VIOLETTE, Justice.
This case comes before the Court for a second time.
See Mutton Hill Estates, Inc. v. Town of Oakland,
468 A.2d 989 (Me.1983)
(“Mutton Hill I”).
In
Mutton Hill I,
we remanded to the Superior Court, Kennebec County, with specific instructions for that court to follow. 468 A.2d at 993. The plaintiff appeals from the decision of the Superior Court upon remand, contending,
inter alia,
that the presiding justice failed to comply with the instructions given by this Court in
Mutton Hill I.
We agree with this contention and sustain the plaintiffs appeal.
The plaintiff, Mutton Hill Estates, Inc., is a developer seeking approval for its plan to develop a twelve-lot residential subdivision in Oakland.
Its attempts to gain such approval before the Planning Board and the Board of Appeals of the Town of Oakland were unsuccessful. In
Mutton Hill I,
we upheld a determination by the Superior Court that certain procedural irregularities involving the Oakland Planning Board rendered the Planning Board’s decision on the plaintiff’s application defective. 468 A.2d at 992. Also, because of the unique circumstances presented in this case, we approved the Superior Court’s decision not to remand the matter for another hearing before the Planning Board.
Id.
at 992-993. We found improper, however, the Superior Court’s order directing the Planning Board to approve the plaintiff’s application without any further proceedings. 468 A.2d at 991, 993. We did so because, at that point, there existed “no valid determination whether Mutton Hill’s subdivision proposal complies with local ordinances and state law.”
Id.
at 993. This Court then made the following statement:
We therefore remand the matter to the Superior Court for a nondeferential review of the record created before the Planning Board to determine [whether the proposal complies with local ordinances and state law]. If the court finds the Mutton Hill proposal demonstrates
prima facie
compliance with local ordinances and state law, the court shall enter its order remanding the matter to the Planning Board for issuance of an order granting approval of the proposal. If the court finds conversely, it shall enter its order affirming the decision of the Board of Appeals.
Id.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the Superior Court.
Id.
On remand, the presiding justice noted that he was conducting a
“de novo
review” of the evidence compiled before the Planning Board. The justice observed that the burden rested with the plaintiff to prove that its proposal satisfied the requirements of local ordinances and state law. The Superior Court found that, on the record before it, the plaintiff successfully carried this burden except as to two criteria: the avoidance of undue water pollution, and the avoidance of undue soil erosion.
In these
two areas, the court stated, the plaintiff’s proof did not meet the standards necessary for approval of its application. The presiding justice was not persuaded by the conditional approval granted to the plaintiff’s proposal by the Board of Environmental Protection (“BEP”).
He observed that,' under section 5(B) of the Oakland Subdivision Ordinance, the Planning Board was free to deny a subdivision proposal even though the applicant had already obtained BEP approval.
See
Oakland, Me., Subdivision Ordinance § 5(B) (July 9, 1979).
The Superior Court “[made] particular note of the very equivocal testimony of the Department of Environmental Protection expert” in the case before it. The presiding justice concluded that, because there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff’s proposal would not cause undue water pollution, or unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the capacity of the land to hold water so that an unhealthy condition may result, the proposal did not comply with local ordinances and state law.
See
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(3)(A), (D) (1978); Oakland, Me., Subdivision Ordinance § 5(F) (July 9, 1979).
Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Oakland Board of Appeals.
In remanding this case to the Superior Court in
Mutton Hill I,
we instructed that court to conduct a nondeferential review of the record created before the Planning
Board. 468 A.2d at 993. By this command, we intended that the Superior Court examine the evidence in the position of a fact finder, rather than in an appellate role where it would be limited to inquiring whether there was substantial evidence supporting the Planning Board’s decision.
See id.
at 992. The Superior Court correctly followed this instruction. We further instructed the Superior Court, however, to find for the plaintiff if the Mutton Hill proposal demonstrated
prima facie
compliance with local ordinances and state law.
Id.
at 993. The Superior Court misconstrued this portion of our remand order.
A party makes out a
prima facie
case when the evidence presented is equivalent to that necessary to survive an opponent’s motion for a directed verdict.
See
9 J. Wigmore,
Evidence in Trials at Common Law
§ 2494, at 379 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981). Accordingly, to determine whether a plaintiff has satisfied a
prima facie
burden, a court “must view the evidence, ‘including every justifiable inference,’ in the light most favorable to the plaintiff so that [the court] may decide whether by any reasonable view of this evidence a [decision] for the plaintiff could be sustained.”
Boetsch v. Rockland Jaycees,
288 A.2d 102, 104 (Me.1972),
quoted in Packard v. Central Maine Power Co.,
477 A.2d 264, 267 (Me.1984). The court
should generally avoid determining the credibility of witnesses when deciding whether the plaintiff has presented the necessary quantum of proof.
See
1 Field, McKusick & Wroth,
Maine Civil Practice
§ 50.2, at 664-68 (2d ed. 1970).
In this case, the Superior Court went beyond determining whether the plaintiff had presented
prima facie
proof of compliance with state law and local ordinances, despite our instruction to the contrary in
Mutton Hill 1.
468 A.2d at 993. The presiding justice did not determine whether “under
any reasonable view
of [the] evidence a [decision] for the plaintiff
could
be sustained.”
Boetsck,
288 A.2d at 104,
quoted in Packard,
477 A.2d at 267 (emphasis added).
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VIOLETTE, Justice.
This case comes before the Court for a second time.
See Mutton Hill Estates, Inc. v. Town of Oakland,
468 A.2d 989 (Me.1983)
(“Mutton Hill I”).
In
Mutton Hill I,
we remanded to the Superior Court, Kennebec County, with specific instructions for that court to follow. 468 A.2d at 993. The plaintiff appeals from the decision of the Superior Court upon remand, contending,
inter alia,
that the presiding justice failed to comply with the instructions given by this Court in
Mutton Hill I.
We agree with this contention and sustain the plaintiffs appeal.
The plaintiff, Mutton Hill Estates, Inc., is a developer seeking approval for its plan to develop a twelve-lot residential subdivision in Oakland.
Its attempts to gain such approval before the Planning Board and the Board of Appeals of the Town of Oakland were unsuccessful. In
Mutton Hill I,
we upheld a determination by the Superior Court that certain procedural irregularities involving the Oakland Planning Board rendered the Planning Board’s decision on the plaintiff’s application defective. 468 A.2d at 992. Also, because of the unique circumstances presented in this case, we approved the Superior Court’s decision not to remand the matter for another hearing before the Planning Board.
Id.
at 992-993. We found improper, however, the Superior Court’s order directing the Planning Board to approve the plaintiff’s application without any further proceedings. 468 A.2d at 991, 993. We did so because, at that point, there existed “no valid determination whether Mutton Hill’s subdivision proposal complies with local ordinances and state law.”
Id.
at 993. This Court then made the following statement:
We therefore remand the matter to the Superior Court for a nondeferential review of the record created before the Planning Board to determine [whether the proposal complies with local ordinances and state law]. If the court finds the Mutton Hill proposal demonstrates
prima facie
compliance with local ordinances and state law, the court shall enter its order remanding the matter to the Planning Board for issuance of an order granting approval of the proposal. If the court finds conversely, it shall enter its order affirming the decision of the Board of Appeals.
Id.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the Superior Court.
Id.
On remand, the presiding justice noted that he was conducting a
“de novo
review” of the evidence compiled before the Planning Board. The justice observed that the burden rested with the plaintiff to prove that its proposal satisfied the requirements of local ordinances and state law. The Superior Court found that, on the record before it, the plaintiff successfully carried this burden except as to two criteria: the avoidance of undue water pollution, and the avoidance of undue soil erosion.
In these
two areas, the court stated, the plaintiff’s proof did not meet the standards necessary for approval of its application. The presiding justice was not persuaded by the conditional approval granted to the plaintiff’s proposal by the Board of Environmental Protection (“BEP”).
He observed that,' under section 5(B) of the Oakland Subdivision Ordinance, the Planning Board was free to deny a subdivision proposal even though the applicant had already obtained BEP approval.
See
Oakland, Me., Subdivision Ordinance § 5(B) (July 9, 1979).
The Superior Court “[made] particular note of the very equivocal testimony of the Department of Environmental Protection expert” in the case before it. The presiding justice concluded that, because there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff’s proposal would not cause undue water pollution, or unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the capacity of the land to hold water so that an unhealthy condition may result, the proposal did not comply with local ordinances and state law.
See
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(3)(A), (D) (1978); Oakland, Me., Subdivision Ordinance § 5(F) (July 9, 1979).
Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Oakland Board of Appeals.
In remanding this case to the Superior Court in
Mutton Hill I,
we instructed that court to conduct a nondeferential review of the record created before the Planning
Board. 468 A.2d at 993. By this command, we intended that the Superior Court examine the evidence in the position of a fact finder, rather than in an appellate role where it would be limited to inquiring whether there was substantial evidence supporting the Planning Board’s decision.
See id.
at 992. The Superior Court correctly followed this instruction. We further instructed the Superior Court, however, to find for the plaintiff if the Mutton Hill proposal demonstrated
prima facie
compliance with local ordinances and state law.
Id.
at 993. The Superior Court misconstrued this portion of our remand order.
A party makes out a
prima facie
case when the evidence presented is equivalent to that necessary to survive an opponent’s motion for a directed verdict.
See
9 J. Wigmore,
Evidence in Trials at Common Law
§ 2494, at 379 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981). Accordingly, to determine whether a plaintiff has satisfied a
prima facie
burden, a court “must view the evidence, ‘including every justifiable inference,’ in the light most favorable to the plaintiff so that [the court] may decide whether by any reasonable view of this evidence a [decision] for the plaintiff could be sustained.”
Boetsch v. Rockland Jaycees,
288 A.2d 102, 104 (Me.1972),
quoted in Packard v. Central Maine Power Co.,
477 A.2d 264, 267 (Me.1984). The court
should generally avoid determining the credibility of witnesses when deciding whether the plaintiff has presented the necessary quantum of proof.
See
1 Field, McKusick & Wroth,
Maine Civil Practice
§ 50.2, at 664-68 (2d ed. 1970).
In this case, the Superior Court went beyond determining whether the plaintiff had presented
prima facie
proof of compliance with state law and local ordinances, despite our instruction to the contrary in
Mutton Hill 1.
468 A.2d at 993. The presiding justice did not determine whether “under
any reasonable view
of [the] evidence a [decision] for the plaintiff
could
be sustained.”
Boetsck,
288 A.2d at 104,
quoted in Packard,
477 A.2d at 267 (emphasis added). Moreover, rather than viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the presiding justice undertook to resolve issues of credibility, “mak[ing] particular note of the very equivocal testimony” of a representative of the Department of Environmental Protection, an agency that had granted conditional approval of the plaintiffs subdivision proposal.
Because the Superior Court imposed a much more stringent proof requirement upon the plaintiff than the one we -specified in our remand order, we vacate the judgment of that court.
Our own review of the record compiled before the Oakland Planning Board reveals that the plaintiff has demonstrated
prima facie
proof of compliance with local ordinances and state law. We note particularly findings made by the BEP in approving the Mutton Hill proposal. These findings indicate that the proposed subdivision would cause neither undue water pollution, nor unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the capacity of the land to hold water so that an unhealthy condition may result.
Further, the BEP approval imposes certain conditions upon the Mutton Hill project
to ensure against such prob
lems in the future.
The BEP reaffirmed its approval of the plaintiffs proposed subdivision when it denied a petition for reconsideration filed by residents of the Town of Oakland. We agree with the Superior Court that this BEP approval does not compel approval of the proposal by the Oakland Planning Board.
See
Oakland, Me., Subdivision Ordinance § 5(B) (July 9, 1979).
We conclude, however, that, based on the evidence compiled before the Oakland Planning Board, particularly the BEP’s assessment of the Mutton Hill subdivision proposal, a finding that the plaintiffs proposed subdivision complies with local ordinances and state law
reasonably could be sustained. See
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 (1978); Oakland, Me., Subdivision Ordinance (July 9, 1979). Accordingly, we determine that the plaintiff did demonstrate
prima facie
proof of compliance with local ordinances and state law.
We therefore remand to the Superior Court for entry of an order remanding to the Oakland Planning Board for issuance of an order granting approval of the plaintiffs subdivision proposal. As we determined in
Mutton Hill I,
the unique circumstances of this case justify such extraordinary relief in lieu of a new hearing for the plaintiff before the Planning Board. 468 A.2d at 992-93.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
Remanded to Superior Court for entry of an order remanding to the Oakland Planning Board for issuance of an order granting approval of the plaintiffs subdivision proposal.
All concurring.