MX. JOSEPH “JOYBEAR” LEE PH.D. v. DANIEL WERNER; JULIANNA MCCORKLE; CITY OF MALDEN; MALDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER GEORGE MACKAY #252; KEVIN J. RUSSELL #338; SGT. T. HEADLY #239; OFC. CHALMERS #354

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJanuary 27, 2026
Docket1:26-cv-10477
StatusUnknown

This text of MX. JOSEPH “JOYBEAR” LEE PH.D. v. DANIEL WERNER; JULIANNA MCCORKLE; CITY OF MALDEN; MALDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER GEORGE MACKAY #252; KEVIN J. RUSSELL #338; SGT. T. HEADLY #239; OFC. CHALMERS #354 (MX. JOSEPH “JOYBEAR” LEE PH.D. v. DANIEL WERNER; JULIANNA MCCORKLE; CITY OF MALDEN; MALDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER GEORGE MACKAY #252; KEVIN J. RUSSELL #338; SGT. T. HEADLY #239; OFC. CHALMERS #354) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MX. JOSEPH “JOYBEAR” LEE PH.D. v. DANIEL WERNER; JULIANNA MCCORKLE; CITY OF MALDEN; MALDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER GEORGE MACKAY #252; KEVIN J. RUSSELL #338; SGT. T. HEADLY #239; OFC. CHALMERS #354, (D. Mass. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MX. JOSEPH “JOYBEAR” LEE PH.D., Plaintiff, -against- DANIEL WERNER; JULIANNA 26-CV-0230 (LTS) MCCORKLE; CITY OF MALDEN; MALDEN ORDER POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER GEORGE MACKAY #252; KEVIN J. RUSSELL #338; SGT. T. HEADLY #239; OFC. CHALMERS #354, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff filed this action pro se. On January 16, 2026, the Court transferred this action to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (ECF No. 12.) On January 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a letter styled as an “Objection” challenging the January 16, 2026 transfer order. (ECF No. 13.) Also on January 20, 2026, Petitioner filed two other letters, one of which he addressed to the Clerk of Court in which he appears to express an intent to bring additional claims against Defendants in this action (ECF No. 14), and the second of which appears to be nearly identical to other letters that he has filed in this action in which he makes arguments that this Court is a superior venue. (ECF No. 15; cf. ECF Nos. 6, 11.) The Court liberally construes these submissions as a motion for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 and as a motion for relief from a judgment or order under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60(b)”). See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (The solicitude afforded to pro se litigants takes a variety of forms, including liberal construction of papers, “relaxation of the limitations on the amendment of pleadings,” leniency in the enforcement of other procedural rules, and “deliberate, continuing efforts to ensure that a pro se litigant understands what is required of him” (citations omitted)). After reviewing the arguments in Plaintiff’s submission, the Court denies the motion.1 DISCUSSION A. Motion for Reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 A party who moves for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 must show that the

Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’” (internal quotation and citations omitted)).

In his motion, Plaintiff asserts that he “submitted updated information of inter-state conspiracy charges that include the New York State Police.” (ECF No. 13, at 1.) He adds: “The cover letter and supplemental memorandum contain my account of police brutality from the New

1 The transfer of an action generally divests the transferor court of jurisdiction over the action. Drabik v. Murphy, 246 F.2d 408, 409 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that district court did not have jurisdiction to rule on motion following physical transfer of case). The transferor court retains jurisdiction over the action only if the party seeking review acts to seek review of the transfer “prior to receipt of the action’s papers by the clerk of the transferee court.” Warrick v. Gen. Electric Co., 70 F.3d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1995). In this action, Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the transfer order before the transferee court received the action’s papers and files. This Court therefore has jurisdiction to address Plaintiff’s motion on the merits. York State Police as well as pedophilia from my New York birth family.” (Id.) He asks that the Court “reassess with this new information.” (Id.) He also appears to allege seditious conspiracy and sex trafficking claims, although he does not provide any factual allegations. (ECF No. 14, at 1-2.)

Plaintiff has failed to show that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the transferred action. As an initial matter, the Court was aware of the “updated information” at the time that it issued its January 16, 2026 transfer order and, therefore, did not overlook it. On the merits, Plaintiff’s prior submissions (ECF Nos. 5-6, 8-11) neither showed an intent to name the New York State Police or any of its employees as a defendant in this action nor suggested that any of the operative events happened in the State of New York. The complaint asserts that police officers in Massachusetts used excessive force against Plaintiff in Massachusetts, and that Massachusetts-based attorneys committed malpractice while they were in Massachusetts, in violation of Massachusetts law. Nothing in Plaintiff’s submissions suggests

otherwise. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration under Local Rule Civil 6.3. B. Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b) Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district court’s order or judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Court has considered Plaintiff’s arguments, and even under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the grounds listed in the first five clauses of Rule 60(b) apply. Therefore, any relief sought under any of these clauses is denied. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5).” United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of HHS, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985)). A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show both that the

motion was filed within a “reasonable time” and that “‘extraordinary circumstances’ [exist] to warrant relief.” Old Republic Ins. Co. v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien
588 F.3d 158 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Ackermann v. United States
340 U.S. 193 (Supreme Court, 1950)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Tracy v. Freshwater
623 F.3d 90 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Simplexgrinnell Lp v. Integrated Systems & Power, Inc.
642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D. New York, 2009)
R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So
640 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp.
90 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D. New York, 2000)
Warrick v. General Electric Co.
70 F.3d 736 (Second Circuit, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
MX. JOSEPH “JOYBEAR” LEE PH.D. v. DANIEL WERNER; JULIANNA MCCORKLE; CITY OF MALDEN; MALDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER GEORGE MACKAY #252; KEVIN J. RUSSELL #338; SGT. T. HEADLY #239; OFC. CHALMERS #354, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mx-joseph-joybear-lee-phd-v-daniel-werner-julianna-mccorkle-city-of-mad-2026.