IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Mykal J. A. Gerou, Jun 05 2026, 9:54 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
June 5, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-2601 Appeal from the Jefferson Superior Court The Honorable Blaine S. Goode, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 39D01-2406-F5-000873
Opinion by Judge Felix Judges May and Mathias concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 1 of 22 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] Mykal Gerou was convicted of five counts of intimidation for threats he made
to multiple people. The trial court sentenced him to 12 years of incarceration
with one year suspended to probation. Gerou now appeals and presents three
issues for our review:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support four of his convictions; 2. Whether the trial court erred by determining part of Gerou’s sentence is not subject to Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(d); and 3. Whether Gerou’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History [3] This case begins not with the criminal conduct for which Gerou was charged
and convicted, but with his family’s involvement with the Indiana Department
of Child Services (“DCS”). On April 27, 2024, DCS received a report of child
neglect concerning Gerou and Constance Mueller’s newborn child. The next
day, DCS Family Case Manager Mary Buxton met with Gerou and Mueller at
the hospital. On April 29, DCS removed Gerou and Mueller’s child from their
care. Buxton informed Gerou of this “in the presence of security,” and Gerou
stated to security “that it wasn’t fair the security officer could carry his gun into
the hospital, but that [Gerou] could not.” Tr. Vol. II at 108.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 2 of 22 [4] DCS filed a petition alleging Gerou and Mueller’s child was a child in need of
services (“CHINS”). Thereafter, Buxton “had a lot of phone[] calls with”
Gerou; during these calls, he “would seem to fly off in a rage in the middle of a
conversation,” and it was “impossible at times” to “reengage him and bring
him back to the topic” Buxton was trying to discuss with him. Tr. Vol. II at
114.
[5] Through the CHINS case, Gerou became a client of Stacey Cornett, a
psychotherapist and “service provider for DCS” who conducted “specialty
assessments to help parents.” Tr. Vol. II at 89–90. Cornett had several phone
calls with Gerou before meeting him in person, and Gerou “was very agitated
and argumentative” during those calls. Id. at 91. Gerou was angry that he had
to participate in an assessment and repeatedly talked about “how he’s been
treated unfairly” by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. 1
Id. at 92. Cornett’s conversations with Gerou “had [her] on high alert,”
“nervous,” and “very scared.” Id. at 93.
[6] On June 3, Cornett met with Gerou in her office in Madison, Indiana. During
the appointment, Gerou “started talking about having a concealing carry and
that he had the right to use his [S]econd [A]mendment. . . . [H]e kept saying[,
1 While living in Michigan with a romantic partner, Gerou interacted with employees from the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services regarding his partner’s two children of whom Gerou is not the father. See In re Mueller/Wells, No. 367427, 2024 WL 2229510, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 16, 2024). Additionally, Gerou has another child, and that child was removed from his care by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 3 of 22 ‘]I have the right to conceal and carry.[’]” Tr. Vol. II at 93. Cornett told
Gerou, “If you have a gun, I’d like you to take that out to your car. . . . [W]hy
don’t you take that gun out to . . . your truck.” Id. at 93–94. Gerou “didn’t
deny that he had a gun” and “started this patting of his hip, which made
[Cornett] think that . . . he was indicating that he had a gun.” Id. at 94. Gerou
“kept ranting about [‘]I have the right to take this wherever I want. This is my -
- I have a concealing carry.[’] . . . And in the course of that, he started saying
that [‘]I have the right to do whatever it takes to use my concealing carry to
protect my child, children from kidnappers.[’]” Id. When Cornett tried to
redirect the conversation, Gerou started talking about his experiences with the
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services and threatened Cornett
that she “better not be like the f[*]ckers in Michigan and [she] better give
[Gerou] a fair report.” Id. at 95. Gerou followed this statement with
“something to the effect of” “or else,” id., or “you will pay,” id. at 102. At no
point during the appointment did Cornett see a firearm. Nevertheless, Cornett
“absolutely” took Gerou’s statements seriously and “felt very threatened.” Id.
at 96. Cornett refused to return to her Madison office and eventually left
Indiana “because of [her] fears of [Gerou’s] agitation.” Id. at 97.
