WHITAKER, Judge.
On October 9,1950, plaintiff was given a probational appointment as a physicist in the National Bureau of Standards. On August 20, 1951 he was suspended without pay, pursuant to a finding of the Loyalty Board of the Fourth United States Civil Service Region, Civil Service Commission, that there was “reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the United States.” On April 30, 1952 the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission reversed this ruling, and on May 21, 1952 plaintiff was notified he would be restored to duty. He reported for duty on May 26, 1952. On the following day he resigned.
He sues for his pay between the date of his suspension on August 20, 1951 and May 26, 1952.
Under the LIoyd-La Follette- Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, as amended by the Act of June 10, 1948, 62 Stat. 354, 5 U. S.C.A. § 652, a person in the classified civil service who has been improperly removed or suspended from his office is entitled to recover his compensation during the period of his unlawful removal or suspension. The question presented is whether or not this section is applicable to a person holding a probational appointment. Sections 6(a) and (b) (1) of the Act of June 10, 1948, supra, are quoted in part-in the note below.1
[932]*932Exhibit 1 attached to the stipulation of facts shows that plaintiff’s appointment was “subject to investigation” and also “probationary period of one year required.”
We are of the opinion that, since the appointment was made subject to investigation, it might be cancelled or suspended if the investigation turned up anything that made questionable plaintiff’s permanent appointment to the position. Likewise, the condition “probationary period of one year required” makes it necessary for a person, within that year, to prove himself acceptable for permanent appointment. If within that year something develops that raises a doubt about the desirability of his permanent appointment, it justifies the agency in holding up the permanent appointment, and where the facts justify it, to remove plaintiff from the payroll, until it can be determined whether or not the question raised makes his permanent appointment inadvisable.
.In short, we are of the opinion that a probationary appointee acquires no right to the office, that is to say, a right protected by the Lloyd-La Follette Act, as amended. His right to the office and protection by this Act only accrues after the probationary period has expired and his appointment becomes permanent.
Subsection (a)'of section 6 of the'1948 Act, supra, accords the protection of that Act only to a “person in the classifiéd civil service”. We do not think a person gets within the classified civil service so long as his appointment is probationary and subject to investigation.
The original Civil Service Act provided for the appointment of a Civil Service Commission, and required them to make rules for carrying the Act into effect. Among the rules which they were required to adopt was that “there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment or employment aforesaid.” The rules of the Civil Service Commission now in effect also provide for probationary appointments. These rules undoubtedly have the force and effect of law because of the broad powers conferred upon the President by Revised Statutes, section 1753, 5- U.S.C.A. § 631, to make such rules, and by him delegated to the Civil Service Commission.
Section 2.113 of 5 Code of Federal Regulations, issued by the Civil Service Commission, provide:
“* * * The agency shall utilize the probationary period as fully as possible to determine the fitness of each employee and shall terminate his services during such period if [933]*933he fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for continued Federal employment.”
In the case'at bar a serious question arose as to plaintiff’s loyalty to the United States. Until this question was settled, of course plaintiff was not entitled to a permanent appointment. Nor was he entitled to continue to work for the Government. Under the above rule, the agency was required to “terminate his services during such period if he fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for continued Federal employment.” When the question arose as to his loyalty, the agency was authorized by this rule to terminate his services. Considering the question, raised, we think the agency was justified in immediately terminating plaintiff’s services before his appeal to the Loyalty Review Board had been acted upon. When that Board did act, the agency was required to restore plaintiff to duty, which it did.
Section 9.101(b) of 5 C.F.R. prohibits the removal of employees “except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 9.102,” but this was expressly made inapplicable to probational or temporary appointments in the competitive service. This provision is a repetition of the provision of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, as amended, supra.
The procedure prescribed by section 9.102, which is also a repetition of the provisions of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, as amended, supra, by its terms is made applicable to persons in the competitive service, that is to say, the classified civil service, “unless he is serving a probationary or trial period.” The procedure therein prescribed for the removal of an appointee is made inapplicable to a probationary appointee. His removal is provided for in the next succeeding section, being 9.103. This provides :
“(a) Any person serving a probationary or trial period shall be given a full and fair trial in the performance of the duties of’the position to which appointed. If the performance of his duties or his conduct is not satisfactory to the agency his services shall be terminated by noti- ' fying him in writing of the reasons for his separation and of its effective date. * * *”
Thus, the only thing necessary to do to remove a probationary appointee is merely to tell him why you are removing him. The provision for notice of the charges, for time to file an answer and affidavits, and for a written decision on the dispute, is inapplicable to a probationary appointee.
It would seem from these provisions that a probationary employee is not entitled to the protection against removal accorded persons in the competitive service by the Lloyd-La Follette Act.
If hé is not accorded this protection, then the provision giving him the right to claim compensation for unjustified removal would seem inapplicable to him.
Section 6(a) and (b) (1) of the Act justifies this conclusion. Subsection (a) provides for the filing of charges against an employee, an opportunity for him to answer the charges and to file affidavits, and .for a decision on the charges. Subsection (b) (1), giving the right to the pay of which he has been deprived by an unlawful discharge, applies only to a person who files an answer to the charges filed against him. If the filing of charges against a probationary employee is not required, as sections 9.101 to 9.103 of 5 C.F.R. say, then section 6(b) (1) of the Act has no application to him, and gives him no right to recover.
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WHITAKER, Judge.
On October 9,1950, plaintiff was given a probational appointment as a physicist in the National Bureau of Standards. On August 20, 1951 he was suspended without pay, pursuant to a finding of the Loyalty Board of the Fourth United States Civil Service Region, Civil Service Commission, that there was “reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the United States.” On April 30, 1952 the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission reversed this ruling, and on May 21, 1952 plaintiff was notified he would be restored to duty. He reported for duty on May 26, 1952. On the following day he resigned.
He sues for his pay between the date of his suspension on August 20, 1951 and May 26, 1952.
Under the LIoyd-La Follette- Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, as amended by the Act of June 10, 1948, 62 Stat. 354, 5 U. S.C.A. § 652, a person in the classified civil service who has been improperly removed or suspended from his office is entitled to recover his compensation during the period of his unlawful removal or suspension. The question presented is whether or not this section is applicable to a person holding a probational appointment. Sections 6(a) and (b) (1) of the Act of June 10, 1948, supra, are quoted in part-in the note below.1
[932]*932Exhibit 1 attached to the stipulation of facts shows that plaintiff’s appointment was “subject to investigation” and also “probationary period of one year required.”
We are of the opinion that, since the appointment was made subject to investigation, it might be cancelled or suspended if the investigation turned up anything that made questionable plaintiff’s permanent appointment to the position. Likewise, the condition “probationary period of one year required” makes it necessary for a person, within that year, to prove himself acceptable for permanent appointment. If within that year something develops that raises a doubt about the desirability of his permanent appointment, it justifies the agency in holding up the permanent appointment, and where the facts justify it, to remove plaintiff from the payroll, until it can be determined whether or not the question raised makes his permanent appointment inadvisable.
.In short, we are of the opinion that a probationary appointee acquires no right to the office, that is to say, a right protected by the Lloyd-La Follette Act, as amended. His right to the office and protection by this Act only accrues after the probationary period has expired and his appointment becomes permanent.
Subsection (a)'of section 6 of the'1948 Act, supra, accords the protection of that Act only to a “person in the classifiéd civil service”. We do not think a person gets within the classified civil service so long as his appointment is probationary and subject to investigation.
The original Civil Service Act provided for the appointment of a Civil Service Commission, and required them to make rules for carrying the Act into effect. Among the rules which they were required to adopt was that “there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment or employment aforesaid.” The rules of the Civil Service Commission now in effect also provide for probationary appointments. These rules undoubtedly have the force and effect of law because of the broad powers conferred upon the President by Revised Statutes, section 1753, 5- U.S.C.A. § 631, to make such rules, and by him delegated to the Civil Service Commission.
Section 2.113 of 5 Code of Federal Regulations, issued by the Civil Service Commission, provide:
“* * * The agency shall utilize the probationary period as fully as possible to determine the fitness of each employee and shall terminate his services during such period if [933]*933he fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for continued Federal employment.”
