Carley, Justice.
Appellant was tried before a jury for the murder of his grandparents, but he was acquitted by reason of his insanity. The trial court, finding that appellant met the criteria for civil commitment set forth in OCGA § 37-3-1 (9.1), placed him in the custody of the Department of Human Resources.
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131 (f), appellant subsequently filed an application for his release from civil commitment. After a hearing, the trial court denied the application, relying entirely upon the presumption of appellant’s continuing insanity. OCGA § 24-4-21. On appeal, however, this court remanded for the trial court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding, in material part, as follows:
[T]he factfinder, here the trial court, may not disregard expert medical evidence and rely solely on the presumption of [continuing] insanity. Nevertheless, ... it was necessary not only that [appellant] present the testimony of experts and other evidence supporting his position, but also that the testimony be of sufficient weight to overcome the presumption. [The] “appropriate standard of appellate review ... is whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was [sane]. . . . [Cit.]” [Cit.] . . . Upon appeal, if any, we will apply the aforestated standard of review.
Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 891-893 (2) (a), (b) (427 SE2d 490) (1993).
On remand, the trial court made the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and again denied appellant’s application for release. Appellant appeals to this court from the order entered by the trial court on remand.
1. The instant appeal is not a criminal case wherein appellant stands accused or convicted of murder. It is an appeal from the denial of an application for appellant’s release from the civil commitment which followed his acquittal on two counts of murder by reason of his successful insanity defense. The Court of Appeals, rather than this court, would have initial appellate jurisdiction over this type of civil case. However, this court did entertain appellant’s original direct appeal and, pursuant to that prior appeal, the case was remanded to the trial court. Accordingly, “we [will] retain jurisdiction based upon the [151]*151procedural posture of [this case].” City of Winder v. Collins, 259 Ga. 570 (385 SE2d 71) (1989). See also Air Line Employees Assn. Intl. v. Evans, 236 Ga. 661 (225 SE2d 34) (1976).
2. Appellant urges that he has carried the burden of proving his sanity by a preponderance of the evidence and that the trial court erred in holding otherwise.
“The [trial] court must consider expert and other evidence presented at the release hearing, and contained in the trial record, on the issue of sanity or insanity.” Nagel v. State, supra at 892 (2) (b). In the instant case, that evidence authorized the trial court to find that the murders of appellant’s grandparents were not the only violent acts which he had ever committed. Those murders were merely the most violent acts which appellant had ever committed. Moreover, the trial court was also authorized to find that appellant’s current civil commitment is not the only instance of his hospitalization for mental illness. Previously, appellant “has been treated in at least two private psychiatric facilities and has been hospitalized in public mental health facilities on numerous occasions.” Indeed, appellant had murdered his grandparents “less than three weeks following his last release from a mental hospital. ...” Thus, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that appellant has exhibited “a steady pattern of violent behavior” which culminated in his murder, while insane, of “the only people who were willing to love him and give him a home.”
In attempting to prove his sanity, appellant proffered the testimony of two experts. However, neither of appellant’s experts held the opinion that he had recovered from being mentally ill. Rather, both were of the opinion that appellant had never been mentally ill. In fact, one of the experts characterized the acquittal of appellant by reason of his insanity as having been a “mistake” on the part of the jury.
The opinions of appellant’s experts that he had never really been insane were obviously entitled to no weight whatsoever, since the jury’s verdict was res judicata as to appellant’s insanity at the time of the murders.
“A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. [Cit.]” . . . [U]nder Georgia law the presumption of continuing insanity has some evidentiary weight. Of course, a presumption is meaningless if it does not possess some weight of its own. It must be of sufficient substance such that, standing alone, it cannot be lightly overcome.
(Emphasis supplied.) Nagel v. State, supra at 889-890 (1). Thus, the [152]*152issue to be determined was whether appellant’s sanity had been restored since the jury had returned its verdict, not whether the jury had made a “mistake” in originally accepting the insanity defense that appellant himself had advanced.
Nevertheless, appellant’s experts merely expressed the opinion that all of his prior acts of violence, including the murders of his grandparents, were the result of his voluntary drug and alcohol abuse rather than his mental illness. However, one of the experts did acknowledge the “possibility” that appellant’s substance abuse could have rendered him “temporarily psychotic.” This expert also testified that substance abuse can have the effect of inducing psychotic “hallucinations.” In addition, this expert admitted that he had really “never been sure” whether appellant’s substance abuse had or had not rendered him “psychotic.” Therefore, this expert certainly could not eliminate the “possibility” that appellant’s substance abuse did, in fact, have the effect of rendering him violently “psychotic.”
Both of appellant’s experts agreed that, if appellant were to be released from civil commitment, it would be imperative that he abstain from drugs and alcohol use. However, neither of the experts had ever had occasion to observe appellant other than in a hospitalized setting wherein he was subjected to “forced abstinence.” As one of the experts candidly testified, “when an individual is on forced abstinence, you don’t know what’s going to happen when [he] get[s] back face to face with it with money in [his] pockets and bottles on the shelves.” Both experts agreed that there was no “guarantee” that, if appellant were released from the “forced abstinence” of hospitalization, he would not return to his pattern of substance abuse. As one of the experts acknowledged, “it’s only a matter of days, sometimes weeks at most, until [some substance abusers are] right back in the same shape.”
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Carley, Justice.
Appellant was tried before a jury for the murder of his grandparents, but he was acquitted by reason of his insanity. The trial court, finding that appellant met the criteria for civil commitment set forth in OCGA § 37-3-1 (9.1), placed him in the custody of the Department of Human Resources.
Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131 (f), appellant subsequently filed an application for his release from civil commitment. After a hearing, the trial court denied the application, relying entirely upon the presumption of appellant’s continuing insanity. OCGA § 24-4-21. On appeal, however, this court remanded for the trial court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding, in material part, as follows:
[T]he factfinder, here the trial court, may not disregard expert medical evidence and rely solely on the presumption of [continuing] insanity. Nevertheless, ... it was necessary not only that [appellant] present the testimony of experts and other evidence supporting his position, but also that the testimony be of sufficient weight to overcome the presumption. [The] “appropriate standard of appellate review ... is whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was [sane]. . . . [Cit.]” [Cit.] . . . Upon appeal, if any, we will apply the aforestated standard of review.
Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 891-893 (2) (a), (b) (427 SE2d 490) (1993).
On remand, the trial court made the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and again denied appellant’s application for release. Appellant appeals to this court from the order entered by the trial court on remand.
1. The instant appeal is not a criminal case wherein appellant stands accused or convicted of murder. It is an appeal from the denial of an application for appellant’s release from the civil commitment which followed his acquittal on two counts of murder by reason of his successful insanity defense. The Court of Appeals, rather than this court, would have initial appellate jurisdiction over this type of civil case. However, this court did entertain appellant’s original direct appeal and, pursuant to that prior appeal, the case was remanded to the trial court. Accordingly, “we [will] retain jurisdiction based upon the [151]*151procedural posture of [this case].” City of Winder v. Collins, 259 Ga. 570 (385 SE2d 71) (1989). See also Air Line Employees Assn. Intl. v. Evans, 236 Ga. 661 (225 SE2d 34) (1976).
2. Appellant urges that he has carried the burden of proving his sanity by a preponderance of the evidence and that the trial court erred in holding otherwise.
“The [trial] court must consider expert and other evidence presented at the release hearing, and contained in the trial record, on the issue of sanity or insanity.” Nagel v. State, supra at 892 (2) (b). In the instant case, that evidence authorized the trial court to find that the murders of appellant’s grandparents were not the only violent acts which he had ever committed. Those murders were merely the most violent acts which appellant had ever committed. Moreover, the trial court was also authorized to find that appellant’s current civil commitment is not the only instance of his hospitalization for mental illness. Previously, appellant “has been treated in at least two private psychiatric facilities and has been hospitalized in public mental health facilities on numerous occasions.” Indeed, appellant had murdered his grandparents “less than three weeks following his last release from a mental hospital. ...” Thus, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that appellant has exhibited “a steady pattern of violent behavior” which culminated in his murder, while insane, of “the only people who were willing to love him and give him a home.”
