Myers v. Gilead Sciences, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 21, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-02668
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AMELIA MYERS, et al., Case No. 24-cv-02668-AMO Plaintiffs, 8 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY 10 GILEAD SCIENCES, INC, et al., PROCEEDINGS 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. No. 27 12 13 This is a putative class action brought by Plaintiffs Amelia Myers and Fatoumata Barry 14 Yapo against their former employers, Defendants Gilead Sciences, Inc. and Kite Pharma, Inc. 15 Myers and Yapo allege that Gilead and Kite Pharma utilized the wrong rate of pay to calculate 16 overtime pay, and thus underpaid overtime in violation of state and federal law. Before the Court 17 is Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or stay, which was heard on December 19, 2024.1 Having 18 read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered the arguments therein and those made 19 at the hearing, as well as relevant legal authority, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND 20 DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or stay for the reasons discussed below. 21 I. BACKGROUND2 22 Plaintiffs formerly worked for Gilead and Kite Pharma in California. FAC ¶¶ 6, 10. They 23 were Cell Therapy Specialists and classified as non-exempt. FAC ¶¶ 7, 11. In addition to hourly 24 wages, Defendants provided Plaintiffs with short-term and annual incentive awards and grants of 25 1 Also pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for issuance of notice to the putative class. 26 See ECF 22. The Court will issue a separate order on that motion. 27 2 The Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint as true and construes the pleadings in 1 Gilead restricted stock units (“RSUs”) (collectively, “supplemental remuneration”). FAC ¶ 57. 2 The grant of incentive awards is determined by metrics such as employee performance and tenure 3 with the company, while RSUs are non-discretionary and granted primarily based on continued 4 employment. FAC ¶¶ 58-59. Plaintiffs allege they worked overtime, but that no supplemental 5 remuneration was included in the calculations of Plaintiffs’ “regular rates,” and that consequently, 6 Defendants failed to pay all overtime wages to which Plaintiffs were entitled under federal and 7 state law. FAC ¶¶ 62, 64. 8 On May 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant putative class action against Defendants 9 challenging their alleged underpayment of overtime wages. ECF 1. Plaintiffs allege violations of 10 the California Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (collectively, the “state law 11 claims”) on behalf of all non-exempt employees working for Defendants in California, as well as 12 violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) on behalf of all current and former non- 13 exempt employees of Defendants in any state. Id. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for 14 issuance of court-authorized notice. ECF 22. On June 21, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss 15 Plaintiffs’ complaint. ECF 27. On July 19, 2024, Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ motion for 16 issuance of court-authorized notice. ECF 32. On October 15, 2024, the parties stipulated to 17 Plaintiffs’ filing of an amended complaint adding a Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) 18 claim without impacting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF 39. On October 25, 2024, Plaintiffs 19 filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF 42. 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC, arguing Plaintiffs have failed to state a 22 plausible claim for unpaid overtime, and that consequently their claims all fail. Defendants further 23 argue any surviving claims should be stayed in light of ongoing state court litigation involving 24 similar parties, facts, and claims to the instant action. The Court first considers whether staying 25 any of Plaintiffs’ claims is appropriate. It then examines whether any unstayed claims survive 26 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 27 A. Motion to Stay 1 ongoing action in state court, Herman Pappoe v. Kite Pharma, Inc., et al., No 24STCV02259 2 (L.A. Super. Ct.), pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine or the Court’s inherent authority in 3 order to avoid duplication of efforts and the risk of conflicting judgments.3 4 Federal courts may abstain from exercising jurisdiction where “considerations of wise 5 judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive 6 disposition of litigation can support a stay of federal litigation in favor of parallel state 7 proceedings.” Ernest Bock, LLC v. Steelman, 76 F.4th 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Colorado 8 River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (internal quotations 9 omitted)). Stays under Colorado River are “based on administrative concerns and prioritize 10 efficient ‘disposition of litigation’ through the wise deployment of ‘judicial resources.’ ” Id. 11 Courts in the Ninth Circuit assess the following factors to determine whether a Colorado River 12 stay is appropriate: 13 (1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; 14 (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained 15 jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings can 16 adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether the state court proceedings 17 will resolve all issues before the federal court. 18 R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2011). “ ‘Any doubt as to 19 whether a factor exists should be resolved against a stay,’ ” id. at 979, but the factors “are not a 20 ‘mechanical checklist’; indeed, some may not have any applicability to a case,” Seneca Ins. Co., 21

