Nam-Hoang Nguyen v. Kevin Raycraft et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-00907
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

NAM-HOANG NGUYEN,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-907

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,

Respondents. ____________________________/

OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner under the conditions of Petitioner’s previous Order of Supervision. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) In an order entered on March 20, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on April 3, 2026, (ECF No. 8), and Petitioner filed his reply on April 20, 2026, (ECF No. 10.) II. Factual Background Petitioner is a native of Malaysia and a citizen of Vietnam. (McClure Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 8-1, PageID.63.) Petitioner entered the United States on October 8, 1979, as a refugee. (Id.)

Following a 2000 criminal conviction for Possession of Cocaine (Less than 25 Grams), Possession of Marijuana, and Operating While Intoxicated, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, Notice to Appear (NTA), charging Petitioner with removability 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) of the INA, which provides: Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID.64); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I). On November 6, 2001, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to Malasia. (McClure Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 8-1, PageID.64.) Petitioner did not appeal that decision and, therefore, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on or about December 6, 2001. (Id.) On February 5, 2002, INS released Petitioner from custody on an Order of Supervision. (Id., ¶ 9.) Thereafter, on September 12, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of Controlled Substance Delivery/Manufacture (Less than 50 Grams) and sentenced to 23 months to 240 months in prison. (Id., ¶ 10, PageID.64–65.) On October 3, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of Home Invasion, 2nd degree, and Breaking and Entering with Intent and sentenced to 57 months to 180 months and 23 months to 120 months. (Id., ¶ 11, PageID.65.) On April 29, 2010, INS served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release and detained Petitioner upon his release from the Michigan Department of Corrections; however, on July 29, 2010, ICE released Petitioner on an Order of Supervision. (Id., ¶¶ 12–13; 2010 Order of Supervision, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.12–13.) ICE again detained Petitioner the following month but released him on an Order of Supervision on September 15, 2010. (McClure Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, ECF No. 8-1, PageID.65.) Petitioner was convicted of additional crimes in 2013, 2018, and 2025,

including Police Officer-Fleeing 4th degree, Police Officer-Assaulting/Resisting/Obstructing, and Domestic Violence. (Id., ¶¶ 16–18, PageID.65–66.) On December 5, 2025, ICE agents detained Petitioner. (Id., ¶ 19, PageID.66.) That same day, ICE issued Petitioner a Notice of Revocation of Release but did not provide Petitioner with an informal interview in connection with the Notice. (2025 Notice of Revocation, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.18.) ICE issued Petitioner a second Notice of Revocation of Release nearly three months later, on March 4, 2026. (McClure Decl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 8-1, PageID.66; 2026 Notice of Revocation, ECF No. 8-2, PageID.69.) Petitioner was scheduled for an informal interview on March 10, 2026. (2026 Notice of Revocation, ECF No. 8-2, PageID.70.) ICE is presently working with the

government of Vietnam to obtain travel documents for Petitioner. (McClure Decl., ECF No. 8-1, ¶¶ 21–22, PageID.67.) III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). IV. Merits Discussion Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated Petitioner’s right to due process by re- detaining him without a hearing to determine whether re-detention is justified. Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), following Petitioner’s final order of removal entered on December 6, 2001.

Ordinarily, when an individual is issued a final order of removal, that person must be removed from the country within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Except for situations where the person is “detained or confined” in a case other than the “immigration process,” or where a court orders a stay of removal, the 90-day removal period begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner’s order of removal is administratively final. Under § 1231(a)(6), the government is permitted to continue to detain individuals who are deemed “inadmissible” beyond the removal period, or it may release them under specified terms of supervision. Id. § 1231(a)(6). However, once that time passes and after “removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute,” and the noncitizen

must be released. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001); see 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (“If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the [90-day] removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”). Consistent with § 1231(a)(6), Petitioner was released from detention with an Order of Supervision, originally dated July 29, 2010, with Petitioner’s last release on September 15, 2010. The government has promulgated regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations concerning the release of noncitizens who are subject to a final removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4; 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. These regulations—specifically, §§ 241.4 and 241.13—also govern the revocation of such noncitizens’ release. The agency must comply with the applicable regulatory and statutory requirements. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as recognized in Dept. of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 135 (2020) (“[A]s long as the regulations remain operative, the

Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep” those regulations.). As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: “The Supreme Court has long recognized that a federal agency is obliged to abide by the regulations it promulgates. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954). An agency’s failure to follow its own regulations ‘tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice’ and consequently may result in a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process. Where a prescribed procedure is intended to protect the interests of a party before the agency, ‘even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed.’ Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 629, 630 (1974) (observing that agency violations of regulations promulgated to provide parties with procedural safeguards generally have been invalidated by courts).” Wilson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. United States Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1998)). 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 generally governs the continued detention of noncitizens under a final order of removal. Section 241.4(l)(2) provides: The Executive Associate Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke release and return to Service custody an alien previously approved for release under the procedures in this section. A district director may also revoke release of an alien when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner. Release may be revoked in the exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official: (i) The purposes of release have been served; (ii) The alien violates any condition of release; (iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal proceedings against an alien; or (iv) The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. Section 241.13 governs the detention of noncitizens under a final order of removal where “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(b). If the noncitizen was released pursuant to § 241.13, release may be revoked if, “on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(i)(2). Further, the regulations governing release provide that, upon revocation of release, the noncitizen “will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release,” and will be given

“an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). “The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). Courts examining the requirements for revocation of release following a final order of removal have consistently held that the procedural requirements of notice and an interview are required for revocation of a noncitizen’s release. Constantinovici v. Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases; citations omitted). This Court agrees. An informal interview is required “promptly after [the noncitizen's] return to Service

custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) (emphasis added); § 241.13(i)(3). Here, Petitioner represents that he was not provided with the required informal interview promptly after his December 5, 2025, detention and Notice of Revocation of Release. Respondents do not contend otherwise. Even assuming that a hearing was held on March 10, 2026, in accordance with the 2026 Notice of Revocation of Release, over three months after Petitioner’s arrest “cannot reasonably be construed as a ‘prompt’ informal interview.” Constantinovici, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1165 (holding that the respondents violated the INA by failing to hold an informal interview within six weeks of the petitioner’s arrest).

Moreover, “even if the government has the discretion to revoke [Petitioner’s] supervision, his constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by his re-detention.” Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation omitted). The Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to Fifth Amendment due process protections for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec.

12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025) 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13, described in detail above, were intended “to provide due process protections to [noncitizens] following the removal period as they are considered for continued detention, release, and then possible revocation of release.” Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025). “The opportunity to contest detention through an informal interview is not some ticky-tacky procedural requirement; it strikes at the heart of what due process demands.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV- 22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“At one level, today’s dispute may seem semantic, focused on a single word, a small one at that. But words are how the law constrains power.”)). In its most elemental formulation, “the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)

(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The Court, therefore, agrees with courts around the country in concluding that the failure to provide Petitioner with an informal interview promptly after his detention with a meaningful opportunity to contest the reasons for revocation in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13 violates Petitioner’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and requires release. See, e.g., Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2017); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *10–12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 774 (D. Minn. 2025); Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 704; Grigorian, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9; Ghafouri v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02675-RBM-BLM,

2025 WL 3085726, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025). V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. VI. Proper Respondents Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025

WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States Attorney General as a Respondent Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under Petitioner’s Order of Supervision. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from

re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States Attorney General as a Respondent. Dated: April 23, 2026 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge