Napleton Orlando Imports, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided December 6, 2019·No. 3:16-cv-02086·Unknown

Opinion

MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC) IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN “CLEAN DIESEL”

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION ORDER (I) GRANTING BOSCH’S _____________________________________/ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

This Order Relates To: JUDGMENT AND (II) DENYING BOSCH’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE MDL Dkt. Nos. 6919, 6953

Napleton, No. 3:16-cv-02086-CRB _____________________________________/ Volkswagen dealerships, in a proposed class action, allege that Robert Bosch GmbH and Robert Bosch LLC were knowing participants in Volkswagen’s “clean diesel” emissions fraud. The dealerships assert that they were harmed by the fraud and they seek to recover damages. The Bosch defendants have moved for summary judgment. They contend that judgment in their favor is warranted because the named plaintiff dealerships, after more than two years of discovery, have not identified any recoverable damages from the emissions fraud. In this Order, each category of damages claimed by the dealerships is reviewed. As will be seen, each category is either factually or legally unsupported. Summary judgment for the Bosch defendants is thus warranted. A. Potential damages from the stop-sale orders After Volkswagen admitted to regulators, in the fall of 2015, that it had been cheating on emissions tests for seven years, the company ordered its dealerships to stop selling new and certified pre-owned versions of the affected cars—the Volkswagen diesel-powered TDIs—at least time alleged that they were harmed by those stop-sale orders, because the orders “rendered millions of dollars of inventory worthless” and forced them to incur “costs to store and maintain unsalable vehicles.” (Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, MDL Dkt. No. 2983 at 23.) Unrebutted evidence submitted by the Bosch defendants now shows that the dealers did not sustain any losses directly from the stop-sale orders. Volkswagen provided the dealers with support payments that were intended to—and did— cover the costs of servicing, storing, and financing the TDIs that the dealers had in inventory when the stop-sale orders were issued. (See MDL Dkt. No. 6954-56, Sheets Report ¶ 27(a)–(b).) And after the EPA approved modifications for the cars and the stop-sale orders were lifted, Volkswagen paid the dealers for the work required to modify the cars and to prepare them for sale. (See id. ¶ 86.) The dealers ultimately sold all of the TDIs they had in inventory, and they realized profits on almost all of those sales. In fact, on average their profit margins on those sales exceeded their margins on TDI sales prior to the stop-sale orders. (See id. ¶¶ 27(c), 46.) Only one of the dealers incurred a loss on the sale of certain TDIs that it had in inventory at the time of the stop-sale orders. But those losses were more than covered by Volkswagen’s support payments. (See id. ¶ 27(g).) The dealers have not meaningfully1 challenged or rebutted this evidence. It follows that a reasonable fact finder could not find that the dealers suffered losses directly from the stop-sale orders. B. Potential damages from discontinuation of the TDI line Volkswagen stopped manufacturing TDIs after its emissions fraud was uncovered. Evidence offered by the dealers supports that if the company had not been caught, it planned to continue manufacturing TDIs, perhaps until 2027. The dealers insist that if Volkswagen had continued making the cars, the dealers would have continued to sell and profit from them. They 1 The only challenge to the Bosch defendants’ evidence, if it can be construed that way, is the dealers’ expert’s assertion that the Bosch defendants’ calculations do not take into account that the dealers faced “uncertain prospects” after Volkswagen issued its stop-sale orders. (Stockton Report, MDL Dkt. No. 6840-9 at 5.) The dealers have made no attempt to calculate any damages also identify ancillary revenue streams that may have resulted from future TDI sales, including revenues from servicing new TDIs and from reacquiring TDIs through trade-ins and selling them as used TDIs. Detailed calculations of the dealers’ predicted profits from all of these sources are included in one of the reports of their expert. (See Stockton Report, MDL Dkt. No. 6406-6 at 29– 41, 56–68, 83–95.) For their lost profits from yet-to-be-manufactured TDIs to be recoverable under RICO, the dealers must establish that these losses resulted from an injury to their “business or property” that was “by reason of” a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). See generally Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The dealers do not suggest that they had a “property” interest in the sale of TDIs that they did not own or possess at the time of the stop-sale orders. For good reason: Volkswagen’s franchise agreements gave Volkswagen, not its dealers, discretion to choose the types of cars to manufacture and to make available for sale. (See MDL Dkt. No. 6954-43 at 21, 28, 42.) The dealers instead assert that they were injured in their “business” when Volkswagen stopped manufacturing TDIs. Assuming that the dealers’ lost profits from yet-to-be-manufactured TDIs can be characterized as an injury to their “business,” as that term is used in the RICO statute, these profits were not lost “by reason of” a pattern of racketeering activity. The TDIs did not comply with emissions standards, and it was racketeering activity (or at least conduct that is alleged to have amounted to racketeering activity) that made the TDIs available for sale in spite of their noncompliance. Specifically, Volkswagen (allegedly with Bosch’s assistance) installed defeat devices in the cars, which allowed the cars to circumvent the EPA’s and the California Air Resources Board’s emissions tests, from 2009 to 2015. The dealers benefited from selling the TDIs during those years, and thus unknowingly benefited from the scheme. What the dealers implicitly claim now is that they had a right to continue benefiting from racketeering activity— that is, to keep selling noncompliant TDIs until 2027. They have not cited to any authority that supports this contention. Their losses from the TDI line’s discontinuation were not “by reason” of between the challenged conduct and the claimed injuries is therefore lacking. The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in affirming dismissal of a RICO claim in In re American Express Co. Shareholder Litigation, 39 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1994). In that derivative action, American Express shareholders alleged that the company’s officers and directors had conspired with foreign operatives to defame a rival by falsely linking him to organized crime. When the conspiracy came to light, the shareholders asserted that American Express lost profits, suffered harm to its reputation, and was forced to incur significant legal costs. See id. at 396–98. The Second Circuit held that American Express could not recover for these damages under RICO. The court explained that the conspiracy “was not what injured American Express;” it was “the exposure of [the conspiracy] that caused the [company’s] harm.” Id. at 400. As the requisite chain of causation was not established, the RICO claim could not proceed. Here, too, it was not the predicate acts of racketeering activity—Volkswagen’s (and perhaps Bosch’s) misrepresentations to the EPA and to CARB and their falsifications of emissions tests—that prevented the dealers from selling TDIs until 2027; it was the discovery of those acts. Indeed, until those acts were discovered, the dealers benefited from them, profiting from the sale of noncompliant cars. The dealers’ losses from the cessation of the TDI line “arose as a result of the scandal, not the scheme itself.” Meng v. Schwartz,

Napleton Orlando Imports, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2019).

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