IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MVMHP, INC. d/b/a MOUNTAIN VIEW MOBILE HOME PARK, No. 88148-5-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
T.C., and JOHN/JANE DOE UNPUBLISHED OPINION OCCUPANT(S),
Defendants,
WILLIAM CLIFFORD COMSTOCK a/k/a BILLY COMSTOCK,
Appellant.
CHUNG, J. — Mountain View Mobile Home Park (MVMHP) filed an unlawful detainer action to evict William Comstock, alleging he engaged in criminal activity. The trial court granted the unlawful detainer, granted a writ of restitution, and denied Comstock’s motion for reconsideration. Comstock appeals, arguing that the commissioner improperly considered hearsay evidence, substantial evidence did not support the court’s findings, and the court should have set the matter for trial because there were material factual issues. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
William Comstock and his wife T.C. had lived at MVMHP since approximately 2010 when in August 2024, MVMHP filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, asserting that William and T.C. had failed to pay rent and other charges. MVMHP alleged they
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were in violation of the written rental agreement and the Community Rules and Regulations and then failed to comply with the 20-day notice served on them in June 2024. As a separate basis for the eviction, MVMHP also claimed that William “engaged in criminal activity which threatened the health, safety, and/or welfare of the other residents at [MVMHP].”
At the show cause hearing, MVMHP voluntarily dismissed most of its allegations and proceeded solely against William on the cause of action based on his alleged criminal activity. T.C. was present at the hearing, but William was not.
The commissioner presiding over the hearing did not take testimony or examine any witnesses and instead relied solely on the evidence submitted to the court before the hearing, including from the owner and manager of MVMHP, Kathy Stacey. Stacey’s declaration included as an exhibit a “Declaration for Determination of Probable Cause” (P.C. declaration) that attached a police report signed by a deputy prosecuting attorney for Pierce County. The P.C. declaration alleged that William committed felony harassment – domestic violence (DV) and assault in the fourth degree – DV. In addition, the P.C. declaration quoted a “DV supplemental report” written by T.C.
Based on its consideration of the record before it, the commissioner made findings of fact, including that “Comstock has engaged in criminal activity . . . which threatened the health, safety, and/or welfare of the other residents. Defendant William Comstock’s tenancy should be terminated and defendant is in unlawful detainer . . . pursuant to RCW 59.20.080(1)(f).” The commissioner concluded that judgment should be entered in favor of MVMHP and against William Comstock and a writ of restitution
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should be issued. 1 The commissioner also awarded attorney fees to MVMHP as the prevailing party and denied T.C.’s request for attorney fees.
William and T.C. filed a motion to revise the commissioner’s order, arguing that T.C. was entitled to attorney fees because she was a prevailing party as to MVMHP’s claims against her and that there were “procedural irregularities and disputed issues of material fact regarding whether William Comstock engaged in ‘criminal activity.’ ” Thus, William and T.C. contended the case against William should be set for trial.
The superior court revised the commissioner’s order to grant attorney fees to T.C. but denied William’s request for trial. It reasoned that “Mr. Comstock did not refute the allegations made against him and the order was proper.” Furthermore, “[t]he argument that hearsay [within the P.C. declaration and police report] was improperly considered was waived, as it was not raised at the hearing.”
Both William and MVMHP filed motions for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. William filed a timely notice of appeal of the commissioner’s order, the writs of restitution issued against him, the superior court’s denial of William and T.C.’s motion to revise, and the March 17, 2025 order denying the motions for reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
William argues that the superior court committed “several prejudicial procedural errors,” including considering hearsay within the P.C. declaration and attached police report. He also argues that there was not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he engaged in criminal activity and that material factual issues necessitated
1 The court issued the writ two times: on December 5, 2024, based on an order for revision, and on December 30, 2024, due to a scrivener’s error, all only against William.
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trial. Additionally, he contends RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) is unconstitutional as applied to allegations of DV-related criminal activity.
On a motion for revision, the superior court reviews the commissioner’s ruling de novo based on the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner. RCW 2.24.050; In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). “[T]he findings and orders of a court commissioner not successfully revised become the orders and findings of the superior court.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). On appeal, “we review the superior court’s decision, not the commissioner’s order.” In the Matter of Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 936, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014).
I. Show Cause Hearing An unlawful detainer action is “a statutorily created proceeding that provides an expedited method of resolving the right to possession of property.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 370-71, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). If a landlord succeeds in an unlawful detainer action, they may obtain a writ of restitution, which restores their right of possession. See RCW 59.18.370; see also RCW 59.20.040 ( RCW “59.18.370, and 59.18.380 through 59.18.410 shall be applicable to any action of . . . unlawful detainer arising from a tenancy under the provisions of this chapter.”). “Chapters 59.12 and 59.18 RCW are statutes in derogation of the common law and thus are strictly construed in favor of the tenant.” Randy Reynolds & Assocs., Inc. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d 143, 156, 437 P.3d 677 (2019).
Rentals of mobile home lots are governed by the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW. Under the MHLTA, a landlord has
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cause to terminate the tenancy of a tenant on a variety of grounds, including if a tenant “engag[es] in criminal activity.” RCW 59.20.080(1)(f). “If a landlord seeks to be restored to possession of the property during an eviction proceeding, a show cause hearing on the issuance of a writ of restitution is required.” Hartson P’ship v. Goodwin, 99 Wn. App. 227, 230, 991 P.2d 1211 (2000) (citing RCW 59.18.370). “At the show cause hearing, the court will determine if the landlord is entitled to a writ of restitution before a trial on the complaint and answer.” Randy Reynolds & Assocs., 193 Wn.2d at 157 (citing RCW 59.18.380).
The landlord carries the burden of proving their right to possession of property by a preponderance of the evidence. FPA Crescent Assocs., LLC v. Jamie’s LLC, 190 Wn. App. 666, 675, 360 P.3d 934 (2015); see also Duprey v. Donahoe, 52 Wn.2d 129, 135, 323 P.2d 903 (1958). “[T]he rules of evidence still apply,” and “inadmissible evidence may not be considered.” Hous. Auth. of City of Pasco & Franklin County v. Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. 382, 392, 109 P.3d 422 (2005). RCW 59.18.380 specifies that the “court shall examine the parties and witnesses orally to ascertain the merits” of the case. “ ‘[I]f it shall appear that the [landlord] has the right to be restored to possession of the property, the court shall enter an order directing the issuance of a writ of restitution.’ ” Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. at 391 (alteration in original) (quoting RCW 59.18.380). “Whether or not the court issues a writ of restitution at the show cause hearing, if material factual issues exist, the court is required to enter an order directing the parties to proceed to trial on the complaint and answer.” Randy Reynolds & Assocs., 193 Wn.2d at 157.
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A. Court’s Reliance on Hearsay As an initial matter, William contends that there was “no admissible evidence that [he] engaged in ‘criminal activity.’ ” Specifically, he argues that the court should not have considered the entirety of the Stacey declaration and its attachments because it contained “inadmissible hearsay.” MVMHP counters that the trial court commissioner properly considered the P.C. declaration and police report because “Mr. Comstock did not properly move the trial court to strike any declarations or statements.” We first address whether William preserved his objections to the P.C. declaration and associated police report as hearsay, as a majority of the information related to his alleged criminal activity came from the Stacey declaration and its attachments.
William argues that he preserved his objections to the Stacey declaration based on hearsay by raising them in the brief he and T.C. filed before the show cause hearing. The portion of the brief disputing that William had engaged in criminal activity included the following paragraph:
Furthermore, the only evidence submitted by the park concerning [ ]
[William’s] alleged criminal activity consists of hearsay reports from the county prosecutor and the sheriff, who quote others concerning the alleged criminal activity. Such hearsay is inadmissible and should not be considered. This issue should be resolved at trial.
At the show cause hearing, the parties focused primarily on whether MVMHP had proved William engaged in criminal activity. The following exchange took place:
THE COMMISSIONER: . . . As I see under .080(f), that can result in an immediate eviction, and it does not require conviction.
[William and T.C.’s Counsel]: That’s correct, but that doesn’t apply against [T.C.] She’s not -- she has not been accused of any criminal activity whatsoever. Her husband is the one that’s accused of criminal conduct. And so, his criminal violations cannot lead to [T.C.’s] eviction.
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THE COMMISSIONER: So, you don’t deny that he was charged at least with the felony DV?
[William and T.C.’s Counsel]: He was charged with that, but just -- all they submitted was the prosecutor’s affidavit of probable cause. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t some defenses to that. For example --
THE COMMISSIONER: I don’t think it requires it . . . It doesn’t require a conviction.
[William and T.C.’s Counsel]: That’s true. The statute does not specifically require a conviction, but it also doesn’t say that a charge is sufficient either.
Significantly, William and T.C. did not directly object to the commissioner considering the Stacey declaration or the attached P.C. declaration and police report during the remainder of the show cause hearing. 2 MVMHP counsel also made several references to information from the police report such as William’s admitting “to smoking methamphetamine” and that T.C. “told police . . . that he’s using drugs,” and that T.C. “was held for a period of about thirty-six hours against her will,” and William and T.C. did not object to these statements either. Indeed, other than these brief references by MVMHP to some of the allegations in the P.C. declaration, neither the parties nor the commissioner discussed the substance of the P.C. declaration.
“The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.” RAP 2.5(a). “Under ER 103(a)(1), when an error is raised based on admitting evidence, the adverse party must make ‘a timely objection or motion to
2 Nor did William raise any other objection or seek relief based on defenses to the criminal
charges. For example, when there are parallel proceedings between criminal and civil matters, a party may seek to stay proceedings or discovery “where the interest of justice so requires.” King v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 104 Wn. App. 338, 350, 16 P.3d 45. In considering a stay request, a court begins by considering “the extent to which a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are implicated,” as well as a variety of other factors such as the “ ‘status of the criminal case’ ” and “ ‘the interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously.’ ” Id. at 352-53 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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strike . . . [and] stat[e] the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.’ ” City of Seattle v. Levesque, 12 Wn. App. 2d 687, 695, 460 P.3d 205 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting ER 103(a)(1)). This rule applies “even when the trial court has already excluded [inadmissible evidence] through a pretrial order.” State v. Ra, 144 Wn. App. 688, 700, 175 P.3d 609 (2008) (citing State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252, 272, 149 P.3d 646 (2006)); City of Bellevue v. Kravik, 69 Wn. App. 735, 742, 850 P.2d 559 (1993) (“A party is obligated to renew an objection to evidence that is the subject of a motion in limine in order to preserve the error for review.”). These requirements “ ‘encourage[] parties to make timely objections[ and] give[] the trial judge an opportunity to address an issue before it becomes an error on appeal.’ ” Wilcox v. Basehore, 187 Wn.2d 772, 788, 389 P.3d 531 (2017) (quoting State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 583, 355 P.3d 253 (2015)).
Here, William did not preserve the hearsay issue for appeal. William asserted in pre-hearing briefing that “hearsay reports from the county prosecutor and the sheriff, who quote others concerning the alleged criminal activity” is inadmissible, at the show cause hearing. Moreover, at no point during the extensive discussion of the application of the statute controlling alleged criminal activity did William directly state he objected to the court’s consideration of the P.C. declaration and associated police report because they contained hearsay. Had he objected to admission of hearsay, T.C., who was present in court, could have attested to her statements in the P.C. declaration. Significantly, he never requested a ruling from the commissioner on this issue, whether by a request at the hearing, an objection, or a motion to strike. 3 “It is our duty to review
3 MVMHP relies on Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., seemingly to argue a motion to strike was necessary to preserve the error. 91 Wn.2d 345, 352, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979). In Lamon, the defendant
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evidentiary rulings made by the trial court; we do not ourselves make evidentiary rulings.” Jacob’s Meadow Owners Ass’n v. Plateau 44 II, LLC, 139 Wn. App. 743, 756, 162 P.3d 1153 (2007). Without a ruling to review, this court cannot address the hearsay argument he raises on appeal.
As William did not preserve the hearsay objection, “[h]earsay evidence admitted without objection may be considered by the trier of fact for its probative value.” State ex rel. Partlow v. Law, 39 Wn. App. 173, 177, 692 P.2d 863 (1984). Therefore, the commissioner considered the P.C. declaration and associated police report when it made its ruling. In reviewing the commissioner’s ruling, we do not address the hearsay objection; we consider the entirety of the record the parties submitted and that the trial court considered.
B. Landlord’s Burden at Show Cause Hearing Next, William argues that because there was no admissible evidence that he engaged in criminal activity, the commissioner erred in finding that MVMHP had met its burden to establish its cause of action. He also contends that material issues of disputed fact exist such that the commissioner should have set the matter for trial.
For a trial court’s factual determinations at a show cause hearing, “[a] trial court’s findings of fact will not be overturned on appeal if [they are] supported by substantial
contested an affidavit produced by the plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment due to it not being competent evidence. Id. The Supreme Court determined the issue waived, as the record did not “reveal any motion to strike the affidavit or any portion thereof prior to the trial court’s action.” Id.
Given the context of a show cause hearing, however, a motion to strike was not the only means to preserve the error. Under RCW 59.18.380, the defendant “may answer, orally or in writing, and assert any legal or equitable defense . . . arising out of the tenancy” the day of the show cause hearing. See also RCW 59.18.400 (“On or before the day fixed for his appearance the defendant may appear and answer.”); Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn. App. 69, 80-81, 207 P.3d 468 (2009) (“[G]iven the . . . resulting difficulty that most persons at risk of eviction face in retaining attorneys, the legislature has relieved such litigants of the burdens of formality associated with Civil Rule 8 pleading.”).
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evidence.” Leda v. Whisnand, 150 Wn. App. 69, 85 n.6, 207 P.3d 468 (2009). “ ‘Substantial evidence exists when there is a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that a finding is true.’ ” Pham v. Corbett, 187 Wn. App. 816, 825, 351 P.3d 214 (2015) (quoting Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., Inc., 132 Wn. App. 546, 555-56, 132 P.3d 789 (2006), aff’d, 162 Wn.2d 340, 172 P.3d 688 (2007)).
Under RCW 59.20.080(1)(f), a landlord can terminate the tenancy of a tenant if they are engaging in “criminal activity.” The statute further defines this term:
“Criminal activity” means a criminal act defined by statute or ordinance that threatens the health, safety, or welfare of the tenants. A park owner seeking to evict a tenant or occupant under this subsection need not produce evidence of a criminal conviction, even if the alleged misconduct constitutes a criminal offense. Notice from a law enforcement agency of criminal activity constitutes sufficient grounds, but not the only grounds, for an eviction under this subsection.
Id. A tenant can place at issue the question of “engaging in criminal activity” by directly disputing the accusation or challenging whether the alleged activity qualifies as material noncompliance with lease terms. See, e.g., Goodwin, 99 Wn. App. at 237 (tenant created issue of material fact concerning “who was ‘[e]ngaging in “criminal activity” ’ ” by claiming cannabis seized by police was not his and he knew nothing about it before it was seized).
For example, in Pleasant, the tenant appealed the issuance of a writ of restitution based on, among other things, engaging in prohibited criminal activity “as evidenced by her arrest” and the charge of “third degree assault of a child when she struck her 13- year-old son several times with a plastic clothes hanger because he failed to obey her.” 126 Wn. App. at 386. The charge was then reduced to “fourth degree assault, a misdemeanor.” Id. At the show cause hearing, the tenant “countered that the
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misdemeanor to which she pleaded guilty while acting pro se was not a crime for which eviction was appropriate as it did not endanger other tenants.” Id. She further argued that “she had never had her children taken away because of abuse.” Id. The court took no testimony on the matter and issued the writ of restitution. Id. at 387. Division Three of this court held that the trial court improperly issued the writ and because the pleadings disclosed a material issue of fact, the question had to be resolved at trial. Id. at 392-93. Specifically, the court highlighted that the tenant had challenged the landlord’s allegations that she was in material noncompliance with her lease terms, and that because the landlord failed to submit the lease, it could not meet its burden. Id. at 392. Additionally, because the tenant lived in public housing administered by the housing authority of the city of Pasco and Franklin County, her lease and its termination were subject to federal law, under which tenancies could “be terminated only for ‘serious or repeated violation of the terms or conditions of the lease or for other good cause’ and . . . termination for ‘criminal activity’ [must] threaten the ‘health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants.’ ” Id. at 393 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5), (6)). Thus, “the issue of whether these requirements are met under the statute was an inappropriate issue to summarily resolve,” and the tenant was “entitled to a trial on this issue.” Id..
In this case, the evidence at the show cause hearing included the P.C.
declaration, which asserted William committed the crimes of felony harassment-DV and assault in the fourth degree-DV. The State charged William with felony harassment in violation of RCW 9A.46.020 and assault in the fourth degree in violation of RCW 9A.36.041. “A person is guilty of harassment if . . . [w]ithout lawful authority, the person
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knowingly threatens . . . [t]o cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened.” RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i). 4 “A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree if, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first, second, or third degree . . . he or she assaults another.” RCW 9A.36.041(1). “Assault” typically means “ ‘an attempt, with unlawful force, to inflict bodily injury upon another, accompanied with the apparent present ability to give effect to the attempt if not prevented.’ ” State v. Krup, 36 Wn. App. 454, 457, 676 P.2d 507 (1984) (quoting State v. Stewart, 73 Wn.2d 701, 703, 440 P.2d 815 (1968)).
The evidence at the show cause hearing also included the P.C. declaration, which quoted a “DV supplemental report” that “the victim wrote,” as follows:
He orders me to sit on the floor because I do not deserve to sit on his furniture. He kicks me. He makes me face the wall. He will not let me drink water or use the toilet. He throws things all over the house. He held knives to my throat and said he would kill me. He also cried and said he would kill himself. He said I would not leave him alive. I feared for my life.
The P.C. declaration also attached the police report from the incident. In the report, the officer recounted being dispatched to a residence due to alleged physical abuse. As the officer arrived, they contacted T.C., who “was crying and was very distressed.” The officer also observed a “red and purple-colored bump right on the top of [T.C.’s] left
4 RCW 9A.46.020(2)(a) defines harassment as a gross misdemeanor. However, the crime may be elevated to a class C felony in certain circumstances, including if
(i) [t]he person has previously been convicted in this or any other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim or members of the victim's family or household or any person specifically named in a no-contact or no-harassment order; (ii) the person harasses another person under subsection (1)(a)(i) of this section by threatening to kill the person threatened or any other person.
RCW 9A.46.020(2)(b).
Here, other than the designation “felony harassment – DV,” the record is not clear which elevating circumstance the State was charging. But we need not resolve this issue as RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) requires only “criminal activity.”
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eye.” T.C. allegedly stated the incident began when William “relapsed on meth and alcohol” the night before.
The police report also included T.C.’s recounting of being attacked, including being tackled to the floor, being kicked all over her body, being stomped on, and receiving several punches and slaps to the head. T.C. allegedly said this happened approximately six separate times in an eight-hour period with similar treatment happening each time. According to the police report, she stated that at one point William grabbed a knife, held “the blade of a knife to her throat[,] and stated: ‘I could slit your throat and kill you any time Bitch!’ ” T.C. also relayed to the investigating officer that “she never experienced anything like that in their 19-year-long relationship.” The police report also detailed the officers taking William into custody. He apparently admitted to smoking methamphetamine and drinking alcohol “but could not recall any incident where he was assaulting” T.C.
Other than the P.C. declaration, the record before the commissioner at the show cause hearing did not include evidence of William’s alleged criminal activity. Rather, in the Stacey declaration, MVMHP’s owner and property manager recounted only that William was arrested on “felony charges of domestic violence, Assault 4/Domestic Violence and Felony Harassment / Domestic Violence with death threats,” but she did not recite any underlying details of the event. Similarly, T.C. submitted a declaration that stated,
While the park alleges that there have been many instances of “disturbing conduct,” again it provides no examples, except the vague references to “arrest reports” and public court records which I have not seen. My husband’s arrest or alleged “criminal activity” has not affected the health, safety, or welfare of the other residents of the park.