[7] On June 20, DCS held a Child and Family Team Meeting with Gerou at its
Madison office. During that meeting, Gerou told Buxton, “Mess with baby
bear, you’re going to die.” Tr. Vol. II at 115. Buxton “interpreted baby bear to
mean [Gerou’s] child and interpreted him stating that [‘]messing with the baby
bear, you’re going to die[’] to mean that DCS was what he thought was messing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 4 of 22 with his child. Therefore[, Buxton] interpreted it as a threat towards DCS
workers, including [her]self.” Id. When Gerou made this statement, Buxton
“did not believe [him] to be carrying . . . a gun or a weapon” because the
meeting was in a “public office building” in which weapons are prohibited. Id.
at 116. However, after Gerou returned to the meeting after briefly leaving—
which will be explained in more detail below—he told Buxton that he had just
threatened an animal control officer with his gun. This “made [Buxton] believe
that [Gerou] likely was carrying a gun even when not on his person in his
vehicle.” Id. at 117. His threat to Buxton combined with his threat to the
animal control officer to use a gun did heighten Buxton’s concern for her safety
and she realized the seriousness of his threat.
[8] While Gerou had been in the meeting with DCS, Madison Animal Control
received a call for a welfare check at the DCS building regarding “two dogs in
the back of a truck that had a . . . camper [shell] on it.” Tr. Vol. II at 127. “[I]t
was super hot that day,” id., so “people from the building . . . were trying to
give the dogs water through the side of the camper shell” because they “were
panting really heavily,” id. at 128. Animal Control Officer Janet Daugherty
“got one of the dogs out of the [truck] because he was in distress” and placed it
in her air-conditioned vehicle; she decided not to retrieve the other dog due to
its aggressiveness and “growling.” Id. Daugherty’s partner then came out of
the building with Gerou. Daugherty “was very upset” with Gerou “because
[she] had dealt with [Gerou] before with the dogs . . . on the same issue,” and
the two “started getting into an argument because [Daugherty] asked him about
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 5 of 22 the dogs being in the back.” Id. Gerou “started getting in [Daugherty’s] face,
cussing [her] out, calling [her] all kinds of different names.” Id. Gerou told
Daugherty that “he was going to sick his dog on [her] to bite [her], the one that
was acting aggressive.” Id. at 129. Daugherty believed Gerou’s statement and
thought she was in danger of being attacked by him had it not been for her
partner’s presence at the scene. Law enforcement officers arrived and were able
to defuse the situation, and Gerou returned to the meeting with DCS.
[9] On June 24, Gerou’s attorney in the CHINS case, Alexa Bischoff, called Gerou
to discuss the CHINS factfinding hearing that was scheduled for June 28.
During this call, “[i]t was hard for [Bischoff] to explain things or talk much
because [Gerou] was very upset, angry[,] and talking over” her. Tr. Vol. II at
153. Gerou’s anger was directed at “Stacey Cornett, the DCS attorney, [and
the] DCS caseworker.” Id. In particular, Gerou “was angry that his kid had
been removed and detained.” Id. Gerou told Bischoff, “[I]f you take my child,
I will kill you. If you come between me and my family, you will die. People
are going to die. I will kill people. . . . I always have a gun.” Id. Gerou also
indicated he wanted Cornett “to testify in a certain way and . . . . if she testified
in the way that [Gerou and Bischoff] expected, . . . she would pay for it.” Id. at
154. Bischoff believed Gerou’s statements to be “more than just ranting,” id. at
159, and something “he intended to do,” id. at 159–60, so “as soon as the
phone call was over,” Bischoff, believing she had a legal responsibility to do so,
reported Gerou’s statements to law enforcement. Id. at 155. Bischoff “also
called a welfare check to Michigan because . . . that’s where [Gerou] resided”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 6 of 22 and she “was concerned about what he might do to anyone around him.” Id. at
156. And Bischoff alerted the CHINS court and the local DCS office of
Gerou’s threats and her safety concerns for people involved in Gerou’s case.
[10] The June 28 CHINS factfinding hearing was rescheduled “[b]ecause [Gerou]
was continuing to make threats towards DCS workers and anyone involved
with the situation with his child at that time,” including death threats. Tr. Vol.
II at 120. Buxton was especially concerned about the factfinding hearing
because Gerou “had made threats to [her] and about [her], and [she] was the
one that was going to be telling [Gerou] all of the information that he ultimately
didn’t want to hear about why his child” should not be in his care. Id. at 121.
Buxton feared that Gerou “would have a gun in his vehicle, that he could . . .
attempt to harm people, to kill people prior to going into the hearing or even
leaving the hearing.” Id.
[11] The State charged Gerou with four counts of intimidation as Level 5 felonies—
one count for his threats against Cornett 2 (the “Cornett Count”), one count for
his threats against DCS that he made to Bischoff 3 (the “DCS-Bischoff Count”),
one count for his threats against DCS that he made to Buxton 4 (the “DCS-
Buxton Count”), and one count for his threats against DCS that he made to
2 Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(A). 3 I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(C). 4 I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(C).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 7 of 22 Cornett 5 (the “DCS-Cornett Count”)—and one count of intimidation as a Level
6 felony 6 for his threat against Daugherty. A jury found Gerou guilty as
charged, and the trial court sentenced him to a total of 12 years of incarceration
with 1 of those years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision 1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support His Conviction for the Cornett Count and to Support as Class A Misdemeanor Convictions the DCS-Buxton, DCS-Bischoff, and DCS-Cornett Counts
[12] Gerou argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his
four convictions for intimidation as Level 5 felonies. Our standard of review
for such a claim is as follows:
“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hancz- Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].
5 I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(C). 6 I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(1)(A).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 8 of 22 Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783). And “it is well-settled that ‘circumstantial evidence alone’ can
sustain a . . . conviction.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1245 (quoting Sallee v.
State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016)).
[13] We first address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Gerou’s conviction
for the Cornett Count. We then address the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting Gerou’s convictions for the DCS-Buxton, DCS-Bischoff, and DCS-
Cornett Counts (collectively, the “DCS Counts”).
a. The Cornett Count
[14] In order to convict Gerou of intimidation under Indiana Code section 35-45-2-
1(a)(4) and (b)(2)(A), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Gerou communicated a threat with the intent that Cornett be placed in fear that
the threat will be carried out and while committing this offense, Gerou drew or
used a deadly weapon. Gerou specifically argues that “there was no evidence
he was actually in possession” of a deadly weapon when he threatened Cornett
and that even if there was, there was no evidence he drew or used the weapon. 7
Appellant’s Br. at 20.
7 Gerou does not challenge any other element of this conviction.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 9 of 22 [15] First, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict
show that while in Cornett’s office, Gerou “didn’t deny that he had a gun”
when told to take any gun he may have to his vehicle; he “patt[ed] his hip, . . .
indicating that he had a gun”; and referring to his gun, he told Cornett that he
had “the right to take this wherever [he] want[s].” Tr. Vol. II at 94. The jury
could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that Gerou did, in fact, have
a gun on his person in Cornett’s office.
[16] Second, “[m]ere possession of a firearm or being ‘armed’ with a deadly weapon
is not enough,” Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 665 (Ind. 2010), to satisfy use-
of-a-deadly-weapon requirements in our criminal statutes. See id. (determining
firearm enhancement, which requires “use,” was not a double jeopardy
violation where defendant’s criminal confinement conviction under I.C. § 35-
42-3-3(a) & (b)(2)(A) required only that he had been “armed with a deadly
weapon”); Cleveland v. State, 129 N.E.3d 227, 235–36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)
(determining defendant only possessed a firearm, so trial court could not order
firearm destroyed under I.C. § 35-47-3-2(b), which requires defendant be
convicted of “misuse of firearms”), trans. denied. As used in the intimidation
statute, “use” includes “brandishing, displaying, bartering [sic], striking with,
and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm.” Daniels v. State, 957
N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 37
(2001)). For instance, in Daniels v. State, this court determined that the
defendant “displayed” a gun to his ex-girlfriend “when he deliberately lifted up
his shirt to reveal to her that it was tucked into his waistband.” 957 N.E.2d at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 10 of 22 1030. This was “sufficient evidence that [the defendant] ‘used’ the gun while
intimidating [his ex-girlfriend].” Id.
[17] Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict
show that Gerou patted his hip to indicate to Cornett that he was armed with a
gun. Then, Gerou said that he has “the right to do whatever it takes to use my
concealing carry to protect my child, children from kidnappers,” Tr. Vol. II at
94, and warned Cornett that she “better not be like the f[*]ckers in Michigan
and [she] better give [Gerou] a fair report,” id. at 95. Gerou followed this last
statement with “something to the effect of” “or else,” id., or “you will pay,” id.
at 102. Although Gerou did not display his gun as overtly as the defendant in
Daniels, Gerou clearly used his gun while threatening Cornett by “patting” it,
Tr. Vol. II at 94, to let Cornett know he had it on him. Based on the foregoing,
we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for Cornett Count.
b. The DCS Counts
[18] In order to convict Gerou of intimidation under Indiana Code section 35-45-2-
1(a)(4) and (b)(2)(C), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Gerou communicated a threat with the intent that another person be placed in
fear that the threat will be carried out and the threat is to commit terrorism or
made in furtherance of an act of terrorism. In this context, “terrorism” is
the unlawful use of force or violence or the unlawful threat of force or violence to:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 11 of 22 (1) intimidate or coerce:
(A) a government; or
(B) all or part of the civilian population; or
(2) affect the conduct of a government by use of a weapon of mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-329.
[19] Regarding the terrorism element of the DCS Counts, the State alleged that
Gerou’s “threats [were] to commit terrorism,” namely “the unlawful threat of
force or violence to intimidate or coerce the government, to-wit: the
Department of Child Services, an agency of the State of Indiana, with the intent
that the Department of Child Services employees be placed in fear that the
threat will be carried out.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 179–80, 247. Gerou
argues that DCS “is not in and of itself a ‘government,’” so the State could not
satisfy the “government” element of the terrorism definition. Appellant’s Br. at
21. We must agree.
[20] “[W]e review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” J.Q.R. v. State, 252
N.E.3d 919, 924 (Ind. 2025) (citing Bojko v. Anonymous Physician, 232 N.E.3d
1155, 1158 (Ind. 2024)). We must “give effect to every word and ‘eschew those
[interpretations] that treat some words as duplicative or meaningless.’” Cutchin
v. Beard, 171 N.E.3d 991, 997 (Ind. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting
Estabrook v. Mazak Corp., 140 N.E.3d 830, 836 (Ind. 2020)). Likewise, we
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 12 of 22 “assume that the language employed in a statute was used intentionally.” Pabey
v. Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138, 1148 (Ind. 2004) (citing Burks v. Bolerjack, 427
N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ind. 1981)). We also give the undefined words and phrases
used “their plain, or ordinary and usual,” meaning. I.C. § 1-1-4-1(1); see also
Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1054 (Ind. 2024) (quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ.
of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)) (“When
interpreting words in a statute, this Court’s ‘first task’ is to assign words their
‘plain meaning’ . . . .”), reh’g denied (Apr. 22, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 177
(2024). “The meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to
their relationship with other associated words and phrases.” ESPN, 62 N.E.3d
at 1198 (quoting 600 Land, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion Cnty., 889
N.E.2d 305, 311 (Ind. 2008)). And in criminal cases, we apply the rule of
lenity, which “requires us to construe a penal statute strictly against the State
while resolving any ambiguities in favor of the defendant.” Fix v. State, 186
N.E.3d 1134, 1139 (Ind. 2022) (citing Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872
(Ind. 2009)).
[21] Indiana’s criminal code does not define “government,” so we must give it its
“plain, or ordinary and usual,” meaning, I.C. § 1-1-4-1(1); see also Morales, 228
N.E.3d at 1054 (quoting ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1195). “Government” generally
means “the body of persons that constitutes the governing authority of a
political unit or organization” or “the complex of political institutions, laws,
and customs through which the function of governing is carried out.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 13 of 22 Government, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY.COM (May 10, 2026),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/government.
[22] Notably, Indiana’s criminal code defines the term “governmental entity,”
which denotes in relevant part (1) “the United States or any state, county,
township, city, town, separate municipal corporation, special taxing district, or
public school corporation”; (2) “any authority, board, bureau, commission,
committee, department, division, hospital, military body, or other
instrumentality of any of those entities”; or (3) “a state assisted college or state
assisted university.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-144(a). Because our General Assembly
has defined “governmental entity” and chose to not use that term in the
terrorism definition statute, we must assume that it had a different meaning in
mind for “government.” See Pabey, 816 N.E.2d at 1148 (citing Burks, 427
N.E.2d at 890); Loomis v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 244 N.E.3d 908, 915 (Ind. 2024)
(quoting WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Sch., 178 N.E.3d 1187, 1191 (Ind. 2022))
(“[C]ourts ‘cannot add words or restrictions,’ but must review ‘what the statute
does—and does not—say.’”).
[23] This conclusion is further bolstered by the other words our General Assembly
chose to use in the terrorism definition statute. See ESPN, 62 N.E.3d at 1198
(quoting 600 Land, 889 N.E.2d at 311). In particular, “government” is one of
two options in Subsection (1)—the other is “all or part of the civilian
population.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-329(1). Our General Assembly’s decision to
associate “government” with “all or part of the civilian population”
demonstrates that “government,” as used in the terrorism definition statute,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 14 of 22 does not encompass a department of state government. 8 To hold otherwise
would require adding “entity” to Subsection (1)(A) of the terrorism definition
statute, which we cannot do. See Loomis, 244 N.E.3d at 915 (quoting WTHR-
TV, 178 N.E.3d at 1191).
[24] With this in mind, we must decide whether DCS is a “government” as that
term is used in the terrorism definition statute. It is not. DCS is an Indiana
state agency. As such, it is a governmental entity, I.C. § 35-31.5-2-144(a)(2),
but it is not itself a “government” for purposes of the terrorism definition
statute, see supra ¶ 23.
[25] Based on the foregoing, the State did not present sufficient evidence to show
that Gerou unlawfully threatened force or violence to intimidate or coerce a
government. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-329(1)(A). Consequently, the State did not
present sufficient evidence to establish that Gerou’s threats against DCS were
threats to commit terrorism. The State therefore failed to present sufficient
evidence to Gerou’s convictions for the DCS Counts as Level 5 felonies
pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(4) and (b)(2)(C).
[26] Our analysis does not end there. “[W]hen we reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence, we may remand to the trial court to enter a judgment of
conviction upon a lesser-included offense if the evidence is sufficient to support
8 We do not attempt to define the exact contours of “government” as used in Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2- 329(1)(A) because doing so is not necessary to resolve this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 15 of 22 the lesser offense.” W.H. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 900, 905 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)
(quoting Alexander v. State, 13 N.E.3d 917, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)); see also
Ind. Appellate Rule 66(C); Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. 1992)
(collecting authorities). Regarding the DCS-Buxton Count, Gerou concedes
that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-
45-2-1(a)(4), which is a lesser-included offense. Appellant’s Br. at 21.
[27] As for the DCS-Cornett and DCS-Bischoff Counts, Gerou argues that the
evidence is insufficient to support convictions for intimidation as Class A
misdemeanors pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(4). In particular,
Gerou contends that he did not know or have reason to believe that Cornett and
Bischoff would repeat his statements to DCS.
[28] “It is well-established that a defendant need not speak directly with a victim to
communicate a threat” within the meaning of the intimidation statute. Peppers
v. State, 152 N.E.3d 678, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing E.B. v. State, 89
N.E.3d 1087, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Doroszko v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1151 (Ind. 2023). “[T]o communicate a threat for
purposes of the offense of intimidation, the statement must be transmitted in
such a way that the defendant knows or has good reason to believe the
statement will reach the victim.” Id. (citing Ajabu v. State, 677 N.E.2d 1035,
1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 16 of 22 [29] In J.T. v. State, this court reversed a juvenile’s delinquency adjudication for
intimidation after concluding that the State did not present sufficient evidence
that the juvenile intended to communicate the threat. 718 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999). In that case, a high school student prepared a document that
contained a threat against a fellow student and printed it in the high school
library. Id. at 1121. A librarian intercepted the document, and the document
was passed through several administrators before it was shown to the intended
victim. Id. at 1121–22.
[30] J.T. appealed the delinquency adjudication for intimidation and argued that
there was no evidence that he communicated or attempted to communicate a
threat to the student named in the document. J.T., 718 N.E.2d at 1123. This
court observed that the State only proved that J.T. intended to print the
document containing the threat and that the printed document would be
returned directly to him. Id. “The printing of a single document, without more,
does not constitute a communication to the person named in the document.”
Id. Moreover, J.T. “did not know or have good reason to believe that the
document would be intercepted and transmitted through various intermediaries
to” the student threatened in the document. Id. at 1124.
[31] On the other hand, this court has held that the State presented sufficient
evidence that the threat was “communicated” to the victim where the defendant
made the threat to a third person who was not a co-conspirator. B.B. v. State,
141 N.E.3d 856, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In B.B. v. State, B.B. repeatedly told
a friend that he was going to shoot students at his high school. Id. at 858–89,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 17 of 22 862. B.B. also showed the friend a “manifesto,” which “included statements
indicating that B.B. planned to harm others.” Id. at 858. B.B. was adjudicated
a delinquent child for an act that would be considered intimidation if
committed by an adult. B.B. appealed, arguing that “the evidence was
insufficient because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
B.B. knew or reasonably should have known his plans to shoot students at the
high school would be communicated to the potential victims.” Id. at 860. This
court disagreed, concluding that because there was no indication B.B.’s friend
was a co-conspirator, “a reasonable fact finder could conclude that B.B. knew
or should have known that [his friend] would report a plan of mass murder to
other students at the high school. [The friend] behaved in a predictable way
when he exposed B.B.’s plans.” Id. at 862.
[32] Concerning the DCS-Cornett Count, like the friend in B.B., Cornett behaved in
a predictable way when she repeated Gerou’s statements to DCS. Gerou
maintains that his statements to Cornett were protected by confidentiality
because Cornett is a psychotherapist. There is no evidence in the record
demonstrating that Gerou was Cornett’s patient or otherwise had a doctor-
patient relationship with her. In fact, Cornett was working on behalf of DCS for
the purpose of assessing Gerou and providing a report to DCS thereon. The jury
could reasonably conclude that Gerou knew or should have known that Cornett
would disclose his threats to DCS.
[33] Concerning the DCS-Bischoff Count, as in B.B., the jury could reasonably
conclude that Gerou knew or should have known that Bischoff would report his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 18 of 22 plan to kill any DCS employee who “c[a]me between [him] and [his] family,”
Tr. Vol. II at 153. Bischoff’s role as Gerou’s attorney does not alter this
conclusion. Although lawyers generally have a duty to “not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,”
Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a), a lawyer “may reveal [such] information
. . . to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,” id. 1.6(b)(1). Bischoff
behaved in a predictable way when she exposed Gerou’s plans. We therefore
cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
intimidation conviction for his threats against DCS that he communicated to
Bischoff.
[34] Based on the foregoing, the State presented sufficient evidence to support
intimidation convictions as Class A misdemeanors pursuant Indiana Code
section 35-45-2-1(a)(4) for the DCS Counts. Remand is thus appropriate for
entry of judgments of conviction upon these lesser-included offenses. See W.H.,
231 N.E.3d at 905 n.2; App. R. 66(C); Nunn, 601 N.E.2d at 339.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Determining Gerou’s Sentences for the DCS Counts Are Not Subject to Indiana Code Section 35-50-1- 2(d)
[35] Gerou asserts that his sentences for the DCS Counts are subject to the
limitations found in Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(d). The trial court
determined these three counts did “not constitute an episode of criminal
conduct, in that [they] were not closely related in time, place, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 19 of 22 circumstance,” so it ordered Gerou to serve the sentences thereon
consecutively. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 181–82. Although we are
remanding for the trial court to sentence Gerou on the DCS Counts as Class A
misdemeanors, for the sake of judicial efficiency, we address the merits of
Gerou’s argument. 9
[36] “Generally, ‘it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to order sentences
be served concurrently or consecutively.’” Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1143 (Ind. 2022)
(quoting Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1082 (Ind. 2015)). This discretion is
not without limits. See id. (citing Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996)). Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(d) provides in relevant part that
“the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment to which the defendant is
sentenced for convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct may not
exceed” certain prescribed caps.
[37] An “episode of criminal conduct” refers to “offenses or a connected series of
offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” I.C. § 35-50-
1-2(b). “Whether certain offenses constitute a single episode of criminal
conduct is a fact-intensive inquiry determined by the trial court.” Fix, 186
N.E.3d at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schlichter v. State,
779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002)). “While the ability to recount each charge
without referring to the other offers guidance on the question of whether a
9 We do not, however, address Gerou’s argument that his sentence is inappropriate pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 20 of 22 defendant’s conduct constitutes an episode of criminal conduct, we focus our
analysis on the timing of the offenses and the simultaneous and
contemporaneous nature of the crimes, if any.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (Ind. 2006)).
[38] The facts here show that on June 3, while at Cornett’s office, Gerou committed
intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor when he communicated to Cornett
threats against DCS; on June 20, while at a DCS office, Gerou committed
intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor when he communicated to Buxton
threats against DCS; and on June 24, during a phone call, Gerou committed
intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor when he communicated to Bischoff
threats against DCS. Gerou did not commit any of these offenses at the same
time or at the same location. And it is not difficult to account for one of these
offenses without referring to details of the others. See Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1144
(quoting O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 951 (Ind. 2001)). To be sure, all of
Gerou’s threats were against DCS and in the context of the CHINS case. But
there is nothing simultaneous or contemporaneous about the nature of the DCS
Counts. We therefore cannot say these three offenses constitute a single
episode of criminal conduct such that the sentencing caps in Indiana Code
section 35-50-1-2(d) apply.
Conclusion [39] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Gerou’s intimidation
conviction for threatening Cornett, it presented sufficient evidence to support
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 21 of 22 intimidation convictions as Class A misdemeanors for the DCS Counts, and the
trial court did not err by determining Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(d) does
not apply to cap the sentences for the DCS Counts. We affirm Gerou’s
conviction for the Cornett Count. We reverse Gerou’s Level 5 felony
convictions for the DCS Counts. And we remand for the trial court to (1) enter
judgments of conviction for intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor pursuant to
Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(4) for the DCS Counts, and (2) sentence
Gerou on the revised convictions.
[40] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath West Sixth Law, LLP Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Daniel H. Frohman Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2601 | June 5, 2026 Page 22 of 22