Nadine Hensler, V. Jerry Twyman

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: December 2, 2024
• Docket: 86844-6
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON NADINE HENSLER, Personal No. 86844-6-I Representative of the Estate of Albert Hensler; and GREG and TERRY DIVISION ONE WILLIS,

Respondents, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

v.

JERRY TWYMAN and any/all Unknown Occupants,

Appellants.

SMITH, C.J. — Jerry Twyman lived in his own mobile home on property he

rented from Nadine Hensler. Hensler served Twyman with an eviction notice.

When Twyman failed to vacate the property, Hensler filed a complaint for

unlawful detainer. The court found Twyman liable for unlawful detainer. Twyman

appeals and argues (1) the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act does not apply

because he was only renting land, not a home and (2) the eviction notice was

invalid. We hold the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act does not apply, but

because the notice to Twyman also included reference to eviction pursuant to the

unlawful detainer act, it was sufficient.

FACTS

In 2016, Jerry Twyman began renting land from Albert Hensler. Under

their agreement, Twyman paid Albert $200 per month and was allowed to move No. 86844-6-I/2

his mobile home onto the land. At the time Twyman moved onto the land, there

were two other mobile homes on the premises, but he was the sole occupant

beginning in 2020. When Albert died, Nadine Hensler became personal

representative of the estate.

In April 2023, Hensler served Twyman with a 90-day notice to terminate

tenancy. The heading of the notice indicated termination was “due to owner

intent to sell property,” but the body of the notice stated the notice was issued

“pursuant to the authority granted landlords by RCW 59.12.030.” In June 2023,

before the 90-day window expired for Twyman to vacate the premises, Hensler

sold the property to Greg and Terry Willis. When Twyman did not vacate the

premises after the 90-day period, Hensler and the Willises1 initiated an unlawful

detainer action. An eviction show cause hearing was held in August 2023.

At the hearing, Twyman claimed the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of

1973 (RLTA)2 did not apply because he was not a “tenant” as defined in the

RLTA. Additionally, Twyman noted that under the definitions of the RLTA,

Hensler was not a landlord and no valid rental agreement existed. Twyman also

claimed the 90-day notice he was served did not conform to the statutory

requirements because the property was not a single-family residence and the

sale of the property occurred before he vacated the property. The court found

Twyman was properly served and liable for unlawful detainer. The court ordered

1 Hensler and the Willises, in their capacities as plaintiffs, will hereby be referred to as “Hensler.” 2 Chapter 59.18 RCW.

2 No. 86844-6-I/3

a writ of restitution, judgment for back rent, and attorney fees and costs.

Twyman appeals.

Analysis

Standard of Review

The parties disagree on whether the RLTA applies to this circumstance.

This court reviews statutory interpretations de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v.

Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). In construing a

statute, the court’s objective is to ascertain the legislature’s intent. State v.

Evergreen Freedom Found., 192 Wn.2d 782, 789, 432 P.3d 805 (2019). When a

statute is unambiguous and its meaning is plain on its face, the court need not

engage in statutory construction. Evergreen, 192 Wn.2d at 789. But when more

than one interpretation is reasonable, the court “looks to the entire ‘context of the

statute in which the provision is found, [as well as] related provisions,

amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole’ ” to decipher

the meaning of the text. Evergreen, 192 Wn.2d at 789 (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Conover, 183 Wn.2d 706,

711, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015)).

Unlawful Detainer Statutes

Twyman claims the 90-day notice to terminate tenancy was not valid

because (1) it did not provide him sufficient notice of the appropriate statute,

(2) the RLTA does not apply to his situation, and (3) the notice was not timely

served. Hensler contends that a plain reading of the RLTA permits Twyman’s

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eviction and, even if the RLTA does not apply, the unlawful detainer act (UDA)3

does. We conclude the RLTA does not apply and Twyman should be given an

opportunity for a hearing focused solely on the appropriate statute.

In Washington, the unlawful detainer process is governed by the UDA and

the RLTA. See Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels, 26 Wn. App. 2d 199, 210, 528

P.3d 834 (2023). Unlawful detainer statutes “are in derogation of the common

law and thus are strictly construed in favor of the tenant.” Hous. Auth. of City of

Seattle v. Silva, 94 Wn. App. 731, 734, 972 P.2d 952 (1999). The UDA applies

unless supplanted by the RLTA. Randy Reynolds & Assocs., Inc. v. Harmon,

193 Wn.2d 143, 156, 437 P.3d 677 (2019); RCW 59.12.030. Unlike an action

under the RLTA, actions initiated under the UDA cannot recover attorney fees.

Compare RCW 59.18.650(4), with RCW 59.12.170.

The RLTA gives a landlord cause to evict a tenant when “[t]he tenant

continues in possession after the owner elects to sell a single-family residence

and the landlord has provided at least 90 days' advance written notice of the date

the tenant's possession is to end.” RCW 59.18.650(2)(e). Similarly, under the

UDA, “a tenant of real property for a term less than life is liable for unlawful

detainer” when the tenant remains on the property after they have been served

with proper notice of eviction. RCW 59.12.030(3).

1. Application of the RLTA

Twyman argues the RLTA does not apply to his circumstances and, as

such, he could not be evicted pursuant to RCW 59.18.650(2)(e). Hensler claims

3 Chapter 59.12 RCW.

4 No. 86844-6-I/5

the eviction clearly falls within the language of the RLTA. We agree with

Twyman.

The RLTA specifically governs landlord-tenant relationships; thus, in order

for it to apply, there must be a “tenant” and a “landlord.” RCW 59.18.911. Under

RCW 59.18.650(2)(e), a landlord may evict a tenant when the “tenant continues

in possession after the owner elects to sell a single-family residence.” The

following definitions apply under the RLTA: • Dwelling Unit: “[A] structure or that part of a structure which is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person or by two or more persons maintaining a common household, including but not limited to single-family residences and units of multiplexes, apartment buildings, and mobile homes.” RCW 59.18.030(10). • Landlord: “[T]he owner, lessor, or sublessor of the dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part, and in addition means any person designated as representative of the owner, lessor, or sublessor including, but not limited to, an agent, a resident manager, or a designated property manager.” RCW 59.18.030(16). • Rental Agreement: “[A]ll agreements which establish or modify the terms, conditions, rules, regulations, or any other provisions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit.” RCW 59.18.030(30). • Single-Family Residence: “[A] structure maintained and used as a single dwelling unit. Notwithstanding that a dwelling unit shares one or more walls with another dwelling unit, it shall be deemed a single-family residence if it has direct access to a street and shares neither heating facilities nor hot water equipment, nor any other essential facility or service, with any other dwelling unit.” RCW 59.18.030(32). • Tenant: “[A]ny person who is entitled to occupy a dwelling unit primarily for living or dwelling purposes under a rental agreement.” RCW 59.18.030(34).

Here, Twyman argues the RLTA does not apply and, specifically, the 90-

Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy was not valid because the property was not a

“single-family dwelling” as defined by the RLTA. Twyman’s argument relies

5 No. 86844-6-I/6

heavily on the unpublished opinion, Parsons v. Mierz.4 In ruling on the

applicability of attorney fees, the court in Parsons found the plaintiff’s occupancy

of land did not create a landlord-tenant relationship as defined by the RLTA. The

court noted that, because Parson lived in his own motor home, not a “dwelling

unit” as defined in the RLTA, Parson was not a tenant, Mierz was not his

landlord, and, accordingly, there was no rental agreement. Similarly, Twyman

argues that because he lived in his own motor home, not a dwelling unit on the

property, he was not a tenant; Hensler was not a landlord; and there was not a

single-family residence or dwelling for Hensler to sell. Twyman asserts that

because the RLTA was not applicable to his situation, the 90-day notice to

terminate tenancy was not valid.

Hensler contends that Parsons was wrongly decided and does not follow

the clear language of the RLTA. Hensler argues the opinion relies on reading

provisions of the RLTA, specifically those including the terms “property” and

“rental agreement” in isolation. Hensler alleges the term “property” as used in

the RLTA goes beyond the definition supplied and “clearly refers to real property,

personal property, public property, or rental property.”5 (Emphasis omitted.)

Hensler also contends that Parsons’ interpretation of the term “rental agreement”

is incorrect. Hensler states that a “rental agreement” clearly encompasses the

4 No. 49324-1-II, slip op. (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2018) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2049324-1-II%20Unpublished% 20Opinion.pdf.

6 No. 86844-6-I/7

land a dwelling unit is placed on, even if the dwelling unit itself is not owned by

the landlord.

Contrary to Hensler’s argument, the plain language of the RLTA does not

support applying RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) to Twyman’s situation. While Hensler

contends the definition of “property” is incorrect in Parsons, that is irrelevant here

because the statute at issue says “single-family residence,” not “property.”

Specifically, RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) refers to the sale of a “single-family residence”

and reiterates that “an owner ‘elects to sell’ when the owner makes reasonable

attempts to sell the dwelling within 30 days after the tenant has vacate.”

Nowhere in this statute is “property” mentioned. The clear language of the

statute refers to the sale of a dwelling unit, not just the property it sits upon.

Because RCW 59.18.650(2)(e) is not implicated here, a notice to evict based on

the RLTA is insufficient.

Because Hensler was not selling a “single-family residence,” the RLTA

does not apply.

2. Sufficiency of Notice and Judgment

Twyman claims the 90-day notice to terminate tenancy was insufficient

because it failed to clearly identify the statute under which he was being evicted.

Hensler contends the notice explicitly referred to the UDA and, thus, was

adequate. We agree with Hensler and further conclude the judgment was

insufficient for the same reason.

Before initiating an unlawful detainer action, a landlord must give proper

notice to the tenant. Kiemle, 26 Wn. App. 2d at 841. Under the RLTA, notice

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must include facts and circumstances that “support the cause or causes with

enough specificity so as to enable the tenant to respond and prepare a defense

to any incidents alleged.” RCW 59.18.650(6)(b). Similarly, under the UDA,

notice must be “sufficiently particular and certain so as not to deceive or

mislead.” IBF, LLC v. Heuft, 141 Wn. App. 624, 632, 174 P.3d 95 (2007).

Here, the notice given to Twyman clearly indicated his tenancy was

ending, but was ambiguous as to which statute the termination relied upon. The

notice given to Twyman had a heading reading “90-Day Notice to Terminate

Tenancy Due to Owner Intent to Sell Property” and had an affidavit attached

supporting as much. The “Owner Intent to Sell Property” provision is pursuant to

the RLTA. But within the body of the notice, RCW 59.12.030(3) (UDA), not the

RLTA, was cited.

In addition to the notice not clearly stating which statute Twyman’s eviction

was pursuant to, the trial court’s ruling did not reference either the RLTA or the

UDA. At the show cause hearing, Twyman only argued that the RLTA did not

apply and the court did not inquire as to the UDA. The ruling granted attorney

fees to Hensler, which are not available under the UDA, indicating the judgment

was made in accordance with the RLTA, but this is only speculation. Because

the notice included references to both the UDA and the RLTA and the judgment

does not explicitly cite a statute, it is unclear which statute the court relied upon

when making its ruling.

Hensler contends it does not matter which statute the court relied on

because Twyman was given adequate time to vacate the property (more than the

8 No. 86844-6-I/9

20-days’ notice as required by the UDA), and a show cause hearing was held,

which would not be required under the UDA. See IBF, 141 Wn. App. at 634

(“[C]hapter 59.12 RCW governs unlawful detainer actions in general, and does

not explicitly require show cause hearings.); RCW 59.12.090. But which statute

the court relied upon in its ruling does matter because given that a hearing took

place, Twyman is entitled to address the eviction under the UDA. In addition, an

award of attorney fees would not be appropriate under the UDA.

Hensler also argues the invited error doctrine applies, but this argument is

without merit. For the invited error doctrine to apply, Twyman would have had to

“set up an alleged error and then complain about the error on appeal.” In re Est.

of Muller, 197 Wn. App. 477, 484, 389 P.3d 604 (2016). Here, all Twyman said

at the hearing was, “[w]hile the plaintiff can still proceed with an eviction under

the [UDA], we don’t have a tenant under the RLTA.” This statement did not

assent to or materially contribute to an error nor does it address Twyman’s

concerns with an eviction pursuant to the UDA. Twyman simply provided that,

while Hensler may bring an action under the UDA, any claim under the RLTA

was not viable.

Because neither the notice or judgment clearly identified which statute the

eviction was being pursued under, Twyman should have an opportunity to

contest the eviction pursuant to the UDA.

3. Timeliness of Sale

Twyman also claims the 90-day notice to terminate tenancy was not valid

because the sale of the property occurred before the notice expired. Because

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the RLTA does not apply, we need not address this claim.

Attorney Fees

RAP 18.1 provides that applicable law may grant a party the right to

recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review. A party requesting

fees under RAP 18.1 must provide argument and citation to authority “to advise

the court of the appropriate grounds for an award of attorney fees as costs.”

Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 267, 277 P.3d 9 (2012).

Here, both Twyman and Hensler request an award of fees under

RAP 18.1 and ground their argument in the RLTA.6 Because the RLTA does not

apply, neither party is entitled to attorney fees.

We vacate the judgment and remand for an eviction hearing pursuant to

RCW 59.12.

WE CONCUR:

6 Twyman relies on RCW 59.18.290(1) and RCW 59.18.650(4), while Hensler relies on RCW 59.18.290 and RCW 59.18.410(1).