IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Domestic Violence No. 87363-6-I Protection Order for DIVISION ONE NANEE VINOD BANDRAPALLI,
Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
JILL K. BANDRAPALLI,
Respondent.
SMITH, J. — Five months after the family law court entered final orders,
including a parenting plan that placed restrictions on the father based on
domestic violence history, the father petitioned for a domestic violence protection
order (DVPO) protecting him from the children’s mother. The trial court made
credibility findings adverse to the father, found that he failed to establish
domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence, denied the petition, and
realigned the parties. The father appeals, challenging a number of factual
findings, the decision to realign the parties, evidentiary rulings, and the order
denying revision. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2023, after a two-week trial, the trial court dissolved the
parties’ 12-year marriage and entered orders providing for the care and support
of their two minor children. The parenting plan placed limitations on the father’s No. 87363-6-I/2
contact with the children under RCW 26.09.191 based on detailed findings about
the father’s history of domestic violence. The plan provided for phased-in
residential time with the father conditioned on his enrollment and progress in
domestic violence (DV) treatment.1 The father appealed the final orders in the
family law matter, and on April 3, 2024, a commissioner of this court dismissed
the appeal as untimely.
On May 24, 2024, the father, representing himself, petitioned for a DVPO.
According to the petition, the precipitating event was an alleged assault by the
mother at the parties’ son’s May 4, 2024 soccer match. The father claimed he
alerted the mother to safety concerns because she left their nine-year-old
daughter unattended in her vehicle during the game. The father said the mother
confronted him as he stood next to her vehicle watching their daughter.
According to the father, the mother yelled at him to move away from her vehicle,
“blocked” his way in the narrow space between the rows of cars, “shov[ed]” him
into the adjacent vehicle, kicked him, and forcefully “pushed” him on the left
shoulder. The mother then moved her vehicle to a different parking area and the
father called the police and reported the incident.
The father’s DVPO petition also maintained that the mother had a “history
of committing domestic violence” against the father, citing specific incidents both
during the marriage and after the 2023 dissolution. In addition to an order
protecting him from the mother, the father requested that the court order a mental
1 As of August 2024, the father acknowledged he had not yet begun DV treatment.
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health evaluation, domestic violence treatment, restrict abusive litigation, and
order the mother to pay his fees and costs. Among other materials, the father
provided a police report and a medical record stemming from a visit to a hospital
emergency department a few days after the alleged assault.
The court entered a temporary protection order. That order did not include
the parties’ children, noting that the father “does not wish to include the children.”
The father moved to quash the mother’s discovery requests related to
Child Protective Services (CPS) records. The mother moved to realign the
parties and moved to restrict abusive litigation. See RCW 7.105.210 (allowing
realignment of the parties to a DVPO petition upon a finding that the original
petitioner is the perpetrator of abuse and the original respondent is the victim).
The mother also filed a declaration describing her version of the incidents
identified by the father and asserting that, since the dissolution, the father
continued to harass, stalk, and raise false allegations against her. The mother
and father each submitted a witness statement in support of their accounts of the
May 4 soccer game incident, but neither witness observed the confrontation by
the mother’s vehicle.
On August 1, 2024, the father filed an amended DVPO petition, seeking to
include the children as protected parties, and requesting that the children and
family dog be placed in his care. In an accompanying declaration, the father
explained that while he initially sought an order only to protect himself, evidence
surfaced during the litigation showing that “both children have suffered physical
abuse and have had exposure to domestic violence.” In addition to the
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allegations described in the original petition, the amended petition described
incidents of physical discipline by the mother and alleged that she exposed the
children to domestic violence.
Following an August 15, 2024 hearing, a superior court commissioner
denied the father’s petition, granted the motion to realign the parties, and entered
a temporary order protecting the mother.2 The court found that the father failed
to establish domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence with respect
to any alleged incident. The court entered 40 written findings in support of its
order, including a finding that, according to the CPS Sealed Confidential Report,
there were no “founded” findings of abuse by the mother. The court also found
“the Respondent/mother credible, and the Petitioner/father not credible” and “no
basis” existed for issuing a protection order against the mother.
