Murray v. Supreme Court of Washington

Opinion

1 2 3 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 SARA MURRAY, Case No. 3:25-cv-05074-DGE 7 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON, et 9 al., NOTED FOR JUNE 25, 2025 10 Defendants. 11 This matter comes before the Court on pro se plaintiff Sara Murray’s motion to 12 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and her proposed amended complaint. Dkt. 4, 9. 13 On February 18, 2025, plaintiff filed an IFP application, requesting her complaint 14 should be filed without paying the filing fee for a civil case. See Dkt. 4. The district court 15 may permit indigent litigants to proceed IFP upon completion of a proper affidavit of 16 indigency. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). However, the court has broad discretion in denying 17 an application to proceed IFP. Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. 18 denied 375 U.S. 845 (1963). 19 After reviewing plaintiff’s complaint, the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause why 20 her complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 5. Plaintiff 21 subsequently filed a “motion to strike show cause order, compel ADA accommodations, 22 compel IFP approval, and disqualify judges.” Dkt. 6. 23 24 1 The Court interpreted this to, in part, be a motion requesting Magistrate Judge 2 Theresa L. Fricke to recuse herself. Magistrate Judge Theresa Fricke declined to 3 voluntarily recuse herself from the case and referred plaintiff’s motion for recusal to 4 Chief Judge David Estudillo pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(f). Chief Judge David

5 Estudillo affirmed Judge Fricke’s denial of plaintiff’s motion seeking her recusal1. Dkts. 6 8, 11. 7 The Court now turns to plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, which was filed 8 in response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause dated March 7, 2025. She brings 9 claims in her own name and on behalf of her minor children, G.E.M. and C.M.M., over 10 whom she appears to no longer have custody. For the reasons discussed below, the 11 Court recommends plaintiff’s IFP motion should be DENIED and her complaint should 12 be DISMISSED without prejudice. 14 The Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

15 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case that is 16 “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks 17 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 19 provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 20 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not 21

22 1 Chief Judge Estudillo interpreted plaintiff’s motion as a motion seeking his own recusal too. Judge Estudillo denied plaintiff’s motion, and referred the matter to District Judge Tana Lin for her review 23 pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(f). Dkt. 11. Judge Lin affirmed the order denying Chief Judge Estudillo’s recusal. Dkt. 12. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit for the District Court’s “constructive 24 denial” of her IFP motion and her disability-related accommodation requests. Dkt. 13. 1 only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to 2 state a claim). An IFP complaint is frivolous if “it ha[s] no arguable substance in law or 3 fact.” Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 4 Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745

5 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). 6 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other 7 complaint, it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially 8 plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic 9 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when 10 “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 11 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain 13 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 14 “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d).

15 In the proposed amended complaint, plaintiff names as defendants Washington 16 Supreme Court, District Judge David Estudillo, Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke, and 17 Washington Supreme Court Chief Justice Steven Gonzalez, Justice Barbara Madsen, 18 Justice Johnson, Justice Susan Owens, Justice Debra Stephens, Justice Gordon 19 McCloud and Justice Montoya-Lewis in their administrative and individual capacities. 20 Plaintiff asserts many causes of action in the amended complaint – the claims 21 are difficult for the Court to fully discern. Generally speaking, plaintiff alleges defendants 22 failed to accommodate her disability and denied her due process in violation of the 23

24 1 United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the 2 Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and the All Writs Act. Dkt. 9-1 at 21-25. 3 Plaintiff further alleges defendants “willfully acted to shield known perpetrators” of 4 state and private actors that have violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

5 Organizations Act (“RICO”), violated international law and subjected her minor children 6 to degrading treatment by isolating her children from plaintiff, their primary caregiver. Id. 7 28-30. 8 A. Plaintiff’s Minor Children 9 As a non-lawyer, plaintiff cannot represent her children pro se. Plaintiff asserts 10 that she is bringing claims on behalf of her minor children, but as a non-attorney, she 11 cannot represent other people—including her children. Johns v. Ctny. of San Diego, 114 12 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“a non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel in 13 bringing an action on behalf of his or her child” because “it is not in the interest of 14 minors . . . that they be represented by non-attorneys” (cleaned up)).

15 While there are rare exceptions to this rule, none apply here. Plaintiff does not 16 claim to be an attorney and the Washington State Bar Association’s online lawyer 17 directory does not list her as a legal professional. Thus, the Court finds that G.E.M.’s 18 and C.M.M.’s claims are not properly before the Court, as they have not appeared 19 through an attorney. G.E.M.’s and C.M.M.’s claims, if any, should be dismissed without 20 prejudice. Johns, 114 F.3d at 877 21 B. Immunity 22 23

24 1 Plaintiff names several Washington State Supreme Court Justices as well as 2 Chief Judge David Estudillo and Magistrate Judge Theresa Fricke2 as parties in this 3 case. Dkt. 9. It is well settled that judges are generally immune from suit for money 4 damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991). But absolute judicial immunity

5 does not apply to non-judicial acts, i.e. the administrative, legislative, and executive 6 functions that judges may on occasion be assigned to perform. Forrester v. White, 484 7 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has identified the following factors as relevant 8 to the determination of whether a particular act is judicial in nature: (1) the precise act is 9 a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the 10 controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the events 11 at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her 12 official capacity. Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1999). 13 Plaintiff claims the defendants violated the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Duvall v. 14 Kitsap County by issuing adverse rulings against plaintiff without any meaningful

15 assessment of her accommodation request, failing to consult qualified ADA experts, 16 failing to conduct an individualized assessment of plaintiff’s disability-related barriers, 17 and failing to explore or offer any reasonable modifications to ensure plaintiff’s equal 18 access to judicial processes. 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001). Dkt. 9-1 at 13-14. 19 20

21 2 Although plaintiff now names Judge Estudillo and Judge Fricke as defendants in this case, plaintiff has not put forward facts that would cause a reasonable person to question the impartiality of either Judge. 22 See Dkts. 8, 11, 12. “A judge is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.” United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954 (1978). “Such 23 an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed. Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 24 U.S. 558 (1984). 1 The Ninth Circuit in Duvall held that a state-court judge was immune from ADA 2 and RA liability for his failure to accommodate a litigant's disability. Duvall claimed that a 3 hearing impairment left him unable to meaningfully participate in his family-law case, so 4 he requested a “videotext display” as an accommodation during his hearings. Id. at

5 1130. On the first day of his family-court trial, Duvall's attorney made a motion 6 “requesting videotext display to accommodate Duvall's hearing impairment.” Id. at 1131. 7 The family-law judge denied the motion, explaining that his court had “not progressed to 8 that technical degree” yet and that he assumed “if Mr. Duvall wished to have that 9 service available[,] he [could] provide that service for himself.” Id. But the judge allowed 10 Duvall to move around the courtroom in an effort to better hear the testimony—an 11 alternative that Duvall claimed only made matters worse and “prevented him from 12 meaningfully participating in the trial.” Id. at 1132. In Duvall's failure-to-accommodate 13 suit, the district court granted summary judgment to the family-law judge on the ground 14 of judicial immunity, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1133.

15 To determine whether an act is judicial and thus immune from suit, “the relevant 16 inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the act, not the ‘act itself. Mireles v. Waco, 502 17 U.S. 9, 13 (1991). So “we look to the particular act's relation to a general function 18 normally performed by a judge ....” Id. An act is a judicial one if “it is a function normally 19 performed by a judge” and the parties were dealing with the judge in his or her “judicial 20 capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). 21 Here, plaintiff repeatedly, but very generally states defendants refused to provide 22 plaintiff with ADA accommodations. Although plaintiff’s allegations are broad, it appears 23 that the nature and function of the acts that she claims caused that effect are entirely

24 1 judicial. Plaintiff states defendants made “adverse rulings” against plaintiff – these are 2 acts performed by judges in the course of litigation. Thus, it appears plaintiff’s claims 3 are rooted in judicial acts that are absolutely immune from suit. These acts remain 4 judicial and immune from suit even if they violate plaintiff’s rights under the ADA and

5 RA. As the Supreme Court explained in Stump v. Sparkman, the result of the act is not 6 dispositive, so the fact that a ruling may be “so unfair” or “totally devoid of judicial 7 concern for the interests and well-being” of a litigant or others does not strip it of 8 immunity. 435 U.S. at 363. 9 In addition to the named judges, the Supreme Court of Washington is also 10 protected by immunity. Eleventh Amendment immunity extends beyond the state itself. 11 “[A]rms of the [s]tate” also enjoy the Amendment's protection. Will v. Mich. Dep't of 12 State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). Thus, the Supreme Court of Washington is 13 immune from suit. See O'Connor v. Nevada, 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982) 14 (recognizing that the Nevada Supreme Court is an arm of the State of Nevada, and so

15 is immune from § 1983 damages claims.). As a result, the Eleventh Amendment 16 precludes plaintiff’s claims against all the Supreme Court of Washington. 17 C. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 18 Under what is known as the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack 19 subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits that are, in effect, appeals from state court 20 judgments. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. 21 Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 A federal lawsuit may be an improper appeal where the federal claims raised are 23

24 1 intertwined with a state court judgment. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 2 859 (9th Cir. 2008). 3 This occurs where a federal lawsuit requests relief that would effectively reverse 4 a state court decision or void its ruling. Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana,

5 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bianci v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 6 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not limited to claims that were 7 actually decided by the state courts, but rather it precludes review of all state court 8 decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges 9 allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” (quotation marks omitted)). 10 Here, the court is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from hearing some 11 of plaintiff’s claims, which seek to challenge decisions made in state court litigation, i.e., 12 a writ of mandamus and aspects of her child custody proceedings. If plaintiff wishes to 13 contest the outcome of that case, the proper means to do so is through a direct appeal 14 to a higher Washington state court. This court has no power to review a state trial

15 court’s decision. 17 Unless it is absolutely clear that amendment would be futile, a pro se litigant 18 must be given the opportunity to amend his complaint to correct any deficiencies. See 19 Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other 20 grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court provided plaintiff one opportunity to amend 21 her complaint; the Court should find further amendment futile because the named 22 defendants appear to be immune from liability and this Court is precluded from hearing 23 plaintiff’s claims related to decisions made in state court litigation.

24 1 The Court thus recommends DENYING plaintiff’s IFP application and 2 DISMISSING plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice. 3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall 4 have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also

5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for 6 purposes of de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can 7 result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 8 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations 9 omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Clerk is 10 directed to set the matter for consideration on June 25, 2025, as noted in the caption. 11 12 Dated this 10th day of June, 2025. 13 14 A 15 Theresa L. Fricke 16 United States Magistrate Judge

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