22 3 Defendants filed a request for judicial notice of the original Pappoe complaint along with their motion to dismiss and/or stay, ECF 28, and filed a request for judicial notice of the second 23 amended complaint in Pappoe along with their reply in support of their motion, ECF 34. On December 13, 2024, Defendants submitted a notice of pendency of the Pappoe action, attaching 24 the third amended complaint that was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court on December 5, 2024. 25 Plaintiffs do not challenge the Court’s consideration of any of the complaints. The Court finds it is appropriate to take judicial notice of the Pappoe complaints because judicial notice is properly 26 taken of matters of public record, including court filings and orders from other cases. See Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that it is proper to take judicial notice of 27 materials from a proceeding in another tribunal), overruled in part on other grounds, Hayward v. 1 Inc. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 2017). “Courts generally rely on the state 2 of affairs at the time of the Colorado River analysis.” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 982. 3 As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether the two actions are “substantially 4 similar” such that the Colorado River doctrine applies. Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1416 5 (9th Cir. 1989). Actions are substantially similar when “substantially the same parties are 6 contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues in another forum.” Gallagher v. Dillon 7 Grp. 2003-I, 2010 WL 890056, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010). Plaintiff Herman Pappoe worked 8 for Gilead and Kite in Los Angeles County and, like Plaintiffs Myers and Yapo, was a non-exempt 9 Cell Therapy Specialist. ECF 52-1 at 3. Pappoe seeks to represent a class of “[a]ll non-exempt 10 employees of [Gilead or Kite] who worked in California [from January 29, 2020] through the date 11 set by the Court.” Id. at 4. Because Plaintiffs Myers and Yapo were employed by Gilead and Kite 12 in California from May 2021 to August 2023, and from June 2018 to February 2024, respectively, 13 they fall within Pappoe’s proposed class. While the named plaintiffs are not the same, there is 14 significant overlap in the putative classes, and the two actions are against the same defendants. 15 Moreover, two actions are substantially similar where they “arise out of the same alleged 16 conduct and seek to vindicate the same rights.” Goodin v. Vendley, 356 F. Supp. 3d 935, 944 17 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Montanore Minerals Corp. v. Bakie, 867 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 18 2017)). “Exact parallelism” between the two actions is not required. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416. 19 Pappoe filed a putative class action against Gilead and Kite in Los Angeles Superior Court 20 alleging violations of the California Labor Code and seeking penalties under PAGA. ECF 52-1 at 21 3. Pappoe alleges that Gilead and Kite omitted the value of RSUs from the regular rates of pay 22 hourly, non-exempt employees who were eligible for overtime compensation. Id. at 6. Pappoe 23 further alleges wage statement and final pay violations, as well as a UCL claim based on Gilead 24 and Kite’s alleged Labor Code violations. Id. at 6-11. Pappoe raises all state law causes of action 25 raised in the instant case, as well as additional state law claims, but does not raise a FLSA claim. 26 While there is not exact identity of claims, the two cases are based on the same facts and both 27 involve the same legal question to be resolved: whether Defendants underpaid its hourly, non- 1 identical, the cases are substantially similar. See Goodin, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (finding 2 substantial similarity between federal and state actions where factual basis for claims arose from 3 the same conduct, despite plaintiffs’ entitlement to different remedies in each action); Alila-Katita 4 v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2017 WL 8948735, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2017) (finding substantial 5 similarity where federal and state actions involved many of the same plaintiffs, the same 6 defendant, wage and hour violations relating to the same position, despite differences in named 7 parties and time periods at issue). The Court thus applies the Colorado River doctrine to 8 determine whether staying any of Plaintiffs’ claims is appropriate. 9 The Court first examines the Colorado River factors that most strongly weigh in favor or 10 against a stay, beginning with the third factor. “Piecemeal litigation occurs when different 11 tribunals consider the same issue, thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different 12 results.” Am. Int’l Underwriters (Philippines), Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258 13 (9th Cir. 1988). But “[t]he mere possibility of piecemeal litigation does not constitute an 14 exceptional circumstance.” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 979. Rather, “the case must raise a ‘special 15 concern about piecemeal litigation,’ which can be remedied by staying or dismissing the federal 16 proceeding.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 17 Plaintiffs argue that this factor weighs against a stay because Pappoe makes only “brief 18 reference” to the exclusion of supplemental remuneration in employees’ regular rates of pay, and 19 accordingly it is “not clear how much of a focus those claims will be in that case.” ECF 32 at 18, 20 21. At the hearing, Plaintiffs again emphasized that the issue of supplemental remuneration is 21 squarely in dispute in this case, whereas it is just one of several issues raised in Pappoe. However, 22 while Pappoe includes claims not raised by Plaintiffs here, and the supplemental remuneration 23 issue is not the singular issue in that case, it does not necessarily follow that the issue is unlikely to 24 be addressed by the state court. As the state law claims are identical in the two actions, the Court 25 finds the third factor weighs in favor of a stay of those claims given the “inherent risk of 26 inconsistent results if both courts proceed with these claims at the same time.” Goodin, 356 F. 27 Supp. at 946. Should the resolution of the state court leave any of Plaintiffs’ state law claims 1 Coast Dist. Hosp., 886 F.2d 241, 243 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 2 Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)) (explaining that a stay “ensures that the federal forum 3 will remain open if ‘for some unexpected reason the state forum does turn out to be inadequate’ ”). 4 Nonetheless, the Court finds the third factor weighs against staying Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim. 5 The factual bases for Plaintiffs’ state law claims and FLSA claim are similar, if not identical, such 6 that certain litigation and discovery efforts may be duplicated in the determination of the state law 7 claims and the California collective members’ FLSA claims. But those efforts will need to be 8 undertaken for the collective members outside of California. Therefore, Defendants have “not 9 identified extraordinary circumstances with regards to the separate litigation of the FLSA and state 10 law claims that would justify a stay” of the FLSA claim. Hernandez v. Sephora USA, Inc., 2017 11 WL 956653, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017). While some courts have found that this factor 12 favors a stay where plaintiffs elected not to raise a FLSA claim in a state court action, see Gintz v. 13 Jack in the Box, Inc., 2006 WL 3422222, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2006) (finding that “[b]y 14 failing to bring all of her claims in her State court litigation” plaintiff’s actions “create[d] the kind 15 of piecemeal litigation that the Colorado River doctrine was developed to prevent,” which 16 weighed in favor of a stay); see also Ross v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 17 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (same), Plaintiffs here are not named parties to Pappoe and consequently should 18 not be disadvantaged by Pappoe’s decision not to raise a FLSA claim there. 19 Next, under the fourth factor, the Court considers the order in which each court obtained 20 jurisdiction. “In determining the order in which the state and federal courts obtained jurisdiction, 21 district courts are instructed not simply to compare filing dates, but to analyze the progress made 22 in each case ‘in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand.’ ” 23 Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 862 F.3d at 843 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1). As this 24 action was filed three months after Pappoe, and because Pappoe has conducted some discovery, 25 the Court finds this factor favors a stay. See Goodin, 356 F. Supp. at 946 (finding the fourth 26 Colorado River factor weighed in favor of a stay where the state action was filed about five 27 months before the federal action and some discovery had occurred in the state action). However, 1 significantly so. Indeed, Pappoe just recently amended his complaint and added a second plaintiff, 2 and ultimately, both actions are still in relatively early stages of litigation. 3 As to the fifth factor, the presence of federal law issues “must always be a major 4 consideration weighing against surrender” of jurisdiction, while the presence of state law issues 5 “may weigh in favor of that surrender only ‘in some rare circumstances’ ” involving “routine 6 issues of state law.” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 981 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 7 F.2d 1364, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990)). However, “the source-of-law factor has less significance” 8 where “the federal courts’ jurisdiction . . . is concurrent with that of the state courts.” Moses H. 9 Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26. While employees may bring FLSA claims in “any Federal 10 or State court of competent jurisdiction,” 29 U.S.C. § 216, Pappoe does not include a FLSA claim, 11 and as Plaintiffs are not named parties in Pappoe, they do not have the ability to raise that claim 12 there. Thus, this factor weighs against a stay of the FLSA claim. See Hernandez, 2017 WL 13 956653, at *5 (“[G]iven the federal nature of this action and the fact that the California FLSA 14 claim has not been brought in any of the state court proceedings, this factor still weighs against a 15 stay.”). 