Nannicola v. Rosan

2012 Ohio 5338
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 14, 2012
Docket12 MA 20
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

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Bluebook
Nannicola v. Rosan, 2012 Ohio 5338 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

[Cite as Nannicola v. Rosan, 2012-Ohio-5338.] STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH DISTRICT

ARMAND NANNICOLA ) CASE NO. 12 MA 20 ) PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT ) ) VS. ) OPINION ) JAMES EDWARD ROSAN, et al. ) ) DEFENDANT-APPELLEES )

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio Case No. 10 CV 3647

JUDGMENT: Reversed.

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant: Atty. David M. Moore Atty. Neal G. Atway Atway & Cochran, LLC 19 East Front Street Youngstown, Ohio 44503

For Defendants-Appellees: Atty. Mark Devicchio 3680 Starr Centre Drive Canfield, Ohio 44406

JUDGES:

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite Hon. Gene Donofrio Hon. Mary DeGenaro Dated: November 14, 2012 [Cite as Nannicola v. Rosan, 2012-Ohio-5338.] WAITE, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Armand Nannicola appeals the decision of the

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas granting a motion for reconsideration in

favor of Appellees in this case after summary judgment had previously been awarded

to Appellant. Appellees, James Edward Rosen and The Whiskey Club, LLC,

borrowed $33,000 from Appellant and failed to repay the loan, prompting Appellant to

file a breach of contract suit. Appellees, through counsel, filed an answer. Appellant

then filed a motion for summary judgment in October of 2011, and Appellees failed to

reply. On December 13, 2011, the trial court awarded summary judgment to

Appellant in the amount of $33,000.

{¶2} Appellees filed a motion for reconsideration on December 22, 2011,

and the motion was granted 13 days later on January 4, 2012. Appellant filed this

appeal on February 3, 2012. Appellant argues that a motion for reconsideration is a

nullity in Ohio; that Appellees gave no indication that they intended that the trial court

treat their motion as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, and that

Appellees could not meet the requirements of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion even if it had

been so characterized. Appellant is correct on all counts. The trial court issued a

final order in favor of Appellant. Subsequently, Appellees filed a motion for

reconsideration of that final order. Appellees clearly captioned their motion as a

motion for reconsideration. Such a motion is a nullity in Ohio. There is no indication

that Appellees or the trial court treated the motion as anything other than a motion for

reconsideration. Even if the motion had been filed as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief

from judgment, Appellees did not allege any meritorious defense as required by GTE -2-

Automatic Elec., Inc. v. Arc Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113

(1976). The judgment of the trial court is reversed and summary judgment is

reinstated in favor of Appellant.

{¶3} Appellant presents one assignment of error that contains a number of

subissues. Appellees have not filed a brief in this appeal. Under App.R. 18(C), if the

appellee has not filed a brief, “the court may accept the appellant's statement of the

facts and issues as correct and reverse the judgment if appellant's brief reasonably

appears to sustain such action.”

{¶4} An order that vacates a judgment, including a judgment that grants

summary judgment, is a final appealable order. McGeary v. Brocker, 94 Ohio St.3d

440, 440, 763 N.E.2d 1175 (2002); R.C. 2505.02(B)(3).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VACATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FOR NANNICOLA.

{¶5} Appellant first argues that a motion for reconsideration of a final

judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio does not exist. Appellant is correct.

A trial court cannot grant a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment, and such a

motion is a nullity. Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 423 N.E.2d

1105 (1981). “Once an appealable or final judgment in a case has been journalized,

it cannot be modified by that court except as provided under Civ.R. 50(B) (motion

notwithstanding the verdict), Civ.R. 59 (motion for a new trial), or Civ.R. 60(B)

(motion for relief from judgment).” In re Guardianship of Maurer, 108 Ohio App.3d -3-

354, 357, 670 N.E.2d 1030 (6th Dist.1995), citing Civ.R. 54(A) and Pitts, supra, at

380. Any decision entered pursuant to a motion for reconsideration filed after a final

judgment is entered is also a nullity. Pitts at 381; State ex rel. Clark v. Lile, 80 Ohio

St.3d 220, 685 N.E.2d 535 (1997).

{¶6} A trial judge does have some discretion in treating a motion seeking

reconsideration of a final order as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, but

there is no indication that the trial court exercised such discretion in this case. State

ex rel. Albourque v. Terry, 128 Ohio St.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-1913, 947 N.E.2d 169, ¶2.

In Appellees' motion for reconsideration they simply asked for more time to respond

to the motion for summary judgment, even though summary judgment had been

granted nine days earlier. The caption of Appellees' motion indicates that it was a

motion for reconsideration and nothing else. The content of the motion does not

refer to Civ.R. 60(B) or to any of the elements that would be found in a Civ.R. 60(B)

motion. This is simply a case in which the trial court granted a motion for

reconsideration. However, following a final judgment in this matter, the trial court had

no power to grant this motion.

{¶7} Even if the trial court had been inclined to convert the motion for

reconsideration into a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, relief would not

have been warranted based on the record before us. Civ.R. 60(B) provides that:

[T]he court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final

judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered -4-

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or

other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been

satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is

based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer

equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5)

any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall

be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not

more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was

entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect

the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

{¶8} There are three basic requirements for a successful Civ.R. 60(B)

motion: “To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must

demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief

is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R.

60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and,

where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year

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