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We conclude that substantial evidence presented at the show cause hearing supported the court’s finding that William engaged in criminal activity in violation of RCW 59.20.080(1)(f), which defines criminal activity as a criminal act defined by statute or ordinance. It is undisputed that the State charged William with felony harassment and assault in the fourth degree.
William’s alleged actions as detailed in the police report, including statements from T.C., provide a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that William engaged in criminal activity. The actions of allegedly threatening T.C. with a knife or hitting, stomping, and kicking her, if true, satisfy the requirement that William committed harassment or assault in the fourth degree. MVMHP could meet this burden even without proving a conviction resulting from the arrest. 5 RCW 59.20.080(1)(f). Indeed, William’s counsel agreed at the show cause hearing that he had been “charged at least with [] felony DV” and at the motion for revision hearing, William had been arrested in relation to DV. Accordingly, the court did not err when it found that William engaged in criminal activity under RCW 59.20.080(1)(f).
Additionally, William argues that it is a “factual issue whether, even if someone committed domestic violence against his wife, the same person would commit violence
5 The parties dedicated a portion of their arguments at the show cause hearing and on appeal
that the Declaration did not qualify as a “notice” under RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) (“Notice from a law enforcement agency of criminal activity constitutes sufficient grounds.”). However, the statute requires only that the landlord prove that a tenant or occupant engaged in criminal activity, not that they received a particular type of notice from law enforcement. Id. Furthermore, Goodwin established that mere service of a “notice” is insufficient to permit a landlord to terminate a tenancy. 99 Wn. App. at 236 (“If we adopted this reading, the predicate requirement of ‘[e]ngaging in “criminal activity” ’ would be read out of the statute because the mere service of notice would permit the landlord to terminate the tenancy.” (quoting RCW 59.20.080(1)(f)). Accordingly, we decline to resolve what qualifies as a “notice” under the statute, as it is unnecessary to resolve the current question of whether substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s finding that William engaged in criminal activity that threatened the health, safety, or welfare of tenants.
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against strangers or other tenants in the park . . . especially where there was no evidence [he] had a prior history of violence against anyone.”6 William contends that RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) must be construed strictly to require a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of more than one tenant to justify an eviction. Thus, he argues, “[e]ven if there was admissible evidence that [William] engaged in ‘criminal activity,’ the park has made no showing that such activity ‘threatened the health, safety, or welfare’ of the other tenants in the park, as it was required to do under RCW 59.20.080(1)(f).”
The commissioner held that “a person . . . committing DV assault is likely a threat. Not just to the person he’s assaulting, but quite possibly other individuals that live nearby.” William’s argument as to whether “ ‘threaten[ing] the health, safety, or welfare’ of the other tenants” requires proof of a threat to more than one tenant poses an issue of statutory interpretation, not a question of fact. 7 Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 761-62, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). 8 Therefore, as the commissioner could decide this question as a
6 William also contends that there is a factual issue concerning his “state of mind and mens rea
when the alleged acts occurred,” “his intent,” “whether [he] acted knowingly, or with criminal negligence, and whether the alleged victim was placed in reasonable fear, among other required elements to be proved.” Because RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) does not require a criminal conviction to prove William engaged in criminal activity, we decline to consider whether meeting specific elements of the crime creates a material factual issue necessitating trial.
7 Appellant quotes RCW 59.20.080(1)(f). (Emphasis added.)
8 In an appeal in an unlawful detainer action, we apply different standards of review to the court’s
factual determinations at the show cause hearing and to the determination of whether to order trial. As to this second determination, the divisions of the Court of Appeals disagree as to the appropriate standard of appellate review. Division Two has held that “[w]e review a decision to strike a trial date in an unlawful detainer action for an abuse of discretion.” Tedford v. Guy, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 462 P.3d 869 (2020); see also Egbert v. Jorgensen, 36 Wn. App. 2d 1, 25, 580 P.3d 1002 (2025), review granted 6 Wn.3d 1012, 591 P.3d 359 (2026) (discussing split in divisions concerning “proper standard of appellate review for a superior court’s decision following a show cause hearing.”). To the contrary, Division Three has held that language in RCW 59.18.380 indicates this review should be de novo. Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels, 26 Wn. App. 2d 199, 218-19, 528 P.3d 834 (2023). However, because we conclude that William raised a legal question, we need not resolve this question here.
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matter of law, it properly concluded there was not a material factual dispute necessitating trial. 9 Unlike the defendant in Goodwin, William did not directly dispute his involvement with the alleged criminal activity. 99 Wn. App. at 236-37. William relies heavily on Pleasant to argue he was entitled to a trial because “whether the requirements to establish ‘criminal activity’ were met ‘was inappropriate to summarily resolve,’ ” but Pleasant is distinguishable. 126 Wn. App. at 393. First, the court in Pleasant determined there was no competent evidence to prove a lease violation because the landlord failed to provide the lease itself. Id. at 392. Here, by contrast, as discussed above, the uncontroverted P.C. declaration established the basis for the unlawful detainer action— criminal activity under RCW 59.20.080(1)(f)—in the affirmative. Second, in Pleasant, to terminate the tenancy, federal law required “ ‘serious or repeated violation[s]’ ” of the terms of the lease and that the criminal activity threaten “ ‘other tenants.’ ” Id. at 393 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437(l)(5), (6)). Here, RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) alone was the basis for the eviction, and it has different language from the federal law that allows eviction for “ ‘criminal activity’ . . . that threatens the health, safety, or welfare of the tenants.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the trial court did not err by declining to grant a trial when it determined as a matter of law that “committing DV assault is likely a
9 William does not provide applicable legal authority or argument to support his statutory
interpretation. He briefly references Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy’s Corner, for the proposition that there is no general duty “owed by a business to an invitee with respect to criminal behavior” outside of “particularized, special circumstances.” 133 Wn.2d 192, 199, 942 P.2d 286 (1997). Otherwise, he cites only an unpublished case, which has no precedential value per GR 14.1(a), and a treatise. He fails to elaborate as to how any of these further the analysis in this case. Accordingly, we decline to address this argument. Palmer v. Jensen, 81 Wn. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413 (1996), remanded, 132 Wn.2d 193 (1997) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.”).
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threat” both “to the person he’s assaulting, [and] quite possibly other individuals that live nearby.”
Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s finding that he engaged in criminal activity, and the commissioner did not err in declining to order a trial because no material factual issues existed.
II. Challenge to RCW 59.20.080(1)(f)
Finally, William argues that “RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to allegations of domestic violence unrelated to the park’s safety or welfare.” MVMHP counters that this constitutional argument cannot be heard for the first time on appeal. We agree with MVMHP.
Ordinarily, the “appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.” RAP 2.5(a). However, an exception is contemplated when the claimed error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” Id. “To meet RAP 2.5(a) and raise an error for the first time on appeal, an appellant must demonstrate (1) the error is manifest, and (2) the error is truly of constitutional dimension.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). “ ‘Manifest’ in RAP 2.5(a)(3) requires a showing of actual prejudice.” State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935, 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (citing State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 8, 17 P.3d 591 (2001)). To show actual prejudice, a defendant needs to make a “ ‘plausible showing . . . that the asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595, 603, 980 P.2d 1257 (1999)). “In order to ensure the actual prejudice . . . the focus of the actual
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prejudice must be on whether the error is so obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99-100.
Here, the error is not manifest. William argues that it is manifest because “the court relied on hearsay to conclude he ‘committed the crime,’ based on nothing more than a sheriff’s arrest report.” However, this argument conflates the issues. His asserted error is that RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) is vague and overbroad as applied to DV-related criminal activity, but he then challenges the commissioner’s consideration of hearsay evidence to support its findings. He fails to argue how any alleged vagueness or overbreadth in RCW 59.20.080(1)(f) permitted such an error. Accordingly, we decline to consider the issue because the error is not so obvious on the record that it warrants appellate review.
III. Attorney Fees Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Under RAP 18.1(a), a party may recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review if an applicable law grants the right. RCW 59.20.110 states that “[i]n any action arising out of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” The rental agreement between the parties also provides that “[i]n any legal action to enforce this Agreement, including eviction, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”
Because substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s findings, and no material issue of fact existed requiring trial, MVMHP is the prevailing party and should be awarded fees on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm.
WE CONCUR: