole is more than one-half (14) inch in diameter, or about the size of a dime. The defective pipe was from two to three feet underground and carried eleven (11) pounds of pressure. From the leak, the gas line extended along the rear of and parallel to the apartment at the place where the windows were left open. The direction of the wind was from the gas leak toward the apartment.

It is virtually conceded that the explosion was a gas explosion and that it occurred within the apartment. The defendants deny, however, that the gas came from this leak.

The testimony, including that of the Deputy State Fire Marshal, establishes that all of the gas valves in the apartment were closed. The hot water heater on the second floor of the apartment was in operation, but did not explode.

The Deputy State Fire Marshal testified in part:

“Q. So then in some substance, Mr. Fuselier, aside from the question which I asked you concerning our conversation, you cannot say here in this Courtroom that whether this explosion was caused by gas coming from outside or inside of the building.
“A. No, sir. Because I wasn’t there and I couldn’t say that.”

Plaintiff’s expert, Charles W. Parish, who had extensive experience in investigating gas explosions, testified that, in his opinion, the gas from the outside leak caused the explosion.

He stated that upon the first release of the gas through a fissure in the pipe, it would follow a path of least resistance, usually along the pipe. Under the pressure of the gas, the escape hole in the pipe would gradually enlarge. The gas would ultimately reach the surface and mix with the air.

In his opinion, the gas entered the apartment through the open windows with the directional air current. There, it came in contact with an ignition agent, and the explosion ensued. The ignition agents include static electricity, electrical devices, *577 and pilot lights. The evidence discloses that the apartment contained a number of electrical appliances. Ignition agents were present on both the first and second floors. A mixture of only four (4) percent of gas by volume with the air was required to produce the explosion. A four and one-half (4¡4) foot square box would be sufficiently large to contain all of the gas necessary to have produced the explosion in the apartment.

Defendant’s expert, Cecil M. Shilstone, was of the opinion that the explosion was produced by gas but was of the opinion that it probably had not come from the outside. He was unable to identify the source of the gas. He further testified:

“Now, don’t for a minute let me leave the Court to believe that I am saying that what Mr. Parish said could not have happened. I said in my opinion the probability is the exact reverse.”

The record is barren of any other proven source of escaping gas. While the gas water heater was in operation, the evidence is clear that it did not explode.

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Bluebook (online)
153 So. 2d 395, 244 La. 569, 1963 La. LEXIS 2405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/naquin-v-marquette-casualty-company-la-1963.