Nachack v. Walmart Inc.
This text of Nachack v. Walmart Inc. (Nachack v. Walmart Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 YSABELLE BOUACHANH NACHACK, Case No. 24-cv-00027-SVK
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
10 WALMART INC., Re: Dkt. Nos. 31, 35 11 Defendant.
12 Defendant Walmart Inc. (“Walmart”) moves to dismiss the fifth cause of action in self- 13 represented Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (the “FAC” at Dkt. 29). See Dkt. 31 (the 14 “Motion”).1 Plaintiff filed an opposition. See Dkt. 36. Walmart filed a reply. See Dkt. 37. All 15 necessary Parties—Plaintiff and Walmart—have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate 16 judge.2 See Dkts. 3, 6. The Court has determined that the Motion is suitable for resolution 17 without oral argument. See Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). After considering the Parties’ briefing, 18 relevant law and the record in this action, and for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the 19 Motion and DISMISSES the fifth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 20 21 1 The Motion is actually a brief that Walmart filed in opposition to Plaintiff amending her original 22 complaint. See Dkt. 30. In that brief, Walmart essentially argued for dismissal of Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action. After the Court accepted the FAC as properly filed, it offered Walmart the option 23 of standing on this opposition brief as a motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 34. Walmart accepted the 24 Court’s offer. See Dkt. 35. 25 2 Plaintiff also sued 10 Doe defendants. See FAC ¶ 3. These Doe defendants are not “parties” for purposes of assessing whether there is complete consent to magistrate-judge 26 jurisdiction. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502-505 (9th Cir. 2017) (magistrate-judge jurisdiction vests only after all named parties, whether served or unserved, consent); RingCentral, 27 Inc. v. Nextiva, Inc., No. 19-cv-02626-NC, 2020 WL 978667, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, I. BACKGROUND 1 The following discussion of background facts is based on the allegations contained in the 2 FAC, the truth of which the Court accepts for purposes of resolving the Motion. See Boquist v. 3 Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2022). In October 2022, Plaintiff purchased “hair coloring” 4 from Walmart online. See FAC ¶ 9. When the product arrived, she “discovered that the item was 5 not pink as ordered, but rather, green.” See id. ¶ 10. She subsequently went to a physical Walmart 6 store with her receipt and asked a “Store clerk” to exchange the item. See id. ¶ 11. After the clerk 7 refused to permit an exchange, Plaintiff asked to speak to the manager. See id. ¶¶ 11-12. The 8 manager “then appeared and initially spoke to Plaintiff in a confrontational manner.” See id. ¶ 12. 9 After Plaintiff explained the situation, the manager “grabbed the bag [containing the item] in a 10 forceful, aggressive manner, rudely attacked, assaulted, and battered Plaintiff [and] then loudly 11 ‘Yelled’ at Plaintiff with a loud voice in the presence of other customers and employees, ‘You are 12 stealing.’” See id. ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiff responded that she was not stealing and that she had a 13 receipt for her purchase, but the manager again yelled at Plaintiff, threatened to call the police and 14 demanded that she leave the store. See id. ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff believes that the store manager 15 treated her in this manner because of her race—she immigrated to the United States from Laos. 16 See id. ¶ 49. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint if it 19 “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a 20 plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Bell 21 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This facial-plausibility standard requires a 22 plaintiff to allege facts resulting in “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 23 unlawfully.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). 24 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only “the complaint, materials 25 incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters [subject to] judicial notice.” See UFCW 26 Loc. 1500 Pension Fund v. Mayer, 895 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). A court 27 must also presume the truth of a plaintiff’s allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in their 1 favor. See Boquist, 32 F.4th at 773. However, a court need not accept as true “allegations that are 2 merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” See Khoja v. 3 Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1008 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 4 If a court grants a motion to dismiss, it may exercise discretion to grant or deny leave to 5 amend the complaint, and it “acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment 6 would be futile, when it would cause undue prejudice to the defendant, or when it is sought in bad 7 faith.” See Nat’l Funding, Inc. v. Com. Credit Counseling Servs., Inc., 817 F. App’x 380, 383 (9th 8 Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 Walmart moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action in which Plaintiff alleges that 11 Walmart engaged in racial discrimination in violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act 12 (the “Act”).3 To state a claim for racial discrimination under the Act, a plaintiff must sufficiently 13 allege that a defendant engaged in intentional discrimination on the basis of the plaintiff’s race. 14 See Austin v. Zhang, No. 22-15955, 2023 WL 3580338, at *1 (9th Cir. May 22, 2023); Greater 15 L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 425 (9th Cir. 2014). 16 Plaintiff does not do so. 17 Plaintiff alleges that: (1) she was born in Laos; (2) the Walmart manager verbally and 18 physically assaulted her; (3) she believes the manager did so because of her race; and (4) she 19 believes the manager would not have done so were she of their same race. See FAC ¶ 49. As 20 these allegations demonstrate, Plaintiff simply assumes that the manager verbally and physically 21 assaulted her because of her race. She does not, however, offer sufficient facts demonstrating, or 22 from which the Court can reasonably infer, that Walmart intentionally discriminated against her on 23 the basis of her race. For example, if the manager had used a racial slur or expressly referred to 24 Plaintiff’s race, those facts would bridge the gap between the manager’s conduct and Plaintiff’s 25 26 3 In standing on its previously filed brief as a motion to dismiss, Walmart explained that it sought 27 dismissal of the FAC. See Note 1, supra; Dkt. 35. In its reply, however, Walmart confirms that it ] race motivating that conduct. 2 In the absence of such a factual bridge, the Court must dismiss the fifth cause of action as 3 insufficiently pled. See, e.g., Kobayashi v. McMullin, 19-cv-06591-DOC, 2022 WL 3137958, at 4 *40 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2022) (recommending dismissal of discrimination claim under the Act 5 || where “the FAC is devoid of any nonconclusory factual allegations that any defendant took any 6 || action against Plaintiff because of a protected characteristic”), report and recommendation 7 || adopted, 2022 WL 3226169 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2022); Est.
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