The father moved to revise the commissioner’s order. A superior court
judge denied the motion. The father appealed.
On October 25, 2024, after a hearing on the realigned petition, a superior
court commissioner denied issuance of a DVPO order to protect the mother. On
the father’s motion for reconsideration, the commissioner amended one of the
background factual findings. The mother did not appeal.
ANALYSIS
Challenging the trial court’s decisions denying a DVPO and realigning the
parties, the father asserts that substantial evidence does not support several
2 The court reserved its ruling on the motion for an order restricting abusive litigation and the mother’s request for attorney fees.
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findings of fact, the court erred in excluding evidence, and the order on revision
does not reflect the statutorily required review.3
A commissioner’s decision denying a DVPO is subject to revision by the
superior court. RCW 2.24.050. On a motion to revise, the superior court reviews
the commissioner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo based on the
evidence and issues presented to the commissioner. In re Marriage of Moody,
137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). A denial of revision “constitutes
an adoption of the commissioner’s decision, and the court is not required to enter
separate findings and conclusions.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App.
779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). On appeal, we review the superior court’s ruling,
not that of the commissioner. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. at 789.
We review a superior court’s decision to deny a petition for a protection
order for an abuse of discretion. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. at 789. A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on
untenable grounds or reasons, or reached by applying the wrong legal standard.
Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. at 789. We defer to the trial court’s determinations on
the persuasiveness of the evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting testimony.
Snyder v. Haynes, 152 Wn. App. 774, 779, 217 P.3d 787 (2009).
This court reviews challenges to the trial court’s findings for substantial
evidence, again, deferring to the trier of fact on questions of witness credibility,
conflicting testimony, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. In re Vulnerable
3 We address each of the father’s claims to the extent he devotes arguments to his assignments of error and the arguments are adequately supported by citations to legal authority and to the record. RAP 10.3(a)(6).
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Adult Petition for Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 936-37, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014).
“Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational
person of the declared premise.” Merriman v. Cokely, 168 Wn.2d 627, 631, 230
P.3d 162 (2010).
Chapter 7.105 RCW governs the issuance of civil protection orders.
Under RCW 7.105.225(1), “[t]he court shall issue a protection order if it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has proved the required
criteria.” A preponderance of the evidence means that the proposition is more
probably true than not. Spivey v. City of Bellevue, 187 Wn.2d 716, 728, 389 P.3d
504 (2017). The petitioner must show they have been “subjected to domestic
violence by the respondent.” RCW 7.105.225(1)(a). The definition of “domestic
violence” includes “[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear
of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; . . . coercive control; unlawful
harassment; or stalking of one family or household member by another family or
household member.” RCW 7.105.010(9)(b). A “petitioner may petition for relief
. . . on behalf of family or household members who are minors.” RCW
7.105.100(1)(a).
Finding of Fact No. 27
The father challenges the trial court’s finding that he failed to establish
domestic violence on May 4, 2024, and that the mother’s declaration testimony
about the soccer match incident was “credible.”
The father contends the court abused its discretion by crediting the
mother’s declaration testimony because she admitted they “brushed” shoulders
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as they passed each other in the narrow space between vehicles and admitted
the father was already standing next to her vehicle when she approached. The
father further contends that a preponderance of the evidence established
domestic violence on May 4, 2024 because (1) the police report described the
incident as domestic violence assault in the fourth degree; (2) he called the
police before the mother reported to a friend that she might need assistance; (3)
the mother’s supporting evidence was merely a “second hand” declaration
“shaped after police had arrived;” (4) medical records demonstrated the assault
caused injury; (5) according to a witness declaration, he was not agitated at the
time of the confrontation; and (6) the court ultimately declined to enter a DVPO
protecting the mother.
The father’s arguments rely on his own selective and subjective
interpretation of the evidence and fail to appreciate our deference to the trial
court’s findings of credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence. The court was
not required to discount the mother’s denial of physical assault because the
parties’ accounts were consistent as to some details. Nothing in the record
suggests the court relied on either of the parties’ third-party declarations that
reported no observations of the interaction in the parking area. The police report
was based on only the father’s statement and the court was not required to treat
its characterization of the incident as dispositive. The report also supported an
inference that the claims asserted in the DVPO petition were embellished, as the
father failed to mention a hard shove to the shoulder, kicking, or any injuries at
the time of the incident. Likewise, the court was entitled to conclude that medical
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records showing the father sought treatment for “[l]eft elbow and left pinky pain”
more than two days later did not corroborate the claim of domestic violence.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
Finding of Fact No. 25
The father similarly challenges the court’s finding the mother’s account of
a December 23 incident was “credible.”
The parties agreed that, on the day the trial court entered its final orders,
the mother went to the father’s home to pick up the children. The mother said
she was holding her son’s oversized “Squishmallow”4 when the father grabbed
the other side of the toy, “swung her around,” and then yelled to the children,
“ ‘Did you see that, your mom hit me!’ ” The father, on the other hand, alleged he
was holding the stuffed toy when the mother “forcibly” grabbed it from him and
upset the children.
The father challenges the finding, claiming the court untenably “excused”
the mother’s violation of the parenting plan’s provisions for exchanging the
children, which prohibited her from going to his home unannounced and getting
out of her vehicle. But the father initiated a DVPO proceeding to seek protection
from domestic violence, not a contempt proceeding to address alleged
noncompliance with the parenting plan. Nothing in the DVPO statute suggests
that a violation of exchange provisions equates to domestic violence. The father
fails to explain how grabbing a toy from his hands met the definition of domestic
4 A Squishmallow is a brand of stuffed toy that is round and comes in a variety of colors and sizes.
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violence under RCW 7.105.010(9)(b). And again, most importantly, we do not
reweigh credibility.
Finding of Fact No. 29
The father challenges the following finding: Regarding the other many meandering allegations referred to as “Past Incidents,” raised by the Petitioner/father in support of his request for a Civil Protection Order, this Court finds them without merit, and most were litigated in the in the family law proceedings before Judge Segal, and do not support entry of a Civil Protection Order protecting the Petitioner from Respondent.
The father contends the court abused its discretion by dismissing his
claims as “meandering.” And, pointing to allegations of domestic violence that
occurred after the dissolution, the father claims substantial evidence does not
support the finding that “most” claims were litigated in the dissolution proceeding.
The trial court did not dismiss any of the father’s claims because they
were “meandering.” The court addressed, in separate findings, the primary
incidents that were the focus of the father’s petition and declarations. As to other
allegations, the court found the father did not meet his burden to prove domestic
violence by a preponderance of the evidence and none of the alleged incidents
supported the entry of a DVPO.
The “Past Incidents” section of the father’s amended petition referenced in
the finding primarily discussed incidents that occurred in 2023, while the family
law proceeding was still ongoing.5 The father identifies nothing in the record to
5 The “Past Incidents” also included the father’s claim that the mother submitted “false statements” from certain witnesses, and made false statements herself, in response to his DVPO petition. The father did not appear to allege
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contradict the court’s finding that these incidents were litigated in the family law
matter. The father asserts, without elaboration or citation to authority, that
collateral estoppel did not apply. We unaware of any authority supporting this
position and the statute precludes only the denial of a petition because relief may
be available in a different proceeding. RCW 7.105.225(2)(d). The father’s
challenge to this finding fails.
Finding of Fact No. 30
The father challenges the evidence supporting finding of fact 30: Ms. Barton (the parenting evaluator from the family law matter) stated in her report that the Petitioner/father is actively trying to destroy the mother’s relationship with the children. This Court finds the Petitioner’s request for a domestic violence protection order to be retaliatory against the mother—perhaps because of his unsuccessful trial efforts, restricted time with his children, failed [and] untimely appeal and unfounded CPS complaints.