In attempting to prove his sanity, appellant proffered the testimony of two experts. However, neither of appellant’s experts held the opinion that he had recovered from being mentally ill. Rather, both were of the opinion that appellant had never been mentally ill. In fact, one of the experts characterized the acquittal of appellant by reason of his insanity as having been a “mistake” on the part of the jury.
The opinions of appellant’s experts that he had never really been insane were obviously entitled to no weight whatsoever, since the jury’s verdict was res judicata as to appellant’s insanity at the time of the murders.
“A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. [Cit.]” . . . [U]nder Georgia law the presumption of continuing insanity has some evidentiary weight. Of course, a presumption is meaningless if it does not possess some weight of its own. It must be of sufficient substance such that, standing alone, it cannot be lightly overcome.
(Emphasis supplied.) Nagel v. State, supra at 889-890 (1). Thus, the [152]*152issue to be determined was whether appellant’s sanity had been restored since the jury had returned its verdict, not whether the jury had made a “mistake” in originally accepting the insanity defense that appellant himself had advanced.
Nevertheless, appellant’s experts merely expressed the opinion that all of his prior acts of violence, including the murders of his grandparents, were the result of his voluntary drug and alcohol abuse rather than his mental illness. However, one of the experts did acknowledge the “possibility” that appellant’s substance abuse could have rendered him “temporarily psychotic.” This expert also testified that substance abuse can have the effect of inducing psychotic “hallucinations.” In addition, this expert admitted that he had really “never been sure” whether appellant’s substance abuse had or had not rendered him “psychotic.” Therefore, this expert certainly could not eliminate the “possibility” that appellant’s substance abuse did, in fact, have the effect of rendering him violently “psychotic.”
Both of appellant’s experts agreed that, if appellant were to be released from civil commitment, it would be imperative that he abstain from drugs and alcohol use. However, neither of the experts had ever had occasion to observe appellant other than in a hospitalized setting wherein he was subjected to “forced abstinence.” As one of the experts candidly testified, “when an individual is on forced abstinence, you don’t know what’s going to happen when [he] get[s] back face to face with it with money in [his] pockets and bottles on the shelves.” Both experts agreed that there was no “guarantee” that, if appellant were released from the “forced abstinence” of hospitalization, he would not return to his pattern of substance abuse. As one of the experts acknowledged, “it’s only a matter of days, sometimes weeks at most, until [some substance abusers are] right back in the same shape.”
“The trial court, rather than mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131. [Cit.]” Nagel v. State, supra at 889 (1). In the instant case, the trial court was authorized to find that appellant’s experts were, in effect, attempting to impeach the original verdict of the jury which had accepted appellant’s insanity defense, rather than attempting to demonstrate that appellant’s sanity had been restored subsequent to the jury’s unimpeachable verdict. Moreover, based upon the testimony of appellant’s experts themselves, the trial court was also authorized to find that appellant became violently “psychotic” when he engaged in substance abuse and that, although appellant might not exhibit violently “psychotic” behavior so long as he underwent the regimen of “forced abstinence” in a hospital setting, there was nothing to show that, once released from that setting and regimen, he would not again engage in substance abuse and commit yet another [153]*153violent “psychotic” act.
Thus, it cannot be said that proof of the restoration of appellant’s sanity was “ ‘so clear and so overwhelming that a finding of (insanity) cannot be upheld.’ [Cit.]” Nagel v. State, supra at 891 (2) (a). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was no longer insane and should be released from civil commitment. See Butler v. State, 258 Ga. 344 (369 SE2d 252) (1988).
3. Appellant contends that an irrebuttable and, therefore, unconstitutional presumption of his continuing insanity has been applied so as to keep him in civil commitment. However, the trial court, following the direction given by this court in Nagel v. State, supra, has neither disregarded expert medical evidence nor relied solely on the presumption of appellant’s continuing insanity. In the context of the instant appeal, this court has given the trial court’s decision the “heightened scrutiny” required by Nagel v. State, supra. Accordingly, there is no merit to appellant’s contention that his continued civil commitment is violative of his federal and state constitutional rights.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Sears-Collins, J., who dissents.