Myers v. Wadsworth Manufacturing Co.

183 N.W. 913, 214 Mich. 636, 1921 Mich. LEXIS 710
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 19, 1921
DocketDocket No. 6
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 183 N.W. 913 (Myers v. Wadsworth Manufacturing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Myers v. Wadsworth Manufacturing Co., 183 N.W. 913, 214 Mich. 636, 1921 Mich. LEXIS 710 (Mich. 1921).

Opinion

Stone, J.

A petition was filed by the defendants praying for reasons therein set forth that they be permitted to discontinue payment of compensation to plaintiff, or applicant, herein. Those reasons will be referred to later herein. It appears that prior to and on July 14, 1920, the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant Wadsworth Manufacturing Company, in the city of Detroit, which company’s principal business was the building of automobile bodies; that it was operating under the workmen’s compensation law, and the other defendant had been designated, with the approval of the industrial accident board, as the means of insuring said manufacturing company against the risks imposed upon it by the terms of said compensation law; and said General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Limited, was carrying the compensation risk of said manufacturing company.

That the plaintiff was on the day aforesaid employed by said defendant manufacturing company as a sub-foreman and final inspector in the finishing' department of said defendant’s plant. Plaintiff’s duties were to inspect the automobile bodies before the finish varnish coat was put on, and as such inspector it was his duty to carefully look the body over as it came through on a small truck, before it was attached to a chain conveyor, for any blemishes or marks, which it was his duty to remove with sandpaper or pull the body out of the line and haves one of the men assisting him do the work of repairing the blemish.

That because of the lighting conditions it was necessary to turn the body around for examination and inspection, which turning had to be done by pushing on the windshield. In the performance of this duty upon [638]*638a body the windshield was broken and plaintiff’s right arm and wrist were severely cut and injured by the glass, the nature and extent of which injury was described in the agreement for compensation hereinafter referred to as follows:

“The flexor eorpi ulnoris tendon was completely severed, and also the ulnor artery muscles and facia were badly lacerated over two-thirds of distance across, lower forearm.”

Thereafter an agreement in regard to compensation, was entered into between the parties providing for the payment of compensation at the rate of $14 per week during total disability, and at a proper rate per' week during partial disability, if the employee should become legally entitled to compensation for partial disability,” which agreement, dated the 19th day of July, 1920, was filed with the industrial accident board, and approved by it.

Thereafter compensation as for total disability was paid to the 11th day of October, 1920. On the 13th day of October, 1920, defendants filed with said board-a petition to be relieved from further payments of compensation, and for such other and further relief as to the industrial accident board should seem just and proper. Said petition averred that after the date of the injury claimant returned to the Wadsworth Manufacturing Company in his capacity as foreman and performed his duties as such until on or about the 18th day of September, 1920, at which time by virtue of shop, conditions he was discharged from the employ of the Wadsworth Manufacturing Company. It was also stated in said petition that an operation to remedy a disability resulting from the injury was tendered to plaintiff and refused by him, under date of August 21, 1920. The relief prayed for was that upon hearing had compensation payments therein might be suspended until such time as claimant sub[639]*639mitted to the operation tendered. And that defendants might be relieved' wholly from further payments of compensation in the case.

The plaintiff filed his answer to such petition, and testimony was taken in support of the various contentions of the parties. The findings of the industrial accident board were as follows, under date of January 8, 1921:

“(c) That said applicant was still disabled, in the employment in which he was engaged when injured, as a result of said injury, on October 11, 1920, the end of the period covered by the last payment of compensation in the case, and should continue to receive compensation in accordance with the terms of the approved agreement on file in the case.
(cl) That there is no reasonable assurance that the proposed operation, offered by respondents, on applicant’s injured arm will result in lessening applicant's ’disability or prove to be beneficial in any way, and that applicant’s refusal to undergo the said 'operation was not unreasonable.”

After determining the amount then due and payable, and directing payment thereof and of future compensation in accordance with the approved agreement, the finding concludes as follows:

“It is therefore ordered and adjudged that said petition should be and the same is hereby^ denied, and that said applicant is entitled to receive and recover from said respondents compensation in accordance with the above findings, receipts therefor to be filed forthwith, all in accordance with the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act.”

The case is here upon certiorari sued out by the defendants, who assign error upon the findings marked above respectively, “c” and “d”.

g. After a careful reading of the testimony we are satisfied that the board did not err in its finding marked “c”. There was testimony that the applicant was still disabled in the employment in which he was [640]*640engaged when injured, as a result of the injury, on October 11, 1920, the end of the period covered by the last payment of compensation. It appeared that plaintiff when injured was a foreman and inspector, an employment requiring training, skill and judgment beyond that of a common laborer. Since the-injury he has not been able, by reason of such injury, to perform in full the duties he was performing at the time of the accident. These duties required, among other things, the use of both hands. Counsel for defendants state in their brief:

“In the instant case, it is not the contention of the respondents and petitioners that the forearm of Mr. Myers is in the same condition as it was before the date of the accident, and indeed it is conceded that there is an impairment in the function of the forearm.”

In our- opinion the case comes within, and is governed by, the cases of Foley v. Railway, 190 Mich. 507, and Jameson v. Newhall Co., 200 Mich. 514.

d. We are constrained, however, to differ with the industrial accident board in its conclusion and finding that there was. no reasonable assurance that the proposed operation, offered by the defendants, on plaintiff’s injured arm, would result in lessening plaintiff’s disability or prove to be beneficial in any way, and that plaintiff’s refusal to undergo an operation was not unreasonable.

The only medical testimony upon this subject was that of Dr. Condit, chief surgeon for the defendant General Accident Corporation. He first treated plaintiff under date of July 20th, continuing to treat him from time to tim,e until August 18th. It is true that Dr. Condit used the word “possibility,” but, taking his testimony as a whole, there can be no question, in our opinion, as to its meaning. The following occurred in his direct testimony:

[641]*641“Q.

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Bluebook (online)
183 N.W. 913, 214 Mich. 636, 1921 Mich. LEXIS 710, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/myers-v-wadsworth-manufacturing-co-mich-1921.