(Emphasis omitted.)
As a factual matter, the father maintains that dismissal of his appeal could
not have motivated his DVPO petition because the appeal was dismissed on
May 28, 2024, four days after he filed the petition. But the record confirms that a
commissioner of this court denied the father’s motion to enlarge the time to
appeal and dismissed the appeal as untimely on April 3, 2024. The May 28,
2024 decision declining to modify the commissioner’s ruling does not alter the
timing of the dismissal. And given the timing, the evidence supports the
that the mother’s filings constituted domestic violence, and the challenged filings do not appear to be a part of the record before us.
10 No. 87363-6-I/11
inference that the father was potentially motivated by the dismissal of his appeal,
among other things.
According to the father, nothing beyond the mother’s speculative and self-
serving assertions supports the court’s finding of retaliatory motive. But this
petition followed after (1) unsuccessful efforts to obtain findings and provisions
unfavorable to the mother by means of CPS referrals and arguments at trial, (2)
the entry of orders that restricted the father’s time with the children and imposed
treatment requirements, and finally, (3) this court’s dismissal of his appeal.
Substantial evidence in the record supports these objective facts which give rise
to a reasonable inference of retaliation.
And significantly, the trial court found that a retaliatory motive was
consistent with the findings of the court-appointed parenting evaluator in the
family law matter who prepared a 69-page report following an investigation. That
report is not included in the record designated on appeal. Accordingly, we are
unable to fully review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of
retaliation. See St. Hilaire v. Food Servs. of Am., Inc., 82 Wn. App. 343, 352,
917 P.2d 1114 (1996) (the appellant bears the burden of presenting a record
adequate for review of the issues raised on appeal).
The father also suggests that the trial court later struck the finding of
retaliation. This argument is based on a finding of fact entered in the October 25,
2024 order (declining to issue a DVPO protecting the mother), which stated, in
part, that his “appeal was dismissed as untimely on April 3, 2024.” The
commissioner amended the finding on reconsideration as follows: “The appeal
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was dismissed—see attachment to this Order. See also #259 in #22-3-00803-6.”
(Boldface omitted.) The referenced attachments are the commissioner’s April 3,
2024 ruling and this court’s mandate.
The order on reconsideration did not strike or amend any finding or
language in the August 15, 2024 order before us on review. It did not address
retaliation. And the amended finding is substantively no different from the
original finding, because the attachment unambiguously states that this court
dismissed the father’s appeal on April 3, 2024.
The father contends the court’s finding of retaliatory motive shows that trial
court focused on “prior litigation history,” rather than “present risk” of harm. We
disagree. The trial court expressly applied the applicable standard under
RCW 7.105.225 and declined to issue a DVPO because the father failed to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was subjected to domestic
violence by the mother.
Coercive Conduct/Realignment of the Parties
The father challenges the realignment of the parties and the following
related factual findings: 31. Per the Petitioner/mother, this is the 5th time she has gone to court in the eight (8) months post their divorce. … 34. Over the court of their marriage, the Petitioner/father is documented to have committed acts of domestic violence and his victim is the Respondent/mother. His attempt to obtain a domestic violence protection order against the Respondent/mother is a continuing effort of his harassment, abusive/retaliatory litigation, and coercive control.
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35. This Court finds the Petitioner/father’s actions could be construed as coercive control as defined by RCW 7.105.010(4)(a).
The statute defines “coercive control” as “a pattern of behavior that is used
to cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in
purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal
liberty.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a). The statute’s non-exclusive list of examples of
coercive control includes “[e]ngaging in vexatious litigation or abusive litigation as
defined in RCW 26.51.020 against the other party to harass, coerce, or control
the other party, to diminish or exhaust the other party’s financial resources, or to
compromise the other party’s employment or housing.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a)(v).
According to the father, the finding that the mother was in court five times
after the dissolution is inconsistent with his declaration testimony that the May
2024 DVPO petition was the only litigation he initiated against the mother. He
also contends the finding conflicts with information in the Judicial Information
System (JIS) database.6
There is no evident conflict between the parties’ declarations. Even if a
conflict did exist, the mother’s testimony, which the court found to be credible,
supports the finding. And here again, nothing in the appellate record allows us to
evaluate whether the finding is consistent with information in the JIS database.
The father claims realignment of the parties cannot be premised on his
“lawful petitioning activity.” And he asserts that the decision to realign the parties
6 The JIS is the primary information system utilized by courts in Washington. In re Pers. Restraint of Adolph, 170 Wn.2d 556, 570, 243 P.3d 540 (2010).
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and the findings supporting that ruling were “discredited” by the October 2024
order that denied a DVPO to protect the mother and declined to impose any
order restricting abusive litigation.
Because the temporary DVPO protecting the mother has now expired, it
does not appear that this court can provide effective relief by reversing the
challenged findings and ruling realigning the parties. See SEIU Healthcare
775NW v. Gregoire, 168 Wn.2d 593, 602, 229 P.3d 774 (2010) (issue is moot if
this court no longer can grant effective relief); Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wn.
App. 715, 717, 230 P.3d 233 (2010) (appeals of expired domestic violence
protection orders are generally moot). Aside from mootness, the father’s
argument fails to acknowledge that the statute defines domestic violence to
encompass litigation activity that is intended to harass and control another.
Here, the court found that the father’s petition was retaliatory, not asserted for a
legitimate purpose, and was part of a pattern of ongoing harassment and
attempts to exert coercive control. And while the court later declined to impose a
DVPO protecting the mother, neither the mother’s petition nor any other materials
filed between the August and October orders are included in the appellate
record. Without knowing what claims, arguments, and evidence were before the
court, we cannot say whether or how any determinations in the October 2024
order implicated the court’s earlier findings and decision.
Evidentiary Rulings
The father claims the court misapplied the applicable evidentiary rules
when it excluded “Exhibit 3” and “dismissed” the CPS Sealed Confidential report.
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The proposed exhibit does not appear to be included in the record on appeal, nor
does the record appear to include the parties’ arguments, or court’s ruling, which
occurred before the August 15, 2024 hearing. Again, the record is insufficient to
review this claim of error.
As to the CPS report, the findings confirm the court’s consideration of the
evidence. And while the father appears to contend the court should have
focused on aspects other than the results of CPS investigations, we decline the
invitation to draw different conclusions from, or reweigh, the evidence on appeal.
Order on Revision
Lastly, the father claims the superior court’s order on revision fails to
demonstrate that the court conducted the review required by statute. But, as
explained, the superior court is not required to enter separate findings and
conclusions when it denies a motion to revise. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. at 789.
No authority supports the father’s position that the revision court was required to
set forth its reasoning for adopting the commissioner’s order and findings.
Nothing in the record supports the claim that the superior court failed to conduct
a de novo review.
Attorney Fees
The mother requests attorney fees, claiming the father’s appeal is
frivolous. RAP 18.9 allows this court to award a party attorney fees as a sanction
when the opposing party files a frivolous appellate action. Reid v. Dalton, 124
Wn. App. 113, 128, 100 P.3d 349 (2004). “An appeal is frivolous if there are no
debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally
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devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal.” In re Marriage
of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514 (2013). “All doubts as to
whether the appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the appellant.”
Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. at 644.
Considering the credibility findings and deferential standard of review, we
are convinced that the father’s appeal of the denial of a DVPO presents no
debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ. However, to the extent
the father challenged the realignment of the parties in light of the ultimate denial
of a DVPO protecting the mother, while unsuccessful and arguably moot, we
cannot say the appeal is frivolous. We award reasonable appellate attorney fees
to the mother incurred in connection with the frivolous aspect of the father’s
appeal under RAP 18.9, subject to a request that is appropriately segregated and
otherwise complies with RAP 18.1.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: