Nachack v. Walmart Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 YSABELLE BOUACHANH NACHACK, Case No. 24-cv-00027-SVK

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 10 WALMART INC., WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 41

12 Self-represented Plaintiff alleges that she purchased a product from Defendant Walmart 13 Inc.’s (“Walmart”) website, and that when she subsequently went to a physical Walmart store to 14 return the item, a store manager verbally and physically assaulted her and accused her of theft. 15 See Dkt. 39 (the “SAC”).1 She commenced this action to pursue five causes of action against 16 Walmart, including a claim of racial discrimination in violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights 17 Act. See id. ¶¶ 49-55. Upon Walmart’s first motion to dismiss the racial-discrimination claim, the 18 Court dismissed the claim because Plaintiff had not “offer[ed] sufficient facts demonstrating, or 19 from which the Court c[ould] reasonably infer, that Walmart intentionally discriminated against 20 her on the basis of her race.” See Dkt. 38 (the “Prior Order”) at 3. Rather, as demonstrated by 21 Plaintiff’s allegations, she had “simply assume[d] that the manager verbally and physically 22 assaulted her because of her race.” See id. 23 The Court offered Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her claim and specifically instructed 24 her to do so “only if she c[ould], in good faith, offer sufficient facts demonstrating, or from which 25 the Court c[ould] reasonably infer, that Plaintiff’s race motivated the manager’s alleged conduct.” 26

27 1 The Court accepts the allegations in the SAC as true. See Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 772 1 See id. at 4. Plaintiff then filed the SAC, and Walmart now again moves to dismiss the racial- 2 discrimination claim. See Dkts. 41 (the “Motion”), 48, 49. The Court has determined that the 3 Motion is suitable for resolution without oral argument.2 See Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). 4 Plaintiff’s allegations in the SAC concerning her racial-discrimination claim remain 5 substantively identical to her allegations in the prior complaint. Compare SAC ¶¶ 49-55, with 6 Dkt. 29 ¶ 49. That is, a store manager treated her rudely and disrespectfully, and she assumes the 7 store manager did so because of her race. Plaintiff alleges just one new fact in the SAC in support 8 of her claim—that she “has experienced several individuals who were prejudiced against her based 9 on her Asian race and Immigrant status since” she first immigrated to the United States as a 10 teenager (see SAC ¶ 50)—but the Court cannot reasonably infer from that fact that the store 11 manager here discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race. Thus, as before, the Court must 12 dismiss the racial-discrimination claim because Plaintiff does not offer facts that “bridge the gap 13 between the manager’s conduct and Plaintiff’s race motivating that conduct.” See Prior Order at 14 3-4. Because Plaintiff’s claim fails for the same reason as before, and because Plaintiff has failed 15 to correct a pleading deficiency previously identified even after being given leave to amend with 16 specific instructions on how she could correct that deficiency, the Court concludes that further 17 leave to amend would be futile and therefore will not give Plaintiff leave to amend the claim 18 further. See, e.g., Snapkeys, Ltd. v. Google LLC, No. 19-cv-02658-LHK, 2020 WL 6381354, at *7 19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020) (dismissing claim without leave to amend where, inter alia, plaintiff 20 “has already failed multiple times to adequately allege a . . . claim”); Martin v. CSAA Ins. Exch., 21 No. 17-cv-04066-MEJ, 2018 WL 1242069, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018) (denying request for 22 leave to amend where, inter alia, “Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in their 23

24 2 All necessary Parties—Plaintiff and Walmart—have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate 25 judge. See Dkts. 3, 6. Plaintiff also sued 10 Doe defendants. See SAC ¶ 3. These Doe defendants are not “parties” for purposes of assessing whether there is complete consent to 26 magistrate-judge jurisdiction. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502-505 (9th Cir. 2017) (magistrate-judge jurisdiction vests only after all named parties, whether served or unserved, 27 consent); RingCentral, Inc. v. Nextiva, Inc., No. 19-cv-02626-NC, 2020 WL 978667, at *1 n.1 ] pleading”). 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES the racial-discrimination 3 clam WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The Parties shall appear for a remote status conference 4 || on December 10, 2024, and shall file a joint status report by December 3, 2024. 5 SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: October 23, 2024 7 8 —Stesse vet SUSAN VAN KEULEN 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 1] 12

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