In the case'at bar a serious question arose as to plaintiff’s loyalty to the United States. Until this question was settled, of course plaintiff was not entitled to a permanent appointment. Nor was he entitled to continue to work for the Government. Under the above rule, the agency was required to “terminate his services during such period if he fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for continued Federal employment.” When the question arose as to his loyalty, the agency was authorized by this rule to terminate his services. Considering the question, raised, we think the agency was justified in immediately terminating plaintiff’s services before his appeal to the Loyalty Review Board had been acted upon. When that Board did act, the agency was required to restore plaintiff to duty, which it did.
Section 9.101(b) of 5 C.F.R. prohibits the removal of employees “except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 9.102,” but this was expressly made inapplicable to probational or temporary appointments in the competitive service. This provision is a repetition of the provision of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, as amended, supra.
The procedure prescribed by section 9.102, which is also a repetition of the provisions of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, as amended, supra, by its terms is made applicable to persons in the competitive service, that is to say, the classified civil service, “unless he is serving a probationary or trial period.” The procedure therein prescribed for the removal of an appointee is made inapplicable to a probationary appointee. His removal is provided for in the next succeeding section, being 9.103. This provides :
“(a) Any person serving a probationary or trial period shall be given a full and fair trial in the performance of the duties of’the position to which appointed. If the performance of his duties or his conduct is not satisfactory to the agency his services shall be terminated by noti- ' fying him in writing of the reasons for his separation and of its effective date. * * *”
Thus, the only thing necessary to do to remove a probationary appointee is merely to tell him why you are removing him. The provision for notice of the charges, for time to file an answer and affidavits, and for a written decision on the dispute, is inapplicable to a probationary appointee.
It would seem from these provisions that a probationary employee is not entitled to the protection against removal accorded persons in the competitive service by the Lloyd-La Follette Act.
If hé is not accorded this protection, then the provision giving him the right to claim compensation for unjustified removal would seem inapplicable to him.
Section 6(a) and (b) (1) of the Act justifies this conclusion. Subsection (a) provides for the filing of charges against an employee, an opportunity for him to answer the charges and to file affidavits, and .for a decision on the charges. Subsection (b) (1), giving the right to the pay of which he has been deprived by an unlawful discharge, applies only to a person who files an answer to the charges filed against him. If the filing of charges against a probationary employee is not required, as sections 9.101 to 9.103 of 5 C.F.R. say, then section 6(b) (1) of the Act has no application to him, and gives him no right to recover.
So, it seems to us that both in reason and according to the law and regulations a probationary appointee may be removed at any time until he has demonstrated his fitness to hold the position ; or, if the agency is hot altogether satisfied about the truth of the question raised as to his fitness, they may suspend him until that question has been answered, and this without liability to him under section 6(b) (1)' of the LlóydLa Follette Act.
[934]*934Now; it must be coftfessed that if some of the regulations of the Civil Service' Commission are read in connection with 5 U.S.C.A., § 658, defining the expression “classified civil service,” then section 6(b) (1) of the Lloyd-La Follette Act would be applicable to probationary employee; but this Act and these regulations do not relate specifically to the discharge of employees, whereas the ones we have quoted and relied on above do relate specifically to them. The right of a suspended employee is the question before us.
The opinion that we have expressed is not in conflict with our opinion in Elchibegoff v. United States, 106 Ct.Cl. 541. We held in that case that a probationary ■appointee was subject to dismissal as soon as' the investigation, subject to which he was appointed, disclosed matter indicating that his permanent appointment was inadvisable.
In Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U.S.App. D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46, affirmed, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669, 95 L.Ed. 1352, there was involved the dismissal of . an employee who had been in the classified civil service, but who had been separated therefrom due to a reduction in force and who had been reinstated, subject to1 the condition that she might be removed if the investigation disclosed disqualification. The investigation developed that there were reasonable .grounds to believe that the plaintiff was disloyal to the United States ' and, accordingly, ■she. was removed. The majority of the court held that since she had been appointed subject to investigation, she Was not in the classified civil service until after survival, of the investigation.
It is implicit from the -opinion in Borak v. Biddle, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 141 F.2d 278, that a person appointed on probation was not in the classified ■civil service and, therefore, not entitled to the protection accorded by the Lloyd-La Follette Act. Cf. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 362, 159 F.2d 22.
• We are of the opinion plaintiff was legally suspended and that he is not entitled to recover. His petition will be dismissed.
JONES, Chief Judge, and LARA-MORE, Judge, concur.