16 Next, the Court considers the sixth factor: whether the state court proceedings can 17 adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants. A stay of the FLSA claim would altogether 18 “ignore[] the interests of the [collective] members [in] the remaining 49 states” other than 19 California. See id. (“This factor weighs strongly against a stay.”). Defendants have expressed 20 they are amenable to stipulating to tolling the FLSA claim. ECF 34 at 17. However, even if the 21 FLSA collective members could return to this Court to lift the stay of the FLSA claim following 22 conclusion of proceedings in Pappoe, this would only be possible after a potentially years-long 23 delay. This delay raises concerns regarding evidence preservation for the federal litigants not 24 implicated by Pappoe’s state law claims. The Court finds this factor weighs against a stay of the 25 FLSA claim. 26 The eighth factor is whether the state court proceeding will resolve all issues in the federal 27 action. This factor weighs in favor of staying the state claims. Pappoe is “an adequate vehicle for 1 Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277 (1988) (internal quotations omitted). However, because the 2 Pappoe plaintiffs do not raise a FLSA claim, that case will therefore not resolve Plaintiffs’ FLSA 3 claim or that of the putative collective members. This factor thus weighs in favor of allowing the 4 FLSA claim to proceed here. 5 The remaining Colorado River factors are neutral or inapplicable. The Court finds the 6 second factor – convenience of the federal forum – is neutral here. Pappoe was filed in Los 7 Angeles County, where Plaintiffs worked and where Defendant Kite is primarily located. 8 However, Defendant Gilead is headquartered within this District, in Foster City. FAC ¶ 15. 9 Defendants do not elaborate on the burden they face by having to litigate here, other than noting 10 that the two courts are approximately 400 miles apart. ECF 27 at 22. The seventh factor – the 11 desire to avoid forum shopping – is also neutral here. Defendants do not accuse Plaintiffs of 12 forum shopping, and the Court has no reason to believe forum shopping has occurred. Plaintiffs 13 argue the absence of evidence of forum shopping weighs in their favor, noting that many cases in 14 which courts considered the forum shopping factor involved the same plaintiffs bringing both the 15 state court action and the subsequent federal court action. ECF 32 at 22. However, the Ninth 16 Circuit has determined it was “unclear whether this factor weighed against a Colorado River stay” 17 where there was a “lack of factual findings by the district court and uncertainty as to whether [the] 18 alleged misconduct amount[ed] to improper forum shopping.” Travelers, 914 F.2d at 1371; see 19 also Goodin v. Vendley, 356 F. Supp. 3d 935, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (determining that where 20 plaintiffs appeared to have “acted within [their] rights in filing a suit in the forum of [their] 21 choice,” forum shopping factor was neutral). Finally, the first factor concerns property disputes, 22 and as no such dispute exists here in this wage and hour action, this factor is irrelevant. R.R. St., 23 656 F.3d at 978. 24 Balancing these factors, the Court concludes that the Colorado River doctrine favors 25 staying the state law claims, as the factors related to the duplication of efforts and risk of 26 conflicting decisions weigh heavily in favor of allowing the state court to resolve the identical 27 state claims at issue here. However, recognizing the balance of the Colorado River factors is 1 stay the FLSA claim. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22. There is less risk of 2 wasting resources and creating conflicting precedent where the state law claims and FLSA claims 3 are allowed to proceed simultaneously. However, there is a greater risk of harm to the federal 4 litigants, who would be forced to wait to bring their FLSA claim, and particularly to the non- 5 California collective members, who are not implicated at all by Pappoe. Accordingly, the Court 6 STAYS Plaintiffs’ state law claims but does not stay Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim.4 7 B. Motion to Dismiss 8 Because the Court finds it is proper to stay Plaintiffs’ state law claims, it only considers 9 whether Plaintiffs’ surviving FLSA claim withstands Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 11 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A defendant may move to 12 dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal 13 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 14 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 15 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 16 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 17 its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 18 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 19 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 20 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as 21 true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek, 22 519 F.3d at 1031. Nonetheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely 23 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. 24 Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 25 4 Defendants argue that if the Court declines to stay Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Colorado 26 River doctrine, it should nevertheless issue a stay based on its inherent power to manage its docket. ECF 27 at 24. However, because simultaneous federal and state actions are involved, the 27 Court may only stay or dismiss a federal case in favor of related state proceedings where the 1 Defendants’ primary argument for dismissal is that Plaintiffs’ claims fail under Landers v. 2 Quality Communications, Inc. because Plaintiffs have not alleged a specific workweek in which 3 they worked overtime and were not afforded all overtime pay to which they were entitled. 771 4 F.3d 638, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2014). In Landers, the court found the plaintiff failed to state a claim 5 as he only made “generalized allegations” that his employer underpaid overtime wages but did not 6 provide details about actually having been denied those overtime wages himself. Id. at 646. The 7 court explained the plaintiff must “be able to allege facts demonstrating there was at least one 8 workweek in which [he] worked in excess of forty hours and w[as] not paid overtime wages.” Id. 9 645-46. 10 However, Landers does not create a special pleading standard for wage and hour cases – 11 such cases “are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard as all other claims not sounding in 12 fraud or mistake.” Cook v. Matrix Absence Mgmt., Inc., 2024 WL 3077160, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13 20, 2024) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). Rather, the Landers court 14 applied the Rule 8 pleading standard to the wage and hour context and concluded that Landers had 15 not alleged sufficient facts to state a FLSA claim because it was not clear from his pleadings 16 whether he ever worked more than forty hours in a single workweek. Landers, 771 F.3d at 646. 17 Here, Plaintiffs allege that “in the course of [Plaintiffs’] employment, [they] worked more 18 than 40 hours a week,” FAC ¶¶ 7, 11, and that Plaintiffs and the putative class members “regularly 19 work in excess of 40 hours in each workweek,” FAC ¶ 54. Plaintiffs allege they were non-exempt 20 from overtime; that they worked overtime; and that Defendants did not properly include 21 supplemental remuneration into the calculations of their rates of pay. FAC ¶¶ 7, 11, 38, 54. 22 Therefore, every time Plaintiffs worked overtime, they were underpaid. See Tan v. GrubHub, 171 23 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“[T]he allegation is that because GrubHub did not treat 24 Plaintiffs as employees, they never reimbursed the identified expenses. As Plaintiffs have 25 identified the expenses that Defendants failed to reimburse, the claim can proceed.”). Contrary to 26 Defendants’ assertions, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants merely had a practice of 27 underpaying overtime without alleging that they themselves worked overtime. See Cook, 2024 1 asserted “that she was not given required meal and rest breaks and explains why she did not 2 || receive these breaks”). 3 To be sure, Plaintiffs’ allegations about their own overtime work are not especially 4 || detailed. But they need not be. Plaintiffs aver that they worked overtime, and — taking as true 5 || their allegations that Defendants failed to accurately calculate employees’ regular rates of pay — 6 || that means when they worked overtime they were not paid the full overtime wages they were 7 || owed. “Whether this actually happened is a factual question [Plaintiffs] must prove at a later 8 stage. But at the pleading stage [their] allegations suffice.” See Cook, 2024 WL 3077160, at *3. 9 || The Court disagrees with Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ allegations make it “impossible to 10 || assess whether Plaintiffs have even potentially suffered a harm that the Court could redress.” ECF 11 34 at 9. Here, relying on “judicial experience and common sense,” the Court finds the factual 12 || allegations, assumed to be true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” See Iqbal, 556 5 13 || U.S. at 664. CONCLUSION 3 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART a 16 || Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or stay. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to stay 3 17 || Plaintiffs’ state law claims pending further proceedings in Herman Pappoe v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 18 || etal., No 24STCV02259 (L.A. Super. Ct.). The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to stay 19 || Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FLSA 20 || claim. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law 21 claims. Should the stay of Plaintiffs’ state law claims be lifted, Defendants may revive their 22 || motion to dismiss those claims. The parties SHALL meet and confer on a schedule for 23 || proceeding with Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim and SUBMIT a joint proposed case schedule within 21 of 24 || this order. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: January 21, 2025

ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 28 